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chore: bump docker/build-push-action from 7.3.0 to 7.4.0 - #129

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@dependabot dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Oct 1, 2026 •

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Bumps docker/build-push-action from 7.3.0 to 7.4.0.

Release notes

Sourced from docker/build-push-action's releases.

v7.4.0

Full Changelog: docker/build-push-action@v7.3.0...v7.4.0

Commits
  • c3c9e26 Merge pull request #1621 from docker/dependabot/npm_and_yarn/docker/actions-t...
  • 459b674 [dependabot skip] chore: update generated content
  • 4dedcb2 chore(deps): Bump @​docker/actions-toolkit from 0.99.0 to 0.100.0
  • 379bf63 Merge pull request #1620 from crazy-max/buildx-error-message
  • 9877975 chore: update generated content
  • 7ed0556 use the shared Buildx error summary helper
  • 91670ba Merge pull request #1618 from docker/dependabot/npm_and_yarn/docker/actions-t...
  • 80dbc86 [dependabot skip] chore: update generated content
  • 50cac3a chore(deps): Bump @​docker/actions-toolkit from 0.98.0 to 0.99.0
  • 03b4d6c Merge pull request #1617 from crazy-max/fix-metadata-workflow-commands
  • Additional commits viewable in compare view

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Bumps [docker/build-push-action](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action) from 7.3.0 to 7.4.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/releases)
- [Commits](docker/build-push-action@v7.3.0...v7.4.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: docker/build-push-action
  dependency-version: 7.4.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot dependabot Bot added dependencies Dependencies github_actions Pull requests that update GitHub Actions code labels Oct 1, 2026
@dependabot
dependabot Bot requested a review from a team as a code owner October 1, 2026 09:23
@dependabot dependabot Bot added the dependencies Dependencies label Oct 1, 2026
@dependabot dependabot Bot added the github_actions Pull requests that update GitHub Actions code label Oct 1, 2026

@bulwark-sc-ent bulwark-sc-ent Bot left a comment

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⚠️ Zizmor found Critical or High severity GitHub Actions workflow security issues:

Summary

Severity Count
High 21
Total 21

Details

Grouped by audit rule and file. Line/column refer to the workflow or action YAML on the scanned branch.

template-injection — High

code injection via template expansion

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#template-injection

Locations:

  • Line 79–92 (cols 8–60) — this step
  • Line 84 (cols 27–42) — expression github.workflow — may expand into attacker-controllable code
  • Line 81 (cols 8–11) — this run block

unpinned-uses — High (9 similar finding(s))

unpinned action reference

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

Locations:

  • Line 26 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 31 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 44 (cols 14–41) — expression docker/setup-qemu-action@v4 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 48 (cols 14–47) — expression docker/setup-buildx-action@v4.3.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 52 (cols 14–40) — expression docker/login-action@v4.6.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 60 (cols 14–45) — expression docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 77 (cols 14–46) — expression sigstore/cosign-installer@v4.1.2 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 101 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • …and 1 more location(s) in this file.

cache-poisoning — High

runtime artifacts potentially vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#cache-poisoning

Locations:

  • Line 60 (cols 8–45) — runtime artifacts usually published here
  • Line 26 (cols 8–35) — enables caching by default
  • Line 25–28 (cols 8–47) — this step

excessive-permissions — High

overly broad permissions

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#excessive-permissions

Locations:

  • Line 8 (cols 2–17) — packages: write is overly broad at the workflow level

unpinned-uses — High (8 similar finding(s))

unpinned action reference

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

Locations:

  • Line 47 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 50 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 58 (cols 14–41) — expression docker/setup-qemu-action@v4 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 61 (cols 14–47) — expression docker/setup-buildx-action@v4.3.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 64 (cols 14–40) — expression docker/login-action@v4.6.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 71 (cols 14–45) — expression docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 94 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 99 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)

cache-poisoning — High

runtime artifacts potentially vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#cache-poisoning

Locations:

  • Line 71 (cols 8–45) — runtime artifacts usually published here
  • Line 50 (cols 8–35) — enables caching by default
  • Line 49–52 (cols 8–47) — this step

Please review these findings before merging.

@bulwark-sc-ent bulwark-sc-ent Bot left a comment

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⚠️ Zizmor found Critical or High severity GitHub Actions workflow security issues:

Summary

Severity Count
High 21
Total 21

Details

Grouped by audit rule and file. Line/column refer to the workflow or action YAML on the scanned branch.

template-injection — High

code injection via template expansion

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#template-injection

Locations:

  • Line 79–92 (cols 8–60) — this step
  • Line 84 (cols 27–42) — expression github.workflow — may expand into attacker-controllable code
  • Line 81 (cols 8–11) — this run block

unpinned-uses — High (9 similar finding(s))

unpinned action reference

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

Locations:

  • Line 26 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 31 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 44 (cols 14–41) — expression docker/setup-qemu-action@v4 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 48 (cols 14–47) — expression docker/setup-buildx-action@v4.3.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 52 (cols 14–40) — expression docker/login-action@v4.6.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 60 (cols 14–45) — expression docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 77 (cols 14–46) — expression sigstore/cosign-installer@v4.1.2 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 101 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • …and 1 more location(s) in this file.

cache-poisoning — High

runtime artifacts potentially vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/release.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#cache-poisoning

Locations:

  • Line 60 (cols 8–45) — runtime artifacts usually published here
  • Line 26 (cols 8–35) — enables caching by default
  • Line 25–28 (cols 8–47) — this step

excessive-permissions — High

overly broad permissions

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#excessive-permissions

Locations:

  • Line 8 (cols 2–17) — packages: write is overly broad at the workflow level

unpinned-uses — High (8 similar finding(s))

unpinned action reference

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

Locations:

  • Line 47 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 50 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 58 (cols 14–41) — expression docker/setup-qemu-action@v4 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 61 (cols 14–47) — expression docker/setup-buildx-action@v4.3.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 64 (cols 14–40) — expression docker/login-action@v4.6.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 71 (cols 14–45) — expression docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 94 (cols 14–35) — expression actions/setup-node@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
  • Line 99 (cols 14–33) — expression actions/checkout@v7 — action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)

cache-poisoning — High

runtime artifacts potentially vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack

File: tutorials/.github/workflows/test.yaml

Fix guidance: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#cache-poisoning

Locations:

  • Line 71 (cols 8–45) — runtime artifacts usually published here
  • Line 50 (cols 8–35) — enables caching by default
  • Line 49–52 (cols 8–47) — this step

Please review these findings before merging.

@benradstone

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@dependabot rebase

@dependabot @github

dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Oct 9, 2026

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Looks like docker/build-push-action is up-to-date now, so this is no longer needed.

@dependabot dependabot Bot closed this Oct 9, 2026
@dependabot
dependabot Bot deleted the dependabot/github_actions/main/docker/build-push-action-7.4.0 branch October 9, 2026 12:24
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