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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -91,9 +91,10 @@ lane or any other surface keeps `L2`.
a PR thread or upstream release notes, and the filter keeps it because it judges the item's
author. This is accepted in the same class as web pages.

## Amendment (2026-11-16): model steps hold no write token, and revocation is best effort
## Amendment (2026-11-16): model steps hold no write token, revocation is best effort, and hosted runners gain an egress control

Two statements above no longer hold. The decisions that changed them are already recorded.
Three statements above no longer hold. The first two changed by decisions already recorded; the
third by a GitHub product change.

- **No write token in the model step.** The Decision's closing paragraph, the third alternative
and the second consequence say a lane holds its job's write token in the model step. Lane model
Expand All @@ -108,3 +109,16 @@ Two statements above no longer hold. The decisions that changed them are already
token was revoked
([ADR 0058](0058-mint-lane-app-tokens-through-an-oidc-broker.md), amendment of 2026-10-12). A
token not revoked expires within the hour, which bounds the exposure.
- **Hosted runners have an egress control the job cannot change.** The Context says a hosted runner
has "no egress policy the job cannot change", and the first alternative says "hosted runners offer
no default-deny egress". Neither holds as an absolute. GitHub's native egress firewall for hosted
runners "operates outside the runner VM at Layer 7" and "remains immutable even if an attacker
gains root access inside the runner environment"
([GitHub Actions 2026 security roadmap](https://github.blog/news-insights/product-news/whats-coming-to-our-github-actions-2026-security-roadmap/)),
and is in technical preview, enforcing "an allowlist from outside the runner VM, so it holds even
if a job is compromised"
([Securing GitHub Actions Workflows](https://learn.github.com/well-architected/library/application-security/recommendations/actions-security/),
source
[`actions-security.md` at `e4d8f49`](https://github.com/github/github-well-architected/blob/e4d8f49d686c7f6f73aef60c464cf6405eb57e3f/content/library/application-security/recommendations/actions-security.md));
both fetched 2026-11-16. The decision stands: lanes run under the five conditions with open
egress. Adopting the firewall is a later hardening choice, not made here.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -220,3 +220,15 @@ adds.
- `trust-root` gains a rule `base` lacks: revisit Decision 5.
- A model activity gains a write effect: the refusal class in Decision 6 no longer covers every lane
write path.

## Amendment (2026-11-16): a `GITHUB_TOKEN` pull request update starts approval-required runs

The Consequences line "A `GITHUB_TOKEN` push starts no workflow run" no longer holds as written.
GitHub now exempts `pull_request` events with the `opened`, `synchronize` or `reopened` activity
types: when a workflow using `GITHUB_TOKEN` creates or updates a pull request, "the resulting
`pull_request` event creates workflow runs in an **approval-required** state"
([triggering a workflow from a workflow](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/write-workflows/choose-when-workflows-run/trigger-a-workflow#triggering-a-workflow-from-a-workflow),
fetched 2026-11-16). A `GITHUB_TOKEN` push still starts no `push` run, and the `pull_request` runs
wait until a user with write access approves them, so `pr-refine`, `pr-unblock` and
`work-resolve-issue` on that path still get no checks re-run automatically. No decision rests on
that line, so the decisions stand.
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