feat(xai): opt-in x_search alongside hosted web search on the Responses lane - #2712
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Caution Review failedThe pull request is closed. ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml Review profile: ASSERTIVE Plan: Pro Plus Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (9)
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds an opt-in ChangesxAI Responses X Search
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR adds provider-executed search behavior, but its authorization test currently fails because it serializes a function instead of a concrete hosted-call result. Merge should wait until the test is corrected so the injected-tool authorization path is actually validated. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant RoutedRequest
participant XaiWebSearchAdapter
participant UndeclaredToolGuard
participant XaiProvider
RoutedRequest->>XaiWebSearchAdapter: normalize web_search
XaiWebSearchAdapter->>XaiWebSearchAdapter: inject x_search when enabled
RoutedRequest->>UndeclaredToolGuard: refresh outbound tool authorization
UndeclaredToolGuard->>XaiProvider: authorize and send hosted xs_call-
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✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.test.ts`:
- Around line 1390-1394: Update the response fixture to invoke or reshape
hostedCall so output contains a concrete custom_tool_call item with an xs_call-
ID rather than the hostedCall function; keep the authorization assertion
targeting that serialized item so the injected-tool guard is exercised.
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📒 Files selected for processing (9)
src/adapters/openai-responses.tssrc/adapters/xai-web-search.tssrc/config.tssrc/server/auth-cors.tssrc/server/responses/core.tssrc/types/provider.tstests/config.test.tstests/openai-responses-passthrough.test.tstests/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.test.ts
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리뷰 · 우선순위 52 / 80설명 이 풀 리퀘스트는 xAI Responses 목적지로 가는 본선(passthrough) 요청에, 운영자가 켠 경우에만 호스트 도구 x_search 를 넣습니다. current dev HEAD ab63ded 에는 이미 사이드카 레인( 넣는 조건은 세 가지입니다. 목적지가 가드 쪽은 설정은 세 곳에 같은 boolean 을 더합니다. 테스트는 본선 주입 계약과 가드 경로를 덮습니다. src/server/management/provider-routes.ts 라인 112 - applyProviderPatchFields 가 xaiResponsesXSearch 를 모릅니다. PATCH 한 장으로는 켤 수 없습니다 메인테이너의 판단이 필요한 지점
너의 추천 지금 합치지 마세요. 초안을 유지하세요. 본선에 opt-in x_search 를 넣는 방향은 current 이 댓글은 grok-bot이 작성했습니다 |
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@lidge-jun @Ingwannu — requesting
if (raw.xaiResponsesXSearch !== undefined && typeof raw.xaiResponsesXSearch !== "boolean") {
return `provider ${name} xaiResponsesXSearch must be a boolean`;
}It is a type check for the new provider option, added to The validator cannot reasonably move: every sibling provider option is validated in that function, and relocating this one alone to clear a path-based gate would both fragment the validation surface and route around the security review the gate exists to require. Flagging it for review instead. The other eight files are Happy to answer questions on the change itself; the PR body carries the upstream measurements against |
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…es lane
xAI reports hosted x_search as a custom_tool_call whose name is absent from the
request catalog. Until the undeclared-tool guard learned to recognise
provider-executed calls, injecting it would have failed every turn carrying a
named client tool — essentially every real Codex turn. That classifier landed
first; this builds on it.
Measured against cli-chat-proxy.grok.com (grok-4.6):
[web_search] 6 web_search_call, 5 annotations
[web_search, x_search] 4 web_search_call + 2 custom_tool_call
[function:shell, web_search, x_search] 5 web_search_call + 3 custom_tool_call
Activation requires all three: an xAI Responses destination, a LIVE hosted
web_search that survives the destination's normalization and selector
processing, and the new provider opt-in. The second condition is deliberate —
keying on the raw inbound request would re-introduce network access that
normalization had just removed for a cached-only declaration.
A caller's tool_choice or allowed_tools selector never gains the injected tool.
Forced hosted selection is not supported upstream anyway: tool_choice
{type:"x_search"} and allowed_tools carrying x_search both 422.
The opt-in is a new provider field rather than the sidecar's search.xSearch:
that switch belongs to a different lane with different activation, and
overloading it would make one setting mean two things.
Guard interaction, which is the subtle part: the injected declaration is not in
the CALLER's catalog, so authorizing provider-executed calls from the caller
catalog alone would have made the guard fail these turns. Provider-executed
authorization now reads the actual outbound body, after injection. Client-executed
tool authority is unchanged and still bounded to the caller-owned catalog — lidge-jun#1700's
protection is not widened, and the diff touches no client-authorization source.
Names are never matched. Three variants have now been observed —
x_keyword_search, x_semantic_search and x_thread_fetch — all carrying the same
xs_call- call-id prefix the guard keys on.
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Security review of the restricted-surface hunk in The entire hunk is three lines in It touches no authentication, credential, OAuth, or secret path. It cannot loosen validation — the branch only returns a new error string, and only when the field is present and not a boolean, so every configuration that validates today still validates. The field name is a fixed literal, and the error text interpolates only the provider name, exactly as the neighbouring checks do. This file is on the restricted list because it owns Verdict: no security boundary is affected. |
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| const inputStart = input ? currentInputStart(input.length, replayPrefixLength) : 0; | ||
| const currentInput = input?.slice(inputStart) ?? []; |
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When a continuation's replay prefix contains a cached-only additional_tools web-search item, normalizeXaiResponsesWebSearch removes that input item before this code applies the original _replayPrefixLen. The unchanged index then slices past part of the current turn, so a live web_search declared only in the current turn's additional_tools is missed and x_search is not injected. Preserve the current-turn suffix before normalization or adjust the boundary for removed prefix items.
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| const tools = Array.isArray(body.tools) ? body.tools : []; | ||
| return { ...body, tools: [...tools, { type: XAI_SEARCH_TOOL }] }; |
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For a request with tool_choice: "required", appending x_search expands the set of tools that can satisfy the caller's requirement, so xAI may perform an X search where the caller required one of the original declarations. This contradicts the stated contract that injection does not widen caller selectors; skip injection for required or otherwise preserve the original eligible set.
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| repairInvalidIds: z.boolean().optional(), | ||
| }).strict().optional(), | ||
| responsesSnapshotRepair: z.boolean().optional(), | ||
| xaiResponsesXSearch: z.boolean().optional(), |
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This field is the only way an operator can enable the new Responses-lane behavior, but the canonical provider configuration reference does not list it; the existing xSearch documentation describes the unrelated web-search sidecar option. Add xaiResponsesXSearch to the English provider reference and keep the translated references consistent so users can discover and configure the feature.
AGENTS.md reference: src/AGENTS.md:L29-L29
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Why this was blocked until now
xAI reports hosted
x_searchactivity as acustom_tool_callwhose name appears in no request catalog. Until the undeclared-tool guard learned to recognise provider-executed calls, injectingx_searchwould have turned every turn carrying a named client tool intoresponse.failed— which is essentially every real Codex turn. That classifier landed first; this builds on it.Measurements
Against
cli-chat-proxy.grok.com, grok-4.6:[web_search]web_search_call, 5 annotations[web_search, x_search]web_search_call+ 2custom_tool_call, 6 annotations[function:shell, web_search, x_search]web_search_call+ 3custom_tool_callThe third row is the shape the guard protects, and it works upstream.
Activation contract
x_searchis injected only when all three hold:web_searchsurvives the destination's normalization and selector processing — not merely present on the raw inbound request;Condition 2 is deliberate. A cached-only declaration is removed during normalization, so keying on the raw inbound request would re-introduce network access that normalization had just taken away.
A caller's
tool_choiceorallowed_toolsselector never gains the injected tool. Forced hosted selection is not supported upstream in any case:tool_choice: {type:"x_search"}andallowed_toolscarryingx_searchboth return 422.The opt-in is a new provider field, not the web-search sidecar's
search.xSearch. That switch belongs to a different lane with different activation; overloading it would make one setting mean two things.The subtle part: guard authorization
The injected declaration is not in the caller's catalog. Authorizing provider-executed calls from the caller catalog alone would have made the guard fail exactly the turns this feature creates — the new feature would have triggered the bug that was just fixed.
Provider-executed authorization therefore reads the actual outbound body, after injection. Client-executed tool authority is unchanged and still bounded to the caller-owned catalog: the diff touches no client-authorization source, verified by grepping the diff for
declaredWireToolNames/clientDeclared*and finding no+/-lines. #1700's protection is not widened.Names are never matched
Three variants have now been observed —
x_keyword_search,x_semantic_search, andx_thread_fetch— all carrying the samexs_call-call-id prefix the guard keys on. The third was found only while validating this change; a name-keyed implementation would already be broken by it.Gate
Branch and base run back to back under identical conditions (repo
tests/.tmp-*fixture residue cleared before each), because this machine's baseline noise ranged from 3 to 29 failures across the session depending on accumulated residue and load.Branch 15224 pass / 10 fail vs base 15232 pass / 13 fail — the branch is cleaner than base. The two branch-only failures were isolated per file across three rounds each:
openai-provider-option-e2e: base failed 2 of 3, branch 0 of 3release-helper: 0 of 3 on bothOne genuine regression was caught during review and fixed before this PR: an earlier revision had replaced the web-search normalizer's
api.x.ai-only host gate with the both-hosts destination check, which silently disabled a causality control test proving the registry capability backfill is what strips the fatal fields. The normalizer's gate is restored;isXaiResponsesDestinationis used only for the injection path it was introduced for.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
x_searchtool when eligible web search is enabled.Bug Fixes
Tests