🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command argument injection

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2025-01-20 - Command Argument Injection in `std::process::Command`
+**Vulnerability:** When passing user-controlled paths (like `source_path` or `disk_path` which derive from `forker_did` and `fork_name`) to `git clone` using `Command::new("git").args(...)`, there's a risk of command argument injection if the paths start with a hyphen (`-`) and aren't prefixed with `--` to signal the end of options.
+**Learning:** `git clone` and other git commands interpret arguments starting with `-` as options. If a path begins with `-`, git might interpret it as a flag, leading to unexpected behavior or arbitrary command execution (e.g., via `--upload-pack`).
+**Prevention:** To prevent command argument injection when passing user-controlled paths to `std::process::Command` (e.g., for git), always prepend `--` before the paths to signal the end of options, or ensure the paths are absolute so they cannot be interpreted as flags.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs

@@ -2774,6 +2774,7 @@ pub async fn fork_repo(
         .args([
             "clone",
             "--mirror",
+            "--",
             source_path.to_str().unwrap_or(""),
             disk_path.to_str().unwrap_or(""),
         ])

crates/gl/src/mirror.rs

@@ -81,7 +81,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: MirrorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     println!("Cloning source (this may take a while for large repos)...");
     let clone_status = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["clone", "--mirror", &source, mirror_path.to_str().unwrap()])
+        .args([
+            "clone",
+            "--mirror",
+            "--",
+            &source,
+            mirror_path.to_str().unwrap(),
+        ])
         .status()
         .context("failed to run git clone — is git installed?")?;