[Programcode]

Summary

• revoke anon and authenticated execution from the two server-owned workspace generation RPCs
• remove direct execution from private workspace text-projection trigger functions
• add pgTAP coverage for the intended ACLs

Production finding

Post-merge catalog verification found that Supabase default privileges left authenticated able to execute start_workspace_thread_generation and complete_workspace_thread_generation. Both accept server-supplied user IDs and are intended for service_role only.

Verification

• production catalog regression query failed before the fix
• the forward migration passed a production transaction with an explicit ROLLBACK
• supabase db push --dry-run lists only 20260922233256_harden_workspace_function_acl.sql
• independent reviewer found no remaining actionable issues
• local Docker database gate is waiting on the shared Supabase lock held by another worktree; CI database tests will run on this PR

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Security

  • Strengthened workspace access controls by limiting thread-generation operations to authorized service access.
  • Prevented anonymous and authenticated access to private workspace version capture and restore operations.
  • Restricted private workspace text projection functions from direct execution by client-facing roles.

• Tests

  • Added coverage to verify the updated execution permissions and prevent unauthorized workspace function access.

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated
debate-navigator	Ready	Preview	Sep 22, 2026 11:41pm UTC

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 68c53f5 and ae01f7d.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)

• supabase/migrations/20260922233256_harden_workspace_function_acl.sql
• supabase/tests/workspace_practice_test.sql

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The migration restricts workspace thread-generation functions to service_role and removes execution privileges from private workspace projection functions. The SQL tests add assertions for these ACL rules and increase the expected assertion count.

Changes

Workspace ACL Hardening

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Apply and validate workspace function ACLs supabase/migrations/20260922233256_harden_workspace_function_acl.sql, supabase/tests/workspace_practice_test.sql	The migration limits thread-generation RPC execution to service_role and revokes execution for private capture and restore functions. The tests verify these permissions for anon, authenticated, and service_role, and increase the assertion count from 30 to 32.

Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes

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[Programcode]

Production follow-through verified:

• merged as 9e1e016dabd72b8456b73a6cad1f25463e196ba7
• applied 20260922233256_harden_workspace_function_acl.sql to Supabase production
• confirmed migration history has no drift
• confirmed both generation RPCs are executable by service_role only
• confirmed both private text-projection trigger functions have no direct execution grants
• security advisors no longer report the two service-owned generation RPCs
• Vercel production is READY on the merge commit and aliases debate.pi-stack.org
• live browser smoke passed for the landing page, authenticated app shell, hidden workspace navigation, and workspace deep-link 404

No Edge Functions changed in this follow-up, so none were redeployed.