fix(ci): do not persist the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard

[yakimoto]

Why

actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false writes the job's GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config, where any later step — or anything those steps execute — can read it. This is the
security gate that DOWNLOADS AND EXECUTES the gitleaks binary, and the workflow's own comment
already reasons about tampered downloads ("so a tampered or MITM'd download can never execute
inside the security gate"), so the threat model is written down and only the credential half of
the mitigation is missing. Found by zizmor as warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts.

Safety

Verified this job only: checks out, installs gitleaks (pinned + checksum), runs
gitleaks detect --no-git, installs ripgrep, runs content-policy.sh. permissions: contents: read. Nothing pushes, calls gh, or reads GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN, so the token was never needed
in .git/config in the first place.

Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1870.

---

Note

Low Risk
Hardens CI credential handling in a read-only security gate; no application or auth logic changes.

Overview
Sets persist-credentials: false on the actions/checkout step in public-repo-guard, so the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN is not stored in .git/config for later steps.

That matters because this workflow downloads and runs gitleaks and other tooling after checkout; leaving credentials in git config would let anything in those steps read the token. The job already uses permissions: contents: read and does not push or use gh, so the token was not needed in config anyway.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5954c76. Configure here.}

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[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Approved 5954c76

This is a minor CI security improvement that adds persist-credentials: false to the checkout step, preventing the job token from being stored in .git/config. The change follows GitHub Actions best practices and has no impact on application runtime behavior.

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Review details

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between a4676d6 and 5954c76.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)

• .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

---

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[qodo-code-review]

PR Summary by Qodo

Fix public-repo guard to avoid persisting GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config

🐞 Bug fix ⚙️ Configuration changes 🕐 Less than 5 minutes

AI Description

• Disable credential persistence for actions/checkout in the public-repo guard job
• Prevent later CI steps from reading GITHUB_TOKEN via .git/config
• Align workflow with its existing “downloaded binary” threat model assumptions

Diagram

graph TD
  runner["GitHub Actions runner"] --> checkout["actions/checkout"] --> guard["Public-repo guard job"] --> gitleaks["Install/run gitleaks"] --> policy["Run content-policy.sh"]
  checkout --> gitcfg[".git/config (no token)"]

Loading

High-Level Assessment

Using actions/checkout with persist-credentials:false is the standard and most direct mitigation for preventing GITHUB_TOKEN from being written into .git/config; it fits this job since no step needs Git credentials.

Files changed (1) +2 / -0

Other (1) +2 / -0

public-repo-guard.ymlDisable credential persistence in checkout step +2/-0

Disable credential persistence in checkout step

• Adds 'persist-credentials: false' to the 'actions/checkout' step in the public-repo guard workflow. This prevents the job token from being written to '.git/config', reducing exposure to subsequent steps that download/execute tooling.

.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

[qodo-code-review]

Code Review by Qodo

🐞 Bugs (0) 📘 Rule violations (0) 📎 Requirement gaps (0)

Great, no issues found!

Qodo reviewed your code and found no material issues that require review

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[qodo-code-review]

Qodo Fixer

No findings are available for this PR yet. Findings appear here once Qodo has reviewed the PR.

[devin-ai-integration]

✅ Devin Review: No Issues Found

Devin Review analyzed this PR and found no bugs or issues to report.

[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 1 file

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

<sub>Requires human review: This PR does not meet the repository auto-approval settings.

Re-trigger cubic</sub>

[yakimoto]

This PR is redundant with #5 (chore/guard-canonical-sync), which is already open and already contains this exact change.

Evidence — #5's diff to .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml includes:

+          # tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
+          # so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
+          persist-credentials: false

#5 is also broader than this PR: it syncs the whole vendored public-repo-guard trio to
the canonical source (wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard) byte-for-byte, verified by
git blob SHA, rather than adding this one line in isolation.

Closing as redundant. This duplicate exists because the fan-out that opened this PR
(refs claude-workstation#1870) did not check for in-flight PRs touching the same file before
going out — #5 was already open. Merge #5 instead.