fix(ci): unblock Windows CI — force LF checkout, then fix the Windows bugs it revealed

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Enforce LF line endings for every text file on all platforms.
+#
+# Without this, the Windows CI runner (git's default `core.autocrlf=true`) checks out
+# text files with CRLF, and oxfmt — which `vp check` / `vp fmt` run and which enforces
+# LF — then flags every file as mis-formatted (the `test (windows-latest)` job). Every
+# committed blob is already LF, so this only changes checkout behavior on Windows; it
+# triggers no renormalization of existing files.
+* text=auto eol=lf
+
+# Binary assets — never apply any line-ending conversion.
+*.png   binary
+*.jpg   binary
+*.jpeg  binary
+*.gif   binary
+*.ico   binary
+*.webp  binary
+*.avif  binary
+*.woff  binary
+*.woff2 binary
+*.ttf   binary
+*.otf   binary
+*.eot   binary
+*.pdf   binary
+*.wasm  binary
+*.mp4   binary
+*.zip   binary
+*.gz    binary

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -33,6 +33,34 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
+      # Defender's real-time scan is synchronous on every file write, and this suite writes a lot of
+      # them (dependency install, ~26 playground builds, per-worker temp dirs). Excluding the paths
+      # we generate is purely a speed measure: it never changes what runs.
+      #
+      # Skipped for fork pull requests, the only case where the checkout is code no maintainer has
+      # pushed. Not because scanning is a boundary for this job — it has no secrets, a read-only
+      # token, an ephemeral runner, and already executes the PR's own build and test code by design
+      # — but because leaving the scan on for untrusted checkouts costs us nothing: Windows runs on
+      # a PR only when a maintainer applies the `test: windows` label, so this is rare, while main
+      # pushes and maintainer branches (the everyday path) keep the speedup.
+      #
+      # Warns instead of failing, so a runner image that refuses the call still runs the suite.
+      - name: Exclude build paths from Windows Defender
+        if: >-
+          ${{ contains(matrix.os, 'windows')
+          && (github.event_name == 'push'
+          || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository) }}
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          foreach ($path in @('${{ github.workspace }}', '${{ runner.temp }}')) {
+            try {
+              Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $path -ErrorAction Stop
+              Write-Host "Defender exclusion added: $path"
+            } catch {
+              Write-Host "::warning::could not add Defender exclusion for ${path}: $_"
+            }
+          }
+
       - uses: voidzero-dev/setup-vp@2dec1e33f4ab2c6d5bce1b0c4607961bb1a3f7a1 # v1.12.0
         with:
           node-version-file: .node-version

.gitignore

@@ -21,3 +21,7 @@ playground-local
 .worktrees
 .svelte-kit/
 docs/superpowers/
+
+# Test temp dirs (unique per test; a Windows run may leave one behind when the OS has not
+# yet unmapped a terminated child process image — see provision.test.ts teardown).
+**/.tmp-*

packages/void/src/cli/provision.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import {
 import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
 import { types as utilTypes } from 'node:util';
 import { parse, type ParseError } from 'jsonc-parser';
-import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from 'pathe';
+import { basename, dirname, join, normalize, resolve } from 'pathe';
 import lockfile from 'proper-lockfile';
 import { voidLog, voidWarn } from '../log.ts';
 import { scanWranglerDotenvKeys } from '../shared/dotenv.ts';
@@ -1424,6 +1424,32 @@ export function createDefaultRunWrangler(
             killProcessGroup(-child.pid, signal); // negative pid → the whole group
             return 'signaled';
           }
+          if (isWindows && typeof child.pid === 'number') {
+            // Windows has NO process groups, so the signal target is the child ITSELF.
+            // Consult Node's own bookkeeping FIRST: once the exit has been observed there is
+            // nothing left to signal. This ORDERING is also what makes the pid-based call below
+            // free of any pid-reuse hazard. Windows destroys a pid only when the process OBJECT
+            // is destroyed, which requires the process to have exited AND every handle to it to
+            // be closed; libuv closes its handle (`CloseHandle(handle->process_handle)` in
+            // `uv__process_proc_exit`, win/process.c) in the SAME straight-line frame that then
+            // invokes `exit_cb` — Node's `onexit`, whose first statements set
+            // `exitCode`/`signalCode`. No JavaScript runs in between, so a pid observed here
+            // with a null exit code is still pinned by libuv's open handle and cannot have been
+            // reassigned. (`child.kill()` is no safer in that instant: libuv sets
+            // UV_HANDLE_ESRCH on the very next line and `uv_process_kill` then short-circuits to
+            // ESRCH, which `ChildProcess.kill` reports as the same ambiguous `false`.)
+            if (child.exitCode !== null || child.signalCode !== null) {
+              return 'gone';
+            }
+            // Routed through the SAME seam POSIX uses, because `process.kill` THROWS ESRCH
+            // (classified "already gone" below), whereas `child.kill()` collapses ESRCH and
+            // EPERM into one silent `false`. Node sets `exitCode`/`signalCode` asynchronously
+            // in its `exit` handler, so a child that died a moment ago still reads as
+            // "running" here — and the ambiguous `false` would then be reported as a FAILED
+            // delivery, quarantining the lock over a child that had simply already exited.
+            killProcessGroup(child.pid, signal);
+            return 'signaled';
+          }
           if (child.kill(signal)) {
             return 'signaled';
           }
@@ -1447,11 +1473,31 @@ export function createDefaultRunWrangler(
         if (groupGone) {
           return true;
         }
-        if (isWindows || typeof child.pid !== 'number') {
-          // No process-group concept — `close` is the only (and sufficient) confirmation.
+        if (typeof child.pid !== 'number') {
           groupGone = true;
           return true;
         }
+        if (isWindows) {
+          // No process GROUP to probe, but the child ITSELF is still confirmable: libuv
+          // implements `kill(pid, 0)` on Windows as a real liveness check
+          // (GetExitCodeProcess + WaitForSingleObject). Descendants are covered separately —
+          // libuv assigns every non-`detached` child to a global Job Object with
+          // KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE, so they die with this process. Prefer Node's own bookkeeping
+          // (immune to pid reuse) and fall back to the signal-0 probe while the exit has not
+          // been observed yet — so confirmation stays EARNED rather than assumed.
+          if (child.exitCode !== null || child.signalCode !== null) {
+            groupGone = true;
+            return true;
+          }
+          try {
+            process.kill(child.pid, 0);
+          } catch (error) {
+            if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ESRCH') {
+              groupGone = true;
+            }
+          }
+          return groupGone;
+        }
         try {
           process.kill(-child.pid, 0);
         } catch (error) {
@@ -2259,7 +2305,11 @@ function assertQuarantineClearedOrClear(lockTarget: string, onBeforeClear?: () =
     typeof recorded?.quarantinedAt === 'string' ? recorded.quarantinedAt : undefined;
   // Prefer the recorded GROUP (negative-pid probe); fall back to the plain pid where no
   // group was recorded (Windows). No probe target at all → cannot verify → fail closed.
-  const probeTarget = pgid !== undefined ? -pgid : pid;
+  // A NEGATIVE target is POSIX-ONLY: on win32 `process.kill(-n, 0)` resolves to
+  // OpenProcess((DWORD)-n), which fails with ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER and surfaces as ESRCH —
+  // i.e. it would report ANY recorded owner "confirmed dead" and clear a LIVE quarantine,
+  // inverting this gate from fail-closed to fail-open. Mirrors the watchdog's guard above.
+  const probeTarget = pgid !== undefined && process.platform !== 'win32' ? -pgid : (pid ?? pgid);
   let confirmedDead = false;
   if (probeTarget !== undefined) {
     try {
@@ -2354,6 +2404,20 @@ function loadProperLockfileInternals(): ProperLockfileInternals | undefined {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * `realpathSync` is `node:fs`, so it returns a NATIVE path — backslashes on Windows —
+ * while every other path in this module comes from `pathe` and is POSIX-normalized,
+ * including the not-yet-created branch below (whose `join()` already normalizes). Without
+ * this, `canonicalizeConfigPath` hands back TWO different spellings of the same file
+ * depending only on whether it happens to exist yet, defeating the "ONE identity" contract
+ * the function exists to provide — and splitting the lock identity, the wrangler `-c` argv,
+ * and the paths printed in error messages. No-op off Windows, where `\` is a legal filename
+ * character that must survive byte-for-byte.
+ */
+function toPosixConfigPath(nativePath: string): string {
+  return process.platform === 'win32' ? normalize(nativePath) : nativePath;
+}
+
 /**
  * Canonicalize an already-absolute config path via `realpath` so the lock identity
  * and every read/write/`-c` key on the REAL file, not a lexical symlink alias. When the
@@ -2366,7 +2430,7 @@ function loadProperLockfileInternals(): ProperLockfileInternals | undefined {
  */
 function canonicalizeConfigPath(absoluteConfigPath: string, depth = 0): string {
   try {
-    return realpathSync(absoluteConfigPath);
+    return toPosixConfigPath(realpathSync(absoluteConfigPath));
   } catch (error) {
     // ONLY ENOENT (a path component does not exist yet) is the benign "not created yet" case
     // we handle below. Any OTHER realpath error (EACCES, ELOOP for a real symlink cycle,

packages/void/test/integration/cloudflare-deploy-build.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import spawn from 'cross-spawn';
-import { join } from 'pathe';
+import { join, normalize } from 'pathe';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vite-plus/test';
 import {
   computeDesiredCloudflareResources,
@@ -167,7 +167,11 @@ describe('playground/kitchen-sink --backend cloudflare real-build deploy guard',
     const pointer = JSON.parse(
       readFileSync(join(PG, '.wrangler', 'deploy', 'config.json'), 'utf-8'),
     ) as { configPath?: string };
-    expect(pointer.configPath).toBe('../../dist/ssr/wrangler.json');
+    // The CF plugin writes this with node:path.relative, so the separator is PLATFORM-NATIVE
+    // (`..\..\dist\ssr\wrangler.json` on Windows). The guard that consumes it resolves through
+    // pathe, which normalizes backslashes, so compare the normalized form rather than pinning
+    // a POSIX literal that only holds on one platform.
+    expect(normalize(pointer.configPath ?? '')).toBe('../../dist/ssr/wrangler.json');
   });
 
   it('merges the pinned account, worker name, and real binding ids into the emitted artifact', () => {

packages/void/test/unit/cloudflare-deploy.test.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
 import { log } from '@clack/prompts';
 import { dirname, join } from 'pathe';
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vite-plus/test';
@@ -103,9 +104,18 @@ function emittedVars(vars: Record<string, unknown> = {}): EmittedWorkerVarsResul
   return { ok: true, vars };
 }
 
-/** Absolute src paths for runtime imports inside spawned-child env.ts fixtures. */
-const srcEnvPublic = join(import.meta.dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'runtime', 'env-public.ts');
-const srcEnvHelpers = join(import.meta.dirname, '..', '..', 'src', 'runtime', 'env-helpers.ts');
+/**
+ * `file://` URLs for the runtime imports inside spawned-child env.ts fixtures. These are ESM
+ * SPECIFIERS, not filesystem paths: an absolute Windows path (`D:/…`, as `pathe` spells it)
+ * parses as a URL whose protocol is `d:`, so Node rejects it with
+ * ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ESM_URL_SCHEME and the child's env.ts never evaluates — the probe then
+ * reports `schema-error` for reasons that have nothing to do with the schema.
+ * `pathToFileURL` is the same form `loadUserEnvFile` uses for real user env files.
+ */
+const srcFileUrl = (...segments: Array<string>): string =>
+  pathToFileURL(join(import.meta.dirname, '..', '..', 'src', ...segments)).href;
+const srcEnvPublic = srcFileUrl('runtime', 'env-public.ts');
+const srcEnvHelpers = srcFileUrl('runtime', 'env-helpers.ts');
 
 /**
  * Wrangler's FULL credential env-var set, canonical names + deprecated `CF_*` aliases.