[supabase-cli-releaser]

Pins packages/stack/src/Artifacts.ts to the
storage v1.79.14
slim-services release and its image digest.

Opened from the mirror-slim-image dispatch. artifactFor derives the
native release tag, asset names, and URLs from service + version, so this
pin is the whole change.

[depthfirst-app]

⚪ Severity: LOW

This pin secures only the GHCR container: native mode ignores image, while artifactFor builds download URLs from the mutable storage-v1.79.14 release. SlimServicesSource trusts SHA256SUMS fetched from that same release before executing bin/storage; a compromised release asset can therefore achieve code execution on a developer host.
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💡 Fix Suggestion

Suggestion: To address the trust-on-first-use risk for native binaries, add hardcoded per-target SHA256 checksums to each service's artifact definition and use them as the authoritative source rather than the dynamically fetched SHA256SUMS file from the same mutable GitHub release. Specifically: (1) Extend the ArtifactDefinition interface (around line 48) to include a checksums: Readonly<Record<NativeTarget, string>> field mapping each target platform to its expected SHA256 hash. (2) Update the definition() helper function (around line 56) to accept and store these per-target checksums. (3) Update the storage definition (lines 92–98) to include the actual SHA256 hex digests for each target (darwin-arm64, linux-amd64, linux-arm64) — these values must be obtained out-of-band from a trusted source and committed alongside the version pin. (4) Modify artifactFor (lines 160–183) to pass the pinned checksum for the selected target into SlimServicesArtifact. (5) Update SlimServicesSource.ts's slimServicesChecksum function (around line 209) to compare the network-fetched checksum against the pinned value rather than trusting the downloaded SHA256SUMS file unconditionally. This ensures that even if the GitHub release assets are replaced, the in-code checksum acts as a pinned root of trust that cannot be silently bypassed.