fix: prevent path-traversal sandbox escape in filesystem operations - #91
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📌 Summary
Fix path-traversal sandbox escape in filesystem operations. The
normalize_pathfunction fell back to raw (unsanitized) paths whencanonicalize()failed for non-existent files, allowing..components to bypassvalidate_path. This enables escaping the allowed directory sandbox viawrite_file,create_directory,move_file, andeditsave-to.🔍 Related Issues
✨ Changes Made
normalize_pathnow attempts to canonicalize the parent directory and rejoin the file name when the full path doesn't exist. Falls back to raw path only as last resort.validate_pathreturns the normalized path instead of the rawabsolute_path. Added defense-in-depth rejection of any path still containingComponent::ParentDirafter normalization.save_tonow passes throughvalidate_pathwith the allowed directories set (previously skipped validation entirely)...escape, symlink escape (unix), write/create/move/edit end-to-end escapes, multi-level.., resolved-in-root paths, non-existent-with-out-of-bounds-parent, and defense-in-depth.🛠️ Testing Steps
💡 Additional Notes
SECURITY.mdadded to document the vulnerability reporting process.CHANGELOG.mdat release time.