ffi: security rule enumeration API + FIPS mode foundation - #2424
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ffi: security rule enumeration API + FIPS mode foundation#2424ronaldtse wants to merge 9 commits into
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #2424 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 85.44% 85.49% +0.04%
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Files 125 125
Lines 22962 23033 +71
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+ Hits 19620 19691 +71
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Allows callers to enumerate the security profile's rule list, including the built-in defaults (SHA-1, MD5, CAST5/3DES/IDEA/BLOWFISH, RIPEMD). Useful for diagnostics, tooling, and letting downstream consumers report which features rnp considers insecure.
Extends test_ffi_security_rule_enumeration to also add a public-key rule (EdDSA, PROHIBITED) so the case rnp::FeatureType::PublicKey branch in rnp_get_security_rule_at and the SecurityLevel::Disabled → RNP_SECURITY_PROHIBITED mapping are exercised. Adds the same RNP_FEATURE_PK_ALG handling to get_feature_sec_value() that hash and cipher types already enjoy, so rnp_add_security_rule, rnp_get_security_rule, and rnp_remove_security_rule accept public-key features symmetrically with the other two types.
…#6) Foundation for FIPS-compliant mode. Adds a cmake build switch ENABLE_FIPS_MODE that: - forces CRYPTO_BACKEND=openssl (Botan has no validated FIPS provider) - requires OpenSSL 3.x (FIPS provider is a 3.x feature) - defines RNP_FIPS_MODE throughout the library - adds Disabled-level default security rules for non-FIPS algorithms (Twofish, CAST5, IDEA, Blowfish, SM4, MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, EdDSA, SM2, ElGamal) Adds the FFI query rnp_is_fips_mode_enabled() so callers can detect the compile-time setting at runtime. Documents the certification boundary in docs/security.adoc: rnp is a consumer of OpenSSL's validated FIPS provider module, not a validated module itself. Adds a CI leg that builds and tests under -DENABLE_FIPS_MODE=On. This is foundation only. Constant-time audit, zeroization, Argon2 → PBKDF2 S2K migration, and FIPS provider loading ceremony are intentionally out of scope and will land in follow-up PRs.
Adds test_ffi_fips_mode_default_rules which is compiled in only when RNP_FIPS_MODE is defined. It queries each algorithm the FIPS default profile marks Disabled (CAST5, IDEA, BLOWFISH, MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, EDDSA, ELGAMAL) via rnp_get_security_rule and asserts the level is RNP_SECURITY_PROHIBITED. AES-256 is sanity-checked to remain DEFAULT. Extends get_feature_sec_value() in the FFI to also accept RNP_FEATURE_PK_ALG so the Disabled public-key rules can be queried through the same API as hash and cipher rules.
When librnp-obj has no INTERFACE_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS set (any non-FIPS build), get_target_property() leaves val as the literal 'val-NOTFOUND'. set_property() then propagated it as a define, so every consumer target compiled with -Dval-NOTFOUND, defining a macro 'val' that broke any translation unit using 'val' as a parameter name (rnpcpp.hpp, rnpcfg.h, ...). All Linux/macOS/CodeQL builds failed with 'expected unqualified-id before - token'. Skip properties that come back *-NOTFOUND.
Main's lint now runs the clang-format 11.1.0 binary (a6b0b99); these files were formatted under the previous 11.0.x pin and drifted.
…ecks str_to_cipher()/str_to_hash_alg()/str_to_pubkey_alg() fold a backend availability check into name resolution, so under the OpenSSL FIPS provider every prohibited algorithm failed to resolve and rnp_get_security_rule() returned RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS for exactly the algorithms whose rules users need to query (test_ffi_fips_mode_ default_rules, test_ffi_security_rule_enumeration). get_feature_sec_value() now resolves via the name tables directly; availability stays where it belongs, in the *_supported() queries. Also restrict the fips-mode workflow's test step to the FIPS/security tests: the provider prohibits legacy algorithms, so legacy fixtures (SHA-1 signatures, EdDSA/Curve25519 keyrings, IDEA ...) cannot pass in that job by design.
The FIPS default profile appends 12 Disabled rules and disables MD5/ SHA1 from time 0, so queries before the regular insecure cutoffs and the rule-removal counts differ under RNP_FIPS_MODE. Guard the affected assertions and match enumerated rules by from/flags instead of name alone. Verified locally with -DENABLE_FIPS_MODE=On against OpenSSL 3 (both tests pass in FIPS and non-FIPS builds).
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Summary
Two related security-profile changes, combined for one review (formerly #2424 + #2427):
rnp_get_security_rule_count()/rnp_get_security_rule_at(): enumerate the active security profile's rules (default SHA-1/MD5 rules plus user-added), covering hash/symmetric/public-key feature types, levels, timestamps and flags.ENABLE_FIPS_MODECMake switch +rnp_is_fips_mode_enabled(): compile-time tightening of the default SecurityProfile (non-FIPS algorithms Disabled, OpenSSL backend only). See docs/security.adoc for the certification boundary — rnp consumes OpenSSL's FIPS provider, it is not a validated module itself.Test plan
ENABLE_FIPS_MODEbuild