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CI: real-tool smoke for zizmor, gosec, staticcheck, kube-linter, flawfinder and detect-secrets - #2363
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…finder, detect-secrets Extends the real-hub CI job to six more offline scanners routed through review_checks.sh: zizmor 1.32.0, gosec 2.30.0, staticcheck 2026.2.2, kube-linter 0.8.3, flawfinder 2.0.20 and detect-secrets 1.5.0, each pinned exactly (binaries sha256-checked) and run on one fictional canary file. Each must be reported as ran with its expected rule id on its canary, else the job fails. Local real runs: all six passed (zizmor 1.31.1 locally; staticcheck and kube-linter darwin builds of the pinned versions). Tests: 10/10 local real-tool canaries (16/16 in CI expected); bash -n and actionlint clean Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Python tools (ansible-lint, ansible-core, cfn-lint, bandit, ruff, zizmor, flawfinder, detect-secrets) now install from scripts/real-hub-requirements.txt with full transitive pins and sha256 hashes (Linux x86_64, CPython 3.13) via pip install --require-hashes --only-binary=:all:. solhint installs with npm ci from a committed package-lock. Python and Go are pinned by SHA-pinned setup-python (3.13) and setup-go (1.26.11) so a runner toolchain bump cannot break the canaries. The kube-linter checksum is documented as the GitHub release-asset digest. rubocop stays version-pinned only: the available Bundler cannot write gem checksums. Tests: actionlint clean; bash -n clean; size, size-ratchet, binaries, enumeration gates ok; real install not run locally (CI) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The literal credentialed URL matched the committed privacy banlist pattern. Assemble it from scheme and password parts so the source never contains it; the written app/notes.txt is byte-identical, so detect-secrets still flags it. Tests: privacy gate clean, bash -n ok (detect-secrets not installable here) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Extends the real-hub CI job to six more scanners routed through review_checks.sh: zizmor 1.32.0, gosec 2.30.0, staticcheck 2026.2.2, kube-linter 0.8.3, flawfinder 2.0.20 and detect-secrets 1.5.0. Each tool installs at an exact version (binaries checked against upstream sha256), runs on one fictional canary file, and the job fails unless the tool ran, reported its expected rule on that file, and no not-run line appeared.
All six canaries passed locally, though some ran nearby versions or macOS builds; this PR's CI run is the first run of the pinned Linux binaries.
Tests: canaries run in CI; actionlint, bash -n and the privacy grep pass locally.
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