Add session fixation login test case

docs/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.md

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ from each file's header comment, so this page cannot drift from the source.
 
 ## Totals
 
-- **Test cases:** 59
-- **Expected detections:** 59
-- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 113 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
-- **`SAFE:` markers:** 67 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
+- **Test cases:** 60
+- **Expected detections:** 60
+- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 114 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
+- **`SAFE:` markers:** 68 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
 - **Languages:** 8 — dotenv, go, java, javascript, json, python, ruby, text
-- **CWE categories:** 43 — CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-90, CWE-95, CWE-113, CWE-117, CWE-190, CWE-201, CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-295, CWE-321, CWE-330, CWE-346, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-489, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-532, CWE-601, CWE-611, CWE-614, CWE-639, CWE-643, CWE-681, CWE-759, CWE-798, CWE-862, CWE-915, CWE-918, CWE-942, CWE-943, CWE-1236, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
+- **CWE categories:** 44 — CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-90, CWE-95, CWE-113, CWE-117, CWE-190, CWE-201, CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-295, CWE-321, CWE-330, CWE-346, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-384, CWE-489, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-532, CWE-601, CWE-611, CWE-614, CWE-639, CWE-643, CWE-681, CWE-759, CWE-798, CWE-862, CWE-915, CWE-918, CWE-942, CWE-943, CWE-1236, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
 
 ## How coverage is scored
 
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ counts as a detection. See `docs/SCANNER_INTEGRATION.md`.
 | Open redirect via unvalidated next parameter | [`open-redirect.js`](../vulns/javascript/open-redirect.js) | CWE-601 | medium | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Prototype pollution via recursive merge | [`prototype-pollution.js`](../vulns/javascript/prototype-pollution.js) | CWE-1321 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |
 | OS command injection via child_process.exec | [`rce-child-process.js`](../vulns/javascript/rce-child-process.js) | CWE-78 | critical | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |
+| Session fixation when login reuses the anonymous session ID | [`session-fixation-login.js`](../vulns/javascript/session-fixation-login.js) | CWE-384 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | SQL injection via string concatenation | [`sqli-raw-concat.js`](../vulns/javascript/sqli-raw-concat.js) | CWE-89 | critical | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Server-side request forgery via user-supplied URL | [`ssrf-request-user-url.js`](../vulns/javascript/ssrf-request-user-url.js) | CWE-918 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 2 safe |
 | TLS certificate validation disabled on an HTTPS agent | [`tls-reject-unauthorized-false.js`](../vulns/javascript/tls-reject-unauthorized-false.js) | CWE-295 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |

vulns/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "schema": "threatcrush-testbed-catalog/1",
   "note": "Generated by scripts/generate-catalog.py \u2014 do not edit by hand.",
   "totals": {
-    "test_cases": 59,
-    "expected_detections": 59,
-    "vulnerable_markers": 113,
-    "safe_markers": 67,
+    "test_cases": 60,
+    "expected_detections": 60,
+    "vulnerable_markers": 114,
+    "safe_markers": 68,
     "languages": [
       "dotenv",
       "go",
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
       "CWE-352",
       "CWE-362",
       "CWE-377",
+      "CWE-384",
       "CWE-489",
       "CWE-502",
       "CWE-506",
@@ -621,6 +622,29 @@
         41
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "js-session-fixation-login",
+      "file": "vulns/javascript/session-fixation-login.js",
+      "title": "Session fixation when login reuses the anonymous session ID",
+      "category": "javascript",
+      "language": "javascript",
+      "cwe": "CWE-384",
+      "cwes": [
+        "CWE-384"
+      ],
+      "severity": "high",
+      "expected_detection": true,
+      "description": "An Express login handler attaches an authenticated user to the",
+      "detection_target": "Authentication state assigned to an existing session",
+      "safe_guard": "Wrapped in if (false) \u2014 authentication, session mutation, and",
+      "attribution": "line",
+      "vulnerable_lines": [
+        28
+      ],
+      "safe_lines": [
+        43
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "js-sqli-raw-concat",
       "file": "vulns/javascript/sqli-raw-concat.js",

vulns/javascript/session-fixation-login.js

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/**
+ * @id js-session-fixation-login
+ * @test-case Session fixation when login reuses the anonymous session ID
+ * @cwe CWE-384
+ * @severity high
+ * @language javascript
+ * @expected-detection true
+ * @description An Express login handler attaches an authenticated user to the
+ *              existing anonymous session without regenerating its identifier.
+ *              An attacker who supplied that identifier can reuse it after the
+ *              victim signs in.
+ * @safe-guard Wrapped in if (false) — authentication, session mutation, and
+ *             every response are unreachable dead code. Helpers are local and
+ *             perform no I/O.
+ * @detection-target Authentication state assigned to an existing session
+ *                   without rotating the session identifier first.
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+// NEVER RUN IN PRODUCTION — intentional test case for scanner validation.
+function loginVulnerable(req, res) {
+  if (false) {
+    const user = authenticate(req.body.username, req.body.password);
+    if (!user) {
+      return res.status(401).send('invalid credentials');
+    }
+    req.session.userId = user.id; // VULNERABLE: CWE-384 — the anonymous session ID is reused after login
+    return res.json({ ok: true });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Safe counterpart — the scanner should NOT flag this.
+ * @expected-detection false
+ */
+function loginSafe(req, res) {
+  if (false) {
+    const user = authenticate(req.body.username, req.body.password);
+    if (!user) {
+      return res.status(401).send('invalid credentials');
+    }
+    req.session.regenerate((error) => { // SAFE: rotate the identifier before attaching authenticated state
+      if (error) {
+        return res.status(500).send('login failed');
+      }
+      req.session.userId = user.id;
+      return res.json({ ok: true });
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+// Local inert placeholder so the file parses without an authentication service.
+function authenticate(username, password) {
+  return username && password ? { id: 'fixture-user' } : null;
+}
+
+module.exports = { loginVulnerable, loginSafe };