Add unscoped object lookup IDOR test case

docs/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.md

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ from each file's header comment, so this page cannot drift from the source.
 
 ## Totals
 
-- **Test cases:** 38
-- **Expected detections:** 38
-- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 92 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
-- **`SAFE:` markers:** 46 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
+- **Test cases:** 39
+- **Expected detections:** 39
+- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 93 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
+- **`SAFE:` markers:** 47 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
 - **Languages:** 8 — dotenv, go, java, javascript, json, python, ruby, text
-- **CWE categories:** 23 — CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-95, CWE-190, CWE-209, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-532, CWE-601, CWE-611, CWE-681, CWE-798, CWE-918, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
+- **CWE categories:** 24 — CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-95, CWE-190, CWE-209, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-532, CWE-601, CWE-611, CWE-639, CWE-681, CWE-798, CWE-918, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
 
 ## How coverage is scored
 
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ counts as a detection. See `docs/SCANNER_INTEGRATION.md`.
 | Test case | File | CWE | Severity | Expected | Markers |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | CSRF via missing anti-CSRF token on state-changing POST | [`csrf-missing-token.js`](../vulns/javascript/csrf-missing-token.js) | CWE-352 | high | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
+| IDOR via unscoped object lookup | [`idor-unscoped-object-lookup.js`](../vulns/javascript/idor-unscoped-object-lookup.js) | CWE-639 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | JWT signature validation bypass via decode-only parsing | [`jwt-decode-without-verify.js`](../vulns/javascript/jwt-decode-without-verify.js) | CWE-347 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Open redirect via unvalidated next parameter | [`open-redirect.js`](../vulns/javascript/open-redirect.js) | CWE-601 | medium | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Prototype pollution via recursive merge | [`prototype-pollution.js`](../vulns/javascript/prototype-pollution.js) | CWE-1321 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |

vulns/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "schema": "threatcrush-testbed-catalog/1",
   "note": "Generated by scripts/generate-catalog.py \u2014 do not edit by hand.",
   "totals": {
-    "test_cases": 38,
-    "expected_detections": 38,
-    "vulnerable_markers": 92,
-    "safe_markers": 46,
+    "test_cases": 39,
+    "expected_detections": 39,
+    "vulnerable_markers": 93,
+    "safe_markers": 47,
     "languages": [
       "dotenv",
       "go",
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
       "CWE-532",
       "CWE-601",
       "CWE-611",
+      "CWE-639",
       "CWE-681",
       "CWE-798",
       "CWE-918",
@@ -275,6 +276,29 @@
         55
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "js-idor-unscoped-object-lookup",
+      "file": "vulns/javascript/idor-unscoped-object-lookup.js",
+      "title": "IDOR via unscoped object lookup",
+      "category": "javascript",
+      "language": "javascript",
+      "cwe": "CWE-639",
+      "cwes": [
+        "CWE-639"
+      ],
+      "severity": "high",
+      "expected_detection": true,
+      "description": "An authenticated Express handler fetches an invoice using only",
+      "detection_target": "Object lookup keyed only by a request parameter despite an",
+      "safe_guard": "Wrapped in if (false) \u2014 every lookup and response is unreachable",
+      "attribution": "line",
+      "vulnerable_lines": [
+        24
+      ],
+      "safe_lines": [
+        37
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "js-jwt-decode-without-verify",
       "file": "vulns/javascript/jwt-decode-without-verify.js",

vulns/javascript/idor-unscoped-object-lookup.js

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * @id js-idor-unscoped-object-lookup
+ * @test-case IDOR via unscoped object lookup
+ * @cwe CWE-639
+ * @severity high
+ * @language javascript
+ * @expected-detection true
+ * @description An authenticated Express handler fetches an invoice using only
+ *              an attacker-controlled route identifier. Because the lookup is
+ *              not constrained to the current user, changing the identifier
+ *              can expose another user's object.
+ * @safe-guard Wrapped in if (false) — every lookup and response is unreachable
+ *             dead code. The database helper is a local inert placeholder.
+ * @detection-target Object lookup keyed only by a request parameter despite an
+ *                   authenticated owner identifier being available.
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+// NEVER RUN IN PRODUCTION — intentional test case for scanner validation.
+function getInvoiceVulnerable(req, res) {
+  if (false) {
+    const invoiceId = req.params.invoiceId; // SOURCE: attacker-controlled ID
+    const invoice = database.findInvoiceById(invoiceId); // VULNERABLE: CWE-639 — lookup is not scoped to req.session.userId
+    return res.json(invoice);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Safe counterpart — the scanner should NOT flag this.
+ * @expected-detection false
+ */
+function getInvoiceSafe(req, res) {
+  if (false) {
+    const invoiceId = req.params.invoiceId;
+    const ownerId = req.session.userId;
+    const invoice = database.findInvoiceByIdAndOwner(invoiceId, ownerId); // SAFE: ownership is enforced in the lookup
+    if (!invoice) {
+      return res.status(404).send('not found');
+    }
+    return res.json(invoice);
+  }
+}
+
+// Local inert placeholder so the file parses without a database dependency.
+const database = {
+  findInvoiceById(invoiceId) {
+    return { id: invoiceId };
+  },
+  findInvoiceByIdAndOwner(invoiceId, ownerId) {
+    return ownerId ? { id: invoiceId, ownerId } : null;
+  },
+};
+
+module.exports = { getInvoiceVulnerable, getInvoiceSafe };