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Codex review: needs real behavior proof before merge. Reviewed September 14, 2026, 11:59 PM ET / September 15, 2026, 03:59 UTC (Revision 3). ClawSweeper reviewWhat this changesAdds a draft design for operator-selected external authorization of exact process invocations, with three redacted prototype evidence exports. Merge readiness⛔ Blocked before merge - 4 items remain Keep open: this proposes a distinct extension beyond the accepted plugin-owned approval contract. The newly committed evidence makes the prototype observations inspectable and clearly limits their claims; it does not establish implementation of the proposed adapter. Priority: P2 Review scores
Verification
How this fits togetherThis repository records OpenClaw design decisions rather than implementing its runtime. The proposed approval boundary would take a frozen process invocation, combine existing policy checks with provider verification, and return permission to the existing process runner. flowchart TD
A[Process invocation] --> B[Existing policy checks]
B --> C[Frozen execution subject]
C --> D[Host approval lifecycle]
E[Configured verification provider] --> D
D --> F[Final admission checks]
F --> G[Existing process runner]
Decision needed
Why: Accepting a new host authorization contract and exempting this document from the literal runtime-proof gate require maintainer intent; prototype results cannot decide either. Before merge
Agent review detailsSecurityNone. Review metrics
Merge-risk optionsMaintainer options:
Technical reviewBest possible solution: Extend the existing approval lifecycle through an explicitly accepted, opt-in process boundary, with adapter-specific execution and upgrade proof required in the implementation PR. Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue? Not applicable: this is a design proposal, and the accepted RFC explicitly excludes the host-owned execution scope it requests. Is this the best way to solve the issue? Yes as a design direction: reusing the canonical approval lifecycle avoids a competing resolver, while exact adapter feasibility remains subject to acceptance and implementation proof. AGENTS.md: not found in the target repository. Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning medium; reviewed against 967d9aac7472. LabelsLabel justifications:
EvidenceWhat I checked:
Likely related people:
Rank-up movesOptional improvements that raise the rating; they are not merge blockers.
Rating scale
Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality. Workflow
History |
Related: openclaw/openclaw#97152
What Problem This Solves
Host-owned process execution paths cannot currently require a plugin's external verification through the lifecycle accepted in RFC 0011. The alternatives are a competing generic approval path or a second resolver lifecycle, neither of which gives one clear authorization owner.
Why This Change Was Made
This draft narrows the earlier cross-harness resolver proposal to one concrete capability: host-owned
process.exec. It reuses OpenClaw-owned approval and attempt state, lets configuration select one provider, binds authorization to an exact executable subject, keeps generic allow unavailable while verification is required, and keeps provider proofs outside core. It explicitly does not claim universal tool or harness coverage.User Impact
There is no runtime change in this RFC. If accepted and implemented, external providers such as wallet or hardware-key plugins could gate exact Codex command executions and later command-automation adapters without replacing the process runner. Provider-owned standing grants could avoid repeat ceremonies while each invocation still receives a host-bound authorization.
Evidence
git diff --checkpasses.The required
maintainer-discussionthread is still pending; this PR remains a draft until that thread is linked. Because this PR changes no production owner, after-change runtime proof belongs to the implementation PR; RFC acceptance requires a maintainer decision on that design-only proof override.