Fix Control Center action access in orchestration workers

application/single_app/config.py

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
 EXECUTOR_TYPE = 'thread'
 EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS = 30
 SESSION_TYPE = 'filesystem'
-VERSION = "0.261.328"
+VERSION = "0.261.329"
 IS_DEVELOPMENT = is_development_env_enabled()
 
 # Opt-out for deployments where App Service Easy Auth is active but the platform

application/single_app/functions_orchestration_external_sources.py

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 # functions_orchestration_external_sources.py
 """Server admission and current access for retained external content.
 
-Version: 0.261.291
+Version: 0.261.329
 Session-trusted agent and action sources in: 0.261.270
 Hand-selected agent honoured while the agent preference is off in: 0.261.289
 Stored agents accepted as any dictionary, and refusals logged by check, in: 0.261.291 (#1699)
+Authenticated action roles forwarded to discovery and exact resolution in: 0.261.329
 
 No fetch, recall, plugin invocation, settings discovery, or credential persistence
 occurs here. Content digests attest the exact retained payload, not a remote page
@@ -310,7 +311,9 @@
         callback = self.agent_catalog_reader if source_type == "agent" else self.action_catalog_reader
         if callback is None:
             raise ResultUnavailableError("result_external_catalog_required")
-        if seeded_agent is None:
+        if source_type == "action":
+            catalog = callback(identity.user_id, settings=settings, user_roles=list(identity.roles))
+        elif seeded_agent is None:
             catalog = callback(identity.user_id, settings=settings)
         else:
             # Narrowed to the run's selection exactly as planning and execution narrowed it.
@@ -413,7 +416,7 @@
                 if self.action_resolver is None:
                     raise ResultUnavailableError("result_external_resolver_required")
                 resolved = self.action_resolver(
-                    identity.user_id, selected["action_ref"], settings=settings,
+                    identity.user_id, selected["action_ref"], settings=settings, user_roles=list(identity.roles),
                 )
                 origin = get_action_origin(resolved)
                 if not isinstance(resolved, dict):

docs/explanation/features/CONTROL_CENTER_ACTION.md

@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
 
 **Version implemented:** 0.261.301
 
+**Updated in version: 0.261.329.** Orchestration forwards authenticated roles
+through worker preflight and retained-result authorization. See the
+[role propagation fix](../fixes/CONTROL_CENTER_ORCHESTRATION_ROLE_PROPAGATION_FIX.md).
+
 **Dependencies:** Semantic Kernel actions (`enable_semantic_kernel`), Chat Orchestration with Action Access for chat use, the V2 Control Center Dashboard, and the existing Control Center role settings.
 
 ## Technical specifications
@@ -29,7 +33,14 @@
 2. Resolving the action's manifest for a plan step refuses anyone else.
 3. Every function re-reads the capabilities from the signed-in session before reading data.
 
-Orchestration captures the caller's roles with their identity and passes them explicitly to the catalog and manifest resolution, including on its worker threads, where the run re-enters a request context carrying the authenticated session. A scheduled workflow run has no signed-in session, so the action refuses it. Any failure to determine access refuses the call.
+Orchestration captures the caller's roles with their authenticated identity and
+passes them explicitly to catalog discovery and exact manifest resolution.
+Worker preflight, result admission, and retained-result reads do not need a Flask
+request context: their external-source identity reader supplies those roles.
+Actual plugin calls use the existing execution bridge to re-enter a request
+context carrying the authenticated session. A scheduled workflow run has no
+signed-in session, so the action refuses it. Any failure to determine access
+refuses the call.
 
 The type is global-only. Personal and group workspaces cannot list, create or save it; an administrator creates it in **Admin Settings › Agents & Actions › Global Actions**.
 
@@ -105,6 +116,7 @@
 
 - `functional_tests/test_v2_control_center_action.py`: refusal without dashboard access and outside a signed-in request, role rules through the real capability function, bounded chartable rows, validation before reads, generic storage errors, no writes, kernel function parameters, schema registration, readiness rules and remedies, admin-only links that match real Admin Settings sections and the browser allowlist, and the readiness route.
 - `functional_tests/test_orchestration_action_catalog.py`: the action is offered and resolved only to dashboard viewers, never outside global scope, and the type is refused for personal and group governance.
+- `functional_tests/test_control_center_orchestration_roles.py`: real worker preflight, acquisition checks, result admission, and fresh-provider retained reads with authenticated roles; denial after access changes and refusal of stale catalogs or saved/ambient roles.
 - `functional_tests/test_v2_control_center_dashboard.py`: the shared aggregation and reports.
 - `ui_tests/test_v2_control_center_dashboard.py`: the checklist, **Check again**, and the prompt hand-off into a new orchestrated chat.
 

docs/explanation/features/ORCHESTRATION_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ACCESS.md

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ refused just before it ran. Each refusal is now logged with the check that faile
 See the [agent document type fix](../fixes/ORCHESTRATION_AGENT_DOCUMENT_TYPE_FIX.md)
 ([#1699](https://github.com/microsoft/simplechat/issues/1699)).
 
+**Updated in version: 0.261.329.** Action discovery and exact manifest resolution
+receive the authenticated external-source identity's roles explicitly. Control
+Center actions therefore remain available to authorized callers during worker
+preflight and retained-result reads without a Flask request context. See the
+[Control Center role propagation fix](../fixes/CONTROL_CENTER_ORCHESTRATION_ROLE_PROPAGATION_FIX.md).
+
 ## Purpose and scope
 
 An external Gather result is the content an authorized adapter actually returned,
@@ -68,6 +74,12 @@ is refused as `result_external_source_unavailable`, and a narrowed catalog with
 more than one agent is refused. The pick only selects a record from the current
 catalog; its own name, scope and ID fields are never proof of access. Action steps
 never receive the pick.
+For action steps, the provider passes `user_roles=list(identity.roles)` to both
+the action catalog reader and exact manifest resolver. Injected action callbacks
+must accept this keyword. These roles come from the current authenticated
+external-source identity, never a saved run or plan; the absence of a Flask
+request on a worker is not a reason to drop them. Agent callbacks do not receive
+this action-specific keyword.
 Membership in a catalog alone is insufficient: the provider also calls
 `resolve_delegation_agent` or `resolve_action_manifest` for the exact stored
 integration. These existing APIs recheck scope membership, governance, enablement,

docs/explanation/fixes/CONTROL_CENTER_ORCHESTRATION_ROLE_PROPAGATION_FIX.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Control Center Orchestration Role Propagation Fix
+
+**Version: 0.261.329**
+
+Fixed in version: **0.261.329**, recorded in
+`application/single_app/config.py`.
+
+## Issue
+
+A signed-in Control Center viewer could ask orchestration to compare dashboard
+activity and chart daily trends. Planning selected the Control Center action, but
+execution reported that the action was unavailable. The dependent summary and
+chart were not delivered.
+
+Application Insights and App Service console logs identified an
+`external_source_preflight` refusal for `action_invoke`, with
+`authority_reason=result_external_source_unavailable` and
+`reason=selection_not_in_catalog`. The executor reported
+`failure_code=integration_unavailable`. This happened before a Control Center
+tool call, not while querying dashboard data.
+
+## Root cause
+
+Orchestration executes on a worker without the original Flask request context.
+Its external-source identity reader captures the signed-in session's roles before
+the worker starts and rechecks the actor's current conversation and user access.
+Planning already supplied those roles to action discovery.
+
+`OrchestrationExternalSourceProvider` did not forward that identity's roles to
+either the action catalog reader or the exact action manifest resolver. Those
+boundaries correctly refuse Control Center access without an authenticated role.
+Their fallback to the current request session found no session on the worker, so
+the catalog hid an action the planner had just selected.
+
+Correcting discovery alone was insufficient: exact manifest resolution then
+refused the same caller with `integration_access_denied`.
+
+## Changes
+
+The provider now supplies `user_roles=list(identity.roles)` when discovering
+actions and resolving the selected action's exact manifest. Both operations use
+the existing authenticated identity reader, not roles from a saved plan, run,
+action record, or browser input.
+
+These shared boundaries apply before invocation, during session-trusted
+acquisition checks, when admitting results, and when reopening retained results.
+The agent catalog callback and hand-selected-agent narrowing are unchanged.
+Injected action catalog readers and resolvers accept the existing `user_roles`
+keyword used by their production counterparts.
+
+Permission rules have not changed:
+
+- Only a caller whose current roles and Control Center settings grant dashboard
+  access can use the global Control Center action.
+- Current action enablement, governance, exact scope, and conversation access are
+  still checked.
+- Saved or ambient roles cannot override the authenticated external-source
+  identity.
+- Runs without a signed-in session remain refused. Plugin functions still check
+  the signed-in session through the existing execution bridge before reading data.
+
+No route, dashboard query, frontend control, deployment setting, or storage schema
+changed.
+
+## Files modified
+
+| File | Change |
+| --- | --- |
+| `application/single_app/functions_orchestration_external_sources.py` | Forward authenticated roles to both action authorization boundaries. |
+| `application/single_app/config.py` | Application patch version `0.261.329`. |
+| `functional_tests/test_control_center_orchestration_roles.py` | Worker-context, exact-resolution, retained-result, and permission-revocation regressions. |
+| Existing external-source, pre-effect, bootstrap, and seeded-agent tests | Accept and verify the action callback role parameter without changing the agent protocol. |
+| `docs/explanation/features/CONTROL_CENTER_ACTION.md` | Explain worker preflight versus the plugin's signed-in execution bridge. |
+| `docs/explanation/features/ORCHESTRATION_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ACCESS.md` | Document the authenticated action callback contract. |
+
+## Validation
+
+The new regressions exercise the real external-source provider, action catalog,
+and exact manifest resolver over existing isolated storage fixtures. Networking
+is blocked. The role rule is the shipped Control Center capability function,
+loaded through the existing bootstrap-free test helper.
+
+The three allowed-role worker cases and the independent exact-resolution case
+failed against the provider before this fix. The worker cases reproduced
+`selection_not_in_catalog`; the exact-resolution case reproduced
+`integration_access_denied`.
+
+| Scenario | Before | After |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Admin or permitted dedicated Control Center viewer on a worker | Selected action refused before a tool call. | Preflight, acquisition checks, admission, persistence, and fresh-provider reads succeed. |
+| Discovery succeeds but exact resolution has no Flask session | Manifest resolution refused the authorized caller. | Exact resolution receives the authenticated roles. |
+| Dashboard access, action enablement, or governance revoked | Access must be refused. | Preflight and retained reads still refuse access. |
+| Stale catalog or saved/ambient Admin roles | Must not grant access. | Exact resolution and current identity checks refuse access. |
+
+Related suites cover existing action governance, session identity capture,
+session-trusted result access, bootstrap and preflight wiring, selected-agent
+behavior, and the read-only Control Center plugin. The combined run passed
+**533 tests and 276 subtests** with the application's pinned Flask, Werkzeug,
+and Semantic Kernel versions in an isolated test environment. Documentation
+coverage passed all seven checks; documentation site quality passed all six.
+
+Live deployment and chat retry are separate from this code fix and were not
+performed.
+
+## Related documentation
+
+- [Control Center action](../features/CONTROL_CENTER_ACTION.md)
+- [Retained orchestration external source access](../features/ORCHESTRATION_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ACCESS.md)