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Greptile SummaryThe PR introduces a strict synchronous prompt-policy HTTP client and signed-bundle contract with source hashing, deployment identity, audience and validity checks, Ed25519 verification, and typed API errors.
Confidence Score: 4/5The response-size bug should be fixed before merging because the client can reject policy bundles that satisfy its own decoded-source contract; transport validation is also worth tightening before production wiring. The client limits encoded JSON to roughly the same size as the allowed decoded source even though JSON escaping can expand valid content substantially, causing silent truncation followed by decoding failure. Files Needing Attention: internal/promptpolicy/client.go
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| Filename | Overview |
|---|---|
| internal/promptpolicy/client.go | Adds the synchronous authenticated client, but its encoded-response bound can truncate valid bundles and URL validation does not enforce the established secure-transport boundary. |
| internal/promptpolicy/contract.go | Defines strict V2 bundle decoding, validation, hashing, and identity calculation; its decoded source limit exposes the client's undersized wire bound. |
| internal/promptpolicy/verifier.go | Adds cloned trust-key storage, audience and validity checks, Ed25519 verification, and strict public-key parsing without an independently established defect. |
| internal/promptpolicy/client_test.go | Covers the request route and typed HTTP errors but does not exercise encoded responses that expand beyond the decoded policy limit. |
| internal/promptpolicy/contract_test.go | Covers valid signatures, source tampering, audience mismatch, strict JSON decoding, and trust-key parsing. |
Sequence Diagram
sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant Client as Prompt-policy client
participant API as Policy API
participant Verifier
Caller->>Client: Put(token, prompt, audience, parent)
Client->>API: PUT prompt-policy resource
API-->>Client: Signed policy bundle
Client->>Client: Strict decode and structural validation
Client-->>Caller: Bundle
Caller->>Verifier: Verify(bundle, expected audience)
Verifier->>Verifier: Recompute source hash and identity
Verifier->>Verifier: Check audience, parent, validity window
Verifier->>Verifier: Verify Ed25519 signature
Verifier-->>Caller: Accepted or verification error
Reviews (1): Last reviewed commit: "feat(policy): verify signed prompt polic..." | Re-trigger Greptile
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| return Bundle{}, fmt.Errorf("send prompt-policy request: %w", err) | ||
| } | ||
| defer response.Body.Close() | ||
| data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, maxPolicySetBytes+64*1024)) |
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When a contract-valid policy near the 1 MiB decoded limit contains JSON-escaped characters, this reader truncates the encoded response before DecodeBundle sees it, causing a valid bundle to fail JSON decoding.
| data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, maxPolicySetBytes+64*1024)) | |
| data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 6*maxPolicySetBytes+64*1024)) |
| if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" { | ||
| return nil, errors.New("invalid prompt-policy base URL") | ||
| } | ||
| if httpClient == nil { |
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NewClient accepts non-loopback HTTP and arbitrary schemes even though Put sends bearer credentials and prompt contents through the resulting URL. Enforcing the repository's HTTPS-or-loopback-HTTP boundary here prevents future client wiring from exposing those values over plaintext and rejects unsupported schemes during configuration. How this was verified: The new URL check was compared with the HTTPS-or-loopback guards used by both sibling authenticated clients.
Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!
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tumberger
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ENG-624 CLI stack 2/6; stacked on #466.
Adds the strict V2 synchronous prompt-policy client, portable deployment-identity calculation, source-hash checks, audience/parent/TTL validation, bounded response sizes, and typed HTTP failures.
Bundles are validated as live HTTPS responses and activated only after their complete authority-bearing identity is recomputed. No signing keys or policy-signature configuration are required.