host_orchestrator: reject archive entries that escape the extraction dir - #3015
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0405ysj wants to merge 2 commits into
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host_orchestrator: reject archive entries that escape the extraction dir#30150405ysj wants to merge 2 commits into
0405ysj wants to merge 2 commits into
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The user-artifacts extractor (ExtractArtifact -> untar/unzip) joined attacker-controlled archive entry names onto the destination directory with no containment check and created symlink entries verbatim, allowing a crafted .tar.gz/.zip to write files outside the extraction directory Add isSafeToExtract() and use it in untar and unzip to verify each entry's resolved path stays within the destination, and reuse it to reject symlink entries whose resolved target escapes it. Add regression tests for the tar-traversal, tar-symlink and zip-traversal vectors.
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August 13, 2026 04:15
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The user-artifacts extractor (ExtractArtifact -> untar/unzip) joined attacker-controlled archive entry names onto the destination directory with no containment check and created symlink entries verbatim, allowing a crafted .tar.gz/.zip to write files outside the extraction directory
Add isSafeToExtract() and use it in untar and unzip to verify each entry's resolved path stays within the destination, and reuse it to reject symlink entries whose resolved target escapes it. Add regression tests for the tar-traversal, tar-symlink and zip-traversal vectors.