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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions archive-tar.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ static size_t get_path_prefix(const char *path, size_t pathlen, size_t maxlen)
i--;
if (i > maxlen)
i = maxlen;
if (!i)
return 0;
do {
i--;
} while (i > 0 && path[i] != '/');
Expand Down
26 changes: 24 additions & 2 deletions date.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1298,7 +1298,18 @@ static const char *approxidate_alpha(const char *date, struct tm *tm, struct tm
while (tl->type) {

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Junio C Hamano wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

"Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget" <gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
writes:

> On platforms where `time_t` is unsigned (and where the pre-processor
> allows us to determine this fact), reject counts that are too large and
> report a parse error. Narrowing them first could otherwise produce
> negative or truncated values that become bogus offsets. Leave signed
> `time_t` count parsing unchanged.

Does this mean that "git log -p" in a project that were made on
reasonably sized platforms and then cloned to my box may cause the
history traversal to stop with an error when a commit has author or
committer timestamp that would not fit the time_t on my box?

It would have been horrible regression than showing the entire
history with patches with bogus timestamp if it were the case.

But I do not think that is what happens.  approxidate_careful() is
only used to parse input by local user (e.g., "git commit
--date="...", "git log @{...}"), and the changes in this patch would
not affect behaviours of other uses of timestamps, so we are safe.

> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> ---
>  date.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/date.c b/date.c
> index 014065b419..0d65804d2f 100644
> --- a/date.c
> +++ b/date.c
> @@ -1298,7 +1298,18 @@ static const char *approxidate_alpha(const char *date, struct tm *tm, struct tm
>  	while (tl->type) {
>  		size_t len = strlen(tl->type);
>  		if (match_string(date, tl->type) >= len-1) {
> -			update_tm(tm, now, tl->length * *num);
> +			time_t length = tl->length, num_t = *num;
> +			time_t seconds;
> +#ifndef is_unsigned_type
> +			seconds = length * num_t;
> +#else
> +			time_t max_val = is_unsigned_type(length)
> +				? maximum_unsigned_value_of_type(length)
> +				: maximum_signed_value_of_type(length);
> +			seconds = mult_overflows(length, num_t)
> +				? max_val : length * num_t;
> +#endif
> +			update_tm(tm, now, seconds);
>  			*num = 0;
>  			*touched = 1;
>  			return end;
> @@ -1368,8 +1379,15 @@ static const char *approxidate_digit(const char *date, struct tm *tm, int *num,
>  	}
>  
>  	/* Accept zero-padding only for small numbers ("Dec 02", never "Dec 0002") */
> -	if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2)
> +	if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2) {
> +#ifdef is_unsigned_type
> +		if (is_unsigned_type((time_t)0) &&
> +		    (number > INT_MAX ||
> +		     number > maximum_unsigned_value_of_type((time_t)0)))
> +			return NULL;
> +#endif
>  		*num = number;
> +	}
>  	return end;
>  }
>  
> @@ -1398,6 +1416,10 @@ static timestamp_t approxidate_str(const char *date,
>  		if (isdigit(c)) {
>  			pending_number(&tm, &number);
>  			date = approxidate_digit(date-1, &tm, &number, time_sec);
> +			if (!date) {
> +				*error_ret = 1;
> +				return 0;
> +			}
>  			touched = 1;
>  			continue;
>  		}

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Phillip Wood wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Hi Johannes

On 14/10/2026 07:09, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
> From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> > The `approxidate_alpha()` function multiplies a time unit length (e.g.,
> 604800 for weeks) by a user-supplied number to compute a time offset in
> seconds. Both operands are `int`, and the product is passed to
> `update_tm()` as `time_t`. For inputs like "99999 weeks ago", the int
> multiplication overflows (604800 * 99999 is roughly 60 billion, far
> beyond `INT_MAX`), producing a wrapped value that results in a wrong
> date.

Signed integer overflow is undefined so we don't necessarily get a wrapped value - the whole program is invalid.

It looks like "length" is always positive, can the user supplied number ever be negative?

> Use the checked `time_t` multiplication so oversized products do not
> overflow or wrap around.

This is only true when compiling with gcc or clang though because mult_overflows() always returns 0 on other compilers, so we're still exposed to undefined behavior when compiling with a different compiler on platforms where time_t is signed. I wonder if it would be better to perform the multiplication on a known type and then check that the result can be losslessly converted to time_t

	intmax_t length tl->length, num_t = *num, result;

	if (signed_mult_overflows(length, num_t))
		// error
	result = length * num_t;
	if ((intmax_t)((time_t)result) != result ||
	    (result < 0 && (time_t)result > 0))
		// error

that would avoid overflow on all platforms, regardless of the compiler and regardless of the type of time_t. Having mult_overflows() only implemented for gcc seems like a footgun waiting to happen when we're typically checking for overflow to avoid some form of bad behavior.

> On platforms where `time_t` is unsigned (and where the pre-processor
> allows us to determine this fact), reject counts that are too large and
> report a parse error. Narrowing them first could otherwise produce
> negative or truncated values that become bogus offsets. Leave signed
> `time_t` count parsing unchanged.

I'm a bit confused what this is trying to do - why can't we check this when time_t is signed?

	if ((timestamp_t)((int)number) != number)
		return NULL

	return *val = value;

Ensures "value" fits in "val" without truncation, we could also add a check that value is positive when time_t is unsigned if we wanted.

Thanks

Phillip
> Pointed out by Coverity.
> > Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-6.1 Sol
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> ---
>   date.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > diff --git a/date.c b/date.c
> index 014065b419..0d65804d2f 100644
> --- a/date.c
> +++ b/date.c
> @@ -1298,7 +1298,18 @@ static const char *approxidate_alpha(const char *date, struct tm *tm, struct tm
>   	while (tl->type) {
>   		size_t len = strlen(tl->type);
>   		if (match_string(date, tl->type) >= len-1) {
> -			update_tm(tm, now, tl->length * *num);
> +			time_t length = tl->length, num_t = *num;
> +			time_t seconds;
> +#ifndef is_unsigned_type
> +			seconds = length * num_t;
> +#else
> +			time_t max_val = is_unsigned_type(length)
> +				? maximum_unsigned_value_of_type(length)
> +				: maximum_signed_value_of_type(length);
> +			seconds = mult_overflows(length, num_t)
> +				? max_val : length * num_t;
> +#endif
> +			update_tm(tm, now, seconds);
>   			*num = 0;
>   			*touched = 1;
>   			return end;
> @@ -1368,8 +1379,15 @@ static const char *approxidate_digit(const char *date, struct tm *tm, int *num,
>   	}
>   >   	/* Accept zero-padding only for small numbers ("Dec 02", never "Dec 0002") */
> -	if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2)
> +	if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2) {
> +#ifdef is_unsigned_type
> +		if (is_unsigned_type((time_t)0) &&
> +		    (number > INT_MAX ||
> +		     number > maximum_unsigned_value_of_type((time_t)0)))
> +			return NULL;
> +#endif
>   		*num = number;
> +	}
>   	return end;
>   }
>   > @@ -1398,6 +1416,10 @@ static timestamp_t approxidate_str(const char *date,
>   		if (isdigit(c)) {
>   			pending_number(&tm, &number);
>   			date = approxidate_digit(date-1, &tm, &number, time_sec);
> +			if (!date) {
> +				*error_ret = 1;
> +				return 0;
> +			}
>   			touched = 1;
>   			continue;
>   		}

size_t len = strlen(tl->type);
if (match_string(date, tl->type) >= len-1) {
update_tm(tm, now, tl->length * *num);
time_t length = tl->length, num_t = *num;
time_t seconds;
#ifndef is_unsigned_type
seconds = length * num_t;
#else
time_t max_val = is_unsigned_type(length)
? maximum_unsigned_value_of_type(length)
: maximum_signed_value_of_type(length);
seconds = mult_overflows(length, num_t)
? max_val : length * num_t;
#endif
update_tm(tm, now, seconds);
*num = 0;
*touched = 1;
return end;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1368,8 +1379,15 @@ static const char *approxidate_digit(const char *date, struct tm *tm, int *num,
}

/* Accept zero-padding only for small numbers ("Dec 02", never "Dec 0002") */
if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2)
if (date[0] != '0' || end - date <= 2) {
#ifdef is_unsigned_type
if (is_unsigned_type((time_t)0) &&
(number > INT_MAX ||
number > maximum_unsigned_value_of_type((time_t)0)))
return NULL;
#endif
*num = number;
}
return end;
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1398,6 +1416,10 @@ static timestamp_t approxidate_str(const char *date,
if (isdigit(c)) {
pending_number(&tm, &number);
date = approxidate_digit(date-1, &tm, &number, time_sec);
if (!date) {
*error_ret = 1;
return 0;
}
touched = 1;
continue;
}
Expand Down
54 changes: 54 additions & 0 deletions git-compat-util.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -85,9 +85,27 @@ struct strbuf;

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Phillip Wood wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Hi Johannes

On 14/10/2026 07:09, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
> From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> > `unsigned_mult_overflows()` does not cover signed arithmetic, but types
> such as `time_t` can be signed or unsigned. Add signed and type-generic
> guards so callers can check multiplication overflow in either case.

It would have been nice to mention that the type-generic macro is gcc only so we cannot rely on this for safety checks.

>   #define maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) \
>       (INTMAX_MAX >> (bitsizeof(intmax_t) - bitsizeof(a)))
>   > +/* Account for the extra negative value on two's-complement targets. */
> +#define minimum_signed_value_of_type(a) \
> +    (-maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) - (INTMAX_MIN < -INTMAX_MAX))

Do we support any platforms that do not use two's complement arithmetic? C23 makes it mandatory so presumably there are not may contemporary platforms out there that do not use it.

> +/*
> + * Returns true if the multiplication of "a" and "b" will
> + * overflow or underflow a signed type. The types of "a" and "b"
> + * must match and must be signed. Note that this macro evaluates
> + * both "a" and "b" twice!

At least twice I think

> + */
> +#define signed_mult_overflows(a, b) \

As the macro relies on both operands being the same width, can we use BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO() to ensure sizeof(a) == sizeof(b) here?

> +    (((a) > 0 && (b) > 0 && (a) > maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (b)) || \
> +     ((a) < 0 && (b) < 0 && (a) < maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (b)) || \
> +     ((a) > 0 && (b) < 0 && (b) < minimum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (a)) || \
> +     ((a) < 0 && (b) > 0 && (a) < minimum_signed_value_of_type(b) / (b)))

Thanks

Phillip

> +
> +/*
> + * Returns true if the product of "a" and "b", after the usual arithmetic
> + * conversions, cannot be represented in the multiplication expression's
> + * type. The operands must be integers and may be evaluated more than once.
> + */
> +#if GIT_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 1)
> +#define mult_overflows(a, b) \
> +    (is_unsigned_type((a) * (b)) \
> +     ? unsigned_mult_overflows((__typeof__((a) * (b)))(a), \
> +			       (__typeof__((a) * (b)))(b)) \
> +     : signed_mult_overflows((__typeof__((a) * (b)))(a), \
> +			     (__typeof__((a) * (b)))(b)))
> +#else
> +/*
> + * This implementation needs GNU `typeof` to convert both operands to the
> + * multiplication's type. Skip the check without that extension.
> + */
> +#define mult_overflows(a, b) 0
> +#endif
> +
>   /*
>    * Returns true if the left shift of "a" by "shift" bits will
>    * overflow. The type of "a" must be unsigned.

#define bitsizeof(x) (CHAR_BIT * sizeof(x))

#if GIT_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 1)
#define is_unsigned_type(a) ((__typeof__(a))-1 >= 0)
#elif __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L
#define is_unsigned_type(a) _Generic((a), \
unsigned char: 1, \
unsigned short: 1, \
unsigned int: 1, \
unsigned long: 1, \
unsigned long long: 1, \
_Bool: 1, \
char: (CHAR_MIN == 0), \
default: 0)
#endif

#define maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) \
(INTMAX_MAX >> (bitsizeof(intmax_t) - bitsizeof(a)))

/* Account for the extra negative value on two's-complement targets. */
#define minimum_signed_value_of_type(a) \
(-maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) - (INTMAX_MIN < -INTMAX_MAX))

#define maximum_unsigned_value_of_type(a) \
(UINTMAX_MAX >> (bitsizeof(uintmax_t) - bitsizeof(a)))

Expand All @@ -111,6 +129,38 @@ struct strbuf;
#define unsigned_mult_overflows(a, b) \
((a) && (b) > maximum_unsigned_value_of_type(a) / (a))

/*
* Returns true if the multiplication of "a" and "b" will
* overflow or underflow a signed type. The types of "a" and "b"
* must match and must be signed. Note that this macro evaluates
* both "a" and "b" twice!
*/
#define signed_mult_overflows(a, b) \
(((a) > 0 && (b) > 0 && (a) > maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (b)) || \
((a) < 0 && (b) < 0 && (a) < maximum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (b)) || \
((a) > 0 && (b) < 0 && (b) < minimum_signed_value_of_type(a) / (a)) || \
((a) < 0 && (b) > 0 && (a) < minimum_signed_value_of_type(b) / (b)))

/*
* Returns true if the product of "a" and "b", after the usual arithmetic
* conversions, cannot be represented in the multiplication expression's
* type. The operands must be integers and may be evaluated more than once.
*/
#if GIT_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 1)
#define mult_overflows(a, b) \
(is_unsigned_type((a) * (b)) \
? unsigned_mult_overflows((__typeof__((a) * (b)))(a), \
(__typeof__((a) * (b)))(b)) \
: signed_mult_overflows((__typeof__((a) * (b)))(a), \
(__typeof__((a) * (b)))(b)))
#else
/*
* This implementation needs GNU `typeof` to convert both operands to the
* multiplication's type. Skip the check without that extension.
*/
#define mult_overflows(a, b) 0
#endif

/*
* Returns true if the left shift of "a" by "shift" bits will
* overflow. The type of "a" must be unsigned.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -740,6 +790,10 @@ static inline uint64_t u64_add(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
*/

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Phillip Wood wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Hi Johannes

On 14/10/2026 07:09, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
> From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> > Both the `read_in_full()` as well as the `write_in_full()` function
> accumulate the bytes transferred count in a variable of type `ssize_t`,
> but accept a `size_t` count parameter. When count exceeds `SSIZE_MAX`,
> that total count overflows after processing `SSIZE_MAX` bytes, producing
> a negative return value that callers interpret as an error (or worse, a
> small positive value after further wrapping).
> > In practice, git never passes such large counts because file sizes and
> buffer allocations are bounded well below SSIZE_MAX on all target
> platforms. Are we sure about that? In the past we've had bug fixes such as c14e5a1a50 (transport-helper: use xread instead of read, 2019-01-03)
on platforms where ssize_t is narrower that size_t (POSIX does not require them to be the same width). I've cc'd Randall to see if ssize_t is still narrower than size_t on the NonStop platforms git supports.

Thanks

Phillip

> The POSIX specification for `read()` and `write()` also
> limits single operations to `SSIZE_MAX` bytes, and git's
> `xread()`/`xwrite()` wrappers further clamp to `MAX_IO_SIZE`. But the
> accumulation in the `*_in_full()` wrappers means that even with per-call
> clamping, total can exceed `SSIZE_MAX` when count does.
> > Reject a total count that exceeds the range of `ssize_t` upfront with
> `EINVAL` rather than silently producing wrong return values, matching
> the POSIX convention for invalid arguments.
> > Pointed out by Coverity.
> > Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
> ---
>   git-compat-util.h |  4 ++++
>   wrapper.c         | 10 ++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
> > diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h
> index a0f901ce79..afce8b85b8 100644
> --- a/git-compat-util.h
> +++ b/git-compat-util.h
> @@ -740,6 +740,10 @@ static inline uint64_t u64_add(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
>    */
>   #define DEFAULT_IO_BUFFER_SIZE (128 * 1024)
>   > +#ifndef SSIZE_MAX
> +# define SSIZE_MAX ((ssize_t)(((size_t)-1) >> 1))
> +#endif
> +
>   #ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
>   # include <alloca.h>
>   # define xalloca(size)      (alloca(size))
> diff --git a/wrapper.c b/wrapper.c
> index 05a9cd369c..ea9c14f834 100644
> --- a/wrapper.c
> +++ b/wrapper.c
> @@ -288,6 +288,11 @@ ssize_t read_in_full(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
>   	char *p = buf;
>   	ssize_t total = 0;
>   > +	if (count > SSIZE_MAX) {
> +		errno = EINVAL;
> +		return -1;
> +	}
> +
>   	while (count > 0) {
>   		ssize_t loaded = xread(fd, p, count);
>   		if (loaded < 0)
> @@ -307,6 +312,11 @@ ssize_t write_in_full(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
>   	const char *p = buf;
>   	ssize_t total = 0;
>   > +	if (count > SSIZE_MAX) {
> +		errno = EINVAL;
> +		return -1;
> +	}
> +
>   	while (count > 0) {
>   		ssize_t written = xwrite(fd, p, count);
>   		if (written < 0)

#define DEFAULT_IO_BUFFER_SIZE (128 * 1024)

#ifndef SSIZE_MAX
# define SSIZE_MAX ((ssize_t)(((size_t)-1) >> 1))
#endif

#ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
# include <alloca.h>
# define xalloca(size) (alloca(size))
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion http.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2848,7 +2848,7 @@ static size_t fwrite_sha1_file(char *ptr, size_t eltsize, size_t nmemb,
{

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Patrick Steinhardt wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 06:09:28AM +0000, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
> diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
> index 4af3c29c76..809471f436 100644
> --- a/http.c
> +++ b/http.c
> @@ -2848,7 +2848,7 @@ static size_t fwrite_sha1_file(char *ptr, size_t eltsize, size_t nmemb,
>  {
>  	unsigned char expn[4096];
>  	size_t size = eltsize * nmemb;
> -	int posn = 0;
> +	size_t posn = 0;
>  	struct http_object_request *freq = data;
>  	struct active_request_slot *slot = freq->slot;

Right. This is how we access the variable:

	do {
		ssize_t retval = xwrite(freq->localfile,
					(char *) ptr + posn, size - posn);
		if (retval < 0)
			return posn / eltsize;
		posn += retval;
	} while (posn < size);

So it's clear that it doesn't have to be signed either, as we only ever
add positive values to it.

Patrick

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Junio C Hamano wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> writes:

> On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 06:09:28AM +0000, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
>> diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
>> index 4af3c29c76..809471f436 100644
>> --- a/http.c
>> +++ b/http.c
>> @@ -2848,7 +2848,7 @@ static size_t fwrite_sha1_file(char *ptr, size_t eltsize, size_t nmemb,
>>  {
>>  	unsigned char expn[4096];
>>  	size_t size = eltsize * nmemb;
>> -	int posn = 0;
>> +	size_t posn = 0;
>>  	struct http_object_request *freq = data;
>>  	struct active_request_slot *slot = freq->slot;
>
> Right. This is how we access the variable:
>
> 	do {
> 		ssize_t retval = xwrite(freq->localfile,
> 					(char *) ptr + posn, size - posn);
> 		if (retval < 0)
> 			return posn / eltsize;
> 		posn += retval;
> 	} while (posn < size);
>
> So it's clear that it doesn't have to be signed either, as we only ever
> add positive values to it.

I agree that changing the type of posn from int to size_t is the
right move.

But I wondered what happens when (size - posn) is larger than half
the range of the ssize_t type early in the loop.  After all, the
proposed commit log message worries about the case where HTTP
response body exceeds 2GB.

Shouldn't the loop clamp the bytecount passed to xwrite() below
whatever would fit in ssize_t when successful?  It may end up making
two calls of xwrite, writing 1.5GB each, to write out 3GB payload,
but that would be better than attempting to write 3GB, succeed, and
be fooled by ssize_t that is narrower by size_t by at least one bit
that we got a negative return from xwrite() and return an error from
here, when in reality we have written them all?

    ... goes and looks ... 

Ah, nevermind.  The big comment in git-compat-util.h before
MAX_IO_SIZE clarifies all of the above.  In short, xwrite() takes
care of clamping, so its callers including this code do not have to
worry about it.

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Simon Richter wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Hi,

On 10/16/26 23:30, Junio C Hamano wrote:

> I agree that changing the type of posn from int to size_t is the
> right move.

It is a position in a file that is being read as binary data[1], so off_t would be the best choice I think.

That is still signed, but it can't overflow, because opening large files requires O_LARGEFILE, which is available only if large file support is enabled, which conveniently makes sure that off_t is 64 bit.

   Simon

[1] to make a distinction from the use case for fpos_t

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Junio C Hamano wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Simon Richter <Simon.Richter@hogyros.de> writes:

>> I agree that changing the type of posn from int to size_t is the
>> right move.
>
> It is a position in a file that is being read as binary data[1], so 
> off_t would be the best choice I think.

Hmm, interesting.  The function writes out eltsize * nmemb (both are
of type size_t) bytes, so the total could theoretically exceed the
range that fits size_t.

But the thing is that posn is used this way

		ssize_t retval = xwrite(freq->localfile,
					(char *) ptr + posn, size - posn);

to offset into a contiguous in-core region that starts at ptr.  I am
not sure if (ptr + posn) is still valid for posn that is too large
to fit in size_t, though.

To put it differently, we are writing out what is in the contiguous
in-core region and posn runs up to the allocation size of that
region, which should be measured in size_t, no?

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Junio C Hamano wrote on the Git mailing list (how to reply to this email):

Simon Richter <Simon.Richter@hogyros.de> writes:

>> I agree that changing the type of posn from int to size_t is the
>> right move.
>
> It is a position in a file that is being read as binary data[1], so 
> off_t would be the best choice I think.

Interesting.

The function writes out eltsize * nmemb bytes (both of type
size_t), which means the product could theoretically exceed the
range of size_t.  However, posn is used in xwrite() to offset
into a contiguous in-core buffer starting at ptr:

        ssize_t retval = xwrite(freq->localfile,
                                (char *) ptr + posn,
                                size - posn);

Because we are indexing into an allocated in-core region, any
valid offset must fit within size_t.  If posn were to exceed
the bounds of size_t, the pointer arithmetic ptr + posn would
already be invalid.  As posn only runs up to the allocation
size of the region, it indeed should be measured in size_t, no?

unsigned char expn[4096];
size_t size = eltsize * nmemb;
int posn = 0;
size_t posn = 0;
struct http_object_request *freq = data;
struct active_request_slot *slot = freq->slot;

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10 changes: 10 additions & 0 deletions wrapper.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -288,6 +288,11 @@ ssize_t read_in_full(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
char *p = buf;
ssize_t total = 0;

if (count > SSIZE_MAX) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}

while (count > 0) {
ssize_t loaded = xread(fd, p, count);
if (loaded < 0)
Expand All @@ -307,6 +312,11 @@ ssize_t write_in_full(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
const char *p = buf;
ssize_t total = 0;

if (count > SSIZE_MAX) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}

while (count > 0) {
ssize_t written = xwrite(fd, p, count);
if (written < 0)
Expand Down
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