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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action to v7 #33

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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action to v7 #33

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/ci.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
node-version: [24]

@kody-ai kody-ai Bot Jun 18, 2026

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kody code-review Security high

Security risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml arises from pull_request_target granting untrusted fork code access to repository secrets and elevated permissions. Remove the trigger or migrate to pull_request to prevent unauthorized secret exposure.

on:
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]
# remove pull_request_target unless you intentionally need base-repo context with secrets
Prompt for LLM 

File .github/workflows/ci.yml:

Line 19:

WHAT: The workflow includes pull_request_target trigger which runs in the base repository context and can expose secrets if a forked PR is checked out and untrusted code is executed. WHY: pull_request_target grants the workflow access to repository secrets and elevated permissions; although upgrading to actions/checkout@v7 appears to block checking out fork refs (reducing this risk), the presence of pull_request_target still requires deliberate validation. HOW: Validate whether pull_request_target is required; if not, prefer pull_request for running untrusted-code steps, or explicitly avoid running steps that use secrets when handling forked PRs.

Suggested Code:

on:
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]
# remove pull_request_target unless you intentionally need base-repo context with secrets

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steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1

@kody-ai kody-ai Bot Jul 21, 2026

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kody code-review Bug critical

Credential exposure risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/checkout@v7 can persist credentials to subsequent workflow steps in PRs, allowing GITHUB_TOKEN to be available to untrusted code. Disable credential persistence by adding with: persist-credentials: false to prevent exposing tokens to PR workflows.

checkout: actions/checkout@v7
    with:
      persist-credentials: false
Prompt for LLM 

File .github/workflows/ci.yml:

Line 22:

Credential exposure risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/checkout@v7 can persist credentials to subsequent workflow steps in PRs, allowing GITHUB_TOKEN to be available to untrusted code. Disable credential persistence by adding with: persist-credentials: false to prevent exposing tokens to PR workflows.

Suggested Code:

checkout: actions/checkout@v7
    with:
      persist-credentials: false

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@kody-ai kody-ai Bot Jul 21, 2026

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kody code-review Bug medium

Fetch-depth/LFS behavior risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml when upgrading to actions/checkout@v7: changes to default fetch-depth or Git LFS handling can omit tags, earlier commits, or LFS-managed files and break CI steps that rely on repository history or LFS artifacts. Explicitly set with: fetch-depth: 1 and monitor LFS behavior to preserve expected shallow-clone semantics and detect any v7-related LFS regressions.

checkout: actions/checkout@v7
    with:
      fetch-depth: 1
Prompt for LLM 

File .github/workflows/ci.yml:

Line 22:

Fetch-depth/LFS behavior risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml when upgrading to actions/checkout@v7: changes to default fetch-depth or Git LFS handling can omit tags, earlier commits, or LFS-managed files and break CI steps that rely on repository history or LFS artifacts. Explicitly set with: fetch-depth: 1 and monitor LFS behavior to preserve expected shallow-clone semantics and detect any v7-related LFS regressions.

Suggested Code:

checkout: actions/checkout@v7
    with:
      fetch-depth: 1

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- name: Setup Node.js ${{ matrix.node-version }}
uses: actions/setup-node@6044e13b5dc448c55e2357c09f80417699197238 # v6.2.0
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