Security: Potential path traversal when saving models to disk#1104
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tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoepfml:developfrom
Open
Security: Potential path traversal when saving models to disk#1104tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoepfml:developfrom
tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoepfml:developfrom
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`saveModelToDisk` builds the output path via string interpolation (`${modelFolder}/${modelFileName}`) without sanitizing `modelFileName`. If user-controlled, attackers can inject `../` sequences or absolute paths to overwrite unintended files.
Affected files: model_loader.ts
Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Problem
saveModelToDiskbuilds the output path via string interpolation (${modelFolder}/${modelFileName}) without sanitizingmodelFileName. If user-controlled, attackers can inject../sequences or absolute paths to overwrite unintended files.Severity:
highFile:
discojs-node/src/model_loader.tsSolution
Use
path.resolve/path.joinand validate that the resolved path stays inside an allowed base directory. Reject path separators inmodelFileNameor enforce a safe filename regex.Changes
discojs-node/src/model_loader.ts(modified)Testing