OpenBMP is an academic simulation-only platform with no operational deployment claim. The most realistic security concerns are:
- Supply-chain integrity of the published crates and binaries.
- Dependency vulnerabilities (RustSec advisories).
- Build-system or scenario-parser bugs that allow malformed input to cause panics, memory unsafety, or unexpected file writes.
Operational-flight, hardware-deployment, or mission-critical-software security guarantees are explicitly not in scope. OpenBMP makes no compliance claims under IEC 61508, ISO 26262, DO-178C, or equivalent regimes.
If you discover a vulnerability:
- Do not open a public GitHub issue.
- Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting if it is enabled on the repository. If it is not enabled yet, contact the repository owner through their private profile contact channel and ask for a private disclosure channel before sending exploit details.
- Include: a description, an estimate of impact, reproduction steps, and any preliminary remediation ideas.
The first public release is blocked on publishing a maintained security contact address or enabling GitHub private vulnerability reporting.
- We acknowledge reports within 5 business days.
- We aim to issue a fix or mitigation within 30 days of confirmed reports for high-severity issues; lower-severity issues may be folded into the next regular release.
- Coordinated disclosure: we credit the reporter unless they prefer anonymity.
- Security advisories are published as GitHub Security Advisories on the repository and (where appropriate) as RustSec advisories.
Until the first tagged release, only the main branch is supported.
Tagged release support begins with the first 0.1.x release.
- Releases ship a CycloneDX SBOM, dependency-audit summary, and
SLSA Build Level 2 provenance per
docs/supply-chain.md. - Yanked dependencies are blocked at CI time via
cargo deny. - crates.io publishing uses Trusted Publishing (no long-lived API tokens).
OpenBMP is academic software; nevertheless, downstream consumers embedding OpenBMP into a larger stack should:
- Verify release artifacts against the published SBOM and SLSA provenance.
- Run
cargo auditandcargo denyagainst their integration build. - Keep
tokioconfined toopenbmp-bridge(or omitopenbmp-bridgeentirely from their build). - Treat any hardware or deployment expansion as a downstream responsibility
per
docs/software-architecture.md§ Extensibility for Downstream Integration.