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…pin CI action SHAs
### Summary of Changes
Addresses security and supply-chain vulnerabilities identified during the workspace audit across `arc-node` (Findings F-02 and F-06).
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### Key Remediations
1. **Re-Enable TLS Certificate Verification (F-02 / CWE-295):**
- Commented out `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` in `deployments/monitoring/config-blockscout/frontend/frontend.env`.
- Prevents disabling certificate verification across the Node.js process, protecting outbound Blockscout traffic against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
- Documented `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` inline as the safe alternative for corporate proxy (e.g., ZScaler) environments requiring custom root certificates.
2. **Supply-Chain Integrity via Action Pinning (F-06 / CWE-829):**
- Pinned all third-party GitHub Actions in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` to immutable 40-character commit SHAs:
- `actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3`
- `actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain@166cdcfd11aee3cb47222f9ddb555ce30ddb9659 # v1`
- `taiki-e/install-action@7623a79cdfecb99d681017af368ca353d9f49bb5 # v2`
- `actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0`
- `foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@908c540300062bd5a7e473851cdb4282204cee09 # v1`
- `bufbuild/buf-action@fd21066df7214747548607aaa45548ba2b9bc1ff # v1.4.0`
- `docker/setup-buildx-action@d7f5e7f509e45cec5c76c4d5afdd7de93d0b3df5 # v4.1.0`
- `docker/build-push-action@f9f3042f7e2789586610d6e8b85c8f03e5195baf # v7.2.0`
- Retained semantic version comments for traceability while protecting CI runners from tag mutation attacks.
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### Verification
- **YAML Validation:** Verified `.github/workflows/ci.yml` with `PyYAML` (syntax and schema clean).
- **TLS Configuration:** Re-scanned active environment variables; zero active `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` instances remain.
- **Formatting:** Preserved POSIX Unix LF line endings across all modified files.
mertcano
requested review from
ZhiyuCircle,
ancazamfir,
romac and
sergio-mena
as code owners
September 23, 2026 14:31
Contributor
|
Hi @mertcano, Thank you for your interest in contributing to Arc Node. This PR has been automatically closed because it does not reference a GitHub issue. All PRs must reference an existing issue using the format To contribute properly:
Please see our CONTRIBUTING.md for more details. |
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Summary of Changes
Addresses security and supply-chain vulnerabilities identified during the workspace audit across
arc-node(Findings F-02 and F-06).Key Remediations
Re-Enable TLS Certificate Verification (F-02 / CWE-295):
NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0indeployments/monitoring/config-blockscout/frontend/frontend.env.NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTSinline as the safe alternative for corporate proxy (e.g., ZScaler) environments requiring custom root certificates.Supply-Chain Integrity via Action Pinning (F-06 / CWE-829):
.github/workflows/ci.ymlto immutable 40-character commit SHAs: -actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3-actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain@166cdcfd11aee3cb47222f9ddb555ce30ddb9659 # v1-taiki-e/install-action@7623a79cdfecb99d681017af368ca353d9f49bb5 # v2-actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0-foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@908c540300062bd5a7e473851cdb4282204cee09 # v1-bufbuild/buf-action@fd21066df7214747548607aaa45548ba2b9bc1ff # v1.4.0-docker/setup-buildx-action@d7f5e7f509e45cec5c76c4d5afdd7de93d0b3df5 # v4.1.0-docker/build-push-action@f9f3042f7e2789586610d6e8b85c8f03e5195baf # v7.2.0Verification
.github/workflows/ci.ymlwithPyYAML(syntax and schema clean).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0instances remain.