Only the latest minor (currently 0.8.x) receives security fixes. Older
versions are not maintained.
Use GitHub's private security advisory flow to report anything that affects:
- API key storage / leakage (the
~/.config/ia-pptx/credentials.jsonpath, process-list visibility, environment leakage) - Carte blanche execution scope (a path where Claude Code could run arbitrary commands the user did not explicitly authorize)
- Subprocess argument handling (
gen_image.py,freeform_helpers, pptxgenjs / WeasyPrint invocations) - Any path that downloads remote resources at install/run time
Do not open a public issue for security-relevant reports. We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours and ship a fix within 7 days for high-severity issues.
- Carte blanche is opt-in (default ON in Streamlit, can be disabled). When enabled, Claude Code has Bash/Read/Write/Edit access in a tmp cwd. Users who don't want this can disable it; the tools are then narrowed to Read (or Read+Bash if Nano Banana is on).
- API keys live at
~/.config/ia-pptx/credentials.json(mode 0600 on POSIX). They are loaded into the Python process and passed to subprocess calls. They are never logged, but they are visible viaps auxwhile a child process is running with them in argv (this is the API server's design — we don't pass keys via argv ourselves). - The skill bundle runs untrusted Claude code via Node + LibreOffice
- WeasyPrint subprocesses. None of these have network ACLs by default.