If you've found a security issue in otterly, please don't open a public GitHub issue. Instead, email:

harsh.joshi.pth@gmail.com

Use a subject line that starts with [otterly-security] so it doesn't get buried. Include:

• A description of the issue
• Steps to reproduce
• Affected versions (if known)
• Your assessment of impact

You can expect an acknowledgement within 72 hours. If the issue is confirmed, a fix and a coordinated disclosure timeline will follow.

otterly is a local transport layer. Understanding what it does (and doesn't) helps frame what counts as a vulnerability.

• Bugs in the HTTP / WebSocket server that allow unauthorized access to local routes (when OTTERLY_API_KEY is set)
• Bugs that cause otterly to mis-route requests away from the intended claude CLI invocation
• Path traversal, command injection, or similar issues in the way otterly invokes the local CLI
• DoS vectors in the server (rate limit bypass, queue starvation, etc.)
• Vulnerabilities introduced by the one runtime dependency (ws) that have a clear otterly-specific impact

• Anything in the upstream Claude Code CLI itself — please report those to Anthropic directly
• The user's choice to expose port 11434 to the public internet (this is documented as a bad idea; running otterly without OTTERLY_API_KEY on a public address is a configuration mistake, not a vulnerability)
• The user's choice to share their Claude Code subscription with others via otterly (an Anthropic ToS issue, not a security one)
• Bugs in third-party clients (OpenClaw, Cursor, Aider, etc.) that happen to use otterly

Only the latest 0.x release receives security fixes. Older versions are not patched.