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read_message allocates whatever Content-Length the peer sends: an oversized header panics the server #53
read_message trusts the peer's Content-Length and allocates that many bytes up front. A header of 18446744073709551615 panics the server with capacity overflow, and any large value reserves that much memory before a single body byte arrives.
Details
crates/lspkit-server/src/jsonrpc.rs (read_message, let mut body = vec![0u8; length];, line 181 at v0.5.0, line 187 on fix/issues-21-26-48-49) has no upper bound on length. Every lspkit language server reads its stdin through this function, so one garbled or hostile header from the client kills the process or makes it reserve gigabytes. Deslop's deslop-lsp and deslop-mcp both use it, while Deslop is already chasing multi-GB RSS reports.
Steps To Reproduce
Create a binary crate that depends on lspkit-server = "=0.5.0" and tokio.
Feed read_message the frame Content-Length: 18446744073709551615\r\n\r\n{}.
Observed: the process panics with capacity overflow. Expected: Err(FramingError::BadHeader(..)).
Details (for AI)
Add a named MAX_FRAME_BYTES constant, overridable by the server, and reject a larger Content-Length with a FramingError before allocating.
Read the body incrementally (take(length).read_to_end), so memory follows the bytes that actually arrive, never the claimed length.
Never panic on peer input (lspkit AGENTS.md: no panics in production).
Acceptance Criteria (for AI)
A failing-first black-box test sends Content-Length: 18446744073709551615 and gets Err, with no panic.
A test sends a length one byte over the cap and gets Err, while a length at the cap still decodes.
A claimed length larger than the bytes sent gets Err(Io(UnexpectedEof)) with no up-front allocation of the claimed size, shown by an allocator-bytes test (test-support/state.rs).
A spec ID cites the frame-size rule in the spec, the code and the tests.
The body is now capped and read incrementally, which I checked in the code. content_length still uses reader.read_line(&mut line) with no limit, so a header line that never ends grows line without bound.
Proof: a probe binary built against the 0dc2f04 sources read Content-Length followed by 512 MiB of A with no newline (tokio::io::repeat(b'A').take(512 MiB)). The result was Err("peer closed the stream"), after a maximum resident set size of 544,555,008 bytes. Memory follows the peer's header, which is exactly what this issue forbids.
Needed:
A named MAX_HEADER_BYTES cap on each header line and on the header block, read through take or a bounded loop.
A red-first test: an endless header line returns Err (HeaderTooLarge), and an allocator-bytes test shows the cost is bounded by the cap.
A cap on the number of header lines, so endless short headers end too.
Fixed on PR #51 in 244650b, red first: a single MAX_HEADER_BYTES (8 KiB) budget is read through take() across every header line and terminator. One endless line and endless short lines (the line-count case) both end in FramingError::HeaderTooLarge. Tests: tests/jsonrpc.rsheader_blocks_past_the_cap_are_rejected_and_one_at_the_cap_decodes (endless line, endless X: y lines, a block exactly at the cap, one byte over), plus the allocator-bytes check in tests/jsonrpc_frame_heap.rs (a 512 KiB header line allocates < 64 KiB; red was 1,056,768 bytes). DeslopClaude1 re-ran the 512 MiB probe: HeaderTooLarge at 7.6 MB RSS, down from 545 MB. The body cap is in aa25ac5. Red→green evidence: docs/plans/issue-fix-evidence-21-26-48-49.md.
✅ Released in v0.6.0 and verified against the published crates
Release:https://github.com/Nimblesite/lspkit/releases/tag/v0.6.0 (run 44186953235, tag at 8e39446). It contains lspkit, lspkit-server, lsp-profiler and lsp-profiler-dotnet 0.6.0 on crates.io, plus @nimblesite/lsp-profiler-ui@0.6.0 on npm (with provenance), the .NET engine for 6 runtime ids, the consumer kit, an SBOM, and SHA256SUMS signed with cosign.
Method: a worktree at v0.6.0, with crates/lspkit/src and crates/lspkit-server/src replaced by the sources unpacked from the crates.io 0.6.0 downloads. The published source is byte-identical to the tag. Results against the released code:
#21 sidecar_disconnect_session: test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed
#26 cancel_during_a_scan: test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed
#48 outbound: test result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed
#48 outbound_heap_leak: test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed
#48 sidecar_correlator: test result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed
#49 uri: test result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed
#49 uri_authority: test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed
#49 style_tests: test result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed
#52 pull_forget: test result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed
#52 pull_forget_heap: test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed
#53 jsonrpc: test result: ok. 21 passed; 0 failed
#53 jsonrpc_frame_heap: test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed
Breaking: the lspkit-server/mcp feature is removed. lsp_profiler::session::rfc3339_now is now lsp_profiler::clock::rfc3339_now. A lone %, or an encoded separator, in a file URI is now an error. Consumers on didClose should call PullStore::forget(uri) instead of clear().
Activity
Cap JSON-RPC frames at MAX_FRAME_BYTES and read bodies incrementally (#…
MelbourneDeveloper commentedon Nov 17, 2026
The header half is still unbounded at 0dc2f04
The body is now capped and read incrementally, which I checked in the code.
content_lengthstill usesreader.read_line(&mut line)with no limit, so a header line that never ends growslinewithout bound.Proof: a probe binary built against the
0dc2f04sources readContent-Lengthfollowed by 512 MiB ofAwith no newline (tokio::io::repeat(b'A').take(512 MiB)). The result wasErr("peer closed the stream"), after a maximum resident set size of 544,555,008 bytes. Memory follows the peer's header, which is exactly what this issue forbids.Needed:
MAX_HEADER_BYTEScap on each header line and on the header block, read throughtakeor a bounded loop.Err(HeaderTooLarge), and an allocator-bytes test shows the cost is bounded by the cap.Cap the JSON-RPC header block at MAX_HEADER_BYTES (#53)
MelbourneDeveloper commentedon Nov 17, 2026
Fixed on PR #51 in
244650b, red first: a singleMAX_HEADER_BYTES(8 KiB) budget is read throughtake()across every header line and terminator. One endless line and endless short lines (the line-count case) both end inFramingError::HeaderTooLarge. Tests:tests/jsonrpc.rsheader_blocks_past_the_cap_are_rejected_and_one_at_the_cap_decodes(endless line, endlessX: ylines, a block exactly at the cap, one byte over), plus the allocator-bytes check intests/jsonrpc_frame_heap.rs(a 512 KiB header line allocates < 64 KiB; red was 1,056,768 bytes). DeslopClaude1 re-ran the 512 MiB probe:HeaderTooLargeat 7.6 MB RSS, down from 545 MB. The body cap is inaa25ac5. Red→green evidence:docs/plans/issue-fix-evidence-21-26-48-49.md.Fix Windows URIs, sidecar truncation, cancellation results; add serve…
MelbourneDeveloper commentedon Nov 17, 2026
✅ Released in v0.6.0 and verified against the published crates
Release: https://github.com/Nimblesite/lspkit/releases/tag/v0.6.0 (run 44186953235, tag at
8e39446). It contains lspkit, lspkit-server, lsp-profiler and lsp-profiler-dotnet 0.6.0 on crates.io, plus@nimblesite/lsp-profiler-ui@0.6.0on npm (with provenance), the .NET engine for 6 runtime ids, the consumer kit, an SBOM, and SHA256SUMS signed with cosign.Method: a worktree at
v0.6.0, withcrates/lspkit/srcandcrates/lspkit-server/srcreplaced by the sources unpacked from the crates.io 0.6.0 downloads. The published source is byte-identical to the tag. Results against the released code:Breaking: the
lspkit-server/mcpfeature is removed.lsp_profiler::session::rfc3339_nowis nowlsp_profiler::clock::rfc3339_now. A lone%, or an encoded separator, in a file URI is now an error. Consumers on didClose should callPullStore::forget(uri)instead ofclear().