Saturday executes model-driven tools on your machine, so security reports matter more here than in a typical repo.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| latest release | yes |
| older releases | best effort — upgrade first |
Email security@saturlabs.dev (or open a GitHub security advisory via Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability). Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.
Include: affected version/commit, reproduction steps or a trajectory export, and your assessment of impact. We aim to acknowledge within 48 hours.
- The desktop app binds to loopback with a per-launch token and pins Host/Origin; reports about remote compromise of a default-instance setup are especially welcome.
- The
servesurface requires a bearer token by design; the Telegram gateway refuses to start without a chat allowlist. Reports that bypass these fail-closed defaults are in scope. - The file tools sandbox against workspace escape; the network tools guard against SSRF (loopback / private / link-local / cloud-metadata, including across redirects). Escape reports are in scope.
- Prompt-injection behavior in general is known and partially mitigated (detection layer, privileged-write blocking, project trust gate); novel bypasses of those specific controls are in scope.
Run unattended workloads with SATURDAY_SANDBOXED=1 inside a container, keep
--allow allowlists on the gateway, and leave destructive-action guardrails
on (they block when no approver exists, by design). See "Safety notes" in the
README.