fix(acp): three defects a desktop ACP client hits - #915
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Found by driving `zero acp` from ZeroApp and comparing both sides of the wire. None of them fail loudly — they produce a blank transcript, a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons nobody can tell apart. session/load restored the conversation into the agent's own memory and sent nothing. The turns were read from the store and used to build every later prompt, but not one notification went out, so a client that resumed opened an empty transcript against a model that remembered everything. Ask a follow-up and ZERO answers correctly, about a question no longer on screen. It now replays the loaded turns as user/agent message chunks before returning, so a client rendering on the reply already has them. Whole messages rather than per-token deltas: this is a transcript, not a stream. A permission option we offered could not be accepted. The fallback list for a request with no AvailableDecisions lived inside buildPermissionOptions, while requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw field — so whenever ZERO did not enumerate, the client was sent Allow and Reject and its reply was checked against an empty slice. Every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny with "permission option was not offered". The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, and nothing surfaced it, because a denial is a legitimate answer. One resolver now feeds both, so they agree by construction. The narrowing this validation exists for is unchanged: an unoffered broader grant is still refused. Cancelling a permission prompt came back as an internal error. Only context.Canceled was recognised, so errPermissionApprovalCanceled fell through to -32603 carrying the sentinel text, and clients render that as a failed turn — declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. For apply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is offered. It maps to StopCancelled now. The sentinel is exported so the surfaces can recognise it; a genuine failure is still an error. request_permissions labelled two different decisions "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows, and plain allow and strict-review allow are offered together, so the panel had two identical buttons where one silently enabled strict auto-review of what was granted. The distinction cannot live in the option id, which is opaque to the client, so it is in the name. Eleven tests, each confirmed to fail without its fix.
Zero automated PR reviewVerdict: No blockers found Blockers
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Included review availability: 1 review is currently available. Based on recent review activity, included reviews refill at 4 per hour. WalkthroughACP permission handling now validates only offered decisions, labels strict approval separately, and maps wrapped permission-cancellation errors to cancelled turns. Regression tests cover option consistency, strict approval, cancellation mapping, retry cancellation, and genuine error propagation. ChangesACP interoperability
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This change corrects permission-option handling, cancellation reporting, and ambiguous approval labels for desktop ACP clients; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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gnanam's #914 lands the same fix and does more with it: the replayed messages carry stable ids derived from the store's event ids, session/load replays while session/resume deliberately does not, and both are capability-gated. Keeping a second, weaker replay here would have meant a conflict in handleSessionLoad and translate.go for no gain. translate.go is back to its state on main. What remains are the three defects #914 does not touch: the permission option that could not be accepted, the cancel that arrived as an internal error, and the two options labelled the same.
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Inline comments:
In `@internal/acp/permission.go`:
- Around line 34-59: Update decisionFromOutcome so the OutcomeSelected branch
rejects PermissionDecisionCancel, matching buildPermissionOptions’s removal of
cancellation from renderable options; validate only selectable ACP actions and
fail closed for a selected cancel identifier. Add a regression test covering
OutcomeSelected with OptionID "cancel".
In `@internal/agent/loop.go`:
- Line 1559: Add cancellation tests for
maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction and
maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial that return PermissionDecisionCancel,
verify errors.Is(err, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled), and assert the retry tool
is invoked only once for the initial sandboxed attempt.
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internal/acp/agent.gointernal/acp/desktopinterop_test.gointernal/acp/permission.gointernal/acp/translate.gointernal/agent/loop.gointernal/agent/loop_test.go
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Vasanthdev2004
changed the title
CodeRabbit caught a hole on the same seam this PR already fixes, in the
other direction.
buildPermissionOptions drops PermissionDecisionCancel, because ACP
expresses cancellation through the outcome rather than an option. But
ZERO enumerates cancel in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and
apply_patch — the two commonest prompts — so validating against the
decisions accepted {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an
identifier no client was ever shown, aborting the whole turn.
Rather than reject cancel by name, decisionFromOutcome now takes the
[]PermissionOption that were actually sent, and requestPermission builds
that list once and uses it for both halves. "What we offered" and "what we
accept" become the same slice instead of two things kept in step, so
anything optionKindFor declines to render is excluded structurally — the
next such action is covered the day it is added.
The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather
than over cancel specifically, for the same reason. Cancelling through
the outcome still works, which is asserted separately: closing the
selected-id route must not close the real one.
Also adds the cancellation coverage CodeRabbit asked for on the two
sandbox-retry paths. Both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
reached by a different denial, and the ACP mapping in this PR depends on
them producing something recognisable. They also assert the escalated
retry does not run: a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the
command the user had just declined.
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Both addressed. Selected I didn't take the proposed guard, because rejecting cancel by name leaves the class open — any future action The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather than over Sandbox-retry cancellation coverage — added for both paths. Worth being clear that these are coverage, not a fix: the wrap sites already behaved correctly, and this PR only renamed the sentinel. But the ACP mapping here depends on those paths producing something recognisable, so locking it in is right. They also assert the escalated retry does not run, since a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the command the user had just declined. Removing the error from the cancel return fails both:
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@gnanam1990 could you take a look when you get a chance? All checks green, CodeRabbit approved after the last round, just needs a human. Three defects, all found by driving
Two things worth your eye specifically:
CodeRabbit found a hole on the same seam going the other direction: Re #914: I dropped my Every fix was reverted by hand and the naming test confirmed to fail, so none of them are green for the wrong reason. |
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@gnanam1990 bumping this one — still green, still just needs your approval. I checked anandh's #916 against it since "transcript and tool feedback" sounded like it might overlap: it doesn't. 100 files and none under internal/acp, and the one file we share is loop.go where his hunk is at 3208 and mine are at 40/1364/1548/1596. Trial-merged all three pairs (915↔916, 914↔916, 915↔914) and every combination is clean, so nothing here is waiting on ordering. No rush if you're deep in #911/#912 — mainly flagging that until this lands, three things are live for anyone driving zero acp: clicking Allow on a shell or apply_patch prompt gets recorded as a deny, dismissing a permission renders as a crashed turn, and request_permissions shows two buttons both labelled Allow. Smallest thing to look at if you're short on time is the loop.go change — it's only exporting the existing sentinel, three wrap sites renamed, no behaviour moved. That's the part that's yours rather than mine. |
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@gnanam1990 third time I've nudged this, but I went and looked properly before nudging again and I don't think it's you. Every open PR on the repo is BLOCKED — all 30 of them, including your #914, #912 and #911, and the ones from outside contributors. So this isn't a queue you're sitting on, it's something structural: either a required check that never reports, or a review rule nobody currently satisfies. Worth someone with admin looking at the branch ruleset, because right now nothing can land at all. On this one specifically, if the holdup IS the review requirement and it keys off CODEOWNERS for internal/agent, I can take my PR out of your files entirely. The only reason it touches loop.go is to export ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled so the ACP layer can recognise a cancelled permission. I could match on the error string inside internal/acp instead — uglier, and I'd rather not, but it would make this a pure internal/acp change and remove whatever CODEOWNERS hop it's waiting on. Say the word. Otherwise it's ready: 9/9 checks green, CodeRabbit approved after the fix round, kevincodex1 approved. The three defects are the permission that records a deny when the user clicks Allow, the cancel that renders as a crashed turn, and request_permissions showing two buttons both labelled Allow. Also FYI I opened #929 about ACP not forwarding token usage — OnUsage already exists on agent.Options, internal/acp just never subscribes to it. Not urgent, and I'm happy to wire it if you tell me what shape you want the notification in. |
2 participants
Found by driving
zero acpover stdio from ZeroApp (the desktop client) and comparing both sides of the wire against each other. None of these fail loudly — they produce a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons a user cannot tell apart.Rebased around #914. This originally carried a fourth fix —
session/loadrestoring history without replaying it — which gnanam's #914 also fixes, and better: the replayed messages get stable ids derived from the store's event ids,session/loadreplays whilesession/resumedeliberately does not, and both are capability-gated. I dropped mine rather than keep a weaker duplicate.translate.gois back to its state onmain, so the only overlap left with #914 isagent.go, in two hunks nowhere nearhandleSessionLoad.The three below are untouched by #914 — it does not modify
permission.goorstopReasonFor.An option we offered could not be accepted
buildPermissionOptionssubstitutes a fallback allow/deny list whenreq.AvailableDecisionsis empty.requestPermissionvalidated the client's reply againstreq.AvailableDecisions— the raw field, still empty.So whenever ZERO did not enumerate — which is every permission event that is not a prompt (
loop.goreturns nil for those), and includes a shell call whose sandbox decision came back deny — the client was sent "Allow" and "Reject" and its answer was checked against an empty slice. Every option it could possibly show failed closed todenywith reason"permission option was not offered".The user clicks Allow, ZERO records a denial, the tool is refused and the turn carries on as though they had rejected it. Nothing surfaces it, because a denial is a legitimate answer.
One
offeredDecisionsresolver now feeds both sides, so what was sent and what is accepted agree by construction rather than by being kept in step. The narrowing this validation exists for is untouched — a client still cannot return a broader grant than it was shown.Cancelling a permission prompt looked like a crash
stopReasonFormatched onlycontext.Canceled, soerrPermissionApprovalCanceledfell through toRPCError(codeInternalError, ...)— a-32603carrying the internal sentinel text. Clients render that as a failed turn, so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. Forapply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is offered at all.It maps to
StopCancellednow, which is what ACP has for exactly this. The sentinel is exported asErrPermissionApprovalCanceledso the surfaces can recognise it (matched witherrors.Is, so it survives the tool-name wrapping every return site applies). A genuine failure is still an error — mapping too much to cancelled would hide real faults behind a clean ending.Two options labelled "Allow"
optionKindForreturned"Allow"for bothPermissionDecisionAllowandPermissionDecisionAllowStrict, andrequest_permissionsoffers them together. The label is the only thing an ACP client shows, so the panel presented two adjacent identical buttons — and one of them silently setsStrictAutoReviewon what was granted.The distinction cannot live in the
optionId, which is opaque to the client, so it is in the name: "Allow with strict review". The round trip is unchanged.Verification
Eight tests in
internal/acp/desktopinterop_test.go. Each fix was reverted by hand and the naming test confirmed to fail — a passing test proves nothing otherwise:stopReasonFor returned an error for a cancellationoptions "allow" and "allow_with_strict_auto_review" share the label "Allow"no options were offeredgo build ./internal/... ./cmd/...,go vet, andgo testoninternal/acpandinternal/agentall pass.gofmt -lclean on every file touched.One note on scope:
internal/agent/loop.gochanges only to export the existing sentinel — three wrap sites and one test reference renamed, no behaviour moves.The companion PR on ZeroApp is Gitlawb/zero-app#31.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests