fix(node)!: enforce owner-only push by default - #330
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe node now enables owner-push enforcement by default. CLI and environment configuration support explicit boolean values. Tests use seeded repository owners and verify non-owner rejection. Deployment configuration, upgrade automation, and documentation reflect the new default. ChangesOwner-push enforcement
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change supports applying configuration updates followed by an upgrade, but some AWS rollout guidance still says replacement is required. This may cause unnecessary replacement during configuration changes, so the documentation should be corrected with owner awareness before or after merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Two tests build a fake git as a `/bin/sh` script, mark it executable through `std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt`, and reap the hung `rev-list` with `libc::kill(SIGKILL)`. None of that exists on Windows, and neither test was cfg-gated, so `cargo test -p gitlawb-node` failed to compile there with six errors before running anything. A Windows checkout could not run a single test in the crate, including the ones that are platform-independent. Gate both with `#[cfg(unix)]`. The attribute is a no-op on Linux, so CI keeps running them exactly as before; only the Windows build changes, from "does not compile" to "runs the platform-independent tests". Refs #228
A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization: the method is self-certifying, so any party can generate a keypair, derive its DID and sign. With `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaulting to `false`, `owner_push_rejection` short-circuited and every `git-receive-pack` carrying any valid signature was accepted — including pushes to a repository the signer does not own, and including private ones, on every branch not explicitly protected. The gate itself already worked when switched on. What was missing is that no reachable default configuration switched it on, so a node started with nothing configured accepted a push from anyone. That default is what this changes. The argument now takes a value so there is a way back: `--enforce-owner-push false` and `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` both disable it, while the bare `--enforce-owner-push` form still means `true`. Without this the flag would be presence-only (`ArgAction::SetTrue`), which with a `true` default would leave operators no way to opt out during a rolling upgrade. Three concurrency tests pushed as non-owners in order to reach the shedding logic they actually assert on. They now push as the repo owner, so they keep exercising the shipped default rather than opting out of the gate. Docs updated in README.md, .env.example and docs/RUN-A-NODE.md, including the delegated-key caveat below. README also carries a dated cutover for `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES`, which stays `false` for now so live peers can finish upgrading. BREAKING CHANGE: `git-receive-pack` now rejects a push whose authenticated DID is not the repo owner, returning 403 before any ref update is applied. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so an agent pushing under its own DID cannot push while this is on. Set `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` during a rolling upgrade, or have automation push as the repo owner, until scoped collaborator / UCAN-delegated push rights land.
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Inline comments:
In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs`:
- Around line 81-95: Update the non-owner git_receive_pack fixtures, including
the cited burst and landed-push tests, to use the seeded repository owner DID or
configure test_state/f4_state_with_repo with enforce_owner_push disabled when
authorization is not being tested. Audit all other direct git_receive_pack
fixtures for the same mismatch while preserving owner-enforcement coverage where
it is intentional.
- Around line 998-1025: Make enforce_owner_push_defaults_to_true independent of
inherited GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH by isolating or clearing that environment
variable during the test, and add a separate test covering the environment
override. Update the enforce_owner_push CLI definition to accept zero or one
value with a missing-value default of true, then extend
enforce_owner_push_stays_disableable_for_rolling_upgrades to verify bare
--enforce-owner-push enables enforcement while explicit false remains
disableable.
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📒 Files selected for processing (5)
.env.exampleREADME.mdcrates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rscrates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rsdocs/RUN-A-NODE.md
…xtures Fourteen concurrency tests seed a repo through `f4_state_with_repo` or `p2_parked_release_state` and then push under an unrelated DID, which the owner-push gate now rejects before the machinery each test asserts on is ever reached. They are transport and lease tests, not authorization tests, so each now signs as the owner of the repo it targets. Two needed more than a swapped constant: - `receive_pack_burst_scans_serialized_and_both_pushes_succeed` pushes to two repos with different owners, so the identity is derived per push from the owner already threaded through the closure. - `u1_parked_push_does_not_shed_another_pusher_behind_the_same_ip` used three distinct pusher DIDs, which owner-only push makes impossible. The distinction was narrative: the per-source key is the resolved peer IP and never the DID, so three concurrent pushes from one edge IP contend exactly as before. The comment now says so rather than leaving the reader to infer it. The gate keeps its own coverage in `enforced_rejects_non_owner_with_forbidden` and `enforced_rejects_missing_did_with_forbidden`, so nothing here removes the assertion that a non-owner push is refused. These tests are `#[cfg(unix)]`, so a Windows checkout cannot run them; they were missed in the previous round because the Windows suite runs 717 of the 825 tests Linux runs.
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Inline comments:
In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs`:
- Around line 8503-8506: Update the cross-tenant test fixtures so n2 is created
under a different fixture owner from n1, and pass that distinct owner DID for
the n2 push while retaining the shared edge IP/source address. Apply the
corresponding identity changes across the n2 setup and push calls near the
existing shared-source assertions.
- Line 9198: The P2_PUSHER identity is hardcoded to z6p2tail while the shared
p2_push helper also targets z6p2fail, causing owner enforcement to reject that
fixture before receive-pack executes. Update p2_push and its AuthenticatedDid
setup to derive the pusher from the owner argument, or provide matching pusher
identities for each fixture, while keeping owner-push enforcement enabled.
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crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs
`p2_push` signed every push as one shared `P2_PUSHER` constant, but its two callers own different repos — `z6p2tail` and `z6p2fail`. Pinning the constant to either owner leaves the other rejected by the owner-push gate, so the identity now follows the `owner` argument the helper already takes, the same way the burst test derives it. The rejection surfaced as `async fn resumed after completion` rather than a 403: a denied push completes on the first poll, `p2_logged` never observes `receive-pack`, and the polling loop then polls the finished future again.
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The default should have been true from the start, and the reasoning in the PR body is right: a
self-certifying did:key is authentication, and a gate that no reachable configuration switched on
was decoration. The fixture sweep in 586896d8 and 7de6f7cf is the correct fix and the suite is
green at 7de6f7c (825 passed, 0 failed). Deriving the pusher from the repo it targets rather than
hard-coding a matching literal is the better of the two shapes, and it is what makes the remaining
item below visible.
I checked the flag's blast radius first. owner_push_rejection is the only production reader,
called once from git_receive_pack, and it runs before the per-source write cap and before
acquire_write, so a rejected push consumes no permit or lease. Nothing in sync.rs, p2p/ or
api/peers.rs reaches receive-pack, so replication is unaffected, and git-remote-gitlawb surfaces
the 403 body rather than rendering the denial as an empty success. The mechanism is sound. What is
left is one test the sweep missed and some prose.
Findings
-
[P1] Push as the owner in
f1_write_cap_is_inert_without_a_resolvable_source_keytoo
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:8663
This is the one fixture the sweep did not reach, and it is invisible precisely because it never
went red. The repo is seeded toz6f1nonewhile the push authenticates as
did:key:z6MkF1NoKeyPusherAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, so the request is now rejected at the owner
gate and never reaches the per-source cap the test exists to measure. Its assertion is
!matches!(r, Err(AppError::Overloaded(_))), and aForbiddensatisfies that, so it reportsok
inside the green run while proving nothing. Confirmed by running it: swapping only that
assertion tomatches!(r, Err(AppError::Forbidden(_)))makes the test pass, so the request
really is stopping at the gate. Give itdid:key:z6f1nonelike the others, and
tighten the assertion so a denial cannot pass it: the current negative shape at:8671accepts any
error at all, which is what let this hide. One sibling carries the same shape,
f1_write_cap_key_is_per_source_not_per_repoat:8626. That one passes for the right reason now
that you gave it the owner DID, but the shape would hide an identical regression, so it is worth
tightening while you are in here. -
[P2] Restore the cross-tenant shape in
u1_parked_push_does_not_shed_another_pusher_behind_the_same_ip
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:8482
The sweep collapsed this test's three pusher identities into onedid:key:z6u1nat, but the
docstring still reads "distinct pusher DIDs" and the line above it still frames the case as "a
DIFFERENT pusher's push to a DIFFERENT repo". The mechanism is fine and I checked it:
read_caller_keydelegates torate_limit::client_key(headers, peer, trust), which never sees the
DID, so the three pushes contend on the resolved edge IP exactly as before. But this is the test
named THE CROSS-TENANT GUARD, and after the collapse nothing drives two distinct tenants sharing
one source key. That shape is still expressible under owner-only push and cheaply so:f1_add_repo
already takes an owner, so seedingn2to a second owner and signing push C as that owner keeps
the guard matching its name. Failing that, fix the two docstring lines, since they currently
describe a scenario the code no longer runs. -
[P1] Test the behavior the PR exists to change
crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs:998
Following the flag through every consumer: the gate's own tests atrepos.rs:3327-3366pass
enforceas a literal and are insensitive to the default, no fixture sets the field, and the
stringonly the repo owner may pushappears exactly once in the file, at its own definition. So
revertingdefault_value_ttofalseturns exactly one test red, and that test parses the
process environment, which means on a host withGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=falseexported the
revert turns nothing red at all. Add a handler-level test: defaultConfig, repo owned by A, push
as B, assert 403. For the other half, asserting the declared default is the env-independent form:let cmd = Config::command(); // clap::CommandFactory let arg = cmd.get_arguments().find(|a| a.get_id() == "enforce_owner_push").unwrap(); assert_eq!(arg.get_default_values(), ["true"]);
I compiled that against the pinned clap and ran it with
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false
exported; it still reads["true"], which is the property the current test lacks. -
[P2] Forward the knob in the shipped compose files
docker-compose.yml:40
The node service uses an explicitenvironment:block with noenv_file:, and
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHis absent from it while the sibling security knob
GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITESsits at line 46. Same gap in
macos-app/Sources/GitlawbNode/Resources/docker-compose.ymlandinfra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl.
An operator who follows the rolling-upgrade instructions this PR adds to three docs gets nothing
on the shipped container path.GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH: ${GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH:-true}
keeps the new default while making the opt-out real. -
[P2] Update the four comments that still say the gate defaults off
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:1783
Alsorepos.rs:1906,repos.rs:5598, and.env.example:199, the last one in a file this PR
otherwise rewrites. At:1906the IP-keying rationale is still correct (a DID farm defeats a DID
key); it is only the "enforcement defaults off" premise underneath it that died.repos.rs:1594
and:3355describe the flag-off branch and are accurate as they stand. -
[P2] Drop the 15 September 2026 cutover from the README
README.md:318
That paragraph is aboutGITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES, which this PR does not change, and
the date appears nowhere onmain. Answering the question you raised in the PR body: it is not a
promise the project has made, and a PR about a different flag is not where we would make one. Cut
the paragraph. The table row you added forGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHcarries the part that belongs.
Two notes, not asks. The docstring at config.rs:1011-1013 credits the value-taking action with
making GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false resolve to false. I built both the old and the new
declarations against the pinned clap 4.5.60 and ran them: the env form already resolved under
SetTrue, so what the change actually buys is --enforce-owner-push false parsing at all. That
same run says the new shape is fail-closed, which is the answer to the parser question raised in
review: bare --enforce-owner-push is true, it does not swallow a following - token, and =1,
=yes, =TRUE and empty are startup errors rather than a silent false, before and after.
Separately, I checked the Windows premise behind the #[cfg(unix)] gates rather than take it on
trust, and it holds. Cross-compiling the crate for x86_64-pc-windows-gnu --all-targets
succeeds with both gates in place; removing just those two attributes fails with six errors
naming exactly the constructs your comments cite (os::unix, libc::kill, SIGKILL,
Permissions::set_mode). Both gates are load-bearing. Nothing in CI covers that, since
pr-checks.yml:269 builds only gl and git-remote-gitlawb on Windows, and a
cargo check --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu -p gitlawb-node --all-targets step needs neither
Postgres nor a Windows runner, so that lane could carry it. Its own change, not yours.
I am not asking for a split. The #[cfg(unix)] commit is a genuine prerequisite and small enough
that separating it would cost more than it saves.
Every item below was verified against the code before changing it; two of them
were confirmed by running the probe the reviewer described.
A test the fixture sweep missed, and that could not fail
--------------------------------------------------------
`f1_write_cap_is_inert_without_a_resolvable_source_key` seeded `z6f1none` and
pushed as `z6MkF1NoKeyPusher…`, so the owner gate rejected it before it reached
the per-caller cap the test exists to measure. Its assertion was
`!matches!(r, Err(Overloaded(_)))`, which a `Forbidden` satisfies, so it reported
ok while measuring nothing — and it is not `#[cfg(unix)]`, so it did that inside
every green run. Confirmed by inverting the assertion to expect `Forbidden`: it
passed, proving the request stopped at the gate.
The pusher is now the owner, and the assertion is positive: reaching git on the
missing on-disk repo (`Err(Git(_))`) is proof the request cleared both the gate
and the cap. The sibling `f1_write_cap_key_is_per_source_not_per_repo` carried
the same weak negative in its second assertion and is tightened the same way.
The default was barely tested, and what tested it read the environment
---------------------------------------------------------------------
`Config::parse_from` consults the process environment, so on a host exporting
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` the old `enforce_owner_push_defaults_to_true`
reported the operator's setting rather than what this crate declares — it failed
outright, which would also break any contributor who sets the variable. It is
replaced by two tests that are env-independent and behavioural:
* `enforce_owner_push_is_declared_true_independent_of_the_environment` reads
the declared default off `Config::command()`.
* `default_config_refuses_a_non_owner_push` drives the handler on an untouched
`test_state` config and asserts 403 — authenticated by a real RFC 9421
signature, so 403 rather than 401 is what makes it a statement about
authorization.
Both were checked by reverting `default_value_t` to `false`: the handler test
reports 500 where it wants 403, and the declared test reports `["false"]`.
The cross-tenant test lost its second tenant
--------------------------------------------
The sweep collapsed `u1_parked_push_does_not_shed_another_pusher_behind_the_same
_ip` onto one identity, leaving the test named for cross-tenant behaviour with a
single tenant and two docstrings describing a scenario it no longer ran. `n2` is
now owned by `z6u1nat2` and its push signs as that owner, so two distinct tenants
share one edge IP again — which is the property under test, since the per-source
key is the resolved peer address and never the DID.
Four comments outlived their premise
-------------------------------------
`repos.rs` (3 sites) and `.env.example` still said owner enforcement defaults
off. The IP-keying rationale they support is unchanged and still correct — a DID
farm defeats a DID key — so only the dead premise is rewritten: the cap is
load-bearing because the rate limiter bounds arrival rate rather than occupancy,
because the gate can be turned off for a rolling upgrade, and because one owner
can open many concurrent pushes to their own repo.
Operators on the container path got none of this
-------------------------------------------------
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` is now forwarded in `docker-compose.yml`, the macOS
app's bundled compose, and `infra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl`, defaulting to `true`
to match the node. Without it the rolling-upgrade opt-out this PR documents in
three places was unreachable for anyone running compose.
A cutover this project never promised
--------------------------------------
The README paragraph announcing a 15 September 2026 flip of
`GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` is removed. That flag is not changed here,
the date appears nowhere on main, and a PR about a different flag is not where
that commitment would be made. The table row for `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`
carries the part that belongs.
A docstring that credited the wrong thing
------------------------------------------
The field and test docs claimed the value-taking action is what makes
`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` resolve to `false`. It is not: the env form
resolved under the presence-only declaration too. What the change buys is
`--enforce-owner-push false` parsing at all, rather than erroring as an
unexpected argument. Both docstrings now say so.
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I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.
Findings
-
[P1] Preserve the opt-out for existing AWS deployments
infra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl:77
The new interpolation is rendered only by first-boot user data. Existing instances retain the pre-PR/opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml:aws_instancedeliberately ignoresuser_datadrift, and the advertised SSM upgrade command atinfra/aws/main.tf:446only pulls the image and runsdocker compose up -d. Those old Compose files have an explicitenvironment:block without this key, so Compose does not pass an operator's/opt/gitlawb/.envvalue into the node container.Reproduction is the documented rolling-upgrade sequence on an existing AWS node: write
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=falseto/opt/gitlawb/.env, then invokeupgrade_command. The node process receives no such environment variable, takes the new binary default oftrue, and immediately rejects delegated/CI pushes that the docs say can remain enabled during migration. This is a deployment-state migration problem, not a template-default problem. Make the upgrade action install the newly rendered Compose file before restarting (or provide a versioned, idempotent Compose migration), and document the required one-time migration for existing instances. Please add a regression check that starts from the old rendered Compose file and proves the opt-out reaches the upgraded container. -
[P1] Wire the macOS app's actual generated Compose file to the opt-out
macos-app/Sources/GitlawbNode/DockerCompose.swift:292
The modified resource is not the Compose file a normal packaged app runs. When no source checkout is selected,composeFilePathwritesApplication Support/GitlawbNode/docker-compose.ymlfromgenerateComposeFile(). Its nodeenvironment:block at this location does not includeGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH; moreover, each start callsConfig.writeEnvFile(), which recreates that app's.env. The bundled resource is not read by this fallback path.Consequently, putting
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=falsein the app's environment file cannot disable the gate: the generated Compose file never forwards it, and a manual edit is discarded on the next start. Packaged-app users with delegated or CI pushers are therefore forced into the breaking default with no usable migration control. Address the root cause by making the app have one source of truth for its runtime Compose configuration: add the interpolation togenerateComposeFile(), persist an explicit owner-push setting in the app configuration (or deliberately preserve an operator-provided value), and make the bundled and generated templates share that definition. A packaged-app smoke test should set the opt-out and assert it appears indocker compose config/ the container environment. -
[P2] Make the default-behavior test independent of the process environment
crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs:2182
The test is named and documented as a no-configuration/default-behavior assertion, buttest_state()buildsAppStatethroughConfig::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]). Clap readsGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHfrom the surrounding process, so a test run launched with the documented rolling-upgrade override (false) constructs a state with enforcement disabled. The signed non-owner request then passes the owner gate and reaches the Git backend instead of returning the asserted 403.The parser-introspection test correctly proves the declared default, but it does not make this handler-level test hermetic. Do not mutate the process environment around an async test suite: construct the test state with an explicit, environment-independent
Config(or add a narrowly scoped state-builder override) and setenforce_owner_push = truefor the handler wiring assertion. Keep the declared-default test as the proof of the shipped default, and add an explicit override test if the behavior underfalseneeds coverage. That separates parser precedence from authorization behavior and prevents a developer or CI environment setting from turning this into a spurious failure.
Guidance for addressing the whole change
The authorization change itself is the right direction: a self-certifying did:key proves who signed, not that the signer owns the target repository. Nothing below asks to restore the insecure default, to honor delegated UCAN pushes in this PR, or to change the separate signed-peer-write rollout. The PR expressly chooses owner-only authorization by default and a temporary false override for rolling upgrades; the guidance is limited to making that stated transition work consistently.
The remaining problems are consequences of treating that default flip as only a Rust/Clap change. For the launch paths this PR documents or modifies, the complete contract is broader than Config::default():
- A fresh source build must default to owner-only push.
- Each documented or changed Compose/runtime path must be able to pass the temporary
falseoverride to the node process. - The documented AWS rolling-upgrade path must migrate existing installations, not merely render future installations correctly.
- Tests must distinguish the declared default, explicit configuration precedence, and the handler's authorization behavior without inheriting ambient process state.
The current diff satisfies the first item and the new parser configuration supports the second in a direct CLI/source invocation. It does not yet satisfy the deployment lifecycle cases. Root Compose, the first-boot AWS template, and the macOS resource were updated, but existing AWS instances retain a previous generated file and the packaged macOS application runs a separately generated template. Those are independent configuration sources with different upgrade lifecycles. Updating a checked-in template is not enough when a deployed copy or a runtime generator remains authoritative.
Please address this as one compatibility-migration change rather than adding isolated forwarding lines:
- Define the owner-push setting in the actual configuration source used by each changed/documented runtime, with the same default and interpolation semantics.
- Inventory the launch paths touched here: source/CLI, root Compose, newly bootstrapped AWS, already-running AWS, packaged macOS fallback, and source-checkout macOS. For each, verify both the omitted-value default and an explicit
falsevalue reach the node process where that path exposes the documented override. - Add an idempotent AWS upgrade migration. It should safely update or regenerate the persisted
/opt/gitlawb/compose.yamlbefore the new image starts; a future instance replacement alone is not an adequate migration for a documented rolling upgrade. - Avoid maintaining two macOS Compose definitions that silently diverge. Generate the fallback from the same canonical template or test that both rendered outputs contain the same node environment contract; ensure the documented override is forwarded rather than overwritten on app restart.
- Split the test responsibilities: parser metadata/default tests, CLI/env override tests, and handler authorization tests should each build only the state they are proving. Do not rely on whichever environment happens to run the test process.
Before requesting another review, please run a small deployment-focused matrix in addition to the normal Rust suite: fresh source default; source CLI false; fresh root Compose false; an old AWS Compose file upgraded through the published SSM command; a newly bootstrapped AWS instance; and the packaged macOS fallback with an explicit false value. In each case, inspect the resolved Compose configuration or container environment and perform a signed non-owner push. The expected outcomes should be explicit: default is 403, temporary override reaches the process and preserves the legacy path. This will make the breaking change reviewable as one end-to-end contract and avoid finding the next un-migrated launcher in a later round.
… path The previous round forwarded GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH in three compose templates. Two of those are not the file their runtime actually reads, so the documented rolling-upgrade opt-out did not work where it mattered. Existing AWS instances could not opt out ----------------------------------------- `aws_instance` ignores user_data drift, so an instance keeps the compose file it was created with, and the published SSM upgrade only ran `docker compose pull && up -d`. Compose passes only the variables named in a service's `environment:` block, so a key added to the template never reached a running instance: an operator following our own instructions wrote GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false to /opt/gitlawb/.env, upgraded, and got the new default anyway — silently, with their CI pushers refused. The upgrade document now reinstalls the rendered compose file before restarting. It is idempotent (identical bytes on an already-current instance) and it makes the upgrade a migration rather than a restart. compose.yaml is Terraform-owned and overwritten; per-instance settings belong in .env, which is untouched. infra/aws/README.md documents that `terraform apply` must precede the upgrade, since the SSM document embeds the rendering. The packaged macOS app read a different compose file ----------------------------------------------------- The bundled Resources/docker-compose.yml is not what a packaged app runs: with no source checkout selected, `generateComposeFile()` writes its own template, whose environment block did not carry the key. `Config.writeEnvFile()` also regenerates .env on every start, so a hand-added value was discarded. Between them, a packaged-app user had no way to opt out at all. `enforceOwnerPush` is now a persisted app setting, emitted into .env on every start, and `generateComposeFile()` forwards it with the same interpolation as the bundled resource — one definition, three consistent sites. A test inherited the environment it was supposed to assert about ----------------------------------------------------------------- `default_config_refuses_a_non_owner_push` built state through `test_state`, which parses `Config` from the process environment — 47 fields come from GITLAWB_* variables. On a host exporting GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false, which is exactly what the rolling-upgrade guidance tells operators to set, it constructed a disabled state, let the push through to git, and failed for a reason unrelated to the code under test. Renamed to `enforced_owner_push_refuses_a_signed_non_owner` and given an explicit config through a new `test_state_with`, so it states the configuration it is about. Verified by running it both with and without the variable exported. The shipped default keeps its own env-independent proof off the parser declaration, in config::tests — a parser question and an authorization question should not share a failure mode. `test_state` now carries a warning about the hazard, since any of those 47 fields can skew a test the same way.
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Inline comments:
In `@infra/aws/main.tf`:
- Around line 440-462: Update the lifecycle guidance in infra/aws/main.tf (lines
440-462) to document both terraform apply followed by the SSM upgrade command
and instance replacement where appropriate. Update the Changing configuration
section in infra/aws/README.md (lines 94-119) with the same apply-plus-upgrade
workflow and remove wording that makes replacement mandatory; the SSM upgrade
mainSteps behavior requires no direct change.
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crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rsinfra/aws/README.mdinfra/aws/main.tfmacos-app/Sources/GitlawbNode/Config.swiftmacos-app/Sources/GitlawbNode/DockerCompose.swift
Superseded: re-reviewed at 1f0d9ff, where every ask from this round landed.
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Every ask from the last two rounds landed, and the node half of this is done. Both f1 fixtures push
as the owner now and assert the positive AppError::Git(_) instead of the negative shape that hid
the first regression; the cross-tenant test seeds n2 under z6u1nat2 so it drives two real tenants
again; the declared default is read off the parser rather than out of a parse, which is the
env-independent form. Suite is green at 1f0d9ff3: 826 passed, 0 failed. Config::parse() in
main.rs:72 is the only production construction site and there is no Default impl, so the flip
cannot be bypassed by a second builder. Fly needs nothing: its [env] block is direct process
environment with no allowlist, so the opt-out already reaches the process there.
What is left is all on the deployment half added in 1f0d9ff3, and none of it is in the Rust.
Findings
-
[P2] Split the AWS "Changing configuration" section so it stops contradicting the upgrade section
infra/aws/README.md:124
That section still says editingimage_tag"does not affect a running instance" and routes the
operator toterraform apply -replace=aws_instance.node. Thirty lines above, the section this PR
added says the opposite and is now the correct one: the upgrade reinstalls the rendered compose,
which carriesimage_tag. The same paragraph also tells operators to edit/opt/gitlawb/.envand
restart, which is exactly the advice your own "Why the upgrade rewrites the compose file" section
explains is silently ineffective for any variable the installed compose does not already name.
Keep the invariant that both halves have to preserve: every rollout instruction in this file must
route throughapplyplusupgrade_command, and.envmust be described as reaching the
container only for keys the installed compose already interpolates.bootstrap_peersand
public_urldo stay replacement-only, so the section needs splitting rather than deleting. -
[P2] Say what
--remove-orphansnow does, or drop it from the upgrade
infra/aws/main.tf:463
The flag is not new, but until this commit it was inert: the upgrade never rewrote
/opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml, so the file it reconciled against was the instance's own and the only
orphans were containers an operator had started by hand. Now it reconciles against a fresh
rendering whose service set is conditional (compose.yaml.tftpl:22renderspostgresonly when
db_host == "",:7renderscaddyonly whendomain_name != ""). An operator who sets
use_rdsor clearsdomain_name, applies, then runs the command the README describes as pull and
restart, has their local postgres or their TLS terminator stopped and deleted. The data survives,
since both are bind mounts under/mnt/data, but the topology change is unannounced. Either state
it in the README caution next to "Terraform-owned and is overwritten on every upgrade", or drop
--remove-orphansand let a service-set change require the explicit replace. -
[P2] Give the macOS setting a writer
macos-app/Sources/GitlawbNode/Config.swift:26
enforceOwnerPushis persisted, loaded, and emitted into.env, and the generated compose
forwards it, so the plumbing is right. Nothing sets it.SettingsWindow.swifthas no@Stateand
no assignment for it, andsave()at:89-98writes only the fields it tracks, so the only way to
reach the documented opt-out on this launch path is hand-editingconfig.jsonin Application
Support, which no doc mentions. Editing.envdoes not work here:writeEnvFile()rebuilds that
file fromConfigon everystart()(DockerCompose.swift:77). I confirmed a hand-edit does
survive a Settings save, sincepersist()re-emits the valueload()read, so this is
reachability rather than data loss. The invariant is that the opt-out this PR documents must have
an operator-reachable setter on every launch path it ships. ATogglebeside the existing
Sync repos from peersone atSettingsWindow.swift:51, with the@Stateat:30and the
assignment insave(), matches the pattern already there; documenting theconfig.jsonkey would
also close it. -
[P3] Fix three prose lines the change made untrue
crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs:2259
The assertion reads "with no configuration at all" while the test setsenforce_owner_push = true
explicitly two dozen lines up, which is the right thing for the test to do and the wrong thing for
the message to claim. Alsoapi/repos.rs:8486, whose docstring still says all three pushes carry
distinct pusher DIDs when A and B now sharen1's owner, anddocs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md:91,
which still lists "unprotected repo branches do not yet enforce owner/UCAN capability checks" as a
live-network blocker. Owner checks are enforced on every branch as of this PR; the UCAN half of
that sentence is the part that stays true.
Three notes, not asks. The #[allow(dead_code)] at test_support.rs:54 is redundant now that the same
commit adds the call site; I removed it locally and nothing warns. repos.rs:5673 and :5866 still carry the lone-negative
!matches!(.., Overloaded) shape in two of the fixtures you swept. Both push as the repo owner now,
so they pass for the right reason and I am not asking you to touch them; I mention it only because
the same shape is what hid the original defect and you tightened its two siblings. Separately, a
non-owner push to a private repo returns 403 with a body naming the reason, which is an existence
oracle the read path does not give away. It is strictly smaller than what it replaces, so it is not
a blocker on this PR, but it is worth its own issue.
I checked the aggregate rather than just this round, since this is the third. The remedy has grown a
long way from a one-line default flip and every finding above traces to the fix for the previous
round rather than to the original defect, which is usually the point to unwind the scope. I am not
asking for a split, and the reason is that the deployment migration cannot ship after the flip: doing
that lands the breaking default on existing AWS instances with the opt-out unreachable, which is the
problem the migration exists to solve. The bundling is load-bearing, so this stays one PR.
…contradicting itself All four are in the deployment half added last round; none is in the Rust. The AWS guide told operators two different things -------------------------------------------------- "Changing configuration" still said editing `image_tag` does not affect a running instance and routed to `-replace`, while the upgrade section thirty lines above now reinstalls the rendered compose, which carries `image_tag`. The same paragraph told operators to edit `.env` and restart — which the new "Why the upgrade rewrites the compose file" section explains is silently ineffective for any key the installed compose does not already name. Split by which file carries the change rather than deleted, because the distinction is real: values rendered into `compose.yaml` (`image_tag`, ports, `domain_name`, `db_host`, `icaptcha_*`) roll out with `apply` + `upgrade_command`; values user-data writes into `.env` at first boot (`public_url`, `bootstrap_peers`, integrations) do not propagate from tfvars at all and need an edit on the instance or a replacement. The third case is the one that bites: a setting the installed compose does not yet name is read from `.env` and dropped, so it needs the upgrade first. `--remove-orphans` stopped being inert --------------------------------------- The flag is not new, but until the upgrade rewrote `compose.yaml` it reconciled against the instance's own file, so the only orphans were hand-started containers. It now reconciles against a fresh rendering whose service set is conditional — `postgres` only when `db_host` is empty, `caddy` only when `domain_name` is set. Setting `use_rds` or clearing `domain_name` and then running what the README calls a pull-and-restart stops and removes the local postgres or the TLS terminator. That is what those variables mean, but it happens on the upgrade rather than on apply, so it is now stated next to the Terraform-owned warning. Data survives either way; both bind-mount under /mnt/data. The macOS setting had no writer -------------------------------- `enforceOwnerPush` was persisted, loaded, emitted into `.env`, and forwarded by the generated compose — and nothing set it. `SettingsWindow` had no state and no assignment, so the only way to reach the opt-out on that launch path was hand editing config.json in Application Support, which no document mentions. Editing `.env` does not work there either: `writeEnvFile()` rebuilds it from `Config` on every start. It now has a Toggle beside "Sync repos from peers", following the pattern already in that view. Three lines the change made untrue ----------------------------------- The handler test asserted "with no configuration at all" while setting `enforce_owner_push` explicitly — the right thing for the test, the wrong claim for the message. The cross-tenant docstring still described three distinct pusher DIDs after A and B were given `n1`'s owner. And OSS-READINESS-AUDIT listed unprotected branches not enforcing owner checks as a live blocker; owner checks now cover every branch, and only the UCAN half of that sentence still stands. Also dropped the `#[allow(dead_code)]` on `test_state_with`, redundant since the same commit added its call site.
The lifecycle comment still listed image_tag among the values needing a deliberate instance replacement. It is rendered into compose.yaml, which the upgrade command now reinstalls, so apply plus upgrade rolls it out. Only the values user-data writes into .env at first boot stay replacement-only.
Superseded: every ask from that round landed at 579eee0. Re-reviewing the new head.
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The node half is done and I have nothing further on it. Both f1 assertions hold on Linux, not just on the Windows box the PR body reports from: I ran f1_write_cap_is_inert_without_a_resolvable_source_key and f1_write_cap_key_is_per_source_not_per_repo at 579eee07 against Postgres and both pass. The gate still sits ahead of branch protection with one production call site at repos.rs:1789, the macOS toggle is a real setter end to end, and the AWS README now splits correctly by which file carries a change. CI is green, seventeen checks.
One thing in the new upgrade path needs fixing before this lands.
Findings
-
[P2] Write the compose file through a unique temp path and serialize the upgrade
infra/aws/main.tf:467
Two executions of the upgrade document race on the fixed/opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.new. The second execution's redirect truncates the file the first is about to install, and because the first has already renamed the inode, the second keeps writing through into the livecompose.yaml. I reproduced both outcomes with the same write-then-rename shape: two different renderings produce an installed file blending both service sets, and a truncating second execution produced a short file in 12 of 12 trials across the timing window, between 66 and 141 of 150 services surviving. Either result is valid YAML, sodocker compose up -d --remove-orphanson the next line accepts it and deletes whatever fell off, which on a live node is the local postgres or the TLS terminator.mainhas no compose write in this document, so the race arrives with this commit.mktempfor the temp path plus anflockaround the whole step closes it. -
[P3] Drop the README cutover item from the PR description
README.md:343
The description's "Two things to confirm" still says a 15 September 2026 cutover forGITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITESis asserted inREADME.md. You removed it, correctly, and the row at:343now says only that it defaults tofalseduring the staged rollout. The description is the last place still claiming a commitment the branch does not make.
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I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.
Findings
-
[P2] Serialize the AWS upgrade compose write with a unique temp path
infra/aws/main.tf:467The upgrade SSM document now reinstalls
/opt/gitlawb/compose.yamlbeforedocker compose pull && up -d --remove-orphans. That migration is the right fix for the opt-out problem on existing instances, but the install step is not safe under overlap.What happens today
The document uses a fixed intermediate path and a plain redirect:
cat > /opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.new <<'COMPOSE_EOF' … COMPOSE_EOF mv /opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.new /opt/gitlawb/compose.yamlmainnever wrote compose from this document, so this race is new in this PR. If twoupgrade_commandinvocations overlap on the same instance — a double-run, a retry while the first is still pulling, or two operators — both executions share/opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.new.Two failure modes follow from the usual write-then-rename shape:
- Blended file. Execution A is still writing service definitions while execution B truncates
.newand writes a different rendering. A thenmvs its (possibly partial) file into place; B keeps writing through the open fd into the livecompose.yamlinode after A's rename. The installed file can contain a mix of both renderings. - Truncated file. A second execution truncates
.newwhile the first is mid-write. The result can be a short, syntactically valid YAML fragment.
Either outcome is still valid YAML enough for
docker compose up -d --remove-orphansto accept. The next line in the script then reconciles against that file. On a live node that can drop conditional services — localpostgreswhendb_hostis set, orcaddywhendomain_nameis cleared — which is exactly what the README now warns about for--remove-orphans.Why this is merge-blocking
The compose rewrite is load-bearing for the rolling-upgrade contract this PR adds: without it,
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHin/opt/gitlawb/.envnever reaches the container on pre-template instances. The migration needs to be safe to run in production, not only correct on a single serial invocation.Guidance
The root cause is treating a shared temp path as an atomic install and assuming at-most-one upgrade without enforcing it. Address both halves:
- Unique temp path per run. Do not write through a fixed
compose.yaml.new. Usemktempunder/opt/gitlawb(or/tmpwith a stable prefix) so concurrent writers never truncate each other's file. - Serialize the whole compose-install + restart step. Wrap the write, rename,
pull, andupin anflockon a dedicated lock file (for example/opt/gitlawb/.upgrade.lock). If the lock is held, exit non-zero with a clear message rather than proceeding. That closes the inode-rename race where the second writer follows the firstmvinto the live path.
A shape that matches the intent of the current script:
set -euo pipefail install -d -m 0755 /opt/gitlawb exec 9>/opt/gitlawb/.upgrade.lock flock -n 9 || { echo "upgrade already in progress" >&2; exit 1; } tmp="$(mktemp /opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.XXXXXX)" trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT cat >"$tmp" <<'COMPOSE_EOF' ${local.compose_yaml} COMPOSE_EOF mv "$tmp" /opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml trap - EXIT cd /opt/gitlawb && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans && docker image prune -f
Keep the heredoc delimiter quoted so shell does not expand compose interpolation markers. If the rendered YAML can ever contain a line that exactly matches the delimiter, pick a delimiter that cannot appear in the template or escape accordingly — the current
COMPOSE_EOFchoice is probably fine given the tftpl content, but it is worth a quick grep when you touch this.Verification to add before re-requesting review
- Manually or in a small shell test, run two overlapping installs that use the same write-then-rename pattern and confirm the fixed version always leaves a byte-identical
compose.yamlmatching one complete rendering. - Confirm a second concurrent invocation exits immediately with the lock message and does not mutate
compose.yamlor rundocker compose up. - After a serial successful upgrade on a fixture that mimics a pre-PR compose file (no
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHin the serviceenvironment:block), confirmGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=falsein/opt/gitlawb/.envreaches the running container — that is the migration this step exists to make safe, and it should keep working once the install is serialized.
- Blended file. Execution A is still writing service definitions while execution B truncates
…temp path
The compose reinstall added last round is not safe under overlap, and `main`
never wrote compose from this document, so the race arrives with that commit.
Two executions — a double run, a retry while the first is still pulling, two
operators — shared the fixed `/opt/gitlawb/compose.yaml.new`. The second
truncates the file the first is about to install; and once the first renames,
the second's open descriptor keeps writing into the live `compose.yaml` inode.
Both outcomes stay valid YAML, so the `up -d --remove-orphans` on the next line
accepts a blended or truncated service set and deletes whatever fell off — on a
live node, the local postgres or the TLS terminator. Both reviewers reproduced
it independently; one measured a short file in 12 of 12 trials.
The whole step now runs under `flock -n` on /opt/gitlawb/.upgrade.lock and
exits non-zero if the lock is held, so a second run cannot restart against a
file the first is mid-install. The temp file comes from `mktemp`, so concurrent
writers cannot truncate each other, with a trap to clean it up on failure.
The compose body is base64-encoded rather than written through a nested
heredoc. The rendering carries `$${VAR}` passthroughs that must reach the file
unexpanded, which needs a quoted delimiter, and a shell heredoc nested inside an
indented Terraform heredoc depends on the dedent landing that delimiter at
column 0. Decoding one line has neither failure mode and no delimiter can
collide with the content.
Not validated locally: terraform is not installed on this machine, so this
change has had no `fmt`, `validate`, or `plan` run against it.
Superseded: the infra ask landed in 888fab6 and I re-verified it. Dismissing so review state reflects the current head.
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Approving. The round-5 ask landed, and I re-verified both it and the premise underneath it.
On the upgrade rewrite I extracted the rendered shell body and ran it rather than reading it. Two overlapping executions serialize correctly: the second is refused with the documented message and exits 1, and compose.yaml survives intact and unblended at mode 0644 with no stray temp files. I also forced a write failure mid-decode, and the script aborts, the EXIT trap removes the temp file, and the pre-existing compose.yaml is untouched. Worth noting for anyone reading the transport later: a deliberately truncated base64 payload does install partially, because base64 -d exits 0 on short input and pipefail never fires. base64encode cannot emit one, so there is no reachable path today, but the safety there comes from the renderer rather than from the guard.
The world-readable compose.yaml carries no secrets. POSTGRES_PASSWORD, GITLAWB_OPERATOR_PRIVATE_KEY, and both S3 keys are $${VAR} runtime references resolved from the 0600 .env.
The premise is still load-bearing: default_value_t = true in crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs, pinned by the test at config.rs:1001. Gutting the default turns it red and restoring it turns it green.
One non-blocking item.
Findings
- [P3] Restrict the upgrade lock file so a local user cannot wedge it
infra/aws/main.tf:479
exec 9>/opt/gitlawb/.upgrade.lockcreates a root-owned 0644 file, and flock(2) grants an exclusive lock through a read-only descriptor. I confirmed both by execution: the file comes out 644 under umask 022, a read-only fd acquires the free lock, and the upgrade's own writer is then refused. Any local user who can open that path read-only can make every subsequent upgrade fail fast with "another upgrade is already running". Not reachable on the default deployment, which has no SSH ingress, so achmod 0600after the open or a follow-up issue both close it.
Recorded without asking for changes: first boot writes compose.yaml at infra/aws/user-data.sh.tftpl:108 with a plain cat >, outside the lock, so an upgrade racing first boot is not serialized. A failed docker compose pull leaves the new rendering on disk over the still-running old stack. Both predate this round. The PR body still describes only the node commits and not the infra work that landed here, worth a one-line edit before merge.
Live SSM execution is the one thing I could not run locally, so that integration point is reasoned rather than executed.
|
@kevincodex1 ready for merge. Both jatmn and I approved, 19/19 green on 888fab6, no unresolved threads. Note it is a breaking change, so it wants the release notes that go with it. |
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Summary
A
did:keysignature is authentication, not authorization. The method is self-certifying, so any party can generate a keypair, derive its DID and sign. WithGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSHdefaulting tofalse,owner_push_rejectionshort-circuited (api/repos.rs:1600,if !enforce { return None; }) and everygit-receive-packcarrying any valid signature was accepted — including pushes to a repository the signer does not own, and including private ones, on every branch not explicitly protected.The gate itself already worked when switched on, and is well covered by unit tests. What was missing is that no reachable default configuration switched it on. A node started with nothing configured accepted a push from anyone who could run
gl identity new. That default is what this PR changes.Two commits, reviewable independently:
fix(node): gate two Unix-only tests…fix(node)!: enforce owner-only push by defaultHappy to split the first commit into its own PR if that reads better — it stands alone.
The argument had to become value-taking
Flipping
default_value_talone would have been a trap. The field is a barebool, so clap derivesArgAction::SetTrue— presence-only. A test asserting the escape hatch failed with:With a
truedefault and a presence-only flag,--enforce-owner-push falseis a parse error and the gate can never be turned off. The argument now takes a value, so--enforce-owner-push falseandGITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=falseboth disable it, while the bare--enforce-owner-pushform still meanstrue. Env and CLI share one value parser, so both resolve consistently.Three tests updated, none weakened
test_support.rs:67builds every fixture withConfig::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]), so the flip reaches every behavioural test. Three broke:f1_write_cap_key_is_per_source_not_per_reporeceive_pack_per_source_write_cap_sheds_capped_source_not_othersreceive_pack_acquire_deadline_sheds_and_releases_permitAll three push as a stranger in order to reach the concurrency behaviour they actually assert on, and now stop at the gate instead. Each fixture now pushes as the repo owner, so they keep exercising the shipped default rather than setting
enforce_owner_push = falseand testing a configuration nobody runs.did_matchescollapses thedid:key:prefix against the bare owner the rows store, so this is the same identity.Verification
Run on Windows against a local PostgreSQL 17.
cargo test -p gitlawb-node --bin gitlawb-nodecargo fmt --all -- --checkcargo clippy --workspace --all-targetsThe +2 is the two new config tests. The 11 failures are pre-existing on a clean tree and unrelated to this change —
sync::tests::*promisor*die onfatal: invalid filter-spec 'blob:limit=10g'from the Windows git build, and theipfs_cid_*walks return 503 where 200 is expected. Both are Windows environment issues that predate this branch; Linux CI should be unaffected. Worth a separate issue.Both new tests were watched failing before the implementation existed, and each failed for its own distinct reason.
Breaking change — please read before approving
git-receive-packnow rejects a push whose authenticated DID is not the repo owner, returning 403 before any ref update is applied.Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners. A UCAN
git/pushcapability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so an agent pushing under its own DID cannot push while this is on, even holding a valid capability for the repo. This is a real trade-off, not an oversight: the previous default meant anyone could push anywhere, which is worse. But it does mean scoped delegation is a claim the forge cannot currently honor, and completing UCAN authorization is the work that removes the trade-off.Merge order. That work is #331, which honors an owner-rooted
git/pushdelegation on this same path. Land #331 first or together with this one; landing this alone locks out every delegated and CI key until #331 follows.Operators who need the old behaviour during a rolling upgrade set
GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false. Documented inREADME.md,.env.example, anddocs/RUN-A-NODE.md.Two things to confirm
GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES— it staysfalsein this PR, andREADME.mddocuments the flip as conditional ("once all live peers upgrade") with no date attached. An earlier revision of this description asserted a 15 September 2026 commitment; the branch never made one, and this corrects that. If the rollout wants a fixed date, it should be set deliberately in a follow-up rather than inferred from here.CHANGELOG.mdis untouched — it is release-please generated, so the breaking change is carried in the commit footer rather than hand-edited.Summary by CodeRabbit
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