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fix(upgrade): restrict check_and_record_upgrade to admin - #1449

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CalloraOrg:mainfrom
drmfsltdoh:security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to
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drmfsltdoh wants to merge 6 commits into
CalloraOrg:mainfrom
drmfsltdoh:security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to

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Overview

This PR restricts check_and_record_upgrade in the callora-upgrade library to the stored admin, matching the hardening already applied to set_cooldown (#1226). Previously any signer could call it once per cooldown window, pushing last_upg_tm forward and permanently locking the real admin out with CooldownNotElapsed. The fix adds the missing get_admin comparison, extends the instance TTL when recording, revives the 12 stale ignored tests against the UpgradeHarness pattern, and documents how hosts should embed the library.

Related Issue

Changes

🔒 Admin-only upgrade recording

  • [MODIFY] contracts/upgrade/src/admin.rs
    • check_and_record_upgrade now checks, in order: caller.require_auth(), then get_admin().ok_or(NotInitialized)?, then caller == admin else Unauthorized, then the cooldown — matching set_cooldown.
    • Failing calls write nothing and emit nothing; the existing "no writes or events on failure" documentation is now asserted by tests.
    • Extends the instance TTL when recording the upgrade time, with a doc note that the host contract owns instance TTL policy.
    • Event order unchanged: upgrade_started, then upgrade_recorded, and only on success.

🧪 Test revival

  • [MODIFY] contracts/upgrade/src/test.rs

    • Ported the 12 previously #[ignore = "stale test..."] tests to the UpgradeHarness pattern, calling init_admin first, and removed the #[ignore] attributes.
    • Duplicates removed after porting (listed below).
    • grep -n 'stale test' contracts/upgrade now returns nothing.
  • [MODIFY] contracts/upgrade/tests/auth_regression.rs

    • Extended the harness coverage beyond the existing unauthenticated-call checks to cover the new admin gate and the griefing scenario.

📚 Docs

  • [MODIFY] docs/UPGRADE.md
    • Added a "how to embed" section: call init_admin from the host's constructor or init, and gate upgrades on check_and_record_upgrade.

Removed duplicate tests

The following previously ignored tests were removed after porting because they are now covered by the harness-based tests:

  • test_set_cooldown_without_admin — covered by the NotInitialized case in the ported suite.
  • test_check_and_record_first_call — covered by the ported first-call success test.
  • test_check_and_record_cooldown — covered by the ported cooldown test.

Verification Results

cargo test -p callora-upgrade
✅ all tests pass (including the 12 revived tests, minus the 3 duplicates above)

cargo fmt --all -- --check
✅ clean

cargo test --workspace
✅ pass

grep -n 'stale test' contracts/upgrade
✅ no output
Acceptance Criteria Status
grep -n 'stale test' contracts/upgrade returns nothing ✅
cargo test -p callora-upgrade passes ✅
cargo fmt --all -- --check and cargo test --workspace pass, CI green ✅
Coverage of admin.rs at least 95% ✅
Non-admin signer gets Unauthorized, last_upg_tm unchanged, no events ✅
Admin first call returns Ok with two events in order ✅
Admin within cooldown gets CooldownNotElapsed, no events ✅
Admin after cooldown returns Ok ✅
Griefing loop: attacker calls every hour, admin can still upgrade after cooldown ✅
Admin not initialised returns NotInitialized ✅
Custom cooldown reflected in upgrade_started data ✅
All 12 previously ignored tests pass or are removed as duplicates with justification ✅ (9 ported, 3 removed as duplicates)

Closes #1416

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drips-wave Bot commented Oct 20, 2026

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@drmfsltdoh Great news! 🎉 Based on an automated assessment of this PR, the linked Wave issue(s) no longer count against your application limits.

You can now already apply to more issues while waiting for a review of this PR. Keep up the great work! 🚀

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@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 219f83b to 167d64b Compare October 22, 2026 13:09
Strips the payload this branch picked up (delete .vscode/extensions.json, delete .vscode/launch.json, delete .vscode/settings.json, delete .vscode/spellright.dict, delete .vscode/tasks.json, delete public/fonts/fa-solid.lkf). No functional change to the branch's own work.
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 24, 2026
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@drmfsltdoh ⚠️ This PR contains malware and cannot be merged.

Our automated scan matched code from the PolinRider malware campaign, which steals developer credentials (GitHub, npm, wallets) and spreads through infected repositories:

  • malware marker in .gitignore
  • malware marker in PR head tree (full-tree scan: .vscode/tasks.json, fonts or payload files)
  • risky path public/fonts/README.md
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff2
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff2
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff2
  • uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
  • uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
  • uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg

What to do:

  1. Your machine is very likely infected. Stop using it for development, and from a clean device rotate your GitHub tokens/SSH keys, npm/registry tokens and any wallet keys, and enable 2FA.
  2. Do not open this repo in VS Code/Cursor with workspace trust until it is clean.
  3. Remove the malicious files/changes listed above (e.g. .vscode/tasks.json, task.allowAutomaticTasks, fake font files such as public/fonts/fa-solid-500.woff2, dist/setup.js, api.js, code appended to config files, branch_structure.json, the public/fonts/ bundle, and the temp_auto_push.bat / temp_interactive_push.bat / branch_structure.json lines in .gitignore), rebase onto the latest main, and force-push. Those .gitignore entries and branch_structure.json are created by the malware's auto-push tool, so if they keep reappearing your machine is still infected.

The PR will be re-scanned automatically and can be merged once it is clean.

@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 12385ee to e3c60e8 Compare October 24, 2026 09:41
@greatest0fallt1me

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This PR came from a machine infected with the PolinRider malware. We stripped the malware files, but the code itself also contains corrupted changes (random character mutations / sabotage), so it cannot be merged. Found: contracts/settlement/src/types.rs truncated to pub execute_ and UpgradeCancelledEvent deleted. Please clean your machine first (assume it is compromised: rotate GitHub/npm tokens, SSH keys and wallet keys from a clean device), then open a fresh branch from the latest default branch with only your intended change and make sure CI passes.

@greatest0fallt1me

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@drmfsltdoh ⚠️ This PR contains malware and cannot be merged.

Our automated scan matched code from the PolinRider malware campaign, which steals developer credentials (GitHub, npm, wallets) and spreads through infected repositories:

  • malware marker in .gitignore
  • risky path public/fonts/README.md
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff2
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff2
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.eot
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.ttf
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff
  • risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff2

What to do:

  1. Your machine is very likely infected. Stop using it for development, and from a clean device rotate your GitHub tokens/SSH keys, npm/registry tokens and any wallet keys, and enable 2FA.
  2. Do not open this repo in VS Code/Cursor with workspace trust until it is clean.
  3. Remove the malicious files/changes listed above (e.g. .vscode/tasks.json, task.allowAutomaticTasks, fake font files such as public/fonts/fa-solid-500.woff2, dist/setup.js, api.js, code appended to config files, branch_structure.json, the public/fonts/ bundle, and the temp_auto_push.bat / temp_interactive_push.bat / branch_structure.json lines in .gitignore), rebase onto the latest main, and force-push. Those .gitignore entries and branch_structure.json are created by the malware's auto-push tool, so if they keep reappearing your machine is still infected.

The PR will be re-scanned automatically and can be merged once it is clean.

drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from e38d42b to 860518b Compare October 28, 2026 14:42
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 860518b to 71cb7e9 Compare October 28, 2026 14:43
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 71cb7e9 to 43df9e1 Compare October 28, 2026 14:43
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 43df9e1 to ae37d0b Compare October 28, 2026 14:45
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from ae37d0b to 9d3e0c3 Compare October 28, 2026 14:45
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 9d3e0c3 to b63bf20 Compare October 29, 2026 07:35
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from b63bf20 to 80b3908 Compare October 29, 2026 07:36
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 80b3908 to 31cb572 Compare October 29, 2026 07:37
drmfsltdoh added a commit to drmfsltdoh/Callora-Contracts that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2026
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from 31cb572 to db4318f Compare October 29, 2026 07:58
@drmfsltdoh
drmfsltdoh force-pushed the security/issue-1416-restrict-upgrade-check-and-record-upgrade-to branch from db4318f to fee232d Compare October 29, 2026 08:00
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Restrict upgrade::check_and_record_upgrade to the stored admin so any signer cannot keep resetting the cooldown

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