VoiceMaster places real phone calls, holds call recordings and transcripts, and can reach an owner's Hermes tools. Please report security problems privately.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: the Report a vulnerability button on this repository's Security tab. Do not open a public issue, and do not include real phone numbers, recordings or credentials in the report.

You should get an answer within a week. Fixes are released as soon as they are ready, and the advisory credits the reporter unless they ask otherwise.

• The dashboard (services/voice-control): authentication, access to recordings and transcripts, the Agent and profile endpoints, anything that places a call.
• The gateway bearer (HERMES_GATEWAY_TOKEN) on POST /voice/outbound, and the paths that must refuse without it.
• Twilio webhook signature validation on the phone bridge.
• Outbound dialing controls: the allow-list, the one-shot placement, the scheduler.
• The inbound caller allow-list and the tool policy an inbound or outbound Agent runs with.
• The Hermes add-ons in hermes/.

• A dashboard deliberately run without login on a network you control. Login is off only when VOICE_DASHBOARD_USER or VOICE_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD is unset.
• VOICE_OUTBOUND_ALLOWED_NUMBERS deliberately left empty (allow any number).
• Vulnerabilities in Hermes Agent, Twilio, OpenAI or other providers themselves. Report those upstream.

• Keep login on unless the dashboard is reachable only from a private network.
• Keep .env out of git, readable only by the account that runs Docker.
• Use a long random HERMES_GATEWAY_TOKEN.
• Expose only the phone bridge (port 3336) through your public tunnel, never the dashboard.