diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index bf6ca830d1..ad9441231a 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ uucore = { workspace = true, features = [
   "entries",
   "pipes",
   "process",
+  "safe-traversal",
   "signals",
   "utmpx",
 ] }
diff --git a/src/uucore/src/lib/features/safe_traversal.rs b/src/uucore/src/lib/features/safe_traversal.rs
index 587fabf36c..05676c70f4 100644
--- a/src/uucore/src/lib/features/safe_traversal.rs
+++ b/src/uucore/src/lib/features/safe_traversal.rs
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use std::time::SystemTime;
 use nix::dir::Dir;
 use nix::fcntl::{OFlag, openat};
 use nix::libc;
-use nix::sys::stat::{FchmodatFlags, FileStat, Mode, fchmodat, fstatat, mkdirat};
+use nix::sys::stat::{FchmodatFlags, FileStat, Mode, fchmodat, fstat, fstatat, mkdirat};
 use nix::unistd::{Gid, Uid, UnlinkatFlags, fchown, fchownat, unlinkat};
 use os_display::Quotable;
 
@@ -146,6 +146,43 @@ const LARGEFILE: OFlag = OFlag::O_LARGEFILE;
 #[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android")))]
 const LARGEFILE: OFlag = OFlag::empty();
 
+/// Flag that opens a directory as an anchor for `*at` calls without read access.
+///
+/// `mkdirat` and `openat` need write and execute on the anchor directory, but
+/// opening it `O_RDONLY` also demands read, which fails on write-only
+/// directories where GNU succeeds. `O_PATH` (Linux) and `O_SEARCH` (POSIX
+/// 2008) both yield a descriptor that anchors `*at` calls without reading.
+/// Such a descriptor cannot list directory entries.
+#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
+const SEARCH_ONLY: Option<OFlag> = Some(OFlag::O_PATH);
+#[cfg(any(
+    target_os = "macos",
+    target_os = "ios",
+    target_os = "freebsd",
+    target_os = "netbsd",
+    target_os = "illumos",
+    target_os = "solaris"
+))]
+const SEARCH_ONLY: Option<OFlag> = Some(OFlag::O_SEARCH);
+#[cfg(not(any(
+    target_os = "linux",
+    target_os = "android",
+    target_os = "macos",
+    target_os = "ios",
+    target_os = "freebsd",
+    target_os = "netbsd",
+    target_os = "illumos",
+    target_os = "solaris"
+)))]
+const SEARCH_ONLY: Option<OFlag> = None;
+
+/// Whether this platform can anchor `*at` calls on a directory it may not read.
+///
+/// Where it cannot, creating an entry inside a write-only directory fails with
+/// `EACCES` instead of succeeding the way `mkdir` does (OpenBSD, for example,
+/// has neither `O_PATH` nor `O_SEARCH`).
+pub const SEARCH_ONLY_SUPPORTED: bool = SEARCH_ONLY.is_some();
+
 impl DirFd {
     /// Open a directory and return a file descriptor
     ///
@@ -166,6 +203,27 @@ impl DirFd {
         Ok(Self { fd })
     }
 
+    /// Open a directory to anchor `*at` calls, following symlinks.
+    ///
+    /// Falls back to a search-only descriptor when the directory denies read
+    /// access, so that creating entries in a write-only directory works the
+    /// way it does with `mkdir`. The returned descriptor is only guaranteed to
+    /// support `*at` calls; it may not be able to list directory entries.
+    pub fn open_anchor(path: &Path) -> io::Result<Self> {
+        let denied = match Self::open(path, SymlinkBehavior::Follow) {
+            Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => e,
+            result => return result,
+        };
+        let Some(search_only) = SEARCH_ONLY else {
+            return Err(denied);
+        };
+
+        let flags = search_only | OFlag::O_DIRECTORY | OFlag::O_CLOEXEC | LARGEFILE;
+        nix::fcntl::open(path, flags, Mode::empty())
+            .map(|fd| Self { fd })
+            .map_err(|_| denied)
+    }
+
     /// Open a subdirectory relative to this directory
     ///
     /// # Arguments
@@ -225,7 +283,7 @@ impl DirFd {
 
     /// Get raw stat data for this directory
     pub fn fstat(&self) -> io::Result<FileStat> {
-        let stat = nix::sys::stat::fstat(&self.fd).map_err(|e| SafeTraversalError::StatFailed {
+        let stat = fstat(&self.fd).map_err(|e| SafeTraversalError::StatFailed {
             path: translate!("safe-traversal-current-directory").into(),
             source: io::Error::from_raw_os_error(e as i32),
         })?;
@@ -651,7 +709,7 @@ fn open_or_create_subdir(parent_fd: &DirFd, name: &OsStr, mode: u32) -> io::Resu
 #[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn create_dir_all_safe(path: &Path, mode: u32) -> io::Result<DirFd> {
     let (existing_ancestor, components_to_create) = find_existing_ancestor(path)?;
-    let mut dir_fd = DirFd::open(&existing_ancestor, SymlinkBehavior::Follow)?;
+    let mut dir_fd = DirFd::open_anchor(&existing_ancestor)?;
 
     for component in &components_to_create {
         dir_fd = open_or_create_subdir(&dir_fd, component.as_os_str(), mode)?;
@@ -988,6 +1046,7 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use std::fs;
     use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
     use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
     use std::os::unix::io::IntoRawFd;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
@@ -1413,6 +1472,27 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(nested_path.is_dir());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_create_dir_all_safe_in_write_only_dir() {
+        // root ignores the permission bits this test depends on, and without
+        // O_PATH or O_SEARCH the walk cannot anchor on an unreadable directory
+        if Uid::effective().is_root() || !SEARCH_ONLY_SUPPORTED {
+            return;
+        }
+        let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let write_only = temp_dir.path().join("wx");
+        fs::create_dir(&write_only).unwrap();
+        fs::set_permissions(&write_only, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o300)).unwrap();
+
+        // mkdir needs write and execute, not read: an unreadable parent must
+        // not stop us, the way it does not stop GNU.
+        let nested = write_only.join("a/b");
+        create_dir_all_safe(&nested, 0o755).unwrap();
+
+        fs::set_permissions(&write_only, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        assert!(nested.is_dir());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_create_dir_all_safe_existing_path() {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
diff --git a/tests/by-util/test_install.rs b/tests/by-util/test_install.rs
index 6832c6edbd..69bd7ffb30 100644
--- a/tests/by-util/test_install.rs
+++ b/tests/by-util/test_install.rs
@@ -2906,6 +2906,44 @@ fn test_install_d_dangling_symlink_in_path_errors() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+#[cfg(all(
+    unix,
+    not(any(target_os = "aix", target_os = "hurd", target_os = "redox"))
+))]
+fn test_install_d_leading_dirs_in_write_only_directory() {
+    // mkdir needs write and execute on the parent, not read, so -D must be
+    // able to create leading directories inside a directory it cannot read.
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+    let scene = TestScenario::new(util_name!());
+    let at = &scene.fixtures;
+
+    if geteuid().is_root() {
+        println!("Test skipped; root ignores directory permissions");
+        return;
+    }
+    if !uucore::safe_traversal::SEARCH_ONLY_SUPPORTED {
+        println!("Test skipped; platform cannot anchor on an unreadable directory");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    at.write("file.txt", "hello");
+    at.mkdir("wx");
+    fs::set_permissions(at.plus("wx"), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o300)).unwrap();
+
+    scene
+        .ucmd()
+        .args(&["-D", "file.txt", "wx/a/b/file.txt"])
+        .succeeds();
+
+    fs::set_permissions(at.plus("wx"), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        fs::read_to_string(at.plus("wx/a/b/file.txt")).unwrap(),
+        "hello"
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 fn test_install_set_owner_nonexistent_uid_and_gid() {