docs: correct the Helm readOnlyRootFilesystem note and the deployed-run variables TSDoc

Author: waleedlatif1

apps/sim/lib/workflows/persistence/utils.ts

@@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ export interface DeployedWorkflowData extends NormalizedWorkflowData {
 }
 
 /**
- * The variables a queued deployed run (async API, schedule, webhook) executes with: the
- * deployed version's own, or the workflow's saved variables for a version deployed before
+ * The variables an unpinned queued deployed run (async API, schedule, webhook) executes with:
+ * the deployed version's own, or the workflow's saved variables for a version deployed before
  * deployments snapshotted them, which is what those runs have always used for such a version.
+ * A run pinned to a version reads that version's variables directly instead.
  */
 export function resolveDeployedRunVariables(
   deployedState: DeployedWorkflowData,

helm/sim/README.md

@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ Before installing in production, confirm each of the following:
           matchLabels:
             kubernetes.io/metadata.name: ingress-nginx
   ```
-* **Namespace hardening** — label the install namespace with Pod Security Standards `restricted` enforcement (`pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted`). All workloads set `runAsNonRoot`, drop all Linux capabilities, disable privilege escalation, and set `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault` — the four controls the Restricted profile requires. `readOnlyRootFilesystem` is intentionally **not** defaulted anywhere (Postgres/Ollama genuinely need a writable root; the stateless services — `realtime`, `pii`, `copilot` — could tolerate it but aren't pre-wired with a `/tmp` `emptyDir`). If your policy requires it, set `<component>.securityContext.readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` and mount writable `emptyDir` volumes yourself via `extraVolumes`/`extraVolumeMounts`: `/tmp` for every component, plus `/app/apps/sim/.next/cache` and `/app/apps/sim/.next/server/route-cache` for `app`.
+* **Namespace hardening** — label the install namespace with Pod Security Standards `restricted` enforcement (`pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted`). All workloads set `runAsNonRoot`, drop all Linux capabilities, disable privilege escalation, and set `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault` — the four controls the Restricted profile requires. `readOnlyRootFilesystem` is defaulted on only for the bundled Redis (Postgres/Ollama genuinely need a writable root; the stateless services — `realtime`, `pii`, `copilot` — could tolerate it but aren't pre-wired with a `/tmp` `emptyDir`). If your policy requires it, set `<component>.securityContext.readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` and mount writable `emptyDir` volumes yourself via `extraVolumes`/`extraVolumeMounts`: `/tmp` for every component, plus `/app/apps/sim/.next/cache` and `/app/apps/sim/.next/server/route-cache` for `app`.
 * **Env validation** — keys under `app.env`, `realtime.env`, and `copilot.server.env` are passed through to the application and validated at startup. The JSON Schema intentionally does not enforce `additionalProperties: false` (would break custom user envs), so typos like `OPENA_API_KEY` (instead of `OPENAI_API_KEY`) surface as missing-key errors at runtime, not at `helm install` time. Review your env block carefully.
 * **Set public URLs** — `app.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` and `app.env.BETTER_AUTH_URL` must match your public origin (e.g. `https://sim.example.com`). Leaving them as `localhost` breaks sign-in.