diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index d07e84f4d..3deca03ba 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -45,7 +45,13 @@ v2/main/
 │   │                                   #   providers.redirectToAuthorization, the only
 │   │                                   #   seam that sees the SDK-built authorize URL;
 │   │                                   #   authorization request only, never the token
-│   │                                   #   request — #2018)
+│   │                                   #   request — #2018;
+│   │                                   #   endpointOverrides.ts per-server
+│   │                                   #   authorization/token URL overrides — a fetch
+│   │                                   #   wrapper that rewrites the discovered AS
+│   │                                   #   metadata document, the one seam SDK v2 routes
+│   │                                   #   BOTH endpoints through (neither reaches the
+│   │                                   #   OAuthClientProvider) — #1906)
 │   │   ├── browser/                    # Browser-side OAuth (sessionStorage, BrowserNavigation)
 │   │   ├── node/                       # Node-side OAuth (NodeOAuthStorage, OAuthCallbackServer,
 │   │   │                               #   runner-interactive-oauth loopback callback flow)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index cb57dd359..a9fab0c1e 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ inspector/
 │   ├── tui/          # TUI client (Ink + React, tsup bundle)
 │   └── launcher/     # Shared launcher — provides the `mcp-inspector` bin, dispatches to web/cli/tui
 ├── core/             # Shared code consumed via the `@inspector/core` alias (no package.json)
-│   ├── auth/         # OAuth: providers, discovery, storage, mid-session recovery (browser/node/remote backends)
+│   ├── auth/         # OAuth: providers, discovery, storage, endpoint overrides, mid-session recovery (browser/node/remote backends)
 │   ├── client/       # Install-level client config (`client.json`): browser-safe parse/validate + Node load/save, remote backend, secrets
 │   ├── json/         # JSON + parameter/argument conversion utilities, and the nullable-union
 │   │                 #   schema collapse shared by the web and TUI form builders
diff --git a/clients/web/src/App.tsx b/clients/web/src/App.tsx
index 72d8bd1f3..5837f27f5 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/App.tsx
+++ b/clients/web/src/App.tsx
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ import { ResourceSubscriptionsState } from "@inspector/core/mcp/state/resourceSu
 import {
   cleanRoots,
   oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings,
+  oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings,
   serializeMcpConfig,
 } from "@inspector/core/mcp/serverList.js";
 import type { ClientConfig } from "@inspector/core/client/types.js";
@@ -2315,12 +2316,16 @@ function App() {
       const serverAuthorizationParams = savedSettings
         ? oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings(savedSettings)
         : undefined;
+      const serverEndpointOverrides = savedSettings
+        ? oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings(savedSettings)
+        : undefined;
       const oauthFromServer =
         savedSettings &&
         (savedSettings.oauthClientId ||
           savedSettings.oauthClientSecret ||
           savedSettings.oauthScopes ||
           serverAuthorizationParams ||
+          serverEndpointOverrides ||
           savedSettings.enterpriseManaged)
           ? {
               ...(savedSettings.oauthClientId && {
@@ -2335,6 +2340,7 @@ function App() {
               ...(serverAuthorizationParams && {
                 authorizationParams: serverAuthorizationParams,
               }),
+              ...serverEndpointOverrides,
               ...(savedSettings.enterpriseManaged && {
                 enterpriseManaged: true,
               }),
diff --git a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.test.tsx b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.test.tsx
index d238228a1..09ded1716 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.test.tsx
+++ b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.test.tsx
@@ -701,6 +701,8 @@ describe("ServerSettingsForm", () => {
       clientSecret: "",
       scopes: "",
       authorizationParams: [],
+      authorizationUrl: "",
+      tokenUrl: "",
       enterpriseManaged: false,
     });
   });
@@ -966,6 +968,104 @@ describe("ServerSettingsForm", () => {
     expect(screen.getByText(/state, scope are set/)).toBeInTheDocument();
   });
 
+  // #1906 — the endpoint overrides ride the same `onOAuthChange` callback as
+  // the rest of the Authorization section.
+  it("invokes onOAuthChange when an endpoint override is typed", async () => {
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    const onOAuthChange = vi.fn();
+    renderWithMantine(
+      <ServerSettingsForm
+        {...baseHandlers}
+        onOAuthChange={onOAuthChange}
+        settings={emptySettings}
+        expandedSections={["oauth"]}
+      />,
+    );
+    await user.type(
+      screen.getByRole("textbox", { name: /Authorization URL override/i }),
+      "h",
+    );
+    expect(onOAuthChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ authorizationUrl: "h" }),
+    );
+
+    onOAuthChange.mockClear();
+    await user.type(
+      screen.getByRole("textbox", { name: /Token URL override/i }),
+      "h",
+    );
+    expect(onOAuthChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ tokenUrl: "h" }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("says the endpoint overrides are unused under enterprise-managed auth", () => {
+    const { rerender } = renderWithMantine(
+      <ServerSettingsForm
+        {...baseHandlers}
+        settings={{ ...emptySettings, enterpriseManaged: true }}
+        expandedSections={["oauth"]}
+      />,
+    );
+    expect(
+      screen.getAllByText(
+        /Not applied while Enterprise-managed authorization is on/,
+      ),
+    ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+    rerender(
+      <ServerSettingsForm
+        {...baseHandlers}
+        settings={{ ...emptySettings, enterpriseManaged: false }}
+        expandedSections={["oauth"]}
+      />,
+    );
+    expect(
+      screen.queryByText(
+        /Not applied while Enterprise-managed authorization is on/,
+      ),
+    ).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  it("flags an endpoint override that is not an absolute http(s) URL", () => {
+    renderWithMantine(
+      <ServerSettingsForm
+        {...baseHandlers}
+        settings={{
+          ...emptySettings,
+          oauthAuthorizationUrl: "/authorize",
+          oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+        }}
+        expandedSections={["oauth"]}
+      />,
+    );
+    expect(
+      screen.getByText('"/authorize" is not an absolute URL.'),
+    ).toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByText(/is not an http\(s\) URL/)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("clears an endpoint override through its clear button", async () => {
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    const onOAuthChange = vi.fn();
+    renderWithMantine(
+      <ServerSettingsForm
+        {...baseHandlers}
+        onOAuthChange={onOAuthChange}
+        settings={{
+          ...emptySettings,
+          oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+        }}
+        expandedSections={["oauth"]}
+      />,
+    );
+    const clearButtons = screen.getAllByRole("button", { name: /clear/i });
+    await user.click(clearButtons[clearButtons.length - 1]);
+    expect(onOAuthChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ tokenUrl: "" }),
+    );
+  });
+
   it("invokes onOAuthChange with the chosen insufficient-scope policy (SEP-2350)", async () => {
     const user = userEvent.setup();
     const onOAuthChange = vi.fn();
@@ -1007,6 +1107,8 @@ describe("ServerSettingsForm", () => {
       clientSecret: "",
       scopes: "",
       authorizationParams: [],
+      authorizationUrl: "",
+      tokenUrl: "",
       enterpriseManaged: true,
     });
   });
@@ -1112,6 +1214,8 @@ describe("ServerSettingsForm", () => {
       clientSecret: "z",
       scopes: "",
       authorizationParams: [],
+      authorizationUrl: "",
+      tokenUrl: "",
       enterpriseManaged: false,
     });
   });
diff --git a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.tsx b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.tsx
index 276c9cf9d..b2a786c64 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.tsx
+++ b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsForm/ServerSettingsForm.tsx
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import {
   authorizationParamKeyError,
   isReservedAuthorizationParam,
 } from "@inspector/core/auth/authorizationParams.js";
+import { oauthEndpointUrlError } from "@inspector/core/auth/endpointOverrides.js";
 import { ADVERTISABLE_EXTENSIONS } from "@inspector/core/mcp/extensions.js";
 import type { Root } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 
@@ -478,11 +479,20 @@ export function ServerSettingsForm({
       clientSecret: settings.oauthClientSecret ?? "",
       scopes: settings.oauthScopes ?? "",
       authorizationParams,
+      authorizationUrl: settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl ?? "",
+      tokenUrl: settings.oauthTokenUrl ?? "",
       enterpriseManaged: settings.enterpriseManaged ?? false,
       onInsufficientScope: settings.oauthOnInsufficientScope,
     };
   }
 
+  // #1906 — the overrides are suppressed under EMA for the same reason the
+  // custom authorization parameters are: that leg authorizes against the
+  // enterprise IdP, a different authorization server.
+  const endpointOverrideEmaNote = settings.enterpriseManaged
+    ? " Not applied while Enterprise-managed authorization is on: that flow authorizes against the enterprise IdP, a different authorization server."
+    : "";
+
   const rejectedParamKeys = authorizationParams
     .map((p) => p.key.trim())
     .filter((key) => isReservedAuthorizationParam(key));
@@ -863,6 +873,55 @@ export function ServerSettingsForm({
                   + Add Parameter
                 </AddButton>
               </Stack>
+              <ClearableTextInput
+                label="Authorization URL override"
+                description={`Leave blank to use the authorization_endpoint the authorization server's metadata advertises. Set it to point this server at a development or staging authorization server instead. Endpoints only — the discovered issuer is unchanged, so an authorization server advertising a different issuer is rejected on callback (RFC 9207).${endpointOverrideEmaNote}`}
+                placeholder="https://staging.auth.example.com/authorize"
+                value={settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl ?? ""}
+                error={oauthEndpointUrlError(
+                  settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl ?? "",
+                )}
+                onChange={(e) =>
+                  onOAuthChange({
+                    ...currentOAuth(),
+                    authorizationUrl: e.currentTarget.value,
+                  })
+                }
+                rightSection={
+                  settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl ? (
+                    <ClearButton
+                      onClick={() =>
+                        onOAuthChange({
+                          ...currentOAuth(),
+                          authorizationUrl: "",
+                        })
+                      }
+                    />
+                  ) : null
+                }
+              />
+              <ClearableTextInput
+                label="Token URL override"
+                description={`Leave blank to use the token_endpoint the authorization server's metadata advertises. Independent of the authorization URL — either can be overridden alone.${endpointOverrideEmaNote}`}
+                placeholder="https://staging.auth.example.com/token"
+                value={settings.oauthTokenUrl ?? ""}
+                error={oauthEndpointUrlError(settings.oauthTokenUrl ?? "")}
+                onChange={(e) =>
+                  onOAuthChange({
+                    ...currentOAuth(),
+                    tokenUrl: e.currentTarget.value,
+                  })
+                }
+                rightSection={
+                  settings.oauthTokenUrl ? (
+                    <ClearButton
+                      onClick={() =>
+                        onOAuthChange({ ...currentOAuth(), tokenUrl: "" })
+                      }
+                    />
+                  ) : null
+                }
+              />
               <Select
                 label="Insufficient-scope response"
                 description="On a 403 insufficient_scope challenge (SEP-2350): re-authorize with the accumulated scope union, or surface the error to you."
diff --git a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.test.tsx b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.test.tsx
index a6faac5e6..1e14d6415 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.test.tsx
+++ b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.test.tsx
@@ -445,6 +445,52 @@ describe("ServerSettingsModal", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  // #1906 — a typed endpoint override lands on the settings; clearing it
+  // persists `undefined` rather than an empty string, so "cleared" and "never
+  // set" are the same state on disk.
+  it("persists a typed endpoint override, and clears it back to undefined", async () => {
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    const onSettingsChange = vi.fn();
+    const { rerender } = renderWithMantine(
+      <ServerSettingsModal
+        opened
+        settings={emptySettings}
+        serverType="streamable-http"
+        isStdio={false}
+        onClose={vi.fn()}
+        onSettingsChange={onSettingsChange}
+      />,
+    );
+    await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "OAuth Settings" }));
+    await user.type(
+      screen.getByRole("textbox", { name: /Token URL override/i }),
+      "h",
+    );
+    expect(onSettingsChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ oauthTokenUrl: "h" }),
+    );
+
+    onSettingsChange.mockClear();
+    rerender(
+      <ServerSettingsModal
+        opened
+        settings={{
+          ...emptySettings,
+          oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+        }}
+        serverType="streamable-http"
+        isStdio={false}
+        onClose={vi.fn()}
+        onSettingsChange={onSettingsChange}
+      />,
+    );
+    const clearButtons = screen.getAllByRole("button", { name: /clear/i });
+    await user.click(clearButtons[clearButtons.length - 1]);
+    expect(onSettingsChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ oauthTokenUrl: undefined }),
+    );
+  });
+
   // #2018 — the authorization-parameter rows ride the same onOAuthChange
   // callback, so the modal folds them onto the settings object.
   it("persists an added authorization-parameter row onto the settings", async () => {
diff --git a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.tsx b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.tsx
index 869291b1a..35c1fb12e 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.tsx
+++ b/clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerSettingsModal/ServerSettingsModal.tsx
@@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ export function ServerSettingsModal({
       // survives a re-render; the drop-blank/omit-empty filtering happens on the
       // way to disk. An emptied list persists as `[]`, which writes nothing.
       oauthAuthorizationParams: oauth.authorizationParams,
+      // #1906: an emptied field persists as undefined rather than `""` — the
+      // read side treats a blank override as "not configured", and keeping the
+      // two in step means clearing the input really clears the setting.
+      oauthAuthorizationUrl: oauth.authorizationUrl || undefined,
+      oauthTokenUrl: oauth.tokenUrl || undefined,
       enterpriseManaged: oauth.enterpriseManaged ? true : undefined,
       // SEP-2350: persist only the non-default ('throw') so unset servers keep
       // the SDK's `reauthorize` behavior without writing a spurious field.
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/core/auth/endpointOverrides.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/core/auth/endpointOverrides.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19fbe266c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/core/auth/endpointOverrides.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
+import {
+  applyOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+  isAuthorizationServerMetadata,
+  normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+  oauthEndpointUrlError,
+  withOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+} from "@inspector/core/auth/endpointOverrides.js";
+
+const METADATA = {
+  issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+  authorization_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+  token_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/token",
+  response_types_supported: ["code"],
+};
+
+const AS_METADATA_URL =
+  "https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
+const STAGING_AUTHORIZE = "https://staging.example.com/authorize";
+const STAGING_TOKEN = "https://staging.example.com/token";
+
+function jsonResponse(body: unknown, init?: ResponseInit): Response {
+  return new Response(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body), {
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    ...init,
+  });
+}
+
+/** A `fetch` that always resolves to the same prepared response. */
+function passThrough(response: Response): typeof fetch {
+  return async () => response;
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+describe("oauthEndpointUrlError", () => {
+  it("accepts a blank value as 'no override'", () => {
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError("")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError("   ")).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("accepts absolute http and https URLs", () => {
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError(STAGING_AUTHORIZE)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(
+      oauthEndpointUrlError("http://localhost:9000/token"),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a relative path", () => {
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError("/authorize")).toMatch(/not an absolute URL/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a non-http(s) scheme", () => {
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError("ftp://example.com/authorize")).toMatch(
+      /not an http\(s\) URL/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  // `new URL` accepts these, but Fetch rejects a request URL carrying them —
+  // so without this check the value passes validation and fails mid-flow.
+  it("rejects embedded credentials", () => {
+    expect(
+      oauthEndpointUrlError("https://user:pass@as.example.com/token"),
+    ).toMatch(/username or password/);
+    expect(oauthEndpointUrlError("https://user@as.example.com/token")).toMatch(
+      /username or password/,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides", () => {
+  it("returns undefined when nothing is configured", () => {
+    expect(normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({})).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({ authorizationUrl: "  " }),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("trims and keeps each configured endpoint independently", () => {
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({
+        authorizationUrl: `  ${STAGING_AUTHORIZE} `,
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ authorizationUrl: STAGING_AUTHORIZE });
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN }),
+    ).toEqual({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN });
+  });
+
+  it("drops a malformed value with a warning, keeping the valid sibling", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({
+        authorizationUrl: "not a url",
+        tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN });
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining("Ignoring `authorizationUrl`"),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("drops a URL with embedded credentials", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({
+        tokenUrl: "https://user:pass@as.example.com/token",
+      }),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining("username or password"),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("returns undefined when every configured value is malformed", () => {
+    vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    expect(
+      normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides({
+        authorizationUrl: "ftp://example.com/a",
+        tokenUrl: "also not a url",
+      }),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("isAuthorizationServerMetadata", () => {
+  it("accepts a document with an issuer and at least one endpoint", () => {
+    expect(isAuthorizationServerMetadata(METADATA)).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isAuthorizationServerMetadata({
+        issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+        token_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/token",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a non-object body", () => {
+    expect(isAuthorizationServerMetadata(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAuthorizationServerMetadata("nope")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAuthorizationServerMetadata([METADATA])).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects protected-resource metadata, which has no issuer", () => {
+    expect(
+      isAuthorizationServerMetadata({
+        resource: "https://mcp.example.com",
+        authorization_servers: ["https://as.example.com"],
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a document with an issuer but neither endpoint", () => {
+    expect(
+      isAuthorizationServerMetadata({ issuer: "https://as.example.com" }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("applyOAuthEndpointOverrides", () => {
+  it("replaces only the configured endpoints and copies the rest", () => {
+    const patched = applyOAuthEndpointOverrides(METADATA, {
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+    expect(patched).toEqual({
+      ...METADATA,
+      token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+    expect(METADATA.token_endpoint).toBe("https://as.example.com/token");
+  });
+
+  it("supplies an endpoint the document never advertised", () => {
+    const patched = applyOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+      { issuer: "https://as.example.com" },
+      { authorizationUrl: STAGING_AUTHORIZE, tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN },
+    );
+    expect(patched).toEqual({
+      issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+      authorization_endpoint: STAGING_AUTHORIZE,
+      token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("withOAuthEndpointOverrides", () => {
+  it("rewrites the endpoints of a metadata response", async () => {
+    const base: typeof fetch = async () => jsonResponse(METADATA);
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(base, () => ({
+      authorizationUrl: STAGING_AUTHORIZE,
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+
+    const response = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({
+      ...METADATA,
+      authorization_endpoint: STAGING_AUTHORIZE,
+      token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("re-reads the overrides on every call, so a settings edit takes effect", async () => {
+    const base: typeof fetch = async () => jsonResponse(METADATA);
+    // Held in a box rather than a `let`: the resolver closes over it before the
+    // first assignment, which is what the lazy read exists to support.
+    const config: { overrides?: { tokenUrl?: string } } = {};
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(base, () => config.overrides);
+
+    const before = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await expect(before.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      token_endpoint: METADATA.token_endpoint,
+    });
+
+    config.overrides = { tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN };
+    const after = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await expect(after.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+  });
+
+  // The gate that keeps this wrapper off the hot path: an ordinary JSON-RPC
+  // response is not even cloned, let alone parsed. Regression test for PR #2037.
+  it("ignores a response to a request that is not metadata discovery", async () => {
+    const original = jsonResponse(METADATA);
+    const clone = vi.spyOn(original, "clone");
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+
+    await expect(wrapped("https://mcp.example.com/mcp")).resolves.toBe(
+      original,
+    );
+    expect(clone).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("recognizes discovery through every request-input form", async () => {
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+      // A fresh response per call: each patched one consumes its own clone.
+      async () => jsonResponse(METADATA),
+      () => ({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN }),
+    );
+    const oidcUrl = "https://as.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+    for (const input of [
+      AS_METADATA_URL,
+      new URL(oidcUrl),
+      new Request(`${AS_METADATA_URL}/tenant-a`),
+    ]) {
+      const response = await wrapped(input);
+      await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+        token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("warns once about a malformed override, not on every request", async () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const base: typeof fetch = async () => jsonResponse(METADATA);
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(base, () => ({
+      tokenUrl: "not a url",
+    }));
+
+    await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("passes the response through untouched when nothing is configured", async () => {
+    const original = jsonResponse(METADATA);
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+      passThrough(original),
+      () => undefined,
+    );
+    await expect(wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL)).resolves.toBe(original);
+  });
+
+  it("leaves an error response alone", async () => {
+    const original = jsonResponse(METADATA, { status: 404 });
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    await expect(wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL)).resolves.toBe(original);
+  });
+
+  it("leaves a non-JSON response alone", async () => {
+    const original = new Response("<html></html>", {
+      headers: { "content-type": "text/html" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    await expect(wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL)).resolves.toBe(original);
+  });
+
+  // Everything that is not a metadata document comes back as the caller's own
+  // Response — identity, not an equivalent copy — so native properties a
+  // synthesized Response cannot carry (`url`, `redirected`, `type`) survive.
+  it("returns the original response for a JSON body that is not metadata", async () => {
+    const original = jsonResponse({ access_token: "abc" });
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    const response = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    expect(response).toBe(original);
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({ access_token: "abc" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns the original response when the body is not valid JSON", async () => {
+    const original = jsonResponse("not json at all");
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    const response = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    expect(response).toBe(original);
+    await expect(response.text()).resolves.toBe("not json at all");
+  });
+
+  // `application/x-ndjson` satisfies a naive `includes("json")` test, and the
+  // streamable-HTTP transport serves its long-lived server-push channel that way
+  // (see `isLongLivedStreamResponse`). Awaiting `.json()` on a clone of an
+  // unbounded stream never resolves, so the MCP connection would hang for as
+  // long as an override was configured. Regression test for PR #2037 review.
+  it("does not read an unbounded NDJSON stream", async () => {
+    // A body that never closes: if the wrapper reads it, this test times out.
+    const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+      start(controller) {
+        controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode('{"jsonrpc":"2.0"}\n'));
+        // Deliberately never closed.
+      },
+    });
+    const original = new Response(stream, {
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/x-ndjson" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    await expect(wrapped("https://mcp.example.com/mcp")).resolves.toBe(
+      original,
+    );
+    await original.body?.cancel();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores content-type parameters when deciding a body is JSON", async () => {
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+      passThrough(
+        new Response(JSON.stringify(METADATA), {
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/json; charset=utf-8" },
+        }),
+      ),
+      () => ({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN }),
+    );
+    const response = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      token_endpoint: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Fetch forbids a body on 204/205, so rebuilding one would throw. A JSON
+  // content-type on an empty response is unusual but legal, and it must not
+  // take down an unrelated transport request.
+  it("passes a body-less 204 through untouched", async () => {
+    const original = new Response(null, {
+      status: 204,
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    });
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(passThrough(original), () => ({
+      tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN,
+    }));
+    await expect(wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL)).resolves.toBe(original);
+  });
+
+  it("drops the stale content-length and content-encoding of a rewritten body", async () => {
+    const body = JSON.stringify(METADATA);
+    const wrapped = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+      passThrough(
+        new Response(body, {
+          headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            "content-length": String(body.length),
+            "content-encoding": "gzip",
+          },
+        }),
+      ),
+      () => ({ tokenUrl: STAGING_TOKEN }),
+    );
+    const response = await wrapped(AS_METADATA_URL);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-length")).toBeNull();
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-encoding")).toBeNull();
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("application/json");
+  });
+});
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/core/client/runner.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/core/client/runner.test.ts
index 3936d6c22..06dd0e1bc 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/test/core/client/runner.test.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/core/client/runner.test.ts
@@ -124,6 +124,46 @@ describe("runner client auth options", () => {
     expect(buildRunnerClientAuthOptions({}, settings)).toEqual({});
   });
 
+  // #1906 — the CLI/TUI leg reads the endpoint overrides from the same
+  // per-server settings the web leg does.
+  it("buildRunnerClientAuthOptions forwards the endpoint overrides", () => {
+    const settings: InspectorServerSettings = {
+      oauthAuthorizationUrl: "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+      oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+      requestTimeout: 0,
+      connectionTimeout: 0,
+      taskTtl: 60000,
+      maxFetchRequests: 10,
+      autoRefreshOnListChanged: false,
+      metadata: [],
+      headers: [],
+      env: [],
+      roots: [],
+    };
+    const opts = buildRunnerClientAuthOptions({}, settings);
+    expect(opts.oauth?.authorizationUrl).toBe(
+      "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+    );
+    expect(opts.oauth?.tokenUrl).toBe("https://staging.example.com/token");
+  });
+
+  it("buildRunnerClientAuthOptions ignores blank endpoint overrides", () => {
+    const settings: InspectorServerSettings = {
+      oauthAuthorizationUrl: "   ",
+      oauthTokenUrl: "",
+      requestTimeout: 0,
+      connectionTimeout: 0,
+      taskTtl: 60000,
+      maxFetchRequests: 10,
+      autoRefreshOnListChanged: false,
+      metadata: [],
+      headers: [],
+      env: [],
+      roots: [],
+    };
+    expect(buildRunnerClientAuthOptions({}, settings)).toEqual({});
+  });
+
   it("buildRunnerClientAuthOptions returns no oauth when nothing supplies it", () => {
     expect(buildRunnerClientAuthOptions({})).toEqual({});
   });
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/inspectorClient-oauth-endpoint-overrides.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/inspectorClient-oauth-endpoint-overrides.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c8dd11a8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/inspectorClient-oauth-endpoint-overrides.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { InspectorClient } from "@inspector/core/mcp/inspectorClient.js";
+import type { CreateTransportOptions } from "@inspector/core/mcp/types.js";
+import { BrowserOAuthStorage } from "@inspector/core/auth/browser/storage.js";
+import type { JSONRPCMessage, Transport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+
+/**
+ * #1906 — the per-server authorization/token endpoint overrides are applied by
+ * wrapping the client's base fetch, so the authorization-server metadata
+ * document carries the overridden endpoints wherever the SDK discovers it —
+ * including the discovery the transport runs on its own (the 401/refresh path),
+ * which is handed this same fetch.
+ *
+ * The assertion goes through the fetch the client actually hands the transport,
+ * rather than through a private field, so it fails if the wiring is removed.
+ */
+
+class InertTransport implements Transport {
+  onclose?: () => void;
+  onerror?: (error: Error) => void;
+  onmessage?: (message: JSONRPCMessage) => void;
+
+  async start(): Promise<void> {}
+
+  async send(): Promise<void> {
+    throw new Error("not connected");
+  }
+
+  async close(): Promise<void> {
+    this.onclose?.();
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The real browser storage plus inert navigation/redirect stubs — enough for the
+ * OAuth manager to exist (which is what installs the override wrapper) without
+ * any stored tokens, so `connect()` still builds a transport with no auth
+ * provider attached.
+ */
+function oauthEnvironment() {
+  return {
+    storage: new BrowserOAuthStorage(),
+    navigation: { navigateToAuthorization: () => {} },
+    redirectUrlProvider: { getRedirectUrl: () => "http://localhost/callback" },
+  };
+}
+
+const METADATA = {
+  issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+  authorization_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+  token_endpoint: "https://as.example.com/token",
+};
+
+/**
+ * Build a client, drive `connect()` far enough to create the transport, and
+ * return the `fetchFn` the transport was given.
+ */
+async function transportFetchFor(
+  oauth: Record<string, string> | undefined,
+): Promise<typeof fetch | undefined> {
+  let captured: CreateTransportOptions | undefined;
+  const baseFetch: typeof fetch = async () =>
+    new Response(JSON.stringify(METADATA), {
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    });
+
+  const client = new InspectorClient(
+    { type: "streamable-http", url: "https://mcp.example/mcp" },
+    {
+      environment: {
+        fetch: baseFetch,
+        oauth: oauthEnvironment(),
+        transport: (_config, options) => {
+          captured = options;
+          return { transport: new InertTransport() };
+        },
+      },
+      ...(oauth && { oauth }),
+    },
+  );
+
+  await client.connect().catch(() => undefined);
+  return captured?.fetchFn;
+}
+
+describe("InspectorClient OAuth endpoint overrides (#1906)", () => {
+  it("rewrites the discovered metadata endpoints for the transport's fetch", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = await transportFetchFor({
+      authorizationUrl: "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+      tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+    });
+    expect(fetchFn).toBeDefined();
+
+    const response = await fetchFn!(
+      "https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
+    );
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({
+      issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+      authorization_endpoint: "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+      token_endpoint: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("leaves the metadata untouched when no override is configured", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = await transportFetchFor(undefined);
+    expect(fetchFn).toBeDefined();
+
+    const response = await fetchFn!(
+      "https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
+    );
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual(METADATA);
+  });
+
+  it("picks up an override applied after construction via setOAuthConfig", async () => {
+    let captured: CreateTransportOptions | undefined;
+    const client = new InspectorClient(
+      { type: "streamable-http", url: "https://mcp.example/mcp" },
+      {
+        environment: {
+          fetch: async () =>
+            new Response(JSON.stringify(METADATA), {
+              headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+            }),
+          oauth: oauthEnvironment(),
+          transport: (_config, options) => {
+            captured = options;
+            return { transport: new InertTransport() };
+          },
+        },
+        oauth: { clientId: "cid" },
+      },
+    );
+    await client.connect().catch(() => undefined);
+
+    client.setOAuthConfig({ tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token" });
+    const response = await captured!.fetchFn!(
+      "https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
+    );
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      token_endpoint: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+    });
+  });
+});
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts
index 99af81bfd..6047b8b05 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts
@@ -115,6 +115,53 @@ describe("OAuthManager", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  // #1906 — the endpoint overrides are read live from the config so a settings
+  // edit reaches the already-built fetch wrapper.
+  describe("getEndpointOverrides", () => {
+    it("returns undefined when neither endpoint is configured", () => {
+      const manager = new OAuthManager(createMockParams());
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("reflects each endpoint set through setOAuthConfig", () => {
+      const manager = new OAuthManager(createMockParams());
+      manager.setOAuthConfig({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+      });
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toEqual({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+      });
+      manager.setOAuthConfig({ tokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token" });
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toEqual({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+      });
+    });
+
+    // The EMA leg authorizes against the enterprise IdP — a different
+    // authorization server, whose OIDC discovery runs through the same fetch the
+    // override wrapper is installed on. Applying a resource-AS override there
+    // would redirect the IdP login (or the IdP code exchange) to the resource
+    // AS. Regression test for the review finding on PR #2037.
+    it("suppresses the overrides under enterprise-managed authorization", () => {
+      const manager = new OAuthManager(createMockParams());
+      manager.setOAuthConfig({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+      });
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toBeDefined();
+
+      manager.setOAuthConfig({ enterpriseManaged: true });
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toBeUndefined();
+
+      manager.setOAuthConfig({ enterpriseManaged: false });
+      expect(manager.getEndpointOverrides()).toEqual({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
   describe("getServerUrl propagation", () => {
     it("createOAuthProviderForTransport throws when getServerUrl throws", async () => {
       const params = createMockParams({
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/serverList.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/serverList.test.ts
index 6641e55bc..0492622d0 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/serverList.test.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/serverList.test.ts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import {
   mergeSecretsIntoStored,
   normalizeServerType,
   oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings,
+  oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings,
   serverEntriesToMcpConfig,
   serializeMcpConfig,
   storedFieldsToInspectorSettings,
@@ -1288,6 +1289,89 @@ describe("oauthOnInsufficientScope (SEP-2350)", () => {
     ).toBeUndefined();
     expect(oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings({})).toBeUndefined();
   });
+
+  // #1906 — authorization/token endpoint overrides.
+  it("lifts oauth endpoint overrides into settings fields", () => {
+    const settings = storedFieldsToInspectorSettings({
+      oauth: {
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+      },
+    });
+    expect(settings?.oauthAuthorizationUrl).toBe(
+      "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+    );
+    expect(settings?.oauthTokenUrl).toBe("https://staging.example.com/token");
+  });
+
+  // Hand-edited `mcp.json` reaches the CLI/TUI unvalidated, and
+  // `oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings` calls `.trim()` on these — so a
+  // non-string would crash the server load rather than being ignored.
+  it("drops a non-string endpoint override from disk", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const settings = storedFieldsToInspectorSettings({
+      oauth: {
+        clientId: "cid",
+        // Types the field as a string; disk does not honor that.
+        authorizationUrl: 42 as unknown as string,
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+      },
+    });
+    expect(settings?.oauthAuthorizationUrl).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(settings?.oauthTokenUrl).toBe("https://staging.example.com/token");
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining("oauth.authorizationUrl"),
+    );
+    // Restored here rather than left to a global teardown: a later describe
+    // spies on `console.warn` again and would inherit this spy's recorded call.
+    warn.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it("reads a blank endpoint override back as unset", () => {
+    const settings = storedFieldsToInspectorSettings({
+      oauth: { clientId: "cid", authorizationUrl: "", tokenUrl: "" },
+    });
+    expect(settings?.oauthAuthorizationUrl).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(settings?.oauthTokenUrl).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("persists endpoint overrides under oauth, trimming whitespace", () => {
+    const stored = inspectorSettingsToStoredFields({
+      ...baseSettings,
+      oauthAuthorizationUrl: "  https://staging.example.com/authorize  ",
+      oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+    });
+    expect(stored.oauth).toEqual({
+      authorizationUrl: "https://staging.example.com/authorize",
+      tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("omits the oauth block when the endpoint overrides are blank", () => {
+    const stored = inspectorSettingsToStoredFields({
+      ...baseSettings,
+      oauthAuthorizationUrl: "   ",
+      oauthTokenUrl: "",
+    });
+    expect(stored).not.toHaveProperty("oauth");
+  });
+
+  it("derives the endpoint-override client option, or undefined when blank", () => {
+    expect(
+      oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings({
+        oauthAuthorizationUrl: " https://staging.example.com/authorize ",
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ authorizationUrl: "https://staging.example.com/authorize" });
+    expect(
+      oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings({
+        oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token",
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ tokenUrl: "https://staging.example.com/token" });
+    expect(
+      oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings({ oauthAuthorizationUrl: "  " }),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings({})).toBeUndefined();
+  });
 });
 
 describe("envRecordToPairs / envPairsToRecord", () => {
diff --git a/clients/web/src/test/integration/mcp/remote/servers-route.test.ts b/clients/web/src/test/integration/mcp/remote/servers-route.test.ts
index 18803b5a1..0a2862538 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/test/integration/mcp/remote/servers-route.test.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/test/integration/mcp/remote/servers-route.test.ts
@@ -496,6 +496,75 @@ describe("/api/servers routes", () => {
       expect(res.status).toBe(400);
     });
 
+    // #1906 — the endpoint overrides travel as plain strings and land under
+    // `oauth` on disk beside the credentials.
+    it("persists the oauth endpoint overrides on POST", async () => {
+      const res = await fetch(`${h.baseUrl}/api/servers`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          id: "endpointoverrides",
+          config: { type: "streamable-http", url: "https://x.test/mcp" },
+          settings: {
+            headers: [],
+            metadata: [],
+            connectionTimeout: 0,
+            requestTimeout: 0,
+            oauthAuthorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+            oauthTokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+          },
+        }),
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const stored = readConfig(h.configPath).mcpServers.endpointoverrides;
+      expect(stored?.oauth).toEqual({
+        authorizationUrl: "https://staging.test/authorize",
+        tokenUrl: "https://staging.test/token",
+      });
+    });
+
+    it("drops an empty oauth endpoint override rather than writing it", async () => {
+      const res = await fetch(`${h.baseUrl}/api/servers`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          id: "blankoverrides",
+          config: { type: "streamable-http", url: "https://x.test/mcp" },
+          settings: {
+            headers: [],
+            metadata: [],
+            connectionTimeout: 0,
+            requestTimeout: 0,
+            oauthAuthorizationUrl: "",
+            oauthTokenUrl: "",
+          },
+        }),
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(
+        readConfig(h.configPath).mcpServers.blankoverrides,
+      ).not.toHaveProperty("oauth");
+    });
+
+    it("rejects a non-string oauthTokenUrl payload", async () => {
+      const res = await fetch(`${h.baseUrl}/api/servers`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          id: "badtokenurl",
+          config: { type: "streamable-http", url: "https://x.test/mcp" },
+          settings: {
+            headers: [],
+            metadata: [],
+            connectionTimeout: 0,
+            requestTimeout: 0,
+            oauthTokenUrl: 42,
+          },
+        }),
+      });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+
     it("updates Inspector-extension fields at the top level on PUT", async () => {
       writeFileSync(
         h.configPath,
diff --git a/core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts b/core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c2438b308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+/**
+ * Per-server authorization/token endpoint overrides (#1906).
+ *
+ * The Inspector deliberately has no fields for the authorization and token URLs
+ * — they are resolved by authorization-server metadata discovery (RFC 8414 /
+ * OpenID Connect Discovery), exactly as a real MCP host resolves them. But a
+ * server under development often advertises its *production* authorization
+ * server while the person debugging it wants the staging one, and discovery
+ * gives them no way to say so.
+ *
+ * These overrides are that affordance: when set, they replace whatever the
+ * authorization server's metadata document returned.
+ *
+ * ## Why this is a fetch wrapper and not a provider hook
+ *
+ * Both endpoints reach the flow through exactly one path in SDK v2: `auth()`
+ * discovers the metadata document and then reads `metadata.authorization_endpoint`
+ * (in `startAuthorization`) and `metadata.token_endpoint` (in `fetchToken`).
+ * Neither is routed through `OAuthClientProvider`, and `AuthOptions` has no
+ * `metadata` field — so the provider seam that carries the custom authorization
+ * parameters (#2018) cannot reach the token endpoint at all. The one seam that
+ * sees both is the `fetchFn` the SDK uses for discovery, so the override is
+ * applied to the metadata document in flight.
+ *
+ * Four consequences worth knowing:
+ *
+ * - **A metadata document is required.** When discovery returns nothing, the SDK
+ *   falls back to `/authorize` and `/token` on the authorization server's origin
+ *   and there is no document to patch. That matches the feature as asked for —
+ *   overriding "whatever urls the authorization server returns" — and a server
+ *   publishing no metadata is already on a path where the endpoints are not
+ *   being advertised in the first place.
+ * - **They do not apply to the enterprise-managed (EMA) leg.** That flow
+ *   authorizes against the enterprise IdP — a different authorization server —
+ *   and its OIDC discovery runs through this same fetch, so `OAuthManager`
+ *   suppresses the overrides when the server is enterprise-managed. This mirrors
+ *   `redirectToExternalAuthorization` skipping the custom authorization
+ *   parameters (#2018).
+ * - **They redirect endpoints, they do not re-point the issuer.** `issuer` is
+ *   left exactly as discovery returned it, deliberately: it is the authorization
+ *   server's *identity*, and it is what RFC 9207 / SEP-2352 check the callback's
+ *   `iss` against to defend against an authorization-server mix-up. So these
+ *   overrides fit alternate endpoints of the same logical issuer (a staging
+ *   deployment fronting the same issuer, a local proxy). Aim one at an
+ *   authorization server that advertises a *different* issuer and the callback
+ *   is rejected as an issuer mismatch before the code is redeemed — which is the
+ *   mix-up defense working. Suppressing that check to make the override "work"
+ *   would trade a real security property for a debugging convenience, so the
+ *   limit is documented rather than removed.
+ * - **The Network tab shows the patched document.** The wrapper is applied to the
+ *   base fetch, inside the request tracker, so what the tab renders is the
+ *   metadata as the flow consumed it. That is the useful reading: it explains why
+ *   the subsequent authorize/token requests went where they did.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Per-server overrides for the two endpoints an authorization server publishes.
+ * Both are optional and independent — overriding only the token URL is a valid
+ * configuration.
+ */
+export interface OAuthEndpointOverrides {
+  /** Replaces `authorization_endpoint` in the discovered metadata. */
+  authorizationUrl?: string;
+  /** Replaces `token_endpoint` in the discovered metadata. */
+  tokenUrl?: string;
+}
+
+/** Field name on the metadata document each override replaces. */
+const OVERRIDE_FIELDS = {
+  authorizationUrl: "authorization_endpoint",
+  tokenUrl: "token_endpoint",
+} as const;
+
+/**
+ * Validation message for one configured endpoint URL, or `undefined` when the
+ * value is acceptable. A blank value is not an error — it means "no override".
+ *
+ * Only absolute `http:`/`https:` URLs are accepted: the value is written
+ * straight into the metadata document, where the SDK passes it to `new URL(...)`
+ * with no base — so a relative path would throw deep inside the flow, far from
+ * the setting that caused it. `http:` is allowed because the whole point is
+ * reaching a local or staging authorization server.
+ *
+ * The settings form renders this message against the field, so the form and the
+ * runtime cannot disagree about which values are usable.
+ */
+export function oauthEndpointUrlError(value: string): string | undefined {
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (trimmed === "") return undefined;
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(trimmed);
+  } catch {
+    return `"${trimmed}" is not an absolute URL.`;
+  }
+  if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
+    return `"${trimmed}" is not an http(s) URL.`;
+  }
+  // `new URL` accepts embedded credentials but Fetch rejects an HTTP(S) request
+  // URL that carries them, so without this the value would pass both the form
+  // and the runtime and then fail deep in the OAuth exchange — the failure mode
+  // this validation exists to prevent. (Sending credentials to an endpoint the
+  // flow discovered is not something to support quietly, either.)
+  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+    return "URL must not contain a username or password.";
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The trimmed value, or `undefined` when it is blank or unusable. A rejected
+ * value warns and is dropped rather than throwing, so one bad field cannot make
+ * an otherwise-working server unconnectable.
+ */
+function normalizeEndpointUrl(
+  value: string | undefined,
+  field: keyof OAuthEndpointOverrides,
+): string | undefined {
+  if (value === undefined) return undefined;
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (trimmed === "") return undefined;
+  const error = oauthEndpointUrlError(trimmed);
+  if (error) {
+    console.warn(`[oauth] Ignoring \`${field}\`: ${error}`);
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return trimmed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize the configured overrides, dropping blank and malformed values.
+ * Returns `undefined` when nothing usable remains, which is the signal callers
+ * use to skip wrapping their fetch at all.
+ */
+export function normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+  overrides: OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined,
+): OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined {
+  if (!overrides) return undefined;
+  const authorizationUrl = normalizeEndpointUrl(
+    overrides.authorizationUrl,
+    "authorizationUrl",
+  );
+  const tokenUrl = normalizeEndpointUrl(overrides.tokenUrl, "tokenUrl");
+  if (!authorizationUrl && !tokenUrl) return undefined;
+  return {
+    ...(authorizationUrl && { authorizationUrl }),
+    ...(tokenUrl && { tokenUrl }),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a parsed JSON body is an authorization-server metadata document.
+ *
+ * The wrapper sees every JSON response on the connection, so this has to be
+ * narrow enough not to rewrite an unrelated body that happens to carry a
+ * similarly-named field. RFC 8414 §2 makes `issuer` REQUIRED and it appears in
+ * no other document the flow fetches (protected-resource metadata has
+ * `authorization_servers`, not `issuer`), so requiring `issuer` alongside at
+ * least one of the two endpoints is a precise test.
+ */
+export function isAuthorizationServerMetadata(
+  value: unknown,
+): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const doc = value as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (typeof doc.issuer !== "string") return false;
+  return (
+    typeof doc.authorization_endpoint === "string" ||
+    typeof doc.token_endpoint === "string"
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a copy of an authorization-server metadata document with the
+ * configured endpoints replaced.
+ *
+ * An override is written even when the document does not advertise that
+ * endpoint: a metadata document missing `authorization_endpoint` already fails
+ * the flow (`new URL(undefined)` throws), so supplying the missing value is
+ * strictly better than leaving the hole.
+ */
+export function applyOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+  metadata: Record<string, unknown>,
+  overrides: OAuthEndpointOverrides,
+): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const patched = { ...metadata };
+  for (const [key, field] of Object.entries(OVERRIDE_FIELDS) as [
+    keyof OAuthEndpointOverrides,
+    (typeof OVERRIDE_FIELDS)[keyof OAuthEndpointOverrides],
+  ][]) {
+    const override = overrides[key];
+    if (override) patched[field] = override;
+  }
+  return patched;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The well-known paths authorization-server metadata is discovered at: RFC 8414
+ * (§3.1, including the path-suffixed and path-prefixed variants the SDK's
+ * `buildDiscoveryUrls` emits) and OpenID Connect Discovery. Matched as a
+ * substring of the pathname so every variant is covered by two literals.
+ */
+const AS_METADATA_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS = [
+  "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
+  "/.well-known/openid-configuration",
+] as const;
+
+/** The request URL a `fetch` call was made with, in any of its three forms. */
+function requestUrlOf(input: RequestInfo | URL): string {
+  if (typeof input === "string") return input;
+  if (input instanceof URL) return input.href;
+  return input.url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a request is an authorization-server metadata discovery request.
+ *
+ * This is what keeps the wrapper off the hot path. Without it, every successful
+ * `application/json` response on the connection — every `tools/call` result, and
+ * every resource payload on the direct CLI/TUI transports — would be buffered
+ * and parsed a second time before the SDK could consume it, purely to discover
+ * that it is not a metadata document. Gating on the discovery URL first means
+ * ordinary traffic is untouched: one string test and the response is returned.
+ *
+ * A URL that will not parse falls back to testing the raw string, which is the
+ * conservative direction — worst case a request is *considered*, and the
+ * metadata predicate then rejects it.
+ */
+function isAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest(
+  input: RequestInfo | URL,
+): boolean {
+  const raw = requestUrlOf(input);
+  let pathname: string;
+  try {
+    pathname = new URL(raw).pathname;
+  } catch {
+    pathname = raw;
+  }
+  return AS_METADATA_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS.some((path) => pathname.includes(path));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a `content-type` names a **whole JSON document** — something that can
+ * be read to completion.
+ *
+ * This must be an exact media-type match, not a substring test for "json". The
+ * streamable-HTTP transport's long-lived server-push channel can be served as
+ * `application/x-ndjson` (see `isLongLivedStreamResponse` in
+ * `core/mcp/fetchTracking.ts`), which is an unbounded stream: awaiting `.json()`
+ * on a clone of it would never resolve, and since this wrapper awaits before
+ * returning, the MCP connection would hang for as long as an override is
+ * configured. Metadata documents are plain `application/json`, so the narrow
+ * test loses nothing. The `+json` structured suffix is accepted for the same
+ * reason it exists — it names a concrete document, not a stream.
+ */
+function isJsonDocumentResponse(contentType: string | null): boolean {
+  if (!contentType) return false;
+  // Strip parameters (`; charset=utf-8`) and compare the media type itself.
+  const mediaType = contentType.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+  return mediaType === "application/json" || mediaType.endsWith("+json");
+}
+
+/** Rebuild a response around a replacement body, preserving status/headers. */
+function responseWithBody(response: Response, body: string): Response {
+  const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+  // The body length changes when an override is applied, and a stale
+  // `content-length` on a synthesized `Response` is worse than none — consumers
+  // read the body we hand them, not the header.
+  headers.delete("content-length");
+  // `fetch` already decoded the body, so the replacement is plain text and an
+  // inherited `content-encoding` would describe an encoding it no longer has.
+  headers.delete("content-encoding");
+  return new Response(body, {
+    status: response.status,
+    statusText: response.statusText,
+    headers,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wrap a `fetch` so authorization-server metadata responses carry the
+ * configured endpoint overrides.
+ *
+ * `getOverrides` is called per request rather than captured once: the OAuth
+ * config is mutable (a settings edit can change it without rebuilding the
+ * client), and reading it lazily means a wrapped fetch never serves a stale
+ * override. When it returns nothing the response is passed through untouched,
+ * so the wrapper is inert for the overwhelmingly common unconfigured case.
+ */
+export function withOAuthEndpointOverrides(
+  fetchFn: typeof fetch,
+  getOverrides: () => OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined,
+): typeof fetch {
+  // Normalization is memoized on the raw pair rather than run per request: it
+  // warns about a malformed value, and every request on the connection passes
+  // through here — so without this a single typo would log on every call.
+  let lastKey: string | undefined;
+  let lastNormalized: OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined;
+
+  const resolveOverrides = (): OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined => {
+    const raw = getOverrides();
+    const key = JSON.stringify([raw?.authorizationUrl, raw?.tokenUrl]);
+    if (key !== lastKey) {
+      lastKey = key;
+      lastNormalized = normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides(raw);
+    }
+    return lastNormalized;
+  };
+
+  return async (input, init) => {
+    const response = await fetchFn(input, init);
+    const overrides = resolveOverrides();
+    if (!overrides) return response;
+    // Cheapest tests first: only a discovery request can carry the document
+    // this wrapper rewrites, so ordinary traffic never reaches the clone below.
+    if (!isAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest(input)) return response;
+    if (!response.ok) return response;
+    if (!isJsonDocumentResponse(response.headers.get("content-type")))
+      return response;
+
+    // Read through a clone so every path that does NOT patch can return the
+    // caller's own `Response`, untouched. Rebuilding unconditionally would drop
+    // native properties a synthesized `Response` cannot carry (`url`,
+    // `redirected`, `type`) from responses this wrapper has no business
+    // altering — and would throw outright on a body-less 204/205, whose status
+    // Fetch forbids a body on. A clone also makes a non-JSON body a plain
+    // parse failure with nothing consumed.
+    let parsed: unknown;
+    try {
+      parsed = await response.clone().json();
+    } catch {
+      return response;
+    }
+    if (!isAuthorizationServerMetadata(parsed)) return response;
+    return responseWithBody(
+      response,
+      JSON.stringify(applyOAuthEndpointOverrides(parsed, overrides)),
+    );
+  };
+}
diff --git a/core/auth/index.ts b/core/auth/index.ts
index 53615f8c7..f38fcbe03 100644
--- a/core/auth/index.ts
+++ b/core/auth/index.ts
@@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ export {
 } from "./authorizationParams.js";
 export type { ReservedAuthorizationParam } from "./authorizationParams.js";
 
+// Authorization/token endpoint overrides (#1906)
+export {
+  oauthEndpointUrlError,
+  normalizeOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+  isAuthorizationServerMetadata,
+  applyOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+  withOAuthEndpointOverrides,
+} from "./endpointOverrides.js";
+export type { OAuthEndpointOverrides } from "./endpointOverrides.js";
+
 // Storage
 export type {
   OAuthStorage,
diff --git a/core/client/runner.ts b/core/client/runner.ts
index 25cd83f30..5192b6743 100644
--- a/core/client/runner.ts
+++ b/core/client/runner.ts
@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ import type {
   InspectorClientOptions,
   InspectorServerSettings,
 } from "../mcp/types.js";
-import { oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings } from "../mcp/serverList.js";
+import {
+  oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings,
+  oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings,
+} from "../mcp/serverList.js";
 import { loadClientConfig } from "./config.js";
 import type { ClientConfig } from "./types.js";
 import {
@@ -74,6 +77,9 @@ export function buildRunnerClientAuthOptions(
   const serverAuthorizationParams = savedSettings
     ? oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings(savedSettings)
     : undefined;
+  const serverEndpointOverrides = savedSettings
+    ? oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings(savedSettings)
+    : undefined;
 
   const oauthFromServer =
     savedSettings &&
@@ -81,6 +87,7 @@ export function buildRunnerClientAuthOptions(
       savedSettings.oauthClientSecret ||
       savedSettings.oauthScopes ||
       serverAuthorizationParams ||
+      serverEndpointOverrides ||
       savedSettings.enterpriseManaged)
       ? {
           ...(savedSettings.oauthClientId && {
@@ -95,6 +102,7 @@ export function buildRunnerClientAuthOptions(
           ...(serverAuthorizationParams && {
             authorizationParams: serverAuthorizationParams,
           }),
+          ...serverEndpointOverrides,
           ...(savedSettings.enterpriseManaged && {
             enterpriseManaged: true,
           }),
diff --git a/core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts b/core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts
index a635582d0..09f665bd2 100644
--- a/core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts
+++ b/core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ import {
   type AuthChallengeOutcome,
   type HandleAuthChallengeOptions,
 } from "../auth/challenge.js";
+import { withOAuthEndpointOverrides } from "../auth/endpointOverrides.js";
 import type { OAuthTokens } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 import { silentLogger, type InspectorLogger } from "../logging/logger.js";
 import { createFetchTracker } from "./fetchTracking.js";
@@ -650,6 +651,16 @@ export class InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget {
     };
 
     // Effective auth fetch: base fetch + tracking with category 'auth'
+    // #1906: apply the per-server authorization/token endpoint overrides to the
+    // authorization-server metadata document in flight. This wraps the *base*
+    // fetch rather than `effectiveAuthFetch` so it also covers the discovery the
+    // SDK runs from inside the transport (the 401/refresh path), which is handed
+    // `this.fetchFn` directly. The overrides are read lazily — `oauthManager` is
+    // created a few lines below, and `setOAuthConfig` can change them later — so
+    // the wrapper is inert until a server actually configures one.
+    this.fetchFn = withOAuthEndpointOverrides(this.fetchFn ?? fetch, () =>
+      this.oauthManager?.getEndpointOverrides(),
+    );
     this.effectiveAuthFetch = this.buildEffectiveAuthFetch();
 
     this.sessionId = options.sessionId;
@@ -5988,6 +5999,9 @@ export class InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget {
     scope?: string;
     /** Custom authorization-request parameters (#2018). Authorize URL only. */
     authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    /** Endpoint overrides applied to the discovered AS metadata (#1906). */
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    tokenUrl?: string;
   }): void {
     if (!this.oauthManager) {
       throw new Error(
diff --git a/core/mcp/oauthManager.ts b/core/mcp/oauthManager.ts
index f49aff49b..59846e2a2 100644
--- a/core/mcp/oauthManager.ts
+++ b/core/mcp/oauthManager.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 
 import { BaseOAuthClientProvider } from "../auth/providers.js";
+import type { OAuthEndpointOverrides } from "../auth/endpointOverrides.js";
 import type { OAuthFlowState, OAuthStep } from "../auth/types.js";
 import { EMPTY_OAUTH_FLOW_STATE } from "../auth/types.js";
 import type { OAuthTokens } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
@@ -95,6 +96,8 @@ export class OAuthManager {
     scope?: string;
     enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
     authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    tokenUrl?: string;
   }): void {
     this.oauthConfig = {
       ...this.oauthConfig,
@@ -106,6 +109,31 @@ export class OAuthManager {
     return this.params.getServerUrl();
   }
 
+  /**
+   * The per-server authorization/token endpoint overrides, read live so a
+   * `setOAuthConfig` between requests takes effect without rebuilding the
+   * client's fetch. `InspectorClient` reads this from inside its fetch wrapper.
+   * (#1906)
+   *
+   * Returns nothing under enterprise-managed authorization, for the same reason
+   * `redirectToExternalAuthorization` skips the custom authorization parameters
+   * (#2018): the EMA leg authorizes against the enterprise IdP, a *different*
+   * authorization server, and its OIDC discovery runs through this same fetch
+   * (`emaFlow` → `idpOidc`). Rewriting that document would point the IdP login —
+   * or the IdP code/refresh-token exchange — at the resource server's
+   * authorization server, which is both wrong and a way to leak an IdP
+   * credential across an authorization-server boundary.
+   */
+  getEndpointOverrides(): OAuthEndpointOverrides | undefined {
+    if (this.isEnterpriseManaged()) return undefined;
+    const { authorizationUrl, tokenUrl } = this.oauthConfig;
+    if (!authorizationUrl && !tokenUrl) return undefined;
+    return {
+      ...(authorizationUrl && { authorizationUrl }),
+      ...(tokenUrl && { tokenUrl }),
+    };
+  }
+
   /**
    * Return the configured OAuth storage, throwing a clear error if it is
    * absent. Used on the EMA re-mint/persist paths, which are only reached for
diff --git a/core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts b/core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts
index d0ee6ea17..02e3423f8 100644
--- a/core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts
+++ b/core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts
@@ -1131,11 +1131,22 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
     clientSecret?: string;
     scopes?: string;
     authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    tokenUrl?: string;
     enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
   } => {
     if (v === null || typeof v !== "object" || Array.isArray(v)) return false;
     const o = v as Record<string, unknown>;
-    for (const k of ["clientId", "clientSecret", "scopes"] as const) {
+    for (const k of [
+      "clientId",
+      "clientSecret",
+      "scopes",
+      // #1906 — shape only; the values are validated as absolute http(s) URLs
+      // where they're applied (core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts), so a typo drops
+      // one field with a warning instead of dropping the whole `oauth` block.
+      "authorizationUrl",
+      "tokenUrl",
+    ] as const) {
       if (o[k] !== undefined && typeof o[k] !== "string") return false;
     }
     if (
@@ -1255,7 +1266,7 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
       if ("oauth" in valObj && !isOauthObject(valObj.oauth)) {
         logWarn(
           { route: "/api/servers", id, droppedKey: "oauth" },
-          "Dropping malformed `oauth` field — expected `{ clientId?, clientSecret?, scopes?, authorizationParams?, enterpriseManaged?, onInsufficientScope? }`.",
+          "Dropping malformed `oauth` field — expected `{ clientId?, clientSecret?, scopes?, authorizationParams?, authorizationUrl?, tokenUrl?, enterpriseManaged?, onInsufficientScope? }`.",
         );
         delete valObj.oauth;
       }
@@ -1522,6 +1533,10 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
       "oauthClientId",
       "oauthClientSecret",
       "oauthScopes",
+      // #1906 — string-shaped on the wire; URL validity is checked where the
+      // override is applied, not here.
+      "oauthAuthorizationUrl",
+      "oauthTokenUrl",
     ] as const) {
       if (obj[optional] !== undefined && typeof obj[optional] !== "string") {
         return { ok: false, error: `settings.${optional} must be a string` };
@@ -1660,6 +1675,18 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
     if (isKvArray(obj.oauthAuthorizationParams)) {
       value.oauthAuthorizationParams = obj.oauthAuthorizationParams;
     }
+    // Empty-string coerces to absent like the credential fields above: the form
+    // emits `""` when a user clears the input, and an empty override on disk
+    // would read back as a configured-but-blank endpoint. (#1906)
+    if (
+      typeof obj.oauthAuthorizationUrl === "string" &&
+      obj.oauthAuthorizationUrl !== ""
+    ) {
+      value.oauthAuthorizationUrl = obj.oauthAuthorizationUrl;
+    }
+    if (typeof obj.oauthTokenUrl === "string" && obj.oauthTokenUrl !== "") {
+      value.oauthTokenUrl = obj.oauthTokenUrl;
+    }
     if (obj.enterpriseManaged === true) {
       value.enterpriseManaged = true;
     }
diff --git a/core/mcp/serverList.ts b/core/mcp/serverList.ts
index 1f34cab03..f4be5f4a8 100644
--- a/core/mcp/serverList.ts
+++ b/core/mcp/serverList.ts
@@ -248,6 +248,56 @@ export function oauthAuthorizationParamsFromSettings(
   return Object.keys(record).length > 0 ? record : undefined;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Validate one of a server's `oauth` endpoint overrides as it comes off disk,
+ * or `undefined` when there is nothing usable. (#1906)
+ *
+ * Same reasoning as `cleanAuthorizationParams` above: `StoredMCPServer` types
+ * these as `string`, but that is a compile-time promise a hand-edited file does
+ * not keep, and the CLI/TUI read `mcp.json` directly. A non-string reaches
+ * `oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings`, which calls `.trim()` on it — so without
+ * this the whole server list fails to load. URL *validity* is not checked here;
+ * that happens where the override is applied, so a typo drops one field with a
+ * warning instead of anything louder.
+ */
+export function cleanEndpointOverride(
+  value: string | undefined,
+  field: "authorizationUrl" | "tokenUrl",
+): string | undefined {
+  if (value === undefined) return undefined;
+  // Keep: unreachable per the parameter type, reachable from disk.
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    console.warn(
+      `Ignoring \`oauth.${field}\`: expected a string, got ${typeof value}.`,
+    );
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return value.trim() || undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Collapse a server's endpoint-override fields into the
+ * `InspectorClientOptions.oauth` sub-shape, or `undefined` when neither is set.
+ * Shared by the web (`App.tsx`) and Node (`buildRunnerClientAuthOptions`) paths
+ * so both derive the option identically. The values are passed through as
+ * typed; validation (absolute http(s) URL) happens once at the point of use, in
+ * `core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts`. (#1906)
+ */
+export function oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings(
+  settings: Pick<
+    InspectorServerSettings,
+    "oauthAuthorizationUrl" | "oauthTokenUrl"
+  >,
+): { authorizationUrl?: string; tokenUrl?: string } | undefined {
+  const authorizationUrl = settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl?.trim();
+  const tokenUrl = settings.oauthTokenUrl?.trim();
+  if (!authorizationUrl && !tokenUrl) return undefined;
+  return {
+    ...(authorizationUrl && { authorizationUrl }),
+    ...(tokenUrl && { tokenUrl }),
+  };
+}
+
 /**
  * Lift the Inspector-extension fields off a freshly-read `StoredMCPServer`
  * into the pair-array / flat-OAuth `InspectorServerSettings` shape the form
@@ -357,6 +407,21 @@ export function storedFieldsToInspectorSettings(
   if (authorizationParams) {
     settings.oauthAuthorizationParams = envRecordToPairs(authorizationParams);
   }
+  // Truthiness drops empty strings like the credential fields above, so a
+  // cleared field reads back as unset rather than as an empty override. The
+  // `string` type is a compile-time promise a hand-edited `mcp.json` does not
+  // keep, and only the web client's `/api/servers` route checks it — the CLI and
+  // TUI read the file directly and then call `.trim()` on these in
+  // `oauthEndpointOverridesFromSettings`, so a non-string would crash the server
+  // load. Sanitized like `authorizationParams` above rather than trusted.
+  // (#1906)
+  const authorizationUrl = cleanEndpointOverride(
+    stored.oauth?.authorizationUrl,
+    "authorizationUrl",
+  );
+  if (authorizationUrl) settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl = authorizationUrl;
+  const tokenUrl = cleanEndpointOverride(stored.oauth?.tokenUrl, "tokenUrl");
+  if (tokenUrl) settings.oauthTokenUrl = tokenUrl;
   if (stored.oauth?.onInsufficientScope) {
     settings.oauthOnInsufficientScope = stored.oauth.onInsufficientScope;
   }
@@ -474,6 +539,14 @@ export function inspectorSettingsToStoredFields(
       oauthFields.authorizationParams = authParams;
     }
   }
+  // Empty/blank reads back as unset (above), so a cleared field writes nothing
+  // and the file diff stays minimal for servers that never set one. (#1906)
+  if (settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl?.trim()) {
+    oauthFields.authorizationUrl = settings.oauthAuthorizationUrl.trim();
+  }
+  if (settings.oauthTokenUrl?.trim()) {
+    oauthFields.tokenUrl = settings.oauthTokenUrl.trim();
+  }
   if (settings.oauthOnInsufficientScope) {
     oauthFields.onInsufficientScope = settings.oauthOnInsufficientScope;
   }
diff --git a/core/mcp/types.ts b/core/mcp/types.ts
index ece4e1be2..3b92eb2c8 100644
--- a/core/mcp/types.ts
+++ b/core/mcp/types.ts
@@ -176,6 +176,19 @@ export type StoredMCPServer = MCPServerConfig & {
      * (#2018)
      */
     authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Overrides the `authorization_endpoint` the authorization server's
+     * metadata document advertises — for pointing a server at a development or
+     * staging authorization server without changing what it publishes.
+     * Inspector-specific. (#1906)
+     */
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    /**
+     * Overrides the `token_endpoint` the authorization server's metadata
+     * document advertises. Independent of {@link authorizationUrl}.
+     * Inspector-specific. (#1906)
+     */
+    tokenUrl?: string;
   };
   /**
    * Filesystem/URI roots advertised to the server via the `roots` client
@@ -534,6 +547,13 @@ export interface OAuthSettings {
    * (#2018)
    */
   authorizationParams?: { key: string; value: string }[];
+  /**
+   * Endpoint overrides applied to the discovered authorization-server metadata
+   * (#1906). Optional for the same reason as `authorizationParams` — callers
+   * building an `OAuthSettings` for the other fields need not supply them.
+   */
+  authorizationUrl?: string;
+  tokenUrl?: string;
   enterpriseManaged?: boolean;
   onInsufficientScope?: OnInsufficientScopePolicy;
 }
@@ -699,6 +719,18 @@ export interface InspectorServerSettings {
    * the way there. Applied to the authorization request only. (#2018)
    */
   oauthAuthorizationParams?: { key: string; value: string }[];
+  /**
+   * Overrides the authorization endpoint discovery resolved, so a server can be
+   * pointed at a development or staging authorization server without changing
+   * what it advertises. Empty/absent means "use what discovery returned".
+   * Persisted as `oauth.authorizationUrl`. (#1906)
+   */
+  oauthAuthorizationUrl?: string;
+  /**
+   * Overrides the token endpoint discovery resolved. Independent of
+   * {@link oauthAuthorizationUrl}; persisted as `oauth.tokenUrl`. (#1906)
+   */
+  oauthTokenUrl?: string;
   /**
    * SEP-2350 step-up policy for a `403 insufficient_scope` challenge on this
    * server's HTTP transport. Defaults to `reauthorize` when unset.
@@ -1064,6 +1096,13 @@ export interface InspectorClientOptions {
      * (#2018). Reserved, protocol-critical keys are dropped with a warning.
      */
     authorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Overrides for the endpoints the authorization server's metadata document
+     * advertises (#1906). Applied to the discovered document, so they reach both
+     * the authorization request and the token request.
+     */
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    tokenUrl?: string;
   };
 
   /**
diff --git a/docs/mcp-server-configuration.md b/docs/mcp-server-configuration.md
index 1fa58a7a1..ac105f3ab 100644
--- a/docs/mcp-server-configuration.md
+++ b/docs/mcp-server-configuration.md
@@ -175,10 +175,18 @@ These have no analog in the broader `mcp.json` ecosystem. Each is **omitted on w
 | `paginatedLists`                       | `false`    | Fetch tools/resources/prompts one page at a time instead of auto-aggregating                        |
 | `advertisedExtensions`                 | —          | Per-extension overrides for what the Inspector declares in `capabilities.extensions`                |
 | `maxFetchRequests`                     | `1000`     | Network-log retention for this server (`DEFAULT_MAX_FETCH_REQUESTS`); `0` means unlimited           |
-| `oauth`                                | —          | `{ clientId, clientSecret, scopes, authorizationParams, enterpriseManaged, onInsufficientScope }`   |
+| `oauth`                                | —          | `{ clientId, clientSecret, scopes, authorizationParams, authorizationUrl, tokenUrl, enterpriseManaged, onInsufficientScope }` |
 
 `oauth.authorizationParams` is a string→string record of extra query parameters merged into the OAuth **authorization request** URL only — never the token request. Use it for provider-specific hints the core specs don't standardize (Keycloak's `kc_idp_hint`, OIDC's `login_hint` / `prompt` / `acr_values`, Auth0's `audience`). The protocol-critical parameters — `client_id`, `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `redirect_uri`, `resource`, `response_type`, `scope`, `state` — are **reserved**: the web form rejects them inline, and any that reach the merge anyway are dropped with a warning rather than overriding what the flow set (overriding them breaks PKCE, the CSRF state binding, or RFC 8707). Edit them in Server Settings → Authorization ("Additional authorization parameters"), beside Scopes.
 
+`oauth.authorizationUrl` and `oauth.tokenUrl` override the `authorization_endpoint` and `token_endpoint` that authorization-server metadata discovery resolved. The Inspector deliberately has no such fields by default — it resolves both from the AS's metadata document, exactly as a real MCP host does — but a server under development often advertises its *production* authorization server while you want to hit staging. Set either (they are independent) to an absolute `http(s)` URL and it replaces what the metadata returned, for both the authorization request and the token request; leave blank to use discovery. A malformed value is flagged inline in the form and dropped with a warning at connect time rather than failing the connection. Edit them in Server Settings → Authorization ("Authorization URL override" / "Token URL override").
+
+They redirect the **endpoints**, not the authorization server's identity: `issuer` is left exactly as discovery returned it, because that is what RFC 9207 / SEP-2352 validate the callback's `iss` against to defend against an authorization-server mix-up. So they fit alternate endpoints of the *same* logical issuer — a staging deployment fronting the same issuer, a local proxy. Point one at an authorization server advertising a **different** issuer and the callback is rejected as an issuer mismatch before the code is redeemed; that is the mix-up defense working, and it is not disabled to make the override succeed.
+
+They are **not applied under enterprise-managed authorization** (`oauth.enterpriseManaged`), for the same reason `oauth.authorizationParams` isn't: that flow authorizes against the enterprise IdP — a different authorization server, whose OIDC discovery would otherwise be rewritten too, pointing the IdP login (or the IdP code exchange) at the resource server's authorization server.
+
+> Because the override is applied to the *discovered metadata document*, a server whose authorization server publishes no metadata at all is unaffected — there the SDK falls back to `/authorize` and `/token` on the AS origin, and there is nothing to override.
+
 A catalog carrying these fields:
 
 ```json