diff --git a/docs/adr/0049-run-ci-lanes-on-github-hosted-runners-under-trigger-and-token-hardening.md b/docs/adr/0049-run-ci-lanes-on-github-hosted-runners-under-trigger-and-token-hardening.md index 7ab2a89f57a..353cef2930a 100644 --- a/docs/adr/0049-run-ci-lanes-on-github-hosted-runners-under-trigger-and-token-hardening.md +++ b/docs/adr/0049-run-ci-lanes-on-github-hosted-runners-under-trigger-and-token-hardening.md @@ -91,9 +91,10 @@ lane or any other surface keeps `L2`. a PR thread or upstream release notes, and the filter keeps it because it judges the item's author. This is accepted in the same class as web pages. -## Amendment (2026-11-16): model steps hold no write token, and revocation is best effort +## Amendment (2026-11-16): model steps hold no write token, revocation is best effort, and hosted runners gain an egress control -Two statements above no longer hold. The decisions that changed them are already recorded. +Three statements above no longer hold. The first two changed by decisions already recorded; the +third by a GitHub product change. - **No write token in the model step.** The Decision's closing paragraph, the third alternative and the second consequence say a lane holds its job's write token in the model step. Lane model @@ -108,3 +109,16 @@ Two statements above no longer hold. The decisions that changed them are already token was revoked ([ADR 0058](0058-mint-lane-app-tokens-through-an-oidc-broker.md), amendment of 2026-10-12). A token not revoked expires within the hour, which bounds the exposure. +- **Hosted runners have an egress control the job cannot change.** The Context says a hosted runner + has "no egress policy the job cannot change", and the first alternative says "hosted runners offer + no default-deny egress". Neither holds as an absolute. GitHub's native egress firewall for hosted + runners "operates outside the runner VM at Layer 7" and "remains immutable even if an attacker + gains root access inside the runner environment" + ([GitHub Actions 2026 security roadmap](https://github.blog/news-insights/product-news/whats-coming-to-our-github-actions-2026-security-roadmap/)), + and is in technical preview, enforcing "an allowlist from outside the runner VM, so it holds even + if a job is compromised" + ([Securing GitHub Actions Workflows](https://learn.github.com/well-architected/library/application-security/recommendations/actions-security/), + source + [`actions-security.md` at `e4d8f49`](https://github.com/github/github-well-architected/blob/e4d8f49d686c7f6f73aef60c464cf6405eb57e3f/content/library/application-security/recommendations/actions-security.md)); + both fetched 2026-11-16. The decision stands: lanes run under the five conditions with open + egress. Adopting the firewall is a later hardening choice, not made here. diff --git a/docs/adr/0085-run-org-lanes-from-ci-workflows-under-one-lanes-app-with-central-grants.md b/docs/adr/0085-run-org-lanes-from-ci-workflows-under-one-lanes-app-with-central-grants.md index 6a04b0a7762..33d2f1189ee 100644 --- a/docs/adr/0085-run-org-lanes-from-ci-workflows-under-one-lanes-app-with-central-grants.md +++ b/docs/adr/0085-run-org-lanes-from-ci-workflows-under-one-lanes-app-with-central-grants.md @@ -220,3 +220,15 @@ adds. - `trust-root` gains a rule `base` lacks: revisit Decision 5. - A model activity gains a write effect: the refusal class in Decision 6 no longer covers every lane write path. + +## Amendment (2026-11-16): a `GITHUB_TOKEN` pull request update starts approval-required runs + +The Consequences line "A `GITHUB_TOKEN` push starts no workflow run" no longer holds as written. +GitHub now exempts `pull_request` events with the `opened`, `synchronize` or `reopened` activity +types: when a workflow using `GITHUB_TOKEN` creates or updates a pull request, "the resulting +`pull_request` event creates workflow runs in an **approval-required** state" +([triggering a workflow from a workflow](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/write-workflows/choose-when-workflows-run/trigger-a-workflow#triggering-a-workflow-from-a-workflow), +fetched 2026-11-16). A `GITHUB_TOKEN` push still starts no `push` run, and the `pull_request` runs +wait until a user with write access approves them, so `pr-refine`, `pr-unblock` and +`work-resolve-issue` on that path still get no checks re-run automatically. No decision rests on +that line, so the decisions stand.