diff --git a/.changes/review/fix-review-owasp-2025-numbering-4f0f9d74.md b/.changes/review/fix-review-owasp-2025-numbering-4f0f9d74.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5178376ea --- /dev/null +++ b/.changes/review/fix-review-owasp-2025-numbering-4f0f9d74.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +--- +bump: patch +--- + +### Fixed + +- **`security-reviewer` cites the OWASP Top 10:2025.** The OWASP floor names the edition, links each id to its 2025 category page, and files every existing check under its 2025 id: SSRF joins A01:2025, outdated components become A03:2025, TLS misuse moves to A07:2025 and verbose errors to A10:2025. No check is added or dropped; the tier-less design-review row is now A06:2025, here and in the findings-normalization crosswalk. diff --git a/docs/upstream/addyosmani-agent-skills.md b/docs/upstream/addyosmani-agent-skills.md index f27722b6a5..4a35d0612f 100644 --- a/docs/upstream/addyosmani-agent-skills.md +++ b/docs/upstream/addyosmani-agent-skills.md @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ recorded miss. The PR that settles a row edits that row. | [`security-and-hardening`, destructive operations on derived paths](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L115) | Before a delete, requires the resolved target under an allowed root, below it, with ownership evidence, and states why even that can fail | A value's channel says nothing about who wrote it, and a shape check is mistaken for authorization. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L117)) | `guardrails` `block-root-delete-target` and `plugins/disk-hygiene/skills/clean/reference/safety-model.md:92` protect our own agents. Review of a consumer's cleanup code stops at traversal (`plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md:60`) | **already have, by measurement:** the current `security-reviewer` reported the shape-checked delete reaching outside its root in 3 of 3 runs, two at source lines and one at the diff-file lines they map to (`plugins/review/evals/security-reviewer-delete-shape-check`, 2026-11-03), so no text lands | | [`security-and-hardening`, dependency scripts and new packages](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L133) | Blocks install scripts before first execution, triages by reachability, reviews new packages since advisories miss fresh malice | A clean audit is not proof a package is safe. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L138)) | `plugins/toolchain/skills/check/SKILL.md:114` already installs with scripts off, but the review floor at `plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md:65` is an audit command only, and `plugins/review` holds no install-script or typosquat check | **already have, by measurement:** the current `security-reviewer` reported the look-alike package and its install script in 3 of 3 runs (`plugins/review/evals/security-reviewer-new-dependency-unread`, 2026-11-03), so no text lands. The runs had no shell, so the audit command could not run and the stop-at-the-audit failure was not exercised | | [`security-and-hardening`, personal data](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L142) | Classify, minimize, set retention, support export and deletion | Hardening does not ask whether to hold the data at all. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md#L144)) | none beyond `plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md:68` | **reject:** generic, jurisdiction-dependent, and no consumer has asked | -| [`security-and-hardening` and `references/security-checklist.md`, OWASP Top 10:2025 numbering](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/references/security-checklist.md#L220) | Moves every OWASP citation to the 2025 edition and cites each id with its year | The 2021 and 2025 editions number several categories differently, so an id without a year is ambiguous. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/references/security-checklist.md#L220)) | `plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md:62-75` keeps the 2021 list without naming the edition. Under the [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/) its A02 to A06 and A10 ids name other categories, SSRF now sits inside A01, and A10:2025 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions has no row | **adapt, not yet applied:** name the edition in that table and move it to the 2025 ids, which changes no check. A row for A10:2025 is a new check class, so it waits for a recorded miss under the eval-first decision above | +| [`security-and-hardening` and `references/security-checklist.md`, OWASP Top 10:2025 numbering](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/references/security-checklist.md#L220) | Moves every OWASP citation to the 2025 edition and cites each id with its year | The 2021 and 2025 editions number several categories differently, so an id without a year is ambiguous. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/references/security-checklist.md#L220)) | The OWASP floor in `plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md` kept the 2021 list without naming the edition, so under the [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/) its A02 to A06 and A10 ids named other categories | **adapt, applied:** the floor names the 2025 edition and links each id to its category page. Each check moved with its category's 2025 successor, SSRF into A01:2025 and outdated components into A03:2025 per the [introduction](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/0x00_2025-Introduction/); TLS misuse (CWE-295) moved to A07:2025 and verbose errors (CWE-209) to A10:2025, where those pages map them. No check was added. Missing CSP (CWE-1021) stays under A02:2025 because A06:2025 is tier-less: #16535 | | [`shipping-and-launch`](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/tree/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/shipping-and-launch) | Launch checklist, flag lifecycle, staged percentages, numeric rollback thresholds, an error budget gate | Releases need a way back and a way to watch them. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/shipping-and-launch/SKILL.md#L10)) | none for this marketplace: plugins ship through a release PR; a consumer's rollout is covered at `plugins/planning/skills/prd/context/templates.md:262-263` and `plugins/performance/reference/techniques.md:654` | **reject:** the threshold table and budget bands carry no source, so they are unearned numbers. `plugins/autonomy/reference/routines.md:250` keeps deploy verification until a telemetry connector exists | | [`source-driven-development`](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/tree/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/source-driven-development) | Detects versions, fetches the exact docs page, cites every framework choice, flags what it could not verify | Training data goes stale. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/source-driven-development/SKILL.md#L10)) | Grounding in live docs | **already have:** `plugins/discovery/skills/read-docs/SKILL.md:24`, `:48`, `plugins/context7/skills/lookup/SKILL.md:24`, `/discipline:do-your-research`, `docs/standards/source-authority-tiers.md:27-29` | | [`spec-driven-development`](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/tree/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/spec-driven-development) | Capability map for bundled requests, a six-part spec, staged approvals, and a stop after writing | Building before requirements are written invites rework. **Stated** ([source](https://github.com/addyosmani/agent-skills/blob/39b723ceebf81474d0557c1fecd01eddab585563/skills/spec-driven-development/SKILL.md#L10)) | Locking intent and splitting a large effort | **already have:** `plugins/planning/skills/interview/SKILL.md:288`, `plugins/planning/skills/prd/SKILL.md:63`, `plugins/planning/skills/wayfind/SKILL.md:9`, `plugins/work-items/skills/decompose/SKILL.md:100-116` | diff --git a/plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md b/plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md index 33d15d7918..490898c49a 100644 --- a/plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md +++ b/plugins/review/agents/security-reviewer.md @@ -61,18 +61,20 @@ When the change set deletes, narrows, or softens a standing instruction (`CLAUDE ### OWASP Top 10 floor +Ids and categories are the [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/) edition. + | OWASP | Category | Specific checks | |---|---|---| -| A01 | Broken Access Control | IDOR (CWE-639), path traversal (CWE-22), missing authorization on endpoints; authorization each route or handler must opt in to, with no central decision point and no default deny, even when every current route carries its check ([OWASP Proactive Controls C1](https://top10proactive.owasp.org/archive/2024/the-top-10/c1-accesscontrol/)) | -| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak crypto (CWE-326/327), TLS misuse (CWE-295), JWT signing/validation, secrets in code | -| A03 | Injection | SQL (CWE-89), command (CWE-77/78), XSS (CWE-79). Covered per-ecosystem | -| A04 | Insecure Design | Threat modeling. Flag for design review, do not tier | -| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | CORS (CWE-942), missing CSP (CWE-1021), cookie config (CWE-614/1004), debug endpoints in prod (CWE-489), verbose errors (CWE-209) | -| A06 | Vulnerable & Outdated Components | Read the manifests and lockfiles for known-vulnerable, EOL or abandoned packages (CWE-1104); run no audit command (step 2's run-none rule), and name the one that would settle a doubt | -| A07 | Identification & Authentication Failures | Session fixation (CWE-384), weak session IDs, JWT alg=none (CWE-345/347) | -| A08 | Software & Data Integrity Failures | Insecure deserialization (CWE-502) | -| A09 | Security Logging & Monitoring Failures | PII in logs without redaction, missing audit trail for sensitive ops | -| A10 | Server-Side Request Forgery | User-controlled URLs in HTTP clients (CWE-918). Verify allowlist and private-IP block | +| [A01:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/) | Broken Access Control | IDOR (CWE-639), path traversal (CWE-22), missing authorization on endpoints; authorization each route or handler must opt in to, with no central decision point and no default deny, even when every current route carries its check ([OWASP Proactive Controls C1](https://top10proactive.owasp.org/archive/2024/the-top-10/c1-accesscontrol/)); user-controlled URLs in HTTP clients (CWE-918): verify allowlist and private-IP block | +| [A02:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A02_2025-Security_Misconfiguration/) | Security Misconfiguration | CORS (CWE-942), missing CSP (CWE-1021), cookie config (CWE-614/1004), debug endpoints in prod (CWE-489) | +| [A03:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A03_2025-Software_Supply_Chain_Failures/) | Software Supply Chain Failures | Read the manifests and lockfiles for known-vulnerable, EOL or abandoned packages (CWE-1104); run no audit command (step 2's run-none rule), and name the one that would settle a doubt | +| [A04:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A04_2025-Cryptographic_Failures/) | Cryptographic Failures | Weak crypto (CWE-326/327), JWT signing/validation, secrets in code | +| [A05:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A05_2025-Injection/) | Injection | SQL (CWE-89), command (CWE-77/78), XSS (CWE-79). Covered per-ecosystem | +| [A06:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A06_2025-Insecure_Design/) | Insecure Design | Threat modeling. Flag for design review, do not tier | +| [A07:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A07_2025-Authentication_Failures/) | Authentication Failures | Session fixation (CWE-384), weak session IDs, JWT alg=none (CWE-345/347), TLS misuse (CWE-295) | +| [A08:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A08_2025-Software_or_Data_Integrity_Failures/) | Software or Data Integrity Failures | Insecure deserialization (CWE-502) | +| [A09:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A09_2025-Security_Logging_and_Alerting_Failures/) | Security Logging and Alerting Failures | PII in logs without redaction, missing audit trail for sensitive ops | +| [A10:2025](https://top10.owasp.org/2025/A10_2025-Mishandling_of_Exceptional_Conditions/) | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | Verbose errors (CWE-209) | ## Output format diff --git a/plugins/review/reference/findings-normalization.md b/plugins/review/reference/findings-normalization.md index 4d667dc85f..531a256c0d 100644 --- a/plugins/review/reference/findings-normalization.md +++ b/plugins/review/reference/findings-normalization.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ The 5-stage main-thread pipeline that turns heterogeneous free-text findings fro | Surface | Native severity | Native confidence | Line basis | |---|---|---|---| | `code-reviewer` | CRITICAL / IMPORTANT / SUGGESTION | high / medium / low (smells capped at medium, except a Duplicated Code finding naming the diverging change, which may be high) | `file:line` (inferred) | -| `security-reviewer` | P1–P5 (CVSS); A04 tier-less | high / medium / low | `file:line` or `module` (inferred) | +| `security-reviewer` | P1–P5 (CVSS); A06:2025 tier-less | high / medium / low | `file:line` or `module` (inferred) | | `architecture-guardian` | Violations / Risks / Opportunities | high / medium / low | file-only (Violations); none (Risks/Opportunities) | | `doc-drift-detector` | Stale / Missing / Aspirational | high / medium / low (table column) | doc-file line (table) | | slice-subagents | project's tiers (or baseline) | high / medium / low (template column) | `file:line` (inferred) | @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Per-surface free-text → records `{surface, file, line, line_basis, category, n Map native severity → the tier vocabulary in effect (the project's own, else `/context/severity.md`): -- security-reviewer: P1/P2 → CRITICAL; P3 → IMPORTANT; P4/P5 → SUGGESTION; A04/tier-less → SUGGESTION + `forward-flag: design-review`. +- security-reviewer: P1/P2 → CRITICAL; P3 → IMPORTANT; P4/P5 → SUGGESTION; A06:2025/tier-less → SUGGESTION + `forward-flag: design-review`. - code-reviewer, slice-subagents, pr-review-toolkit: identity mapping (Critical/Important-or-Warning/Suggestion). - architecture-guardian: Violation → CRITICAL (broken rule today) or IMPORTANT (drift) by content; **Risk → SUGGESTION + `forward-flag: future` (never a blocking tier)**; Opportunity → SUGGESTION. - doc-drift: Stale → IMPORTANT; Missing/Aspirational → SUGGESTION.