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ci(skills): ratchet stack-specific code fences in skill bodies and amend ADR 0101 #3195
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| name: Intake Label Outside Actor Activity | |
| # Flags an issue or pull request when someone outside the organization opens | |
| # or edits it, or comments or reviews on it. Outside actors are the security | |
| # boundary the owner keeps: such an item goes to a person (`needs-human`). | |
| # The rules are in .github/scripts/security-outside-actor/flag.mjs. | |
| # | |
| # A removal of `security: outside-actor` always starts the job, whoever sent | |
| # it: flag.mjs puts the label back unless the sender is a person on the | |
| # trusted-actor list. Removing any other label starts none. For every other | |
| # event, two skips run in the job's `if`, before a runner starts, so most | |
| # events cost nothing: | |
| # - the content's author has `author_association` OWNER or MEMBER, unless the | |
| # event is an edit, a push to a pull request or a reopen by someone other | |
| # than that author: flag.mjs then judges the sender by id alone, so anyone | |
| # not on the trusted list, an organization member included, who edits | |
| # another's text or pushes to another's pull request is flagged; | |
| # - the event's sender is a Bot. Only a GitHub App installed on this | |
| # repository acts as a Bot here, which means one of ours, so lane traffic | |
| # starts no job. A fork pull request is the exception: an App installed on | |
| # the fork can act there, so a Bot's `pull_request_target` event of any | |
| # action on a pull request whose head repository is not this one still | |
| # runs (the job reads that repository's name from the payload and never | |
| # checks the head out). | |
| # Machine-user accounts are type User and are still checked. | |
| # Everything that runs is judged by the default branch's trusted-actor list, | |
| # matched by numeric id: a listed id is trusted, any other author is flagged, | |
| # and an unreadable list flags too. | |
| # | |
| # No model, no secret and no App token: the job's GITHUB_TOKEN adds the | |
| # `security: outside-actor` label, sets an issue's Work status to needs-human | |
| # (a pull request gets the `needs-human` label), and posts one comment per | |
| # outside actor, naming their login without a mention and quoting none of | |
| # their text. `security: outside-actor` is a hold of its own (merge-holds.mjs | |
| # OUTSIDE_ACTOR_LABEL): the merge queue, auto-merge arming, babysit, intake | |
| # triage, the work-unblock sweep and each activity whose labels-absent lists | |
| # needs-human skip it. The script reads the event payload itself; no event | |
| # text reaches a shell. The lanes kill switch does not stop this check: it | |
| # would silence the boundary it guards. | |
| # | |
| # Accepted exposure: `issues`, `issue_comment` and `pull_request_target` run | |
| # this file from the default branch with a write token. `pull_request_review` | |
| # and `pull_request_review_comment` run from the pull request's merge ref, and | |
| # on a pull request from a fork GitHub gives them a read-only token, so a | |
| # review or diff comment on a fork pull request is logged as a failed run, not | |
| # flagged. Every fork pull request is an outsider's, and its opening is | |
| # flagged through `pull_request_target`; the review and comment triggers catch | |
| # an outsider writing on one of this repository's own pull requests. | |
| on: | |
| # Runs from the default branch; checks out main only and passes no event | |
| # text to a shell. | |
| issues: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers] | |
| types: [opened, edited, reopened, unlabeled] | |
| issue_comment: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers] | |
| types: [created, edited] | |
| pull_request_review: | |
| types: [submitted, edited] | |
| pull_request_review_comment: | |
| types: [created, edited] | |
| # Never checks out the pull request head. | |
| pull_request_target: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers] | |
| types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, unlabeled] | |
| permissions: {} | |
| jobs: | |
| label-outside-actor: | |
| # The author is the comment's, else the review's, else the pull | |
| # request's, else the issue's, the order flag.mjs reads them in. | |
| name: Label Outside Actor | |
| if: >- | |
| (github.event.action == 'unlabeled' | |
| && github.event.label.name == 'security: outside-actor') | |
| || (github.event.action != 'unlabeled' | |
| && (github.event.sender.type != 'Bot' | |
| || (github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' | |
| && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != github.repository)) | |
| && ((contains(fromJSON('["edited", "synchronize", "reopened"]'), github.event.action) | |
| && github.event.sender.id != (github.event.comment.user.id | |
| || github.event.review.user.id | |
| || github.event.pull_request.user.id | |
| || github.event.issue.user.id)) | |
| || !contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER"]'), | |
| github.event.comment.author_association | |
| || github.event.review.author_association | |
| || github.event.pull_request.author_association | |
| || github.event.issue.author_association))) | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 | |
| timeout-minutes: 5 | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read # check out main | |
| issues: write # label and comment on an issue | |
| pull-requests: write # label and comment on a pull request | |
| # Runs on one item wait in line (`queue: max`) so none is dropped. | |
| concurrency: | |
| group: security-outside-actor-${{ github.event.issue.number || github.event.pull_request.number }} | |
| queue: max | |
| env: | |
| API_BUDGET_TOKEN: github-token | |
| npm_config_audit: "false" | |
| npm_config_fetch_timeout: "60000" | |
| npm_config_fund: "false" | |
| # npm's fetch timeout and retries, from the one file that sets them. | |
| npm_config_globalconfig: ${{ github.workspace }}/.base/.github/npm-fetch.npmrc | |
| steps: | |
| - name: Resolve main's tip | |
| id: tip | |
| env: | |
| TIP_BRANCH: main | |
| GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0" | |
| run: | | |
| until sha=$(timeout 60 git -C "$RUNNER_TEMP" ls-remote "https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY.git" "refs/heads/$TIP_BRANCH" | | |
| awk -v ref="refs/heads/$TIP_BRANCH" '$2 == ref { print $1 }') && [[ $sha =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; do | |
| ((++i < 3)) || { echo "::error::the tip of $TIP_BRANCH did not resolve"; exit 1; } | |
| sleep "$((RANDOM % (2 * i + 1)))" | |
| done | |
| echo "sha=$sha" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT" | |
| - name: Check out the default branch tip | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ steps.tip.outputs.sha }} | |
| path: .base | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - name: Set up Node | |
| uses: ./.base/.github/actions/setup-pinned-node # zizmor: ignore[self-repository] | |
| with: | |
| node-version-file: .base/.node-version | |
| # flag.mjs writes an issue's Work status through resolve-config.mjs, | |
| # whose packages only the resolve-config action installs, and this job | |
| # does not run that action. The label and comment must land without them, | |
| # so a failed install continues; on an issue the field write then fails | |
| # the run visibly. | |
| - name: Install resolve-config's packages | |
| continue-on-error: true | |
| timeout-minutes: 3 | |
| run: npm ci --ignore-scripts --omit=dev --prefix .base/.github/actions/resolve-config | |
| - name: Flag an outside actor | |
| env: | |
| GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | |
| TRUSTED_ACTORS_PATH: .base/.github/standards/trusted-actors/trusted-actors.json | |
| run: node .base/.github/scripts/security-outside-actor/flag.mjs | |
| - name: Log the API budget at the end | |
| if: always() | |
| continue-on-error: true | |
| timeout-minutes: 1 | |
| uses: ./.base/.github/actions/log-api-budget # zizmor: ignore[self-repository] | |
| with: | |
| tokens: github-token |