diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml
index 31b5b42b8..dfa8116e2 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ concurrency:
 permissions:
   contents: read
   pull-requests: write
-  id-token: write # OIDC exchange for the Claude GitHub App token
 
 jobs:
   review:
@@ -48,6 +47,20 @@ jobs:
       - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@1298632ce7736903d02a1435002705aa2a594a6c # v1.0.175
         with:
           claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
+          # By default the action trades an OIDC token for a Claude GitHub App
+          # token, and Anthropic's exchange rejects tokens minted under
+          # `pull_request_target` (anthropics/claude-code-action#713). Passing the
+          # job token skips that exchange. Under `pull_request_target` the job
+          # token carries this workflow's declared permissions, so it can post
+          # comments. Comments appear as github-actions[bot], not claude[bot].
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # The action refuses actors without write access, and community
+          # authors never have it here. This input is the action's escape hatch.
+          # Its docs restrict it to workflows with very limited permissions, and
+          # this one qualifies: a job token scoped to `pull-requests: write`, the
+          # PR head never checked out, and tools limited to reading the diff and
+          # posting comments.
+          allowed_non_write_users: '*'
           prompt: |
             REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
             PR NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}