55//! identifier when the repo IS the product. GitHub/GitLab/
66//! Bitbucket URLs are normalized to
77//! `pkg:<github|gitlab|bitbucket>/<owner>/<name>`; anything else
8- //! is returned as the raw URL.
8+ //! is returned as the URL with any credentials (userinfo), query
9+ //! and fragment removed.
910//! 2. `package.json` (npm) → `pkg:npm/<name>@<version>`
1011//! 3. `pyproject.toml` (PyPI) → `pkg:pypi/<name>@<version>`
1112//! 4. `Cargo.toml` (Cargo) → `pkg:cargo/<name>@<version>`
@@ -552,8 +553,18 @@ fn parse_git_config_value(raw: &str) -> String {
552553/// * `https://github.com/owner/repo` → `pkg:github/owner/repo`
553554/// * Same shapes for `gitlab.com` (→ `pkg:gitlab`) and `bitbucket.org`
554555/// (→ `pkg:bitbucket`).
555- /// * Anything else (self-hosted gitea, generic SSH, etc.) → URL as-is.
556+ /// * Anything else (self-hosted gitea, generic SSH, etc.) → the URL with
557+ /// its userinfo, query and fragment removed.
558+ ///
559+ /// The identifier lands in a VEX document that is meant to be committed,
560+ /// so it must never carry credentials: a CI-style origin such as
561+ /// `https://gitlab-ci-token:<TOKEN>@gitlab.example.com/g/r.git` would
562+ /// otherwise publish the token. The query and fragment are dropped up
563+ /// front (they are not part of a repository's identity, and a token can
564+ /// ride there too), the userinfo on the fallback path
565+ /// ([`split_remote_host_path`] already skips it for the normalized hosts).
556566fn remote_url_to_purl ( url : & str ) -> String {
567+ let url = strip_url_query_fragment ( url) ;
557568 if let Some ( ( host, path) ) = split_remote_host_path ( url) {
558569 // Trim slashes BEFORE stripping `.git`: a URL like
559570 // `https://github.com/owner/repo.git/` carries a trailing
@@ -578,7 +589,41 @@ fn remote_url_to_purl(url: &str) -> String {
578589 }
579590 }
580591 }
581- url. to_string ( )
592+ strip_url_userinfo ( url)
593+ }
594+
595+ /// Cut a URL at its first `?` or `#`. A trailing bare `?`/`#` goes too.
596+ fn strip_url_query_fragment ( url : & str ) -> & str {
597+ match url. find ( [ '?' , '#' ] ) {
598+ Some ( idx) => & url[ ..idx] ,
599+ None => url,
600+ }
601+ }
602+
603+ /// Remove a `user[:password]@` prefix from a remote URL.
604+ ///
605+ /// * `scheme://[userinfo@]host[:port]/path` — the userinfo is everything
606+ /// up to the LAST `@` of the authority (the part before the first `/`
607+ /// after `://`), since an unencoded `@` in a password still precedes
608+ /// the host's.
609+ /// * scp-style `[user@]host:path` (git treats a `:` before any `/` as
610+ /// this form) — everything up to the last `@` before the first `/`,
611+ /// but only when a `:` follows it; otherwise the `@` belongs to the
612+ /// path (`host:repo@v1`) or the string is not a remote URL at all.
613+ fn strip_url_userinfo ( url : & str ) -> String {
614+ if let Some ( scheme_end) = url. find ( "://" ) {
615+ let ( scheme, rest) = url. split_at ( scheme_end + 3 ) ;
616+ let authority_end = rest. find ( '/' ) . unwrap_or ( rest. len ( ) ) ;
617+ return match rest[ ..authority_end] . rfind ( '@' ) {
618+ Some ( at) => format ! ( "{scheme}{}" , & rest[ at + 1 ..] ) ,
619+ None => url. to_string ( ) ,
620+ } ;
621+ }
622+ let prefix_end = url. find ( '/' ) . unwrap_or ( url. len ( ) ) ;
623+ match url[ ..prefix_end] . rfind ( '@' ) {
624+ Some ( at) if url[ at + 1 ..prefix_end] . contains ( ':' ) => url[ at + 1 ..] . to_string ( ) ,
625+ _ => url. to_string ( ) ,
626+ }
582627}
583628
584629/// Pull `(host, path)` out of a git remote URL. Returns `None` for
@@ -812,6 +857,98 @@ mod tests {
812857 assert_eq ! ( remote_url_to_purl( raw) , raw) ;
813858 }
814859
860+ /// A CI-style origin on a self-hosted forge carries a token in its
861+ /// userinfo. The raw-URL fallback must drop it: the product `@id`
862+ /// lands in a committed VEX document.
863+ #[ test]
864+ fn remote_url_unknown_host_strips_credentials ( ) {
865+ assert_eq ! (
866+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://gitlab-ci-token:glcbt-SECRET@gitlab.example.com/g/r.git" ) ,
867+ "https://gitlab.example.com/g/r.git"
868+ ) ;
869+ // Username only.
870+ assert_eq ! (
871+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://deploy@git.example.com/team/repo.git" ) ,
872+ "https://git.example.com/team/repo.git"
873+ ) ;
874+ // An unencoded `@` inside the password: the LAST `@` of the
875+ // authority ends the userinfo.
876+ assert_eq ! (
877+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://user:p@ss@git.example.com:8443/team/repo.git" ) ,
878+ "https://git.example.com:8443/team/repo.git"
879+ ) ;
880+ // ssh:// with a port, and git+https.
881+ assert_eq ! (
882+ remote_url_to_purl( "ssh://git@git.example.com:2222/team/repo.git" ) ,
883+ "ssh://git.example.com:2222/team/repo.git"
884+ ) ;
885+ assert_eq ! (
886+ remote_url_to_purl( "git+https://oauth2:tok@git.example.com/team/repo" ) ,
887+ "git+https://git.example.com/team/repo"
888+ ) ;
889+ }
890+
891+ /// The same token on a NORMALIZED host never reaches the output
892+ /// either (the purl drops the authority entirely), even when an `@`
893+ /// inside the password defeats `split_remote_host_path`'s
894+ /// first-`@` split.
895+ #[ test]
896+ fn remote_url_normalized_host_never_leaks_credentials ( ) {
897+ assert_eq ! (
898+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://x-access-token:ghs_SECRET@github.com/o/r.git" ) ,
899+ "pkg:github/o/r"
900+ ) ;
901+ let out = remote_url_to_purl ( "https://user:p@ss@github.com/o/r.git" ) ;
902+ assert ! ( !out. contains( "p@ss" ) && !out. contains( "user" ) , "{out}" ) ;
903+ }
904+
905+ /// scp-style remotes on unknown hosts lose their `user@` too; an `@`
906+ /// that belongs to the path (no `:` after it) is left alone.
907+ #[ test]
908+ fn remote_url_unknown_host_scp_style_userinfo ( ) {
909+ assert_eq ! (
910+ remote_url_to_purl( "git@git.example.com:team/repo.git" ) ,
911+ "git.example.com:team/repo.git"
912+ ) ;
913+ assert_eq ! (
914+ remote_url_to_purl( "deploy@git.example.com:team/repo.git" ) ,
915+ "git.example.com:team/repo.git"
916+ ) ;
917+ assert_eq ! ( remote_url_to_purl( "host:repo@v1" ) , "host:repo@v1" ) ;
918+ // An `@` after the first `/` is path, not userinfo.
919+ assert_eq ! (
920+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://git.example.com/team/repo@v2" ) ,
921+ "https://git.example.com/team/repo@v2"
922+ ) ;
923+ assert_eq ! (
924+ remote_url_to_purl( "/srv/git/repo@v2.git" ) ,
925+ "/srv/git/repo@v2.git"
926+ ) ;
927+ }
928+
929+ /// Query strings and fragments are not part of a repository's
930+ /// identity and can carry tokens: dropped on every path, including
931+ /// the normalized hosts (where they used to leak into the purl name).
932+ #[ test]
933+ fn remote_url_query_and_fragment_are_dropped ( ) {
934+ assert_eq ! (
935+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://git.example.com/team/repo.git?private_token=SECRET#frag" ) ,
936+ "https://git.example.com/team/repo.git"
937+ ) ;
938+ assert_eq ! (
939+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://git.example.com/team/repo#readme" ) ,
940+ "https://git.example.com/team/repo"
941+ ) ;
942+ assert_eq ! (
943+ remote_url_to_purl( "https://github.com/o/r.git?token=SECRET" ) ,
944+ "pkg:github/o/r"
945+ ) ;
946+ assert_eq ! (
947+ remote_url_to_purl( "git@gitlab.com:foo/bar.git#main" ) ,
948+ "pkg:gitlab/foo/bar"
949+ ) ;
950+ }
951+
815952 #[ test]
816953 fn remote_url_ssh_protocol_form ( ) {
817954 assert_eq ! (
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