From 90012d098997d68db417d42b71d8aa9fb9e9bcff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:17:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 01/20] Add agent tool permission settings --- .claude/settings.json | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ CHANGELOG.md | 5 +++ README.md | 12 ++++++ 3 files changed, 109 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .claude/settings.json diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5903a53 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +{ + "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json", + "permissions": { + "deny": [ + "Read(./.env)", + "Read(./.env.*)", + "Read(./**/.env)", + "Read(./**/.env.*)", + "Read(./**/*.pem)", + "Read(./**/*.key)", + "Read(~/.ssh/**)", + "Read(~/.aws/**)", + "Read(~/.config/gcloud/**)", + "Read(~/.azure/**)", + "Read(~/.kube/**)", + "Read(~/.docker/config.json)", + "Read(~/.npmrc)", + "Read(~/.pypirc)", + "Read(~/.netrc)", + "Read(~/.config/gh/**)", + "Bash(sudo *)", + "Bash(rm -rf *)", + "Bash(rm -fr *)", + "Bash(git push *)", + "Bash(git reset --hard *)", + "Bash(git clean *)", + "Bash(git filter-branch *)", + "Bash(gh pr merge *)", + "Bash(gh repo delete *)", + "Bash(gh secret *)", + "Bash(terraform apply *)", + "Bash(terraform destroy *)", + "Bash(terraform import *)", + "Bash(terraform state *)", + "Bash(tofu apply *)", + "Bash(tofu destroy *)", + "Bash(kubectl delete *)", + "Bash(kubectl apply *)", + "Bash(helm install *)", + "Bash(helm upgrade *)", + "Bash(helm uninstall *)", + "Bash(aws *)", + "Bash(gcloud *)", + "Bash(az *)", + "Bash(npm publish *)", + "Bash(pnpm publish *)", + "Bash(uv publish *)", + "Bash(twine upload *)", + "Bash(curl *)", + "Bash(wget *)", + "Bash(ssh *)", + "Bash(scp *)", + "Bash(nc *)", + "Bash(printenv *)", + "Bash(env)", + "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", + "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" + ], + "ask": [ + "Bash(npm install *)", + "Bash(npm i *)", + "Bash(npm update *)", + "Bash(npx *)", + "Bash(pnpm install *)", + "Bash(pnpm add *)", + "Bash(pnpm update *)", + "Bash(pnpm dlx *)", + "Bash(uv add *)", + "Bash(uv sync *)", + "Bash(uv lock *)", + "Bash(uvx *)", + "Bash(pip install *)", + "Bash(git commit *)", + "Bash(git rebase *)", + "Bash(git checkout -- *)", + "Bash(git restore *)", + "Bash(git branch -D *)", + "Bash(rm *)", + "Bash(docker *)", + "Bash(terraform *)" + ] + }, + "sandbox": { + "enabled": true, + "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, + "excludedCommands": ["codex exec *"] + } +} diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index d1e5be6..154f063 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,6 +3,11 @@ All notable changes to this project are recorded in this file. The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and the project uses [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). +## [Unreleased] + +### Security +- Add `.claude/settings.json` with deny and ask permission rules and the Bash sandbox for Claude Code. `codex exec` runs outside the sandbox, but only with the Codex read-only sandbox. + ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 Pull request: [#10](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/10) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8eb6f65..0932446 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ - [Content](#content) - [`AGENTS.md`](#agentsmd) - [`CLAUDE.md`](#claudemd) + - [`.claude/settings.json`](#claudesettingsjson) - [`.agents/skills/`](#agentsskills) - [`docs/`](#docs) - [`templates/`](#templates) @@ -50,6 +51,17 @@ See [this blog post](https://kickstart.ai/news/agentic-engineering-best-practice A one-liner that points to `AGENTS.md`. Claude Code reads `CLAUDE.md` by default, so this redirect makes sure it picks up the same instructions as every other agent. +### `.claude/settings.json` + +Permission rules and sandbox settings that Claude Code enforces. Instructions in `AGENTS.md` can be ignored in long sessions, but these rules cannot be overridden by the agent: + +- **Deny**: reading secrets (`.env`, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. +- **Ask**: installing dependencies, commits, and other commands that change local state. +- **Sandbox**: Bash commands can only write inside the project, and each new network host needs your approval. +- **Codex reviews**: `codex exec` runs outside the sandbox, because Codex uses its own sandbox. Deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox (`-s workspace-write`, `danger-full-access`, `-c`, `-p`), so use `codex exec -s read-only`. + +Bash deny rules match the command text only, so `bash -c 'curl ...'` or `/usr/bin/curl` is not blocked by the rules. The sandbox is the real boundary. See the [permissions documentation](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions#permission-rule-syntax). Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. + ### `.agents/skills/` Skills are task-specific prompts that are only loaded when needed. They keep your `AGENTS.md` focused on general guidelines while letting you define detailed workflows for recurring tasks. From 0f50399f3204d1286af8c54d4cc7412666e1fbd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:41:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/20] Remove the Codex sandbox exception and document using Claude and Codex together --- .claude/settings.json | 11 ++--------- CHANGELOG.md | 3 ++- README.md | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 5903a53..50796d5 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -52,13 +52,7 @@ "Bash(scp *)", "Bash(nc *)", "Bash(printenv *)", - "Bash(env)", - "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", - "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" + "Bash(env)" ], "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", @@ -86,7 +80,6 @@ }, "sandbox": { "enabled": true, - "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["codex exec *"] + "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false } } diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 154f063..387f285 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and ## [Unreleased] ### Security -- Add `.claude/settings.json` with deny and ask permission rules and the Bash sandbox for Claude Code. `codex exec` runs outside the sandbox, but only with the Codex read-only sandbox. +- Add Codex workspace-write sandbox defaults, command rules, and a restricted Claude review command that runs outside the sandbox. Document the limits in the README. +- Add `.claude/settings.json` with deny and ask permission rules and the Bash sandbox for Claude Code. Document how to use Claude and Codex together. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0932446..83d0a8a 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ - [`AGENTS.md`](#agentsmd) - [`CLAUDE.md`](#claudemd) - [`.claude/settings.json`](#claudesettingsjson) + - [`.codex/`](#codex) + - [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together) - [`.agents/skills/`](#agentsskills) - [`docs/`](#docs) - [`templates/`](#templates) @@ -58,10 +60,33 @@ Permission rules and sandbox settings that Claude Code enforces. Instructions in - **Deny**: reading secrets (`.env`, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. - **Ask**: installing dependencies, commits, and other commands that change local state. - **Sandbox**: Bash commands can only write inside the project, and each new network host needs your approval. -- **Codex reviews**: `codex exec` runs outside the sandbox, because Codex uses its own sandbox. Deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox (`-s workspace-write`, `danger-full-access`, `-c`, `-p`), so use `codex exec -s read-only`. Bash deny rules match the command text only, so `bash -c 'curl ...'` or `/usr/bin/curl` is not blocked by the rules. The sandbox is the real boundary. See the [permissions documentation](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions#permission-rule-syntax). Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. +### `.codex/` + +Codex uses `.codex/config.toml` and `.codex/rules/default.rules` in trusted projects. Restart Codex after changing rules. The workspace-write sandbox allows repository edits and non-blocked commands, with network access disabled. Commands that need more access can request approval. Command rules block or ask for approval for the matching command prefixes. See the [Codex rules documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules). + +These settings are not equivalent to the Claude settings. Codex rules match literal argument prefixes, not arbitrary argument positions or wildcards. Shell wrappers and constructs, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass these matches. The rules do not block reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment or use an enforced sandbox that restricts reads. Project settings are defaults and can be overridden; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. + +### Using Claude and Codex together + +You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work differently: + +- **Codex calls Claude**: the Codex rules allow this exact command outside the Codex sandbox: + + ```sh + claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." + ``` + + Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). + +- **Claude calls Codex**: this does not work. Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex`, and the Claude sandbox blocks that. In our tests, the Claude desktop app did not apply a `sandbox.excludedCommands` exception for Codex. Run the Codex review yourself in a separate terminal: + + ```sh + codex exec -s read-only -- "Review the uncommitted changes and report findings." + ``` + ### `.agents/skills/` Skills are task-specific prompts that are only loaded when needed. They keep your `AGENTS.md` focused on general guidelines while letting you define detailed workflows for recurring tasks. From 0b676a982ce1af9afbdf7a1d3f519cef33771eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:53:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 03/20] Explain the Claude Code permission rules and sandbox in the README --- README.md | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 83d0a8a..b6f5cf5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ - [How to use this repository](#how-to-use-this-repository) - [As a reference](#as-a-reference) - [As a starting point for your own project](#as-a-starting-point-for-your-own-project) +- [Security and permissions](#security-and-permissions) + - [Claude Code](#claude-security) + - [Codex](#codex-security) - [Content](#content) - [`AGENTS.md`](#agentsmd) - [`CLAUDE.md`](#claudemd) @@ -41,6 +44,47 @@ Browse the `AGENTS.md`, the skill files and templates to see how agent instructi The `get-started` skill will kick in and guide you through setting up your project interactively. +## Security and permissions + +Instructions in `AGENTS.md` are only requests. Agents can ignore them, especially in long sessions. This template therefore also uses settings that the agent tools enforce. Each agent has its own settings file, and the rules do not transfer between agents. + + + +### Claude Code + +`.claude/settings.json` contains three types of rules. Claude Code checks them in this order, and the first match wins: + +1. **`deny`**: Claude Code blocks the command. It does not ask you, in any permission mode, including auto mode. A matching `allow` rule or an earlier "Yes, and don't ask again" does not override it. +2. **`ask`**: Claude Code always asks you, also in auto mode. The auto mode classifier cannot approve these commands. +3. **`allow`**: Claude Code runs the command without asking. + +Other commands follow the permission mode. In manual mode Claude Code asks you. In auto mode a classifier decides. + +To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. A rule in `.claude/settings.local.json` cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. + +**Rules match the command text only.** `Bash(git push *)` blocks `git push origin main`, but not `git -C . push` or `bash -c 'git push'`. The rules stop the usual form of a command. They are not a security boundary. + +**The sandbox is the security boundary.** With `sandbox.enabled`, the operating system limits every Bash command, whatever its text: + +- Commands can write only inside the project. +- Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. +- Each new network host needs your approval. +- `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. + +The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. + + + +### Codex + +The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run commands within the sandbox. Network access is disabled by default. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. + +**A `prompt` rule requires approval, but does not require a human to approve.** With **Approve for me** enabled (`approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"`), Codex sends these requests to its automatic reviewer. The reviewer can approve the command without asking you. With `approvals_reviewer = "user"`, eligible requests go to you instead. Codex has no documented per-command setting that forces human approval while Approve for me remains enabled. + +For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. The restricted Claude review command remains an explicit `allow` exception. + +These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match command prefixes and do not replace the sandbox. They also do not prevent reads of secret files. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). + ## Content ### `AGENTS.md` @@ -65,7 +109,7 @@ Bash deny rules match the command text only, so `bash -c 'curl ...'` or `/usr/bi ### `.codex/` -Codex uses `.codex/config.toml` and `.codex/rules/default.rules` in trusted projects. Restart Codex after changing rules. The workspace-write sandbox allows repository edits and non-blocked commands, with network access disabled. Commands that need more access can request approval. Command rules block or ask for approval for the matching command prefixes. See the [Codex rules documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules). +Codex uses `.codex/config.toml` and `.codex/rules/default.rules` in trusted projects. Restart Codex after changing rules. The workspace-write sandbox allows repository edits and non-blocked commands, with network access disabled. Commands that need more access can request approval. Command rules block the listed command prefixes; the restricted Claude review command is explicitly allowed. See [Security and permissions](#security-and-permissions) for the approval behavior. See the [Codex rules documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules). These settings are not equivalent to the Claude settings. Codex rules match literal argument prefixes, not arbitrary argument positions or wildcards. Shell wrappers and constructs, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass these matches. The rules do not block reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment or use an enforced sandbox that restricts reads. Project settings are defaults and can be overridden; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. From f6611aa44fb23565c1715ab88f1cb3eece8840bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:57:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 04/20] Remove duplicated security explanations from the README --- README.md | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b6f5cf5..16dae4d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run co For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. The restricted Claude review command remains an explicit `allow` exception. -These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match command prefixes and do not replace the sandbox. They also do not prevent reads of secret files. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). +These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match literal command prefixes, so shell wrappers, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass them. They do not replace the sandbox, and they do not prevent reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment. Project settings are defaults that users can override; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). ## Content @@ -99,19 +99,17 @@ A one-liner that points to `AGENTS.md`. Claude Code reads `CLAUDE.md` by default ### `.claude/settings.json` -Permission rules and sandbox settings that Claude Code enforces. Instructions in `AGENTS.md` can be ignored in long sessions, but these rules cannot be overridden by the agent: +Claude Code permission rules and sandbox settings: - **Deny**: reading secrets (`.env`, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. - **Ask**: installing dependencies, commits, and other commands that change local state. -- **Sandbox**: Bash commands can only write inside the project, and each new network host needs your approval. +- **Sandbox**: enabled, without the retry outside the sandbox. -Bash deny rules match the command text only, so `bash -c 'curl ...'` or `/usr/bin/curl` is not blocked by the rules. The sandbox is the real boundary. See the [permissions documentation](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions#permission-rule-syntax). Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. +Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. See [Claude Code](#claude-security) for how the rules work. ### `.codex/` -Codex uses `.codex/config.toml` and `.codex/rules/default.rules` in trusted projects. Restart Codex after changing rules. The workspace-write sandbox allows repository edits and non-blocked commands, with network access disabled. Commands that need more access can request approval. Command rules block the listed command prefixes; the restricted Claude review command is explicitly allowed. See [Security and permissions](#security-and-permissions) for the approval behavior. See the [Codex rules documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules). - -These settings are not equivalent to the Claude settings. Codex rules match literal argument prefixes, not arbitrary argument positions or wildcards. Shell wrappers and constructs, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass these matches. The rules do not block reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment or use an enforced sandbox that restricts reads. Project settings are defaults and can be overridden; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. +Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml` and command rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules`. See [Codex](#codex-security) for how the rules work. ### Using Claude and Codex together From 7663a34a86524d20e4d80fa9889103612f04b017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:44:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/20] Document how Claude can call Codex with an explicit model --- README.md | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 16dae4d..3ab1e07 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ This is a template repository for **any type of project** that you want to build using coding agents. It contains a minimal set of agent instructions and a project structure that works well with agents like OpenAI Codex, Claude Code, Factory Droid, and others. -The idea is that you clone this repo, start your coding agent, and let it help you set up the rest. - ## How to use this repository ### As a reference @@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ Browse the `AGENTS.md`, the skill files and templates to see how agent instructi 2. Clone this repository and open it in your terminal. 3. Start your coding agent and prompt it with **"Help me get started!"** -The `get-started` skill will kick in and guide you through setting up your project interactively. +The [`get-started` skill](#agentsskills) guides the project setup. ## Security and permissions @@ -52,7 +50,9 @@ Instructions in `AGENTS.md` are only requests. Agents can ignore them, especiall ### Claude Code -`.claude/settings.json` contains three types of rules. Claude Code checks them in this order, and the first match wins: +`.claude/settings.json` denies access to secrets, destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. It requires approval for dependency installation, commits, and other commands that change local state. + +Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: 1. **`deny`**: Claude Code blocks the command. It does not ask you, in any permission mode, including auto mode. A matching `allow` rule or an earlier "Yes, and don't ask again" does not override it. 2. **`ask`**: Claude Code always asks you, also in auto mode. The auto mode classifier cannot approve these commands. @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Instructions in `AGENTS.md` are only requests. Agents can ignore them, especiall Other commands follow the permission mode. In manual mode Claude Code asks you. In auto mode a classifier decides. -To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. A rule in `.claude/settings.local.json` cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. +Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. **Rules match the command text only.** `Bash(git push *)` blocks `git push origin main`, but not `git -C . push` or `bash -c 'git push'`. The rules stop the usual form of a command. They are not a security boundary. @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run co **A `prompt` rule requires approval, but does not require a human to approve.** With **Approve for me** enabled (`approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"`), Codex sends these requests to its automatic reviewer. The reviewer can approve the command without asking you. With `approvals_reviewer = "user"`, eligible requests go to you instead. Codex has no documented per-command setting that forces human approval while Approve for me remains enabled. -For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. The restricted Claude review command remains an explicit `allow` exception. +For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. The [Claude review command](#using-claude-and-codex-together) remains an explicit `allow` exception. These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match literal command prefixes, so shell wrappers, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass them. They do not replace the sandbox, and they do not prevent reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment. Project settings are defaults that users can override; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). @@ -99,13 +99,7 @@ A one-liner that points to `AGENTS.md`. Claude Code reads `CLAUDE.md` by default ### `.claude/settings.json` -Claude Code permission rules and sandbox settings: - -- **Deny**: reading secrets (`.env`, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. -- **Ask**: installing dependencies, commits, and other commands that change local state. -- **Sandbox**: enabled, without the retry outside the sandbox. - -Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. See [Claude Code](#claude-security) for how the rules work. +Claude Code permission rules and sandbox settings. See [Security and permissions: Claude Code](#claude-security) for the blocked operations, approval behavior, and personal overrides. ### `.codex/` @@ -118,17 +112,38 @@ You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work d - **Codex calls Claude**: the Codex rules allow this exact command outside the Codex sandbox: ```sh - claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." + claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." ``` + The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements need separate approval. + Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). -- **Claude calls Codex**: this does not work. Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex`, and the Claude sandbox blocks that. In our tests, the Claude desktop app did not apply a `sandbox.excludedCommands` exception for Codex. Run the Codex review yourself in a separate terminal: +- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. Add this to your user settings in `~/.claude/settings.json` and restart Claude: + + ```json + "permissions": { + "deny": [ + "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", + "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", + "Bash(codex exec *--full-auto*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" + ] + }, + "sandbox": { "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *"] } + ``` + + The exception is personal, so it belongs in your user settings, not in the project. The deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox, because the `*` for the model can match any text. Claude can then run: ```sh - codex exec -s read-only -- "Review the uncommitted changes and report findings." + codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- "Follow the review instructions in prompt.md." ``` + Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Use `-o review.txt` to save the output. A prompt that contains ` -c `, ` -p `, or "danger" is denied, so put long prompts in a file. + ### `.agents/skills/` Skills are task-specific prompts that are only loaded when needed. They keep your `AGENTS.md` focused on general guidelines while letting you define detailed workflows for recurring tasks. @@ -145,8 +160,7 @@ The `.claude/skills` directory is a symlink to `.agents/skills/`, so Claude Code A lightweight documentation structure for the agent (and you) to keep track of things across sessions: - `docs/decisions/` -- Record architectural or design decisions with date-stamped files (`YYYY-MM-DD.md`) so the agent can look up past reasoning. -- `docs/plans/` -- Multi-session plans that describe larger pieces of work, organized under `active/`, `pending/`, and `completed/`. -- `docs/plans/...` plan files also carry their own `## TODOs` sections at the bottom, so open follow-up work stays attached to the plan that produced it. +- `docs/plans/` -- Multi-session plans organized under `active/`, `pending/`, and `completed/`. Each plan keeps its follow-up work in a `## TODOs` section at the bottom. This structure exists because agents don't have memory across sessions. Without these files, every new session starts from zero context about what was decided and what was done before. From da77701c47b6257f14e2a65519b140d3f4288a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:53:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 06/20] Allow the read-only Codex review command outside the Claude sandbox --- .claude/settings.json | 12 ++++++++++-- README.md | 25 ++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 50796d5..62bb25a 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -52,7 +52,14 @@ "Bash(scp *)", "Bash(nc *)", "Bash(printenv *)", - "Bash(env)" + "Bash(env)", + "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", + "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", + "Bash(codex exec *--full-auto*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" ], "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", @@ -80,6 +87,7 @@ }, "sandbox": { "enabled": true, - "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false + "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, + "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *"] } } diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 3ab1e07..8056ce3 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -115,28 +115,15 @@ You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work d claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." ``` - The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements need separate approval. + The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements do not match this exception. Running them outside the sandbox requires separate approval. With **Approve for me**, the automatic reviewer can approve them without asking you. - Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). + **The allow rules do not enforce these restrictions on every Claude invocation.** They only pre-approve the exact forms above. Other invocations can reach the reviewer, including commands with weaker permissions. Automatic review is not a guarantee that these commands will be rejected. -- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. Add this to your user settings in `~/.claude/settings.json` and restart Claude: - - ```json - "permissions": { - "deny": [ - "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", - "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", - "Bash(codex exec *--full-auto*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" - ] - }, - "sandbox": { "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *"] } - ``` + Codex prefix rules support neither regex nor wildcard argument matching. A deny rule for `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` would miss the same flag after other arguments. We therefore do not add rules that depend on the position of individual unsafe flags. Use the documented review command; outside that form, safety depends on the active sandbox and reviewer. See the [Codex rule syntax](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules#understand-rule-fields). + + Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). - The exception is personal, so it belongs in your user settings, not in the project. The deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox, because the `*` for the model can match any text. Claude can then run: +- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. `.claude/settings.json` excludes `codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *` from the Claude sandbox. Its `codex exec` deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox, because the `*` for the model can match any text. Restart Claude after you change these settings. Claude can then run: ```sh codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- "Follow the review instructions in prompt.md." From 65033e505df48150b667ad99f412d741e6bcecf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 14:00:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 07/20] Deny Codex output files and correct the sandbox description --- .claude/settings.json | 4 +++- README.md | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 62bb25a..7b260ee 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -59,7 +59,9 @@ "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)" + "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)", + "Bash(codex exec * -o *)", + "Bash(codex exec *--output*)" ], "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8056ce3..b5b75c5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: 2. **`ask`**: Claude Code always asks you, also in auto mode. The auto mode classifier cannot approve these commands. 3. **`allow`**: Claude Code runs the command without asking. -Other commands follow the permission mode. In manual mode Claude Code asks you. In auto mode a classifier decides. +Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Because the sandbox is enabled, other Bash commands also run without asking, but only inside the sandbox. File edits and commands outside the sandbox follow the mode: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. @@ -66,10 +66,11 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a **The sandbox is the security boundary.** With `sandbox.enabled`, the operating system limits every Bash command, whatever its text: -- Commands can write only inside the project. +- Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories. - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. -- Each new network host needs your approval. +- Each new network host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. +- The only exception is the read-only Codex review command. See [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together). The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work d codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- "Follow the review instructions in prompt.md." ``` - Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Use `-o review.txt` to save the output. A prompt that contains ` -c `, ` -p `, or "danger" is denied, so put long prompts in a file. + Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Outside the Claude sandbox, the Claude `Read` deny rules do not apply, so only the Codex settings limit what Codex can read. Claude reads the review from the command output. The `-o` flag is denied, because Codex would write that file outside its sandbox. A prompt that contains ` -c `, ` -o `, ` -p `, or "danger" is denied, so put long prompts in a file. ### `.agents/skills/` From bea5a22ce8c878443cb11f45526a42508c4e1094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 14:06:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/20] Release 0.4.0 with agent permission settings --- .claude/settings.json | 2 +- .codex/config.toml | 5 +++ .codex/rules/default.rules | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ CHANGELOG.md | 14 ++++-- README.md | 4 +- templates/py/pyproject.toml | 2 +- templates/ts/package.json | 2 +- 7 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .codex/config.toml create mode 100644 .codex/rules/default.rules diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 7b260ee..5efe91c 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -90,6 +90,6 @@ "sandbox": { "enabled": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *"] + "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *"] } } diff --git a/.codex/config.toml b/.codex/config.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1b7ba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.codex/config.toml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +approval_policy = "on-request" +sandbox_mode = "workspace-write" + +[sandbox_workspace_write] +network_access = false diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules new file mode 100644 index 0000000..111679d --- /dev/null +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +# Rules match command prefixes; see README.md for their limits. +prefix_rule(pattern = ["sudo"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", "-rf"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", "-fr"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "push"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "reset", "--hard"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "clean"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "filter-branch"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "pr", "merge"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "repo", "delete"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "secret"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "destroy"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "import"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "state"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["tofu", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["tofu", "destroy"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["kubectl", "delete"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["kubectl", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "upgrade"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "uninstall"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["aws"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["gcloud"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["az"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["twine", "upload"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["curl"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["wget"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["ssh"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["scp"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["nc"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["printenv"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["env"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "i"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "update"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npx"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "add"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "update"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "dlx"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "add"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "sync"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "lock"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uvx"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "commit"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "rebase"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "checkout", "--"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "restore"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "branch", "-D"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["docker"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform"], decision = "forbidden") + +# Only these fixed review invocations can run outside the Codex sandbox. +# The final -- prevents the prompt from overriding the restrictions. +prefix_rule( + pattern = [ + "claude", "--safe-mode", "--print", "--permission-mode", "plan", + "--tools", "Read,Glob,Grep", "--disallowedTools", "mcp__*", "--", + ], + decision = "allow", + justification = "Run Claude reviews with read/search tools and no customizations or MCP tools.", + match = ["claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' -- 'Review the code'"], + not_match = [ + "claude --print 'Edit the code'", + "claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --print 'Edit the code'", + "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --tools Bash -- 'Edit the code'", + ], +) + +prefix_rule( + pattern = [ + "claude", "--safe-mode", "--print", "--permission-mode", "plan", + "--tools", "Read,Glob,Grep", "--disallowedTools", "mcp__*", + "--model", "claude-opus-5-5", "--", + ], + decision = "allow", + justification = "Run Claude Opus 5.5 reviews with read/search tools and no customizations or MCP tools.", + match = ["claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- 'Review the code'"], + not_match = [ + "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model other-model -- 'Review the code'", + "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 --tools Bash -- 'Edit the code'", + "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 --dangerously-skip-permissions -- 'Edit the code'", + ], +) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 387f285..fd1534f 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,11 +3,18 @@ All notable changes to this project are recorded in this file. The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and the project uses [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). -## [Unreleased] +## [0.4.0] - 2026-11-16 + +Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9) ### Security -- Add Codex workspace-write sandbox defaults, command rules, and a restricted Claude review command that runs outside the sandbox. Document the limits in the README. -- Add `.claude/settings.json` with deny and ask permission rules and the Bash sandbox for Claude Code. Document how to use Claude and Codex together. +- Add Claude Code deny and ask rules, with the Bash sandbox enabled. +- Add Codex workspace-write defaults with network access disabled and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. +- Allow restricted Claude review invocations from Codex, with either the default model or explicit `claude-opus-5-5`. +- Limit the Claude sandbox exception to the fixed `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only --` review command. Keep additional deny rules for unsafe Codex flags and output files. + +### Changed +- Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, automatic review, and cross-agent review commands. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 @@ -66,6 +73,7 @@ This release protects the templates against recent vulnerabilities and supply-ch ### Changed - Dependency updates from Dependabot ([#6](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/6)). +[0.4.0]: https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9 [0.3.0]: https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/10 [0.2.0]: https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/8 [0.1.0]: https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/commits/ff6b7cb diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b5b75c5..26dec86 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -124,13 +124,13 @@ You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work d Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). -- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. `.claude/settings.json` excludes `codex exec -m * -s read-only -- *` from the Claude sandbox. Its `codex exec` deny rules block the flags that change the Codex sandbox, because the `*` for the model can match any text. Restart Claude after you change these settings. Claude can then run: +- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. `.claude/settings.json` excludes only `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *` from the Claude sandbox. The fixed model and sandbox flags come before `--`; only the prompt can vary. This prevents the model argument from matching extra flags. Other models or flag arrangements do not match this exception. The `codex exec` deny rules remain as an additional check, not a complete filter for every option spelling. Restart Claude after you change these settings. Claude can then run: ```sh codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- "Follow the review instructions in prompt.md." ``` - Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Outside the Claude sandbox, the Claude `Read` deny rules do not apply, so only the Codex settings limit what Codex can read. Claude reads the review from the command output. The `-o` flag is denied, because Codex would write that file outside its sandbox. A prompt that contains ` -c `, ` -o `, ` -p `, or "danger" is denied, so put long prompts in a file. + Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Outside the Claude sandbox, the Claude `Read` deny rules do not apply, so only the Codex settings limit what Codex can read. Claude reads the review from the command output. The `-o` flag is denied, because Codex would write that file outside its sandbox. Option-like text in the prompt can also match the deny rules, so put long prompts in a file. ### `.agents/skills/` diff --git a/templates/py/pyproject.toml b/templates/py/pyproject.toml index 7b06a3a..eb738f8 100644 --- a/templates/py/pyproject.toml +++ b/templates/py/pyproject.toml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [project] name = "agent-ready-template" -version = "0.2.0" +version = "0.4.0" requires-python = ">=3.11" [tool.ruff] diff --git a/templates/ts/package.json b/templates/ts/package.json index c6ccdbc..766559f 100644 --- a/templates/ts/package.json +++ b/templates/ts/package.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/package.json", "name": "agent-ready-template", - "version": "0.2.0", + "version": "0.4.0", "packageManager": "pnpm@12.5.1", "engines": { "node": "^24.22.1 || >=26.12.1" From 2ba2ef8cb39e432a8fabefbaff87caede3092776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 09:47:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 09/20] Run git fetch and git pull outside the sandbox and protect git config --- .claude/settings.json | 5 ++++- CHANGELOG.md | 1 + README.md | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 5efe91c..769fb38 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ "sandbox": { "enabled": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *"] + "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch *", "git pull *"], + "filesystem": { + "denyWrite": ["./.git/config", "./.git/hooks"] + } } } diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index fd1534f..6d8b46f 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kicks - Add Codex workspace-write defaults with network access disabled and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. - Allow restricted Claude review invocations from Codex, with either the default model or explicit `claude-opus-5-5`. - Limit the Claude sandbox exception to the fixed `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only --` review command. Keep additional deny rules for unsafe Codex flags and output files. +- Run `git fetch` and `git pull` outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config` and `.git/hooks`, because git runs commands from these files. ### Changed - Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, automatic review, and cross-agent review commands. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 26dec86..dac7558 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. - Each new network host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. -- The only exception is the read-only Codex review command. See [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together). +- Three commands run outside the sandbox: the read-only Codex review command (see [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together)), `git fetch`, and `git pull`. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. +- Commands cannot write `.git/config` or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and `git fetch` and `git pull` run outside the sandbox. The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. From aa938c17457d43b58ba211d067e22a5c5f7ea221 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:28:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Limit the git sandbox exceptions to commands without arguments --- .claude/settings.json | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 769fb38..05e8301 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ "sandbox": { "enabled": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch *", "git pull *"], + "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch", "git pull"], "filesystem": { - "denyWrite": ["./.git/config", "./.git/hooks"] + "denyWrite": ["./.git/config", "./.git/config.worktree", "./.git/hooks"] } } } From a74364f7c24ce971741c36855c539cc192a4c42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:54:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 11/20] Restrict agent network hosts and cover more install commands --- .claude/settings.json | 14 ++++++++++++++ .codex/config.toml | 8 ++++++-- .codex/rules/default.rules | 11 +++++++++++ CHANGELOG.md | 9 ++++++--- README.md | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 5 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 05e8301..613abca 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -77,6 +77,17 @@ "Bash(uv lock *)", "Bash(uvx *)", "Bash(pip install *)", + "Bash(pip3 install *)", + "Bash(python -m pip install *)", + "Bash(python3 -m pip install *)", + "Bash(uv pip install *)", + "Bash(npm ci *)", + "Bash(npm add *)", + "Bash(pnpm i *)", + "Bash(yarn *)", + "Bash(bun add *)", + "Bash(bun install *)", + "Bash(bun i *)", "Bash(git commit *)", "Bash(git rebase *)", "Bash(git checkout -- *)", @@ -91,6 +102,9 @@ "enabled": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch", "git pull"], + "network": { + "allowedDomains": ["api.github.com", "registry.npmjs.org", "pypi.org"] + }, "filesystem": { "denyWrite": ["./.git/config", "./.git/config.worktree", "./.git/hooks"] } diff --git a/.codex/config.toml b/.codex/config.toml index a1b7ba0..59f9f3b 100644 --- a/.codex/config.toml +++ b/.codex/config.toml @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ -approval_policy = "on-request" +approval_policy = { granular = { sandbox_approval = false, rules = true, mcp_elicitations = true, request_permissions = true, skill_approval = true } } sandbox_mode = "workspace-write" [sandbox_workspace_write] -network_access = false +network_access = true + +[features.network_proxy] +enabled = true +domains = { "api.github.com" = "allow", "registry.npmjs.org" = "allow", "pypi.org" = "allow" } diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules index 111679d..1860df8 100644 --- a/.codex/rules/default.rules +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -47,6 +47,17 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "sync"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "lock"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uvx"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip3", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["python", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["python3", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "ci"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "add"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "i"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["yarn"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "add"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "i"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "commit"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "rebase"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "checkout", "--"], decision = "forbidden") diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 6d8b46f..ab61bbc 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -8,13 +8,16 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9) ### Security -- Add Claude Code deny and ask rules, with the Bash sandbox enabled. -- Add Codex workspace-write defaults with network access disabled and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. +- Disable ordinary Codex sandbox escalation approvals while retaining explicit allow rules and the other approval categories. +- Add Claude Code deny and ask rules, with the Bash sandbox enabled. Allow sandboxed commands to reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Cover more install commands in the Claude ask rules and the Codex forbidden rules: `npm ci`, `npm add`, `pnpm i`, `yarn`, `bun add`, `bun install`, `pip3 install`, `python -m pip install`, and `uv pip install`. +- Add Codex workspace-write defaults, a network proxy restricted to `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. - Allow restricted Claude review invocations from Codex, with either the default model or explicit `claude-opus-5-5`. - Limit the Claude sandbox exception to the fixed `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only --` review command. Keep additional deny rules for unsafe Codex flags and output files. -- Run `git fetch` and `git pull` outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config` and `.git/hooks`, because git runs commands from these files. +- Run plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, and `.git/hooks`, because git runs commands from these files. ### Changed +- Clarify that allowed domains can serve source code and package archives, and that command rules do not guarantee packages cannot be downloaded or installed. +- Explain why Claude has argument-free Git fetch and pull sandbox exceptions while the Codex template does not. - Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, automatic review, and cross-agent review commands. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index dac7558..aa6c0ec 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -68,10 +68,11 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a - Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories. - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. -- Each new network host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. +- Commands can reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Each other host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. To block other hosts instead, set `sandbox.network.strictAllowlist: true` in `~/.claude/settings.json`. Claude Code reads this key only from user or managed settings. With it, Claude Code ignores `allowedDomains` from the project, so also put the allowed hosts in `~/.claude/settings.json`. +- Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. -- Three commands run outside the sandbox: the read-only Codex review command (see [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together)), `git fetch`, and `git pull`. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. -- Commands cannot write `.git/config` or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and `git fetch` and `git pull` run outside the sandbox. +- Three commands run outside the sandbox: the read-only Codex review command (see [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together)), and plain `git fetch` and `git pull` without arguments. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. +- Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and the git commands above run outside the sandbox. Settings that already point to files in the project, such as `core.hooksPath` or `include.path`, are not protected, so check `.git/config` in existing clones. The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. @@ -79,7 +80,29 @@ The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edi ### Codex -The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run commands within the sandbox. Network access is disabled by default. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. +The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run commands within the sandbox. Command network access uses the domain-restricted proxy described below. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. + +The config enables both `sandbox_workspace_write.network_access` and `features.network_proxy.enabled`. The proxy allows only these destinations: + +| Domain | Intended use | Also accessible | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `api.github.com` | GitHub CLI queries | Repository file contents and write operations permitted by the credentials | +| `registry.npmjs.org` | npm metadata queries | Package archives served from the same host | +| `pypi.org` | Python metadata queries | Other endpoints on this host; the policy does not restrict URL paths or HTTP methods | + +Other destinations are blocked by the proxy. Keep the proxy enabled whenever command networking is enabled; network access without the proxy permits unrestricted outbound connections. Filesystem restrictions remain active. This domain policy applies to sandboxed commands and their subprocesses, not to connectors, hosted tools, or explicitly allowed commands outside the sandbox. + +**The allowed domains are not metadata-only or read-only services.** Any sandboxed process can contact them. In particular, allowing `registry.npmjs.org` permits package archive downloads as well as metadata queries. GitHub API access can return source code and permit writes when the credentials allow them. Use read-only credentials when that boundary is required. + +**These settings do not guarantee that packages cannot be downloaded or installed.** This limitation applies to both agents. Codex forbids the listed installation command forms; Claude requires approval for its listed forms. Command matching does not cover every interpreter, wrapper, or program that can download, unpack, install, or execute code. Local or cached packages can be installed without network access, and writable project directories can hold packages, environments, and executable files. + +The Codex proxy excludes `files.pythonhosted.org`, which normally serves PyPI package files, and `github.com`, which ordinary GitHub-based pip installs need. This blocks those normal download routes when the proxy is active, but does not prevent all code acquisition through allowed hosts or local files. The intended protection is restricted network destinations and checks on common installation commands, not a complete ban on package installation. + +Metadata commands can use temporary caches, for example `npm view typescript version --cache /tmp/npm-cache` or `python -m pip --cache-dir /tmp/pip-cache list --outdated`. See [Codex network isolation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-approvals-security#network-isolation). + +The granular approval policy sets `sandbox_approval = false`. Ordinary requests to run outside the sandbox are rejected instead of sent to you or Auto-review. Explicit `allow` rules still permit their matching commands outside the sandbox without approval. The other approval categories remain enabled: command-rule prompts (`rules`), MCP requests (`mcp_elicitations`), additional permission requests (`request_permissions`), and skill approvals (`skill_approval`). This blocks sandbox escalation requests; it is not a blanket ban on every way to grant access. See the [approval policy reference](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/config-file/config-reference). + +**Git fetch and pull differ from Claude.** The Claude settings above exclude only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, from its sandbox. This template adds no corresponding Codex allow rules. Codex rules match prefixes: allowing `["git", "fetch"]` or `["git", "pull"]` would also allow arbitrary arguments. These can include options such as `--upload-pack` that execute a program outside the sandbox. We therefore leave these exceptions out. The proxy does not allow Git remote hosts such as `github.com`, `.git` remains protected from sandboxed writes, and ordinary sandbox escalation is rejected. Run remote fetch and pull operations yourself in a separate terminal. Additional global rules, including rules for wrappers such as `rtk`, can change this behavior. **A `prompt` rule requires approval, but does not require a human to approve.** With **Approve for me** enabled (`approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"`), Codex sends these requests to its automatic reviewer. The reviewer can approve the command without asking you. With `approvals_reviewer = "user"`, eligible requests go to you instead. Codex has no documented per-command setting that forces human approval while Approve for me remains enabled. @@ -117,9 +140,9 @@ You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work d claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." ``` - The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements do not match this exception. Running them outside the sandbox requires separate approval. With **Approve for me**, the automatic reviewer can approve them without asking you. + The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements do not match this exception. Ordinary sandbox escalation requests for those commands are rejected by `sandbox_approval = false`. A separate applicable allow or prompt rule can still provide another approval path. - **The allow rules do not enforce these restrictions on every Claude invocation.** They only pre-approve the exact forms above. Other invocations can reach the reviewer, including commands with weaker permissions. Automatic review is not a guarantee that these commands will be rejected. + **The allow rules do not enforce these restrictions on every Claude invocation.** They only pre-approve the exact forms above. Other global or managed rules can authorize additional forms, and the other approval categories remain enabled. Automatic review is not a guarantee that commands with weaker permissions will be rejected. Codex prefix rules support neither regex nor wildcard argument matching. A deny rule for `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` would miss the same flag after other arguments. We therefore do not add rules that depend on the position of individual unsafe flags. Use the documented review command; outside that form, safety depends on the active sandbox and reviewer. See the [Codex rule syntax](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules#understand-rule-fields). From cbd401dbf8cba5463477cf057c89f4a3d1126f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz <32169272+jvdgoltz@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:35:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 12/20] Apply batched suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: sannewielinga-kai --- .claude/settings.json | 19 +++++++++++++++---- .codex/rules/default.rules | 17 ++++++----------- README.md | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 613abca..656407a 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json", "permissions": { "deny": [ - "Read(./.env)", - "Read(./.env.*)", - "Read(./**/.env)", - "Read(./**/.env.*)", + "Read(//**/.env)", + "Read(//**/.env.*)", "Read(./**/*.pem)", "Read(./**/*.key)", "Read(~/.ssh/**)", @@ -42,6 +40,9 @@ "Bash(aws *)", "Bash(gcloud *)", "Bash(az *)", + "Bash(gsutil *)", + "Bash(bq *)", + "Bash(vercel *)", "Bash(npm publish *)", "Bash(pnpm publish *)", "Bash(uv publish *)", @@ -78,6 +79,14 @@ "Bash(uvx *)", "Bash(pip install *)", "Bash(pip3 install *)", + "Bash(python -m pip *)", + "Bash(python3 -m pip *)", + "Bash(uv pip *)", + "Bash(pnpm i *)", + "Bash(npm ci *)", + "Bash(git checkout . *)", + "Bash(git stash drop *)", + "Bash(pip3 install *)", "Bash(python -m pip install *)", "Bash(python3 -m pip install *)", "Bash(uv pip install *)", @@ -100,6 +109,8 @@ }, "sandbox": { "enabled": true, + "autoAllowBashIfSandboxed": false, + "failIfUnavailable": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch", "git pull"], "network": { diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules index 1860df8..d807140 100644 --- a/.codex/rules/default.rules +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "uninstall"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["aws"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["gcloud"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["az"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["gsutil", "bq", "vercel"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") @@ -34,19 +35,13 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["scp"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["nc"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["printenv"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["env"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "i"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "update"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", ["install", "i", "ci", "update"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["npx"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "add"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "update"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "dlx"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "add"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "sync"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "lock"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", ["install", "i", "add", "update", "dlx"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", ["add", "sync", "lock", "pip"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uvx"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["pip", "pip3"], "install"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["python", "python3"], "-m", "pip"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip3", "install"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["python", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["python3", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index aa6c0ec..f6b395c 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: 2. **`ask`**: Claude Code always asks you, also in auto mode. The auto mode classifier cannot approve these commands. 3. **`allow`**: Claude Code runs the command without asking. -Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Because the sandbox is enabled, other Bash commands also run without asking, but only inside the sandbox. File edits and commands outside the sandbox follow the mode: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. +Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Other Bash commands run inside the sandbox. Because `autoAllowBashIfSandboxed` is `false`, they follow the mode like file edits and commands outside the sandbox: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a - Commands can reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Each other host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. To block other hosts instead, set `sandbox.network.strictAllowlist: true` in `~/.claude/settings.json`. Claude Code reads this key only from user or managed settings. With it, Claude Code ignores `allowedDomains` from the project, so also put the allowed hosts in `~/.claude/settings.json`. - Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. +- Sandboxed commands can still change files that run later outside the sandbox, such as `.husky/` hooks, `.pre-commit-config.yaml` and `package.json` scripts. Check these files in the diff before you commit. - Three commands run outside the sandbox: the read-only Codex review command (see [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together)), and plain `git fetch` and `git pull` without arguments. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. - Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and the git commands above run outside the sandbox. Settings that already point to files in the project, such as `core.hooksPath` or `include.path`, are not protected, so check `.git/config` in existing clones. From c7db676f3038a92b2ce21d1b574d8cadb36ec68a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:39:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/20] Remove the section and configuration for using codex/claude together. --- .claude/settings.json | 13 ++----------- .codex/rules/default.rules | 35 +---------------------------------- CHANGELOG.md | 7 ++----- README.md | 35 ++++------------------------------- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 656407a..548b1fc 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -53,16 +53,7 @@ "Bash(scp *)", "Bash(nc *)", "Bash(printenv *)", - "Bash(env)", - "Bash(codex exec *danger*)", - "Bash(codex exec *workspace-write*)", - "Bash(codex exec *--full-auto*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -c *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--config*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -p *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--profile*)", - "Bash(codex exec * -o *)", - "Bash(codex exec *--output*)" + "Bash(env)" ], "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", @@ -112,7 +103,7 @@ "autoAllowBashIfSandboxed": false, "failIfUnavailable": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *", "git fetch", "git pull"], + "excludedCommands": ["git fetch", "git pull"], "network": { "allowedDomains": ["api.github.com", "registry.npmjs.org", "pypi.org"] }, diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules index d807140..a66e623 100644 --- a/.codex/rules/default.rules +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -60,37 +60,4 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "restore"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "branch", "-D"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["docker"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform"], decision = "forbidden") - -# Only these fixed review invocations can run outside the Codex sandbox. -# The final -- prevents the prompt from overriding the restrictions. -prefix_rule( - pattern = [ - "claude", "--safe-mode", "--print", "--permission-mode", "plan", - "--tools", "Read,Glob,Grep", "--disallowedTools", "mcp__*", "--", - ], - decision = "allow", - justification = "Run Claude reviews with read/search tools and no customizations or MCP tools.", - match = ["claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' -- 'Review the code'"], - not_match = [ - "claude --print 'Edit the code'", - "claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --print 'Edit the code'", - "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --tools Bash -- 'Edit the code'", - ], -) - -prefix_rule( - pattern = [ - "claude", "--safe-mode", "--print", "--permission-mode", "plan", - "--tools", "Read,Glob,Grep", "--disallowedTools", "mcp__*", - "--model", "claude-opus-5-5", "--", - ], - decision = "allow", - justification = "Run Claude Opus 5.5 reviews with read/search tools and no customizations or MCP tools.", - match = ["claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- 'Review the code'"], - not_match = [ - "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model other-model -- 'Review the code'", - "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 --tools Bash -- 'Edit the code'", - "claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 --dangerously-skip-permissions -- 'Edit the code'", - ], -) +prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform"], decision = "forbidden") \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index ab61bbc..ba8d4b3 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -11,14 +11,11 @@ Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kicks - Disable ordinary Codex sandbox escalation approvals while retaining explicit allow rules and the other approval categories. - Add Claude Code deny and ask rules, with the Bash sandbox enabled. Allow sandboxed commands to reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Cover more install commands in the Claude ask rules and the Codex forbidden rules: `npm ci`, `npm add`, `pnpm i`, `yarn`, `bun add`, `bun install`, `pip3 install`, `python -m pip install`, and `uv pip install`. - Add Codex workspace-write defaults, a network proxy restricted to `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. -- Allow restricted Claude review invocations from Codex, with either the default model or explicit `claude-opus-5-5`. -- Limit the Claude sandbox exception to the fixed `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only --` review command. Keep additional deny rules for unsafe Codex flags and output files. -- Run plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, and `.git/hooks`, because git runs commands from these files. +- Run plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, and `.git/hooks` in Claude, because git runs commands from these files. ### Changed - Clarify that allowed domains can serve source code and package archives, and that command rules do not guarantee packages cannot be downloaded or installed. -- Explain why Claude has argument-free Git fetch and pull sandbox exceptions while the Codex template does not. -- Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, automatic review, and cross-agent review commands. +- Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, and automatic review. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f6b395c..b04dbb1 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ - [`CLAUDE.md`](#claudemd) - [`.claude/settings.json`](#claudesettingsjson) - [`.codex/`](#codex) - - [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together) - [`.agents/skills/`](#agentsskills) - [`docs/`](#docs) - [`templates/`](#templates) @@ -72,8 +71,8 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a - Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. - Sandboxed commands can still change files that run later outside the sandbox, such as `.husky/` hooks, `.pre-commit-config.yaml` and `package.json` scripts. Check these files in the diff before you commit. -- Three commands run outside the sandbox: the read-only Codex review command (see [Using Claude and Codex together](#using-claude-and-codex-together)), and plain `git fetch` and `git pull` without arguments. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. -- Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and the git commands above run outside the sandbox. Settings that already point to files in the project, such as `core.hooksPath` or `include.path`, are not protected, so check `.git/config` in existing clones. +- Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, run outside the sandbox. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. +- Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and `git fetch` and `git pull` run outside the sandbox. Settings that already point to files in the project, such as `core.hooksPath` or `include.path`, are not protected, so check `.git/config` in existing clones. The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. @@ -103,11 +102,11 @@ Metadata commands can use temporary caches, for example `npm view typescript ver The granular approval policy sets `sandbox_approval = false`. Ordinary requests to run outside the sandbox are rejected instead of sent to you or Auto-review. Explicit `allow` rules still permit their matching commands outside the sandbox without approval. The other approval categories remain enabled: command-rule prompts (`rules`), MCP requests (`mcp_elicitations`), additional permission requests (`request_permissions`), and skill approvals (`skill_approval`). This blocks sandbox escalation requests; it is not a blanket ban on every way to grant access. See the [approval policy reference](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/config-file/config-reference). -**Git fetch and pull differ from Claude.** The Claude settings above exclude only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, from its sandbox. This template adds no corresponding Codex allow rules. Codex rules match prefixes: allowing `["git", "fetch"]` or `["git", "pull"]` would also allow arbitrary arguments. These can include options such as `--upload-pack` that execute a program outside the sandbox. We therefore leave these exceptions out. The proxy does not allow Git remote hosts such as `github.com`, `.git` remains protected from sandboxed writes, and ordinary sandbox escalation is rejected. Run remote fetch and pull operations yourself in a separate terminal. Additional global rules, including rules for wrappers such as `rtk`, can change this behavior. +**Codex cannot fetch or pull.** The proxy does not allow Git remote hosts such as `github.com`, and ordinary sandbox escalation is rejected. This template adds no `allow` rules for `git fetch` or `git pull`, because Codex rules match prefixes: `["git", "fetch"]` would also allow any arguments, including options such as `--upload-pack` that run a program outside the sandbox. Run these commands yourself in a separate terminal. **A `prompt` rule requires approval, but does not require a human to approve.** With **Approve for me** enabled (`approvals_reviewer = "auto_review"`), Codex sends these requests to its automatic reviewer. The reviewer can approve the command without asking you. With `approvals_reviewer = "user"`, eligible requests go to you instead. Codex has no documented per-command setting that forces human approval while Approve for me remains enabled. -For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. The [Claude review command](#using-claude-and-codex-together) remains an explicit `allow` exception. +For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `prompt`. A matching command is blocked in both manual and automatic approval modes. Auto-review cannot approve it, and a matching `allow` rule does not override it. Run a needed blocked operation yourself in a separate terminal. These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match literal command prefixes, so shell wrappers, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass them. They do not replace the sandbox, and they do not prevent reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment. Project settings are defaults that users can override; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). @@ -131,32 +130,6 @@ Claude Code permission rules and sandbox settings. See [Security and permissions Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml` and command rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules`. See [Codex](#codex-security) for how the rules work. -### Using Claude and Codex together - -You can use one agent to review the work of the other. The two directions work differently: - -- **Codex calls Claude**: the Codex rules allow this exact command outside the Codex sandbox: - - ```sh - claude --safe-mode --print --permission-mode plan --tools Read,Glob,Grep --disallowedTools 'mcp__*' --model claude-opus-5-5 -- "Review the relevant files and report findings." - ``` - - The rule allows `--model claude-opus-5-5` in this position, or no `--model` option to use the default model. Other model values or flag arrangements do not match this exception. Ordinary sandbox escalation requests for those commands are rejected by `sandbox_approval = false`. A separate applicable allow or prompt rule can still provide another approval path. - - **The allow rules do not enforce these restrictions on every Claude invocation.** They only pre-approve the exact forms above. Other global or managed rules can authorize additional forms, and the other approval categories remain enabled. Automatic review is not a guarantee that commands with weaker permissions will be rejected. - - Codex prefix rules support neither regex nor wildcard argument matching. A deny rule for `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` would miss the same flag after other arguments. We therefore do not add rules that depend on the position of individual unsafe flags. Use the documented review command; outside that form, safety depends on the active sandbox and reviewer. See the [Codex rule syntax](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules#understand-rule-fields). - - Claude can read and search, but has no shell or editing tools. Safe mode disables hooks, plugins, skills, and automatic `CLAUDE.md` loading; managed policy still applies. Supply review instructions and file paths in the prompt. Keep the final `--` so later arguments cannot change these restrictions. This is a tool restriction, not an OS read-only sandbox. See the [Claude CLI reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference). - -- **Claude calls Codex**: Codex must write its own state in `~/.codex` and reach the OpenAI API, so it must run outside the Claude sandbox. Codex then uses its own read-only sandbox. `.claude/settings.json` excludes only `codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- *` from the Claude sandbox. The fixed model and sandbox flags come before `--`; only the prompt can vary. This prevents the model argument from matching extra flags. Other models or flag arrangements do not match this exception. The `codex exec` deny rules remain as an additional check, not a complete filter for every option spelling. Restart Claude after you change these settings. Claude can then run: - - ```sh - codex exec -m gpt-6-astra -s read-only -- "Follow the review instructions in prompt.md." - ``` - - Use exactly this form. A redirect (such as `< /dev/null` or `> review.txt`) or a command substitution (`$(...)`) keeps the command in the sandbox, and Codex fails. Outside the Claude sandbox, the Claude `Read` deny rules do not apply, so only the Codex settings limit what Codex can read. Claude reads the review from the command output. The `-o` flag is denied, because Codex would write that file outside its sandbox. Option-like text in the prompt can also match the deny rules, so put long prompts in a file. - ### `.agents/skills/` Skills are task-specific prompts that are only loaded when needed. They keep your `AGENTS.md` focused on general guidelines while letting you define detailed workflows for recurring tasks. From e31085ee727aa570118e5b8487c0408768ec3c67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:03:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/20] Remove duplicates in the rules and add allow rules for pnpm commands --- .claude/settings.json | 24 +++++++-------- .codex/rules/default.rules | 62 +++++++++++--------------------------- CHANGELOG.md | 16 +++++----- README.md | 2 +- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 548b1fc..0faea56 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ { "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json", "permissions": { + "allow": [ + "Bash(pnpm validate)", + "Bash(pnpm lint)", + "Bash(pnpm typecheck)", + "Bash(pnpm format:check)" + ], "deny": [ "Read(//**/.env)", "Read(//**/.env.*)", @@ -58,32 +64,24 @@ "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", "Bash(npm i *)", + "Bash(npm ci *)", + "Bash(npm add *)", "Bash(npm update *)", "Bash(npx *)", "Bash(pnpm install *)", + "Bash(pnpm i *)", "Bash(pnpm add *)", "Bash(pnpm update *)", "Bash(pnpm dlx *)", "Bash(uv add *)", "Bash(uv sync *)", "Bash(uv lock *)", + "Bash(uv pip *)", "Bash(uvx *)", "Bash(pip install *)", "Bash(pip3 install *)", "Bash(python -m pip *)", "Bash(python3 -m pip *)", - "Bash(uv pip *)", - "Bash(pnpm i *)", - "Bash(npm ci *)", - "Bash(git checkout . *)", - "Bash(git stash drop *)", - "Bash(pip3 install *)", - "Bash(python -m pip install *)", - "Bash(python3 -m pip install *)", - "Bash(uv pip install *)", - "Bash(npm ci *)", - "Bash(npm add *)", - "Bash(pnpm i *)", "Bash(yarn *)", "Bash(bun add *)", "Bash(bun install *)", @@ -91,8 +89,10 @@ "Bash(git commit *)", "Bash(git rebase *)", "Bash(git checkout -- *)", + "Bash(git checkout . *)", "Bash(git restore *)", "Bash(git branch -D *)", + "Bash(git stash drop *)", "Bash(rm *)", "Bash(docker *)", "Bash(terraform *)" diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules index a66e623..3c07432 100644 --- a/.codex/rules/default.rules +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ # Rules match command prefixes; see README.md for their limits. +# Keep in sync with .claude/settings.json. Claude deny and ask rules are both forbidden here. + +# Claude deny prefix_rule(pattern = ["sudo"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", "-rf"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", "-fr"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "push"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "reset", "--hard"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "clean"], decision = "forbidden") @@ -9,55 +10,26 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "filter-branch"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "pr", "merge"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "repo", "delete"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["gh", "secret"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "destroy"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "import"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform", "state"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["tofu", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["tofu", "destroy"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["kubectl", "delete"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["kubectl", "apply"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "upgrade"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", "uninstall"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["aws"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["gcloud"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["az"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = [["gsutil", "bq", "vercel"]], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "publish"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["tofu", ["apply", "destroy"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["kubectl", ["delete", "apply"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["helm", ["install", "upgrade", "uninstall"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["aws", "gcloud", "az", "gsutil", "bq", "vercel"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["npm", "pnpm", "uv"], "publish"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["twine", "upload"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["curl"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["wget"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["ssh"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["scp"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["nc"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["printenv"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["env"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", ["install", "i", "ci", "update"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["curl", "wget", "ssh", "scp", "nc", "printenv", "env"]], decision = "forbidden") + +# Claude ask. The rm and terraform rules also cover the Claude deny rules for rm -rf and terraform apply. +prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", ["install", "i", "ci", "add", "update"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["npx"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", ["install", "i", "add", "update", "dlx"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", ["add", "sync", "lock", "pip"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["uvx"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = [["pip", "pip3"], "install"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = [["python", "python3"], "-m", "pip"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pip3", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["python", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["python3", "-m", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["uv", "pip", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "ci"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "add"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "i"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["yarn"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "add"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "install"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", "i"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "commit"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "rebase"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "checkout", "--"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "restore"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["bun", ["add", "install", "i"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", ["commit", "rebase", "restore"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "checkout", ["--", "."]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "branch", "-D"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["docker"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = ["terraform"], decision = "forbidden") \ No newline at end of file +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "stash", "drop"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["rm", "docker", "terraform"]], decision = "forbidden") diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index ba8d4b3..9567dbd 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -8,14 +8,16 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9) ### Security -- Disable ordinary Codex sandbox escalation approvals while retaining explicit allow rules and the other approval categories. -- Add Claude Code deny and ask rules, with the Bash sandbox enabled. Allow sandboxed commands to reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Cover more install commands in the Claude ask rules and the Codex forbidden rules: `npm ci`, `npm add`, `pnpm i`, `yarn`, `bun add`, `bun install`, `pip3 install`, `python -m pip install`, and `uv pip install`. -- Add Codex workspace-write defaults, a network proxy restricted to `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org`, and forbidden command rules. Commands that require human approval in Claude are blocked in Codex because Approve for me can approve `prompt` rules automatically. -- Run plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, outside the Claude sandbox, so they can use SSH. Block sandboxed writes to `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, and `.git/hooks` in Claude, because git runs commands from these files. +- Add Claude Code permission rules in `.claude/settings.json`: + - Deny reading secrets (`.env` files, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. + - Ask before dependency installs, commits, and other commands that change local state. + - Allow the TypeScript template checks (`pnpm validate`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm format:check`) without a prompt. +- Enable the Claude Code Bash sandbox. Sandboxed commands still follow the permission mode, cannot run again outside the sandbox, and can reach only `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval. Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, run outside the sandbox, so they can use SSH. +- Add Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml`: the `workspace-write` sandbox, network access only through a proxy restricted to the same three hosts, and rejection of sandbox escalation requests. +- Add Codex command rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules`. They forbid the same commands that Claude Code denies or asks about, because Codex automatic review can approve `prompt` rules. -### Changed -- Clarify that allowed domains can serve source code and package archives, and that command rules do not guarantee packages cannot be downloaded or installed. -- Consolidate README security and permission guidance. Explain the agents' differences, command matching limits, and automatic review. +### Added +- Add a "Security and permissions" section to the README. It explains how each agent enforces its rules, the limits of command matching, and that the allowed hosts can serve source code and packages. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b04dbb1..100adf5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: 2. **`ask`**: Claude Code always asks you, also in auto mode. The auto mode classifier cannot approve these commands. 3. **`allow`**: Claude Code runs the command without asking. -Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Other Bash commands run inside the sandbox. Because `autoAllowBashIfSandboxed` is `false`, they follow the mode like file edits and commands outside the sandbox: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. +Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Other Bash commands run inside the sandbox. Because `autoAllowBashIfSandboxed` is `false`, they follow the mode like file edits and commands outside the sandbox: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. The `allow` rules let the TypeScript template checks (`pnpm validate`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm format:check`) run without asking. These scripts come from `package.json`, so check changes to it in the diff. Codex has no matching rules, because Codex `allow` rules run commands outside its sandbox. Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. From 26be9a273e741d2cf1e172ff1372abab672a5a7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:06:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 15/20] Keep package caches in the project and add template lockfiles --- .agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md | 10 +- .github/workflows/validate.yml | 4 +- CHANGELOG.md | 5 + README.md | 7 +- templates/py/.gitignore | 1 + templates/py/pyproject.toml | 2 + templates/py/uv.lock | 15 + templates/ts/.gitignore | 1 + templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml | 2360 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml | 3 + 10 files changed, 2400 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 templates/py/uv.lock create mode 100644 templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml diff --git a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md index c0b333a..246b8ac 100644 --- a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md +++ b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md @@ -44,20 +44,20 @@ Create the minimum docs structure needed by this repo if it does not exist yet: - `docs/decisions/` Handle template scaffolding based on the chosen project language: - If the project is **Python**: - - Move `templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml`, `templates/py/.gitignore`, and `templates/py/pyproject.toml` to the repo root. + - Move `templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml`, `templates/py/.gitignore`, `templates/py/pyproject.toml`, and `templates/py/uv.lock` to the repo root. - Delete `templates/ts/` and any TS-only template files. - If the project is **TypeScript**: - - Move `templates/ts/package.json`, `templates/ts/.npmrc`, `templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml`, `templates/ts/.gitignore`, `templates/ts/tsconfig.json`, `templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs`, `templates/ts/.secretlintrc.json`, `templates/ts/.prettierignore`, and `templates/ts/.husky/` to the repo root. + - Move `templates/ts/package.json`, `templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml`, `templates/ts/.npmrc`, `templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml`, `templates/ts/.gitignore`, `templates/ts/tsconfig.json`, `templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs`, `templates/ts/.secretlintrc.json`, `templates/ts/.prettierignore`, and `templates/ts/.husky/` to the repo root. - Delete `templates/py/` and any Python-only template files. - If the project is **neither Python nor TypeScript**: - Create equivalent starter files for the selected stack in the repo root. - Remove both `templates/py/` and `templates/ts/` so only relevant files remain. -- In `pyproject.toml` or `package.json`, set the project `name` and reset `version` to `0.1.0`. Replace `CHANGELOG.md` with an empty one for the new project. -- In `.github/workflows/validate.yml`, keep only the job for the chosen stack and adapt it to the project: run it from the repo root, remove the template-only steps and settings (the placeholder source file and the `SKIP: deptry` setting), and use `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` once a lockfile exists. For other stacks, replace the jobs with ones that run the stack's checks. +- In `pyproject.toml` or `package.json`, set the project `name` and reset `version` to `0.1.0`. Then ask the developer to update the lockfile (`uv lock` or `pnpm install`), because the lockfile records the name and version. Replace `CHANGELOG.md` with an empty one for the new project. +- In `.github/workflows/validate.yml`, keep only the job for the chosen stack and adapt it to the project: run it from the repo root, remove the template-only steps and settings (the placeholder source file and the `SKIP: deptry` setting), and keep the lockfile checks (`uv lock --check`, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`). For other stacks, replace the jobs with ones that run the stack's checks. - In `.github/dependabot.yml`, keep only the entry for the chosen stack and set its `directory` to `/`. For other stacks, replace the entries with one for the stack's package ecosystem. Execute the plan. Make sure to keep the developer in the loop and explain what you are doing. Before handoff, validate that the configured repo works: -- Run the smallest relevant install/setup command for the chosen stack. +- Ask the developer to run the install/setup command (for example `uv sync` or `pnpm install`) in a separate terminal. The agent sandbox blocks the hosts that serve package files, so the agent cannot install dependencies. Tell the developer this at the start of this step, not after a failed install. For TypeScript, the developer must also install the pnpm version from `packageManager` in `package.json` (for example `pnpm self-update `). With any other version, every `pnpm` command fails in the sandbox. - Run the configured lint, typecheck, test, and validation commands. - If a validation command fails because the project has no source files yet, either add the minimal expected placeholder source/test structure or adjust the command so a fresh scaffold passes. - Report each validation command and whether it passed. diff --git a/.github/workflows/validate.yml b/.github/workflows/validate.yml index 114ac51..ac1aee5 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/validate.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/validate.yml @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ jobs: - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@c18668ad3cf93ea998bef934396af7bb5c839dc7 # v10.2.0 with: working-directory: templates/py + - run: uv lock --check + working-directory: templates/py # deptry needs a [project] section, which only exists after get-started. - run: uvx pre-commit@4.6.2 run --all-files --show-diff-on-failure --config templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml env: @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ jobs: with: node-version: 26 check-latest: true - - run: pnpm install + - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile # The template has no source files; add one so tsc and knip have input. - run: | mkdir -p src diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 9567dbd..7e9da1e 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9) +The Claude Code settings were tested with Claude Code 2.1.325. + ### Security - Add Claude Code permission rules in `.claude/settings.json`: - Deny reading secrets (`.env` files, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. @@ -18,6 +20,9 @@ Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kicks ### Added - Add a "Security and permissions" section to the README. It explains how each agent enforces its rules, the limits of command matching, and that the allowed hosts can serve source code and packages. +- Keep the uv cache and the pnpm store and cache in the project directory, so sandboxed agents can use them. +- Instruct the `get-started` skill to ask the developer to install dependencies, because the agent sandbox blocks package downloads. +- Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 100adf5..41eb613 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: Other commands follow the permission mode. Built-in read-only commands such as `ls` and `cat` run without asking. Other Bash commands run inside the sandbox. Because `autoAllowBashIfSandboxed` is `false`, they follow the mode like file edits and commands outside the sandbox: in manual mode Claude Code asks you, and in auto mode a classifier decides. The `allow` rules let the TypeScript template checks (`pnpm validate`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm format:check`) run without asking. These scripts come from `package.json`, so check changes to it in the diff. Codex has no matching rules, because Codex `allow` rules run commands outside its sandbox. -Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. +Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. "Yes, and don't ask again" also saves an `allow` rule there. Do not choose it for generic tools such as `sed`, `python3`, or `bash`: a rule like `Bash(sed *)` lets every later `sed` command run without asking. These cannot override a `deny` rule, because Claude Code merges the rules from all files. To run a denied command, run it yourself in a separate terminal, or remove the rule from `.claude/settings.json`. **Rules match the command text only.** `Bash(git push *)` blocks `git push origin main`, but not `git -C . push` or `bash -c 'git push'`. The rules stop the usual form of a command. They are not a security boundary. @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. These cannot override a - Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories. - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. - Commands can reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Each other host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. To block other hosts instead, set `sandbox.network.strictAllowlist: true` in `~/.claude/settings.json`. Claude Code reads this key only from user or managed settings. With it, Claude Code ignores `allowedDomains` from the project, so also put the allowed hosts in `~/.claude/settings.json`. +- Package files come from hosts that are not allowed, for example `files.pythonhosted.org`. So agents cannot install dependencies. Run `uv sync` or `pnpm install` yourself in a separate terminal. The templates keep the uv cache and the pnpm store in the project (`.uv-cache/`, `.pnpm-store/`, `.pnpm-cache/`), so sandboxed commands can still read and write them. - Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. - Sandboxed commands can still change files that run later outside the sandbox, such as `.husky/` hooks, `.pre-commit-config.yaml` and `package.json` scripts. Check these files in the diff before you commit. @@ -163,12 +164,14 @@ It is inspired by the concept of "Agent Readiness" by Factory.AI: https://factor - `.pre-commit-config.yaml` - `.gitignore` - `pyproject.toml` +- `uv.lock` Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, and secret scanning because they are fast, easy for agents to run locally. The `uv` config waits 30 days before accepting new package releases and sets a minimum `uv` version (`required-version`) that blocks releases with known vulnerabilities. Raise it when `uv` publishes a security release. `certifi`, the CA certificate bundle, has a short permanent delay of 2 days instead, so certificate revocations install quickly. To let another urgent security fix through, add the package to `exclude-newer-package`. #### `ts/` - `package.json` +- `pnpm-lock.yaml` - `.npmrc` - `pnpm-workspace.yaml` - `.gitignore` @@ -180,4 +183,4 @@ Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, - `.husky/pre-push` - `.husky/_/husky.sh` -Use this set for TypeScript projects. It uses Husky and lint-staged, while CI can still run the full validation script. ESLint, TypeScript, Knip, jscpd, and secretlint cover linting, strict typing, dead code, duplicate code, and secrets. All direct dependencies, and pnpm itself, are pinned to exact versions. Both npm (`.npmrc`) and pnpm (`pnpm-workspace.yaml`) wait 30 days before accepting new package releases. To let an urgent security fix through, add the package to `min-release-age-exclude` in `.npmrc` and to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. `package.json` sets a patched minimum version for each supported Node.js line (`engines.node`), and both package managers refuse to install on an older version. Raise these minimums when Node.js publishes a security release. In CI, set `check-latest: true` on `actions/setup-node`, because runner images can lag behind a security release. +Use this set for TypeScript projects. It uses Husky and lint-staged, while CI can still run the full validation script. ESLint, TypeScript, Knip, jscpd, and secretlint cover linting, strict typing, dead code, duplicate code, and secrets. All direct dependencies, and pnpm itself, are pinned to exact versions. Install the pnpm version from `packageManager` (for example `pnpm self-update 12.5.1`). With any other version, pnpm tries to download the pinned one, and every `pnpm` command fails in the agent sandbox. Both npm (`.npmrc`) and pnpm (`pnpm-workspace.yaml`) wait 30 days before accepting new package releases. To let an urgent security fix through, add the package to `min-release-age-exclude` in `.npmrc` and to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. `package.json` sets a patched minimum version for each supported Node.js line (`engines.node`), and both package managers refuse to install on an older version. Raise these minimums when Node.js publishes a security release. In CI, set `check-latest: true` on `actions/setup-node`, because runner images can lag behind a security release. diff --git a/templates/py/.gitignore b/templates/py/.gitignore index 6dd0145..90de4ca 100644 --- a/templates/py/.gitignore +++ b/templates/py/.gitignore @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ dist/ # Virtual environments .venv/ venv/ +.uv-cache/ # Editors and OS files .idea/ diff --git a/templates/py/pyproject.toml b/templates/py/pyproject.toml index eb738f8..db54aed 100644 --- a/templates/py/pyproject.toml +++ b/templates/py/pyproject.toml @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ respect-type-ignore-comments = true [tool.uv] required-version = ">=0.13.5" +# Keep the cache in the project, so sandboxed agents can write it. +cache-dir = ".uv-cache" exclude-newer = "30 days" # certifi releases are trust-store fixes. Keep this short delay permanently. exclude-newer-package = { certifi = "2 days" } diff --git a/templates/py/uv.lock b/templates/py/uv.lock new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f4237c --- /dev/null +++ b/templates/py/uv.lock @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +version = 1 +revision = 5 +requires-python = ">=3.11" + +[options] +exclude-newer = "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z" # This has no effect and is included for backwards compatibility when using relative exclude-newer values. +exclude-newer-span = "P30D" + +[options.exclude-newer-package] +certifi = { timestamp = "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", span = "P2D" } + +[[package]] +name = "agent-ready-template" +version = "0.4.0" +source = { virtual = "." } diff --git a/templates/ts/.gitignore b/templates/ts/.gitignore index 3411622..89a80fa 100644 --- a/templates/ts/.gitignore +++ b/templates/ts/.gitignore @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # Dependencies node_modules/ .pnpm-store/ +.pnpm-cache/ # Build outputs dist/ diff --git a/templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml b/templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8506dfe --- /dev/null +++ b/templates/ts/pnpm-lock.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2360 @@ +--- +lockfileVersion: '9.0' + +importers: + + .: + configDependencies: {} + packageManagerDependencies: + pnpm: + specifier: 12.5.1 + version: 12.5.1 + +packages: + + '@pnpm/exe.android-arm64@12.5.1': + resolution: {integrity: sha512-6LGBmQuDzUmgpHSuy+haG0jrmkwFNa4EuShDZqK3cIBv4Wfb75CzjJmowkzr+iJg40vnBKMQ62t4Ko6mwsId7A==} + cpu: [arm64] + os: [android] + + '@pnpm/exe.android-x64@12.5.1': + resolution: {integrity: sha512-091oCltP3Rx89yxL1Wh5rXkUXEyFzyxIzSHKRFDyDFlQkb8Ox8FaDcm+M8PNkMyqnLA+qeGOLzY7Rjj9izl1Ww==} + cpu: [x64] + os: [android] + + '@pnpm/exe.darwin-arm64@12.5.1': + resolution: {integrity: sha512-r1vEMQPVjRexZMyL2HonxJoo3+nuB/+G+tg+f2PK6faRdXX1TDwevKXOxJAfqlPInTy6W/pm912+s+m0NcR4BQ==} + cpu: [arm64] + os: [darwin] + + '@pnpm/exe.darwin-x64@12.5.1': + resolution: {integrity: sha512-YHwI1g2B+Y2cAEylOR31r781GWijdJL7Gy7TEn/ZpZ5v/Cuwp5/Pz0EFCgo0M2MKLafAbL/laUMGvOpAdnerAw==} + 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8.70.1(eslint@10.11.0(jiti@2.7.0)(supports-color@10.2.2))(supports-color@10.2.2)(typescript@6.0.3) + '@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree': 8.70.1(supports-color@10.2.2)(typescript@6.0.3) + '@typescript-eslint/utils': 8.70.1(eslint@10.11.0(jiti@2.7.0)(supports-color@10.2.2))(supports-color@10.2.2)(typescript@6.0.3) + eslint: 10.11.0(jiti@2.7.0)(supports-color@10.2.2) + typescript: 6.0.3 + transitivePeerDependencies: + - supports-color + + typescript@6.0.3: {} + + unbash@4.0.12: {} + + undici-types@7.18.2: {} + + unicorn-magic@0.4.1: {} + + uri-js@4.4.1: + dependencies: + punycode: 2.3.1 + + validate-npm-package-license@3.0.4: + dependencies: + spdx-correct: 3.2.0 + spdx-expression-parse: 3.0.1 + + version-range@4.15.0: {} + + walk-up-path@4.0.0: {} + + which@2.0.2: + dependencies: + isexe: 2.0.0 + + word-wrap@1.2.5: {} + + yaml@2.9.1: {} + + yocto-queue@0.1.0: {} + + zod@4.6.7: {} diff --git a/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml b/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml index 6c61949..e925376 100644 --- a/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml +++ b/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +# Keep the store and cache in the project, so sandboxed agents can write them. +storeDir: .pnpm-store +cacheDir: .pnpm-cache minimumReleaseAge: 43200 savePrefix: "" minimumReleaseAgeExclude: From 0564f8b2bc840f2029d407dd4eb55f09e52823ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:48:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/20] Keep all agent caches in .cache, pin the Python check tools, and fix pre-commit in the sandbox --- .claude/settings.json | 5 +++++ .codex/config.toml | 3 +++ .github/dependabot.yml | 2 +- .github/workflows/validate.yml | 2 +- .gitignore | 2 ++ CHANGELOG.md | 5 +++-- README.md | 4 ++-- templates/py/.gitignore | 2 +- templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml | 22 +++++++++++++--------- templates/py/pyproject.toml | 2 +- templates/ts/.gitignore | 3 +-- templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs | 2 +- templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml | 4 ++-- 13 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 0faea56..29ebf91 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ { "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json", + "env": { + "UV_CACHE_DIR": ".cache/uv", + "UV_TOOL_DIR": ".cache/uv-tools", + "PRE_COMMIT_HOME": ".cache/pre-commit" + }, "permissions": { "allow": [ "Bash(pnpm validate)", diff --git a/.codex/config.toml b/.codex/config.toml index 59f9f3b..07118a2 100644 --- a/.codex/config.toml +++ b/.codex/config.toml @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ approval_policy = { granular = { sandbox_approval = false, rules = true, mcp_elicitations = true, request_permissions = true, skill_approval = true } } sandbox_mode = "workspace-write" +[shell_environment_policy] +set = { UV_CACHE_DIR = ".cache/uv", UV_TOOL_DIR = ".cache/uv-tools", PRE_COMMIT_HOME = ".cache/pre-commit" } + [sandbox_workspace_write] network_access = true diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.yml index 3f1e66c..6fa1fe5 100644 --- a/.github/dependabot.yml +++ b/.github/dependabot.yml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ version: 2 updates: - - package-ecosystem: "pip" + - package-ecosystem: "uv" directory: "/templates/py" schedule: interval: "semiannually" diff --git a/.github/workflows/validate.yml b/.github/workflows/validate.yml index ac1aee5..3caa48e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/validate.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/validate.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs: - run: uv lock --check working-directory: templates/py # deptry needs a [project] section, which only exists after get-started. - - run: uvx pre-commit@4.6.2 run --all-files --show-diff-on-failure --config templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml + - run: uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 run --all-files --show-diff-on-failure --config templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml env: SKIP: deptry diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 9f11b75..4327c83 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1 +1,3 @@ .idea/ +# Agent caches, see .claude/settings.json and .codex/config.toml. +.cache/ diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 7e9da1e..b5ff719 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ The Claude Code settings were tested with Claude Code 2.1.325. ### Added - Add a "Security and permissions" section to the README. It explains how each agent enforces its rules, the limits of command matching, and that the allowed hosts can serve source code and packages. -- Keep the uv cache and the pnpm store and cache in the project directory, so sandboxed agents can use them. +- Keep all package caches in the project's `.cache/` folder, so sandboxed agents can use them: the uv cache and the pnpm store and cache through the template configs, and the `uvx` tools and pre-commit through the agent settings (`UV_CACHE_DIR`, `UV_TOOL_DIR`, `PRE_COMMIT_HOME`), because these tools ignore the project configuration. ESLint, pylint, and vulture exclude `.cache/`. - Instruct the `get-started` skill to ask the developer to install dependencies, because the agent sandbox blocks package downloads. -- Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests. +- Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests, and Dependabot updates them (the Python entry now uses the `uv` ecosystem). +- Pin the Python check tools that pre-commit runs through `uvx` to exact versions: `ruff` 0.17.1, `ty` 0.0.89, `vulture` 2.16, `pylint` 4.1.3, `deptry` 0.25.1, `detect-secrets` 1.5.0, and `pre-commit` 4.7.0. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 41eb613..618603f 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. "Yes, and don't ask aga - Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories. - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. - Commands can reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Each other host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. To block other hosts instead, set `sandbox.network.strictAllowlist: true` in `~/.claude/settings.json`. Claude Code reads this key only from user or managed settings. With it, Claude Code ignores `allowedDomains` from the project, so also put the allowed hosts in `~/.claude/settings.json`. -- Package files come from hosts that are not allowed, for example `files.pythonhosted.org`. So agents cannot install dependencies. Run `uv sync` or `pnpm install` yourself in a separate terminal. The templates keep the uv cache and the pnpm store in the project (`.uv-cache/`, `.pnpm-store/`, `.pnpm-cache/`), so sandboxed commands can still read and write them. +- Package files come from hosts that are not allowed, for example `files.pythonhosted.org`. So agents cannot install dependencies. Run `uv sync` or `pnpm install` yourself in a separate terminal. The templates and the agent settings keep all package caches in the project's `.cache/` folder (uv, `uvx` tools, pre-commit, and the pnpm store), so sandboxed commands can still read and write them. The checks exclude `.cache/`. - Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. - Sandboxed commands can still change files that run later outside the sandbox, such as `.husky/` hooks, `.pre-commit-config.yaml` and `package.json` scripts. Check these files in the diff before you commit. @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ It is inspired by the concept of "Agent Readiness" by Factory.AI: https://factor - `pyproject.toml` - `uv.lock` -Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, and secret scanning because they are fast, easy for agents to run locally. The `uv` config waits 30 days before accepting new package releases and sets a minimum `uv` version (`required-version`) that blocks releases with known vulnerabilities. Raise it when `uv` publishes a security release. `certifi`, the CA certificate bundle, has a short permanent delay of 2 days instead, so certificate revocations install quickly. To let another urgent security fix through, add the package to `exclude-newer-package`. +Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, and secret scanning because they are fast, easy for agents to run locally. The pre-commit hooks run each tool through `uvx` with an exact version. Dependabot does not update these versions, so update them by hand, and keep the 30-day release delay. The `uv` config waits 30 days before accepting new package releases and sets a minimum `uv` version (`required-version`) that blocks releases with known vulnerabilities. Raise it when `uv` publishes a security release. `certifi`, the CA certificate bundle, has a short permanent delay of 2 days instead, so certificate revocations install quickly. To let another urgent security fix through, add the package to `exclude-newer-package`. #### `ts/` diff --git a/templates/py/.gitignore b/templates/py/.gitignore index 90de4ca..e61d6e8 100644 --- a/templates/py/.gitignore +++ b/templates/py/.gitignore @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ dist/ # Virtual environments .venv/ venv/ -.uv-cache/ +.cache/ # Editors and OS files .idea/ diff --git a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml index 9799bcc..904eb29 100644 --- a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Pre-commit template for Python agent-readiness baseline. # Copy to `.pre-commit-config.yaml` to activate, then run: -# uvx pre-commit install -# uvx pre-commit run --all-files +# uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 install +# uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 run --all-files minimum_pre_commit_version: "4.0.0" repos: @@ -12,8 +12,12 @@ repos: - id: check-added-large-files args: ["--maxkb=500"] - id: end-of-file-fixer + # The hook opens files for writing; the Claude Code sandbox blocks this for agent settings and skills. + exclude: ^\.(claude|agents)/ - id: trailing-whitespace - id: check-yaml + # pnpm-lock.yaml contains several YAML documents. + args: ["--allow-multiple-documents"] - id: check-toml # Python ecosystem checks, all executed through `uvx`. @@ -22,48 +26,48 @@ repos: # formatter -> ruff - id: ruff-format name: Ruff format - entry: uvx ruff format + entry: uvx ruff@0.17.1 format language: system types_or: [python, pyi] # lint_config + naming_consistency + cyclomatic_complexity + tech_debt_tracking -> ruff - id: ruff-check name: Ruff lint - entry: uvx ruff check --fix + entry: uvx ruff@0.17.1 check --fix language: system types_or: [python, pyi] # type_check (+ strict typing where applicable) -> ty - id: ty-check name: Ty type check - entry: uvx ty check + entry: uvx ty@0.0.89 check language: system pass_filenames: false # dead_code_detection -> vulture - id: vulture name: Vulture dead code - entry: uvx vulture . --min-confidence 80 + entry: uvx vulture@2.16 . --min-confidence 80 --exclude .cache,.venv,node_modules language: system pass_filenames: false # duplicate_code_detection + file_size + function_size -> pylint checks - id: pylint-quality name: Pylint quality checks - entry: uvx pylint --disable=all --enable=duplicate-code,too-many-lines,too-many-statements --min-similarity-lines=8 --max-module-lines=500 --max-statements=50 . + entry: uvx pylint@4.1.3 --disable=all --enable=duplicate-code,too-many-lines,too-many-statements --min-similarity-lines=8 --max-module-lines=500 --max-statements=50 --ignore=.cache,.venv,node_modules . language: system pass_filenames: false # unused_dependencies_detection -> deptry - id: deptry name: Deptry unused dependencies - entry: uvx deptry . + entry: uvx deptry@0.25.1 . language: system pass_filenames: false # secret scanner -> detect-secrets - id: detect-secrets name: Detect secrets - entry: uvx --from detect-secrets detect-secrets-hook + entry: uvx --from detect-secrets@1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook language: system pass_filenames: true diff --git a/templates/py/pyproject.toml b/templates/py/pyproject.toml index db54aed..f40a25d 100644 --- a/templates/py/pyproject.toml +++ b/templates/py/pyproject.toml @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ respect-type-ignore-comments = true [tool.uv] required-version = ">=0.13.5" # Keep the cache in the project, so sandboxed agents can write it. -cache-dir = ".uv-cache" +cache-dir = ".cache/uv" exclude-newer = "30 days" # certifi releases are trust-store fixes. Keep this short delay permanently. exclude-newer-package = { certifi = "2 days" } diff --git a/templates/ts/.gitignore b/templates/ts/.gitignore index 89a80fa..d02e934 100644 --- a/templates/ts/.gitignore +++ b/templates/ts/.gitignore @@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ # Dependencies node_modules/ -.pnpm-store/ -.pnpm-cache/ +.cache/ # Build outputs dist/ diff --git a/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs b/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs index bf68c36..dbd194d 100644 --- a/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs +++ b/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs @@ -45,6 +45,6 @@ export default defineConfig( extends: [tseslint.configs.disableTypeChecked], }, { - ignores: ["dist/**", "build/**", "coverage/**", "node_modules/**"], + ignores: ["dist/**", "build/**", "coverage/**", "node_modules/**", ".cache/**"], }, ); diff --git a/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml b/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml index e925376..26eb746 100644 --- a/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml +++ b/templates/ts/pnpm-workspace.yaml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Keep the store and cache in the project, so sandboxed agents can write them. -storeDir: .pnpm-store -cacheDir: .pnpm-cache +storeDir: .cache/pnpm-store +cacheDir: .cache/pnpm minimumReleaseAge: 43200 savePrefix: "" minimumReleaseAgeExclude: From 99dc8a5c86c80e5f307f5c37283fadbcaa7cdc79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:31:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 17/20] Protect agent configs, keep skills editable, and document the dependency bootstrap --- .agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- .claude/settings.json | 34 ++++++++++++++-- .codex/config.toml | 18 ++++++--- AGENTS.md | 2 + CHANGELOG.md | 12 ++++-- README.md | 23 ++++++++--- templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml | 8 ++-- 7 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md index 246b8ac..f542dc0 100644 --- a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md +++ b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md @@ -56,9 +56,57 @@ Handle template scaffolding based on the chosen project language: - In `.github/workflows/validate.yml`, keep only the job for the chosen stack and adapt it to the project: run it from the repo root, remove the template-only steps and settings (the placeholder source file and the `SKIP: deptry` setting), and keep the lockfile checks (`uv lock --check`, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`). For other stacks, replace the jobs with ones that run the stack's checks. - In `.github/dependabot.yml`, keep only the entry for the chosen stack and set its `directory` to `/`. For other stacks, replace the entries with one for the stack's package ecosystem. Execute the plan. Make sure to keep the developer in the loop and explain what you are doing. -Before handoff, validate that the configured repo works: -- Ask the developer to run the install/setup command (for example `uv sync` or `pnpm install`) in a separate terminal. The agent sandbox blocks the hosts that serve package files, so the agent cannot install dependencies. Tell the developer this at the start of this step, not after a failed install. For TypeScript, the developer must also install the pnpm version from `packageManager` in `package.json` (for example `pnpm self-update `). With any other version, every `pnpm` command fails in the sandbox. -- Run the configured lint, typecheck, test, and validation commands. +### Dependency bootstrap + +Ask the developer to perform the setup below for the selected stack in a separate terminal before agent validation. This is the supported procedure; network and command restrictions do not guarantee that agents cannot install packages. Explain the setup before attempting checks. Use the versions in the project's current manifests and hook configuration; update the examples when those versions change. + +#### Python + +After moving the Python template files to the project root, ask the developer to run this from that root in a separate terminal. Review the hook configuration first: the bootstrap downloads tools and runs the configured checks, including formatters. A separate terminal does not inherit the agent settings, so the exports select the same caches explicitly. `uv sync` installs project dependencies; the `uvx` commands prepare isolated tools, and pre-commit prepares its own hook environments. + +```sh +( + set -e + export UV_CACHE_DIR="$PWD/.cache/uv" + export UV_TOOL_DIR="$PWD/.cache/uv-tools" + export PRE_COMMIT_HOME="$PWD/.cache/pre-commit" + export UV_EXCLUDE_NEWER="30 days" + + uv sync + for tool in ruff@0.17.1 ty@0.0.89 vulture@2.16 pylint@4.1.3 deptry@0.25.1; do + uvx "$tool" --version + done + uvx --from detect-secrets@1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook --help + uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 install --install-hooks + uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 run --all-files +) +``` + +The explicit tool calls populate caches even when hooks would skip an empty project. Keep their versions aligned with `.pre-commit-config.yaml`. Resolve failures and rerun the checks before returning validation to the agent. Repeat the bootstrap after tool or hook versions change, caches are removed, or the Python interpreter changes. Run agent checks from the same project root. Cached tools do not override command permission rules: Codex still forbids `uvx`, and Claude still asks for it. + +#### TypeScript + +After moving the TypeScript template files to the project root, ask the developer to install the pnpm version pinned in `packageManager` in `package.json`. If pnpm is already installed, the example below uses `pnpm self-update`; otherwise, install the pinned version first using the [pnpm installation instructions](https://pnpm.io/installation). Use the Node.js version required by `engines.node`. + +Run from the project root. For the current template, the pinned pnpm version is `12.5.1`: + +```sh +( + set -e + pnpm self-update 12.5.1 + pnpm --version + pnpm install + pnpm validate + pnpm format:check +) +``` + +Confirm the reported pnpm version matches `packageManager`. `pnpm install` installs the check tools into `node_modules` and populates the store and cache configured in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. These checks do not need separate tool environments or agent-specific cache exports. Resolve installation or check failures before agent validation. Repeat setup when dependencies or the pinned package manager change, or the installed dependencies or caches are removed. + +### Validation + +- For other stacks, ask the developer to run the equivalent install/setup command before validation. +- Run the configured lint, typecheck, test, and validation commands within the agent's permissions. Report checks that require the developer to run them. - If a validation command fails because the project has no source files yet, either add the minimal expected placeholder source/test structure or adjust the command so a fresh scaffold passes. - Report each validation command and whether it passed. @@ -75,4 +123,8 @@ Definition of done checklist: - Open decisions or deferred items are listed explicitly. ## 6. Wrap-up -Confirm with the developer that the project is ready; then you can remove the `get-started` skill from the project. +Copy the dependency bootstrap for the chosen stack into the project's `README.md`, because the developer must repeat it when versions change. Confirm with the developer that the project is ready. Then ask the developer to remove the `get-started` skill in a separate terminal, because the agent sandbox blocks commands that delete skill files: + +```sh +rm -r .agents/skills/get-started +``` diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index 29ebf91..b082f73 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -64,7 +64,20 @@ "Bash(scp *)", "Bash(nc *)", "Bash(printenv *)", - "Bash(env)" + "Bash(env)", + "Edit(/.claude)", + "Edit(/.claude/**)", + "Edit(/.codex)", + "Edit(/.codex/**)", + "Edit(~/.claude/settings.json)", + "Edit(~/.claude/settings.local.json)", + "Edit(~/.codex/config.toml)", + "Edit(~/.codex/rules)", + "Edit(~/.codex/hooks.json)", + "Edit(~/.codex/requirements.toml)", + "Edit(~/.codex/managed_config.toml)", + "Edit(~/.codex/*.config.toml)", + "Edit(~/.codex/rules/**)" ], "ask": [ "Bash(npm install *)", @@ -108,12 +121,25 @@ "autoAllowBashIfSandboxed": false, "failIfUnavailable": true, "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false, - "excludedCommands": ["git fetch", "git pull"], + "excludedCommands": [ + "git fetch", + "git pull" + ], "network": { - "allowedDomains": ["api.github.com", "registry.npmjs.org", "pypi.org"] + "allowedDomains": [ + "api.github.com", + "registry.npmjs.org", + "pypi.org" + ] }, "filesystem": { - "denyWrite": ["./.git/config", "./.git/config.worktree", "./.git/hooks"] + "denyWrite": [ + "./.git/config", + "./.git/config.worktree", + "./.git/hooks", + "./.claude", + "./.codex" + ] } } } diff --git a/.codex/config.toml b/.codex/config.toml index 07118a2..9f46ed0 100644 --- a/.codex/config.toml +++ b/.codex/config.toml @@ -1,12 +1,20 @@ approval_policy = { granular = { sandbox_approval = false, rules = true, mcp_elicitations = true, request_permissions = true, skill_approval = true } } -sandbox_mode = "workspace-write" - +default_permissions = "agent-workspace" [shell_environment_policy] set = { UV_CACHE_DIR = ".cache/uv", UV_TOOL_DIR = ".cache/uv-tools", PRE_COMMIT_HOME = ".cache/pre-commit" } -[sandbox_workspace_write] -network_access = true - [features.network_proxy] enabled = true domains = { "api.github.com" = "allow", "registry.npmjs.org" = "allow", "pypi.org" = "allow" } + +[permissions.agent-workspace] +extends = ":workspace" + +[permissions.agent-workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] +".claude" = "read" +".codex" = "read" +".agents" = "write" + +[permissions.agent-workspace.network] +enabled = true +domains = { "api.github.com" = "allow", "registry.npmjs.org" = "allow", "pypi.org" = "allow" } diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 0c000e2..2124040 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ - No need for backward compatibility or forward compatibility. ## Security +- This project runs agents in a sandbox with command deny rules (see `.claude/settings.json`, `.codex/`). Do not try to work around them, for example with wrappers, other paths, or scripts. If a restriction blocks the task, stop and tell the user which one. - For high-risk operations, make sure to always stop and confirm with the user before execution. Examples: - Irreversible removals like `rm -rf` - Changing infrastructure like `terraform apply` @@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ - Use red/green TDD. - If stuck after 2 failed implementation attempts, stop and present a blocker summary with concrete next options. - Before handoff, run the smallest relevant tests/lint for touched code and report pass/fail explicitly. +- Run commands from the repository root. Do not use `cd`. Use the tool options for other directories (for example `uv --directory`, `pnpm --dir`, `git -C`). The agent settings set the cache paths relative to the current directory, so a command in a subdirectory does not find the caches in `.cache/`. - Self-improvement: If the user corrects a mistake or gives feedback, suggest a change to the `AGENTS.md` to prevent the same mistake from happening again. ## Testing diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index b5ff719..7b4081f 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -15,14 +15,18 @@ The Claude Code settings were tested with Claude Code 2.1.325. - Ask before dependency installs, commits, and other commands that change local state. - Allow the TypeScript template checks (`pnpm validate`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm format:check`) without a prompt. - Enable the Claude Code Bash sandbox. Sandboxed commands still follow the permission mode, cannot run again outside the sandbox, and can reach only `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval. Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, run outside the sandbox, so they can use SSH. -- Add Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml`: the `workspace-write` sandbox, network access only through a proxy restricted to the same three hosts, and rejection of sandbox escalation requests. +- Add Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml`: a permission profile extending `:workspace`, network access only through a proxy restricted to the same three hosts, and rejection of sandbox escalation requests. +- Make `.claude/` and `.codex/` read-only in both agent sandboxes, with Edit deny rules for Claude file tools. Claude Edit deny rules also protect the agent configs in the home folder. Agents can still edit skills in `.agents/`. Exclude the agent folders from the pre-commit hook that always opens files for writing. - Add Codex command rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules`. They forbid the same commands that Claude Code denies or asks about, because Codex automatic review can approve `prompt` rules. ### Added - Add a "Security and permissions" section to the README. It explains how each agent enforces its rules, the limits of command matching, and that the allowed hosts can serve source code and packages. -- Keep all package caches in the project's `.cache/` folder, so sandboxed agents can use them: the uv cache and the pnpm store and cache through the template configs, and the `uvx` tools and pre-commit through the agent settings (`UV_CACHE_DIR`, `UV_TOOL_DIR`, `PRE_COMMIT_HOME`), because these tools ignore the project configuration. ESLint, pylint, and vulture exclude `.cache/`. -- Instruct the `get-started` skill to ask the developer to install dependencies, because the agent sandbox blocks package downloads. -- Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests, and Dependabot updates them (the Python entry now uses the `uv` ecosystem). +- Keep all package caches in the project's `.cache/` folder, so sandboxed agents can use them: the uv cache and the pnpm store and cache through the template configs, and the `uvx` tools and pre-commit through the agent settings (`UV_CACHE_DIR`, `UV_TOOL_DIR`, `PRE_COMMIT_HOME`), because these tools ignore the project configuration. ESLint, pylint, and vulture exclude `.cache/`. `AGENTS.md` tells agents to run commands from the repository root, so they find these caches. +- Put the Python and pnpm bootstrap procedures in the `get-started` skill, with short links from the README. Developer-run setup populates project-local caches and runs the checks before agent validation. Explain that network and command restrictions do not guarantee installation is impossible. +- Explain that blocking `env` and `printenv` does not protect inherited secrets from shell expansion or other programs. +- Tell agents in `AGENTS.md` not to work around the sandbox and deny rules. +- Instruct the `get-started` skill to copy the dependency bootstrap into the project README and to ask the developer to remove the skill, because the sandbox blocks the agent from deleting it. +- Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests. Dependabot updates them; its Python entry uses the `uv` ecosystem instead of `pip`. - Pin the Python check tools that pre-commit runs through `uvx` to exact versions: `ruff` 0.17.1, `ty` 0.0.89, `vulture` 2.16, `pylint` 4.1.3, `deptry` 0.25.1, `detect-secrets` 1.5.0, and `pre-commit` 4.7.0. ## [0.3.0] - 2026-11-16 diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 618603f..a8023a9 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ - [Security and permissions](#security-and-permissions) - [Claude Code](#claude-security) - [Codex](#codex-security) + - [Environment secrets](#environment-secrets) - [Content](#content) - [`AGENTS.md`](#agentsmd) - [`CLAUDE.md`](#claudemd) @@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ The [`get-started` skill](#agentsskills) guides the project setup. Instructions in `AGENTS.md` are only requests. Agents can ignore them, especially in long sessions. This template therefore also uses settings that the agent tools enforce. Each agent has its own settings file, and the rules do not transfer between agents. +The project folders `.claude/` and `.codex/` are read-only during sandboxed agent work. Claude also denies edits through its built-in file tools. Change agent settings yourself in a separate editor or terminal. Agents can edit skills in `.agents/`, so that they can maintain them. Claude Code still blocks Bash commands from writing skill files, so Claude uses its file tools for skills. These restrictions do not protect inherited environment secrets, and commands explicitly allowed outside the sandbox are outside this filesystem boundary. Review personal and managed exceptions as well as project settings. + ### Claude Code @@ -65,14 +68,14 @@ Put personal overrides in `.claude/settings.local.json`. "Yes, and don't ask aga **The sandbox is the security boundary.** With `sandbox.enabled`, the operating system limits every Bash command, whatever its text: -- Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories. +- Commands can write only inside the project and temporary directories, except for write-denied paths. Both `Edit` deny rules and `sandbox.filesystem.denyWrite` protect `.claude/` and `.codex/`. Claude's file tools do not run in the sandbox, so `Edit` deny rules also protect the agent configs in your home folder (`~/.claude/settings*.json`, `~/.codex/config.toml`, `~/.codex/rules/`, and the other Codex config files). - Commands cannot read the paths in the `Read` deny rules. - Commands can reach `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval, the same hosts as the Codex proxy. Each other host needs approval: from you in manual mode, or from the classifier in auto mode. To block other hosts instead, set `sandbox.network.strictAllowlist: true` in `~/.claude/settings.json`. Claude Code reads this key only from user or managed settings. With it, Claude Code ignores `allowedDomains` from the project, so also put the allowed hosts in `~/.claude/settings.json`. -- Package files come from hosts that are not allowed, for example `files.pythonhosted.org`. So agents cannot install dependencies. Run `uv sync` or `pnpm install` yourself in a separate terminal. The templates and the agent settings keep all package caches in the project's `.cache/` folder (uv, `uvx` tools, pre-commit, and the pnpm store), so sandboxed commands can still read and write them. The checks exclude `.cache/`. +- Run dependency installation in a separate terminal as the supported setup procedure. Some download hosts, such as `files.pythonhosted.org`, are not pre-approved, and common install commands are blocked or require approval. This is not a guarantee that agents cannot install packages. The templates and agent settings use project-local `.cache/` directories. For Python, follow the [Python bootstrap in get-started](.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md#python) to populate the same tool and hook caches before agent validation; `uv sync` alone does not populate them. The checks exclude `.cache/`. - Downloads and installs are still possible from the allowed hosts. The rules cover the usual install commands, but not every alias (npm alone has several, such as `npm in`) or a script that downloads packages itself. The rules cannot prevent installs in general. The sandbox limits what an installed package can do. - `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false` prevents Claude from running a failed command again outside the sandbox. - Sandboxed commands can still change files that run later outside the sandbox, such as `.husky/` hooks, `.pre-commit-config.yaml` and `package.json` scripts. Check these files in the diff before you commit. -- Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, run outside the sandbox. SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy, so git cannot reach the remote from inside the sandbox. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. +- Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, are excluded from the Claude sandbox, because SSH does not work through the sandbox network proxy. Arguments are not allowed, because options such as `--upload-pack` run a program. A pull can change tracked files in `.claude/` and `.codex/`, but only to commits that already exist on the remote. - Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Git runs commands from these files, for example `core.sshCommand`, and `git fetch` and `git pull` run outside the sandbox. Settings that already point to files in the project, such as `core.hooksPath` or `include.path`, are not protected, so check `.git/config` in existing clones. The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edit`) use the `Read` and `Edit` rules instead. For more information, see the [permissions](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions) and [sandboxing](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) documentation. @@ -81,9 +84,9 @@ The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edi ### Codex -The project uses `workspace-write` so Codex can edit repository files and run commands within the sandbox. Command network access uses the domain-restricted proxy described below. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. +The project selects the `agent-workspace` permission profile, which extends `:workspace`. Codex can edit ordinary repository files and run commands within the sandbox; `.claude/` and `.codex/` are read-only, and `.agents/` is writable, so Codex can maintain skills. The inherited protections for `.git/` and `.aws/` remain active. Command network access uses the domain-restricted proxy described below. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. -The config enables both `sandbox_workspace_write.network_access` and `features.network_proxy.enabled`. The proxy allows only these destinations: +The config enables both `permissions.agent-workspace.network.enabled` and `features.network_proxy.enabled`. The proxy allows only these destinations: | Domain | Intended use | Also accessible | | --- | --- | --- | @@ -101,6 +104,8 @@ The Codex proxy excludes `files.pythonhosted.org`, which normally serves PyPI pa Metadata commands can use temporary caches, for example `npm view typescript version --cache /tmp/npm-cache` or `python -m pip --cache-dir /tmp/pip-cache list --outdated`. See [Codex network isolation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-approvals-security#network-isolation). +Permission profiles do not compose with legacy `sandbox_mode` or `sandbox_workspace_write` settings. Remove those legacy entries from loaded user and profile configs, and do not pass `--sandbox`, or they can override the selected profile. Restart Codex and select `agent-workspace` for the chat; check the effective permissions before relying on the protected folders. See the [permission profile documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/permissions). + The granular approval policy sets `sandbox_approval = false`. Ordinary requests to run outside the sandbox are rejected instead of sent to you or Auto-review. Explicit `allow` rules still permit their matching commands outside the sandbox without approval. The other approval categories remain enabled: command-rule prompts (`rules`), MCP requests (`mcp_elicitations`), additional permission requests (`request_permissions`), and skill approvals (`skill_approval`). This blocks sandbox escalation requests; it is not a blanket ban on every way to grant access. See the [approval policy reference](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/config-file/config-reference). **Codex cannot fetch or pull.** The proxy does not allow Git remote hosts such as `github.com`, and ordinary sandbox escalation is rejected. This template adds no `allow` rules for `git fetch` or `git pull`, because Codex rules match prefixes: `["git", "fetch"]` would also allow any arguments, including options such as `--upload-pack` that run a program outside the sandbox. Run these commands yourself in a separate terminal. @@ -111,6 +116,10 @@ For this reason, this template uses `forbidden` for these commands instead of `p These rules do not make all other commands safe. They match literal command prefixes, so shell wrappers, alternate executable paths, and commands run by other tools can bypass them. They do not replace the sandbox, and they do not prevent reads of `.env` files, keys, or credentials. Keep secrets outside the agent's accessible environment. Project settings are defaults that users can override; use managed requirements for enforced restrictions. The project must be trusted for its rules to load; restart Codex after changes. See the [Codex rules](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules) and [Auto-review documentation](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/sandboxing/auto-review). +### Environment secrets + +The `env` and `printenv` rules do not prevent access to inherited environment variables. For example, `echo "$OPENAI_API_KEY"` can print an inherited key: the shell expands the variable before it runs `echo`, so neither blocked command is used. Other commands and programs can also read environment variables. Secret-file read restrictions do not protect values already present in the process environment. Do not expose credentials to an agent process unless the task needs them; these command rules do not isolate environment secrets. + ## Content ### `AGENTS.md` @@ -168,6 +177,8 @@ It is inspired by the concept of "Agent Readiness" by Factory.AI: https://factor Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, and secret scanning because they are fast, easy for agents to run locally. The pre-commit hooks run each tool through `uvx` with an exact version. Dependabot does not update these versions, so update them by hand, and keep the 30-day release delay. The `uv` config waits 30 days before accepting new package releases and sets a minimum `uv` version (`required-version`) that blocks releases with known vulnerabilities. Raise it when `uv` publishes a security release. `certifi`, the CA certificate bundle, has a short permanent delay of 2 days instead, so certificate revocations install quickly. To let another urgent security fix through, add the package to `exclude-newer-package`. +The [Python bootstrap in get-started](.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md#python) installs dependencies and populates the same tool and hook caches used by the agents. Run it in a separate terminal before agent validation. + #### `ts/` - `package.json` @@ -183,4 +194,4 @@ Use this set for Python projects. It uses `uv`, `ruff`, `ty`, pre-commit checks, - `.husky/pre-push` - `.husky/_/husky.sh` -Use this set for TypeScript projects. It uses Husky and lint-staged, while CI can still run the full validation script. ESLint, TypeScript, Knip, jscpd, and secretlint cover linting, strict typing, dead code, duplicate code, and secrets. All direct dependencies, and pnpm itself, are pinned to exact versions. Install the pnpm version from `packageManager` (for example `pnpm self-update 12.5.1`). With any other version, pnpm tries to download the pinned one, and every `pnpm` command fails in the agent sandbox. Both npm (`.npmrc`) and pnpm (`pnpm-workspace.yaml`) wait 30 days before accepting new package releases. To let an urgent security fix through, add the package to `min-release-age-exclude` in `.npmrc` and to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. `package.json` sets a patched minimum version for each supported Node.js line (`engines.node`), and both package managers refuse to install on an older version. Raise these minimums when Node.js publishes a security release. In CI, set `check-latest: true` on `actions/setup-node`, because runner images can lag behind a security release. +Use this set for TypeScript projects. It uses Husky and lint-staged, while CI can still run the full validation script. ESLint, TypeScript, Knip, jscpd, and secretlint cover linting, strict typing, dead code, duplicate code, and secrets. All direct dependencies, and pnpm itself, are pinned to exact versions. The [TypeScript bootstrap in get-started](.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md#typescript) sets up the pinned pnpm version, dependencies, project-local caches, and validation checks. Both npm (`.npmrc`) and pnpm (`pnpm-workspace.yaml`) wait 30 days before accepting new package releases. To let an urgent security fix through, add the package to `min-release-age-exclude` in `.npmrc` and to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. `package.json` sets a patched minimum version for each supported Node.js line (`engines.node`), and both package managers refuse to install on an older version. Raise these minimums when Node.js publishes a security release. In CI, set `check-latest: true` on `actions/setup-node`, because runner images can lag behind a security release. diff --git a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml index 904eb29..5533a2e 100644 --- a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ # Pre-commit template for Python agent-readiness baseline. -# Copy to `.pre-commit-config.yaml` to activate, then run: -# uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 install -# uvx pre-commit@4.7.0 run --all-files +# Copy to `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, then follow the Python bootstrap in .agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md. minimum_pre_commit_version: "4.0.0" repos: @@ -12,8 +10,8 @@ repos: - id: check-added-large-files args: ["--maxkb=500"] - id: end-of-file-fixer - # The hook opens files for writing; the Claude Code sandbox blocks this for agent settings and skills. - exclude: ^\.(claude|agents)/ + # The hook opens every file for writing, including unchanged files in protected agent folders. + exclude: ^\.(claude|codex|agents)/ - id: trailing-whitespace - id: check-yaml # pnpm-lock.yaml contains several YAML documents. From 87a61c9e835b5ff8c33de3697bd9a5f4b6178f3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:39:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 18/20] Resolve review findings on bypass rules and skill removal --- .agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md | 2 +- AGENTS.md | 1 - CHANGELOG.md | 2 +- templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml | 2 +- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md index f542dc0..4353a5e 100644 --- a/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md +++ b/.agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Definition of done checklist: - Open decisions or deferred items are listed explicitly. ## 6. Wrap-up -Copy the dependency bootstrap for the chosen stack into the project's `README.md`, because the developer must repeat it when versions change. Confirm with the developer that the project is ready. Then ask the developer to remove the `get-started` skill in a separate terminal, because the agent sandbox blocks commands that delete skill files: +Copy the dependency bootstrap for the chosen stack into the project's `README.md`, because the developer must repeat it when versions change. Confirm with the developer that the project is ready. Then ask the developer to remove the `get-started` skill in a separate terminal, because the agent restrictions block it (Claude Code blocks Bash writes to skill files, and the Codex rules forbid `rm`): ```sh rm -r .agents/skills/get-started diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 2124040..dc4f165 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ - Modifying access control, permissions, or authentication logic - Running scripts that affect multiple systems or environments - Publishing packages or deploying to production - - Using custom ad-hoc scripts to bypass any tool or environment restrictions - When installing or updating dependencies, verify before installation that the selected version has no known supply-chain compromise reports or critical CVEs. - Always pin dependencies to exact versions in manifests or lockfiles instead of using floating version ranges. diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 7b4081f..a529a9d 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ The Claude Code settings were tested with Claude Code 2.1.325. - Put the Python and pnpm bootstrap procedures in the `get-started` skill, with short links from the README. Developer-run setup populates project-local caches and runs the checks before agent validation. Explain that network and command restrictions do not guarantee installation is impossible. - Explain that blocking `env` and `printenv` does not protect inherited secrets from shell expansion or other programs. - Tell agents in `AGENTS.md` not to work around the sandbox and deny rules. -- Instruct the `get-started` skill to copy the dependency bootstrap into the project README and to ask the developer to remove the skill, because the sandbox blocks the agent from deleting it. +- Instruct the `get-started` skill to copy the dependency bootstrap into the project README and to ask the developer to remove the skill, because the agent restrictions block the agent from deleting it. - Add lockfiles to both templates (`uv.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`). CI checks that they match the manifests. Dependabot updates them; its Python entry uses the `uv` ecosystem instead of `pip`. - Pin the Python check tools that pre-commit runs through `uvx` to exact versions: `ruff` 0.17.1, `ty` 0.0.89, `vulture` 2.16, `pylint` 4.1.3, `deptry` 0.25.1, `detect-secrets` 1.5.0, and `pre-commit` 4.7.0. diff --git a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml index 5533a2e..b2ca745 100644 --- a/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/templates/py/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Pre-commit template for Python agent-readiness baseline. -# Copy to `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, then follow the Python bootstrap in .agents/skills/get-started/SKILL.md. +# Copy to `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, then follow the dependency bootstrap in README.md. minimum_pre_commit_version: "4.0.0" repos: From dafa4e69e808782951fc0f247b7843730035cf5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:45:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 19/20] Fix CI: format the ESLint config and allow an empty uv cache --- .github/workflows/validate.yml | 2 ++ templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/validate.yml b/.github/workflows/validate.yml index 3caa48e..966f85a 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/validate.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/validate.yml @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ jobs: - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@c18668ad3cf93ea998bef934396af7bb5c839dc7 # v10.2.0 with: working-directory: templates/py + # The template has no dependencies, so the uv cache can stay empty. + ignore-nothing-to-cache: true - run: uv lock --check working-directory: templates/py # deptry needs a [project] section, which only exists after get-started. diff --git a/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs b/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs index dbd194d..b7f35b4 100644 --- a/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs +++ b/templates/ts/eslint.config.mjs @@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ export default defineConfig( extends: [tseslint.configs.disableTypeChecked], }, { - ignores: ["dist/**", "build/**", "coverage/**", "node_modules/**", ".cache/**"], + ignores: [ + "dist/**", + "build/**", + "coverage/**", + "node_modules/**", + ".cache/**", + ], }, ); From 28502e949033b8ad096668ad66bb272920a0403d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian von der Goltz Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 13:56:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 20/20] Limit the effect of agent errors instead of blocking deletes Move rm and local git commands from deny to ask, ask only before recursive deletes, start Claude in acceptEdits mode, block file-tool writes outside the project, and disable bypass mode. Mirror the delete rules in Codex. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- .claude/settings.json | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- .codex/rules/default.rules | 10 ++++++++-- CHANGELOG.md | 11 ++++++++--- README.md | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json index b082f73..90364a5 100644 --- a/.claude/settings.json +++ b/.claude/settings.json @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ "PRE_COMMIT_HOME": ".cache/pre-commit" }, "permissions": { + "disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable", + "blockWritesOutsideWorkingDirectories": true, + "defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "allow": [ "Bash(pnpm validate)", "Bash(pnpm lint)", @@ -28,11 +31,7 @@ "Read(~/.netrc)", "Read(~/.config/gh/**)", "Bash(sudo *)", - "Bash(rm -rf *)", - "Bash(rm -fr *)", "Bash(git push *)", - "Bash(git reset --hard *)", - "Bash(git clean *)", "Bash(git filter-branch *)", "Bash(gh pr merge *)", "Bash(gh repo delete *)", @@ -104,6 +103,8 @@ "Bash(bun add *)", "Bash(bun install *)", "Bash(bun i *)", + "Bash(git reset --hard *)", + "Bash(git clean *)", "Bash(git commit *)", "Bash(git rebase *)", "Bash(git checkout -- *)", @@ -111,7 +112,18 @@ "Bash(git restore *)", "Bash(git branch -D *)", "Bash(git stash drop *)", - "Bash(rm *)", + "Bash(rm -*r*)", + "Bash(rm -*R*)", + "Bash(rm * -*r*)", + "Bash(rm * -*R*)", + "Bash(rm *--recursive*)", + "Bash(find * -delete*)", + "Bash(find * -exec rm *)", + "Bash(find * -execdir rm *)", + "Bash(rsync *--delete*)", + "Bash(rimraf *)", + "Bash(pnpm exec rimraf *)", + "Bash(git rm -r*)", "Bash(docker *)", "Bash(terraform *)" ] diff --git a/.codex/rules/default.rules b/.codex/rules/default.rules index 3c07432..2ec0569 100644 --- a/.codex/rules/default.rules +++ b/.codex/rules/default.rules @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = [["npm", "pnpm", "uv"], "publish"], decision = "forbidden" prefix_rule(pattern = ["twine", "upload"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = [["curl", "wget", "ssh", "scp", "nc", "printenv", "env"]], decision = "forbidden") -# Claude ask. The rm and terraform rules also cover the Claude deny rules for rm -rf and terraform apply. +# Claude ask. The terraform rule also covers the Claude deny rules for terraform apply and destroy. prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", ["install", "i", "ci", "add", "update"]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["npx"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", ["install", "i", "add", "update", "dlx"]], decision = "forbidden") @@ -32,4 +32,10 @@ prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", ["commit", "rebase", "restore"]], decision = "forb prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "checkout", ["--", "."]], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "branch", "-D"], decision = "forbidden") prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "stash", "drop"], decision = "forbidden") -prefix_rule(pattern = [["rm", "docker", "terraform"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["docker", "terraform"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", ["-r", "-R", "-rf", "-fr", "-Rf", "-fR", "-rv", "-rfv", "-vrf", "--recursive"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rm", "-f", ["-r", "-R", "--recursive"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["rsync"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = [["rimraf"]], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["pnpm", "exec", "rimraf"], decision = "forbidden") +prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "rm", "-r"], decision = "forbidden") \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index a529a9d..ed615dc 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -7,12 +7,17 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and Pull request: [#9 - Add agent tool permission settings](https://github.com/Kickstart-AI/agent-ready-template/pull/9) -The Claude Code settings were tested with Claude Code 2.1.325. +The settings were tested with +- Claude Code 2.1.325. +- Claude Desktop 6.6395.1 (8fc566) 2026-11-18T17:19:06.000Z +- Codex CLI 0.169.0 +- ChatGPT Desktop 26.1111.21308 ### Security - Add Claude Code permission rules in `.claude/settings.json`: - - Deny reading secrets (`.env` files, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. - - Ask before dependency installs, commits, and other commands that change local state. + - Deny reading secrets (`.env` files, keys, cloud and SSH credentials), git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. + - Ask before dependency installs, recursive deletes, and git commands that change the working tree or local history. Allow single-file `rm` inside the project. + - Start in `acceptEdits` mode, refuse file-tool writes outside the project (`blockWritesOutsideWorkingDirectories`), and disable bypass mode (`disableBypassPermissionsMode`). - Allow the TypeScript template checks (`pnpm validate`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm format:check`) without a prompt. - Enable the Claude Code Bash sandbox. Sandboxed commands still follow the permission mode, cannot run again outside the sandbox, and can reach only `api.github.com`, `registry.npmjs.org`, and `pypi.org` without approval. Sandboxed commands cannot write `.git/config`, `.git/config.worktree`, or `.git/hooks`. Only plain `git fetch` and `git pull`, without arguments, run outside the sandbox, so they can use SSH. - Add Codex settings in `.codex/config.toml`: a permission profile extending `:workspace`, network access only through a proxy restricted to the same three hosts, and rejection of sandbox escalation requests. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a8023a9..633951c 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -52,7 +52,15 @@ The project folders `.claude/` and `.codex/` are read-only during sandboxed agen ### Claude Code -`.claude/settings.json` denies access to secrets, destructive commands, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. It requires approval for dependency installation, commits, and other commands that change local state. +`.claude/settings.json` denies access to secrets, git remote actions, infrastructure changes, cloud CLIs, publishing, and network tools. It requires approval for dependency installation, recursive deletes (`rm -r`, `find -delete`, `rsync --delete`, `rimraf`, `git rm -r`), and git commands that change the working tree or local history. + +The settings limit the effect of errors instead of trying to block every risky command. Changes inside the repository can be restored with git, so the agent may edit files and delete single files there. Changes outside the repository are blocked: + +- `defaultMode: "acceptEdits"` lets Claude edit files and run common file commands, such as `mkdir`, `mv`, and a plain `rm`, inside the project without asking. +- `blockWritesOutsideWorkingDirectories: true` makes the `Write`, `Edit`, and `NotebookEdit` tools refuse paths outside the project in every mode. The sandbox does the same for Bash commands. +- `disableBypassPermissionsMode: "disable"` prevents bypass mode (`--dangerously-skip-permissions`) in this project. + +Commit often. Uncommitted and untracked files are not protected by git. Claude Code checks permission rules in this order, and the first match wins: @@ -84,7 +92,7 @@ The sandbox applies to Bash commands only. Claude's own file tools (`Read`, `Edi ### Codex -The project selects the `agent-workspace` permission profile, which extends `:workspace`. Codex can edit ordinary repository files and run commands within the sandbox; `.claude/` and `.codex/` are read-only, and `.agents/` is writable, so Codex can maintain skills. The inherited protections for `.git/` and `.aws/` remain active. Command network access uses the domain-restricted proxy described below. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, file removal, Docker, and Terraform. See the rule file for the full list. +The project selects the `agent-workspace` permission profile, which extends `:workspace`. Codex can edit ordinary repository files and run commands within the sandbox; `.claude/` and `.codex/` are read-only, and `.agents/` is writable, so Codex can maintain skills. The inherited protections for `.git/` and `.aws/` remain active. Command network access uses the domain-restricted proxy described below. The rules in `.codex/rules/default.rules` block selected command prefixes, including dependency installation and updates, commits, rebases, recursive file removal, Docker, and Terraform. A plain `rm` is allowed, as in Claude. Codex rules match only fixed prefixes, so they cannot catch `find -delete` or recursive flags in other positions, and they forbid all `rsync` to catch `--delete`. See the rule file for the full list. The config enables both `permissions.agent-workspace.network.enabled` and `features.network_proxy.enabled`. The proxy allows only these destinations: