diff --git a/crates/skilllite-sandbox/src/bash_validator.rs b/crates/skilllite-sandbox/src/bash_validator.rs
index 2a4dca01..a9e44603 100644
--- a/crates/skilllite-sandbox/src/bash_validator.rs
+++ b/crates/skilllite-sandbox/src/bash_validator.rs
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 //!
 //! ## Security Layers
 //!
-//! 1. **Chain operator detection** — blocks `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, backticks,
-//!    `$(...)`, `${...}`, newlines, and other injection vectors.
+//! 1. **Chain operator detection** — blocks `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `&`,
+//!    redirects (`>`, `<`, `>(`), backticks, `$(...)`, `${...}`, newlines,
+//!    and other injection vectors.
 //! 2. **Allowed prefix matching** — command must start with one of the
 //!    `allowed-tools: Bash(prefix:*)` patterns declared in SKILL.md.
 //! 3. **Blocked prefix check** — dangerous commands (rm, sudo, sh, curl, etc.)
@@ -46,11 +47,15 @@ pub enum BashValidationError {
     EmptyCommand,
 }
 
-/// Operators that could chain multiple commands together.
+/// Operators that could chain multiple commands together or redirect I/O.
 /// We treat their presence anywhere in the command string as an injection attempt.
+///
+/// Note: bare `&` / `>` / `<` must be blocked even though `&&` / `||` / `>(`
+/// are listed separately — an unsandboxed `sh -c` will otherwise run a
+/// backgrounded second command or write arbitrary host files.
 const CHAIN_OPERATORS: &[&str] = &[
-    ";", "&&", "||", "|", "`", "$(", "${", "\n", "\r", // Redirect-based attacks
-    ">(",
+    ";", "&&", "||", "|", "&", "`", "$(", "${", "\n", "\r", // Redirect-based attacks
+    ">(", ">", "<",
 ];
 
 /// Command prefixes that are always blocked, regardless of `allowed-tools`.
@@ -248,6 +253,47 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_reject_background_ampersand() {
+        let patterns = agent_browser_patterns();
+        let result =
+            validate_bash_command("agent-browser open x.com & touch /tmp/pwned", &patterns);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
+        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            err.contains("chain operator"),
+            "error should mention chain operator: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_reject_tight_background_ampersand() {
+        let patterns = agent_browser_patterns();
+        let result = validate_bash_command("agent-browser open x&touch /tmp/pwned", &patterns);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_reject_stdout_redirect() {
+        let patterns = agent_browser_patterns();
+        let result = validate_bash_command("agent-browser open x.com > /tmp/pwned", &patterns);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_reject_stdin_redirect() {
+        let patterns = agent_browser_patterns();
+        let result = validate_bash_command("agent-browser open x.com < /etc/passwd", &patterns);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_reject_append_redirect() {
+        let patterns = agent_browser_patterns();
+        let result = validate_bash_command("agent-browser open x.com >> /tmp/pwned", &patterns);
+        assert!(matches!(result, Err(BashValidationError::ChainOperator(_))));
+    }
+
     // ---- Blocked prefixes ----
 
     #[test]
diff --git a/docs/en/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/en/ARCHITECTURE.md
index 9e8aac60..562244c6 100644
--- a/docs/en/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/docs/en/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ Scans Skill dependencies for known vulnerabilities using OSV (Open Source Vulner
 
 ### 6. Additional Protections
 
-- **Bash Validator** (`bash_validator.rs`): Detects dangerous bash commands
+- **Bash Validator** (`bash_validator.rs`): Detects dangerous bash commands, including chain operators (`;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `&`), redirects (`>`, `<`, `>(`), substitutions, and blocked prefixes before unsandboxed `sh -c` execution
 - **File Move Protection** (`move_protection.rs`): Prevents malicious file overwrites of critical paths
 - **User Authorization**: Level 3 runs a unified precheck (`SKILL.md` + entry script); if the precheck produces a review report (including medium script findings, SKILL.md alerts, or scan errors), the runner (CLI) or host (agent/MCP) requires explicit consent before execution. `SKILLLITE_AUTO_APPROVE` applies to the same gate for TTY/CLI runs.
 
diff --git a/docs/zh/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/zh/ARCHITECTURE.md
index e6750680..175e4e06 100644
--- a/docs/zh/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/docs/zh/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ SKILLLITE_NO_SANDBOX=false   # 禁用沙箱
 
 ### 6. 其他保护
 
-- **Bash 验证器** (`bash_validator.rs`)：检测危险 bash 命令
+- **Bash 验证器** (`bash_validator.rs`)：检测危险 bash 命令，包括链式运算符（`;`、`&&`、`||`、`|`、`&`）、重定向（`>`、`<`、`>(`）、替换写法以及被禁止的命令前缀；在无沙箱的 `sh -c` 执行前拦截
 - **文件移动保护** (`move_protection.rs`)：防止恶意文件覆盖关键路径
 - **用户授权**：Level 3 先做统一预检（`SKILL.md` + 入口脚本）；若预检生成需审阅的报告（含中等脚本告警、SKILL.md 告警或扫描失败提示），CLI 由 runner 在 TTY 上征求同意，Agent/MCP 由宿主侧确认；`SKILLLITE_AUTO_APPROVE` 作用于 CLI 侧同一门控。
 
diff --git a/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/CONTEXT.md b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/CONTEXT.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..070560d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/CONTEXT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# CONTEXT
+
+## Technical boundaries
+
+- Change is confined to `crates/skilllite-sandbox/src/bash_validator.rs` plus EN/ZH architecture notes.
+- Call sites in `skilllite-agent` / `skilllite-commands` already call `validate_bash_command` before `sh -c`; no call-site API change.
+
+## Constraints
+
+- Keep fail-closed substring policy consistent with existing operators.
+- Do not relax blocked-prefix or allowed-pattern checks.
+- Avoid broad refactors in the same PR.
+
+## Compatibility notes
+
+- Stricter than `main@12010e8`: previously accepted commands with `&` / `>` / `<` (including URL query strings containing `&`) will now fail validation.
+- This is intentional security hardening for an unsandboxed execution path.
+
+## Near-misses deferred
+
+- `SilentEventSink` auto-approves `ConfirmRequired` during memory flush / swarm single-task.
+- `ChatSession` uses `chat_root()` and ignores `config.workspace` when `SKILLLITE_WORKSPACE` is unset.
+- Concurrent `sessions.json` RMW last-writer-wins (medium metadata loss).
diff --git a/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/PRD.md b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/PRD.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..736f42b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/PRD.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# PRD
+
+## Summary
+
+Harden bash-tool command validation so backgrounding and I/O redirection cannot bypass the existing chain-operator gate before unsandboxed `sh -c` execution.
+
+## Why
+
+Bash-tool skills are an intentional exception path: after Rust-side validation they run on the host shell without bubblewrap. The validator is therefore the primary injection boundary. Omitting bare `&` / `>` / `<` leaves a concrete host command-execution and arbitrary-file-write hole.
+
+## Requirements
+
+1. Reject commands containing bare `&` (background / and-redirect forms).
+2. Reject commands containing `>` or `<` (stdout/stdin/append redirects).
+3. Keep existing protections for `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, backticks, `$()`, `${}`, newlines, and `>(`.
+4. Document the operator set in EN/ZH architecture security notes.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Quote-aware or AST-based shell parsing in this change.
+- Moving bash-tool execution into the sandbox.
diff --git a/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/REVIEW.md b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/REVIEW.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85dcea79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/REVIEW.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# REVIEW
+
+## Findings
+
+- Root cause confirmed: `CHAIN_OPERATORS` omitted bare `&`, `>`, `<` while execution uses unsandboxed `sh -c`.
+- Fix is minimal and fail-closed; no API surface change.
+- False-positive risk for URL query `&` is accepted and documented (same substring policy as `;` / `|`).
+- Falsifiability: without the new operators, the five injection payloads remain ACCEPT; with them they BLOCK; valid `agent-browser open https://example.com` stays ACCEPT.
+
+## Security review notes
+
+- [x] What security policy changed, and why is it needed? — Expanded chain/redirect operator deny list to close host RCE/file-write via bash-tool skills.
+- [x] Is default behavior more permissive? — No; stricter only.
+- [x] Does this affect `SKILLLITE_*` config semantics or backward compatibility? — No env semantics; previously-accepted unsafe command strings are now rejected.
+- [x] Were tests and EN/ZH docs updated? — Yes.
+
+## Merge readiness: ready to merge after PR CI
diff --git a/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/STATUS.md b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/STATUS.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..61cf3cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/STATUS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# STATUS
+
+## Current status
+
+`done` — fix validated; preparing PR.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- 2026-08-09: Critical bug sweep on `main@12010e8` reproduced bash-tool injection via bare `&` / `>` / `<`.
+- 2026-08-09: Extended `CHAIN_OPERATORS`, added regression tests, updated EN/ZH architecture notes.
+- 2026-08-09: Validation passed (`cargo test -p skilllite-sandbox bash_validator` 25 ok; clippy sandbox clean; `validate_tasks.py` 71 folders).
+
+## Checkpoints
+
+- [x] Concrete PoC: validator accepted injection forms; `sh -c` created `/tmp/pwned_*`
+- [x] Code fix in `bash_validator.rs`
+- [x] Unit tests added
+- [x] Docs EN/ZH updated
+- [x] `cargo test -p skilllite-sandbox bash_validator` — 25 passed
+- [x] `cargo clippy -p skilllite-sandbox --all-targets -- -D warnings` — clean
+- [x] `cargo fmt --check` — clean for changed files / workspace
+- [x] `python3 scripts/validate_tasks.py` — 71 task folders passed
+- [x] PR opened: https://github.com/EXboys/skilllite/pull/137
+
+## Blockers
+
+- None.
+
+## Validation evidence
+
+```text
+$ cargo test -p skilllite-sandbox bash_validator
+running 25 tests
+...
+test result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 61 filtered out
+
+$ cargo clippy -p skilllite-sandbox --all-targets -- -D warnings
+Finished `dev` profile ... 
+
+$ python3 scripts/validate_tasks.py
+Task validation passed (71 task directories checked).
+```
+
+Pre-fix PoC (host):
+
+```text
+ACCEPT agent-browser open ... & touch /tmp/pwned_bg  -> file created
+ACCEPT agent-browser open x&touch /tmp/pwned_tight   -> file created
+ACCEPT agent-browser open x > /tmp/pwned_redir       -> file created
+```
diff --git a/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/TASK.md b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/TASK.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1cc02d01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tasks/TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect/TASK.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# TASK Card
+
+## Metadata
+
+- Task ID: TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect
+- Title: Block bash background and redirect injection
+- Status: `done`
+- Priority: `P0`
+- Owner: automation
+- Contributors: automation
+- Created: 2026-08-09
+- Target milestone: security hotfix
+
+## Problem
+
+`validate_bash_command` blocks `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, and process substitution `>(`, but accepts bare `&`, `>`, and `<`. Bash-tool skills then run the accepted string via unsandboxed `sh -c`, so an LLM (or compromised skill args) can background a second host command or redirect I/O to arbitrary paths.
+
+Concrete trigger:
+
+```text
+agent-browser open https://example.com & touch /tmp/pwned
+agent-browser open x > /tmp/pwned
+```
+
+Both are accepted by the validator on `main@12010e8` and execute the side effect even when `agent-browser` is missing.
+
+## Scope
+
+- In scope:
+  - Extend `CHAIN_OPERATORS` in `skilllite-sandbox` bash validator
+  - Regression tests for `&`, tight `&`, `>`, `<`, `>>`
+  - EN/ZH architecture note for the hardened operator set
+- Out of scope:
+  - Full shell AST parsing / quote-aware validation
+  - Sandboxing bash-tool execution itself
+  - SilentEventSink auto-approve and chat-root workspace split (tracked separately)
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [x] Bare `&`, `>`, and `<` are rejected by `validate_bash_command`
+- [x] Existing chain-operator / blocked-prefix tests still pass
+- [x] New regression tests cover background and redirect forms
+- [x] EN/ZH architecture docs mention the operator set
+- [x] `cargo test -p skilllite-sandbox` passes for validator coverage
+
+## Risks
+
+- Risk: Strict substring blocking of `&` / `>` / `<` rejects URLs or args that contain those characters (including quoted query strings).
+  - Impact: Some previously-accepted bash-tool commands fail validation.
+  - Mitigation: Matches existing substring policy for `;` / `|`; safer fail-closed default for unsandboxed `sh -c`.
+
+## Validation Plan
+
+- Required tests: sandbox bash_validator unit tests (existing + new)
+- Commands to run:
+  - `cargo test -p skilllite-sandbox bash_validator`
+  - `cargo clippy -p skilllite-sandbox --all-targets -- -D warnings`
+  - `cargo fmt --check`
+  - `python3 scripts/validate_tasks.py`
+- Manual checks:
+  - Confirm pre-fix acceptance / post-fix rejection matrix for `&` / `>` / `<`
+
+## Regression Scope
+
+- Areas likely affected: bash-tool skill execution (`skilllite-agent` / `skilllite-commands` execute paths)
+- Explicit non-goals: changing sandbox level defaults; rewriting bash execution to use bwrap
+
+## Links
+
+- Source TODO section: N/A (critical bug automation sweep 2026-08-09)
+- Related PRs/issues: open security backlog #89 / #112 / #123–#136 (different themes)
+- Related docs: `docs/en/ARCHITECTURE.md`, `docs/zh/ARCHITECTURE.md`
diff --git a/tasks/board.md b/tasks/board.md
index 47f785f3..42f2ff06 100644
--- a/tasks/board.md
+++ b/tasks/board.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Task Board
 
-Last updated: 2026-07-06 (TASK-2026-070 critical bug sweep done)
+Last updated: 2026-08-09 (TASK-2026-085 bash validator background/redirect injection done)
 
 ## In Progress
 
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Last updated: 2026-07-06 (TASK-2026-070 critical bug sweep done)
 
 ## Done
 
+- `TASK-2026-085-bash-validator-background-redirect` - Status: `done` - Owner: `automation`
 - `TASK-2026-070-critical-bug-sweep-2026-07-06` - Status: `done` - Owner: `agent`
 - `TASK-2026-069-evolution-workspace-run-scope` - Status: `done` - Owner: `agent`
 - `TASK-2026-068-evolution-workspace-db-scope` - Status: `done` - Owner: `agent`